


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A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS

By PETRUS JOHANNES BLOK, Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF DUTCH HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN

TO BE COMPLETED IN FIVE PARTS.

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IV and V by OSCAR A. BIERSTADT.

**PART I. From the Earliest Times to the Beginning of
the 15th Century.**

**PART II. The Gradual Centralization of Power, and
the Burgundian Period.**

PART III. The War of Independence, 1568-1621.

PART IV. Frederick Henry, John de Witt, William III.

PART V. To be announced later.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE NETHERLANDS

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PETRUS JOHANNES BLOK

Professor of Dutch History in the University of Leyden

PART IV.

FREDERICK HENRY JOHN DE WITT WILLIAM III.

TRANSLATED BY OSCAR A. BIERSTADT

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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PREFACE

THE historian of the "golden age" of the Netherlands has a pleasant task to perform, because the glory of posterity has never risen higher than in this time, especially in the second half of the century. But this task is difficult, for great is the number of the works that have appeared on this attractive epoch, and hard it is to hold fast the thread of the narrative amid the many important events occurring in every department of the national life. The author hopes he has overcome this difficulty without allowing too ample a space to any portion of the history of the people, so far as possible without being swayed by his personal preference for persons and systems.

It would not greatly surprise him, however, if the critics, as has previously happened, were again to complain that in this volume also of the history of the *people* of the Netherlands too much place has perhaps been given to the *political* history of the people. That poor political history! Formerly it was everything, the everywhere recognised mistress; now it is put under a ban and thrown into an obscure corner, and unjustly. It may not be denied that the interest of the public at present is directed more to other expressions of the life of the people, but this does not signify that those other expressions of old took a so much more considerable place in the popular life itself, in the daily thoughts of the nation. Any one acquainted with the most-read pamphlets of

the seventeenth century will readily acknowledge that the political events at home and abroad occupied a very notable space in the life and thought of the people, in close connection with their hope and fear, with differences of opinion in religious matters, and with the changes of material prosperity. It would be wrong to attribute too great an influence to a temporary phenomenon, to interest in material questions, in treating the history of the people in general, just as it would be a wrong view to pay attention chiefly to the vicissitudes of working men who now rejoice in great importance. The author believes he has been faithful to the principles developed by him in the introduction to his first volume, according to which he assigns to the political history the eminent place belonging to it in the life of the people, without forgetting that it does not alone constitute the history of the people, but that a larger space must be granted to other utterances of the popular life than was formerly the case in general historical works. Opinions may differ as to how ample this space should be. The extent of its demands depends often upon personal political views. No difference of ideas can exist with regard to the subject itself, if one is only guided by the requirements of a purely scientific consideration, not by the political or social opinion of the day.

The author hopes some years longer to continue working upon the task set for himself and to bring it to an end, encouraged by the great interest and coöperation which he has so far encountered with gratitude.

P. J. B.

LEYDEN, September 26, 1901.



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HISTORY OF THE DUTCH PEOPLE

CHAPTER I

THE FIRST YEARS AFTER THE TRUCE

HOW little power the new government possessed was manifest both in foreign and domestic affairs during the first years after the renewal of the war. Relations with France, England, Sweden, Denmark, the German princes, and the Hanse towns were anything but satisfactory. The United Netherlands, honoured and feared under Oldenbarnevelt's sway by all Europe, were still desired as an ally and respected as an enemy on account of their 50,000 disciplined troops and 100 war ships, but these advantages were not boldly used. The prince and his advisers did not show themselves equal to their task.

The Huguenots of La Rochelle begged the help of the States against their government, but although Maurice and the preachers sympathised with them, their emissaries were not publicly received in the States-General, and assistance was neither given nor positively refused them. The tone of Maurice and Du Maurier in their interviews on the relation of the States to France remained sharp and unfriendly, and the remembrance of Oldenbarnevelt raised an insuperable barrier between them, but hostility did not go beyond bitter words and

mutual complaints. Cause enough for such complaints was given by the French government, particularly on the occasion of De Groot's escape from Loevestein. The brave and faithful wife of the imprisoned pensionary neglected nothing in order to obtain from the States the liberation of her husband. Failing in this, she had recourse to another way, and on March 22, 1621, succeeded in getting her husband out of his prison, as is well known, in a chest used for conveying books. The one woman was a match for a thousand men. The escaped prisoner did not stop in the Southern Netherlands, where he would have been received with open arms, but hastened to Paris. Here he met with a cordial reception, and was entertained by the best society as a man of uncommon importance and a celebrated scholar. The king granted him a yearly pension of 3600 livres and took him under his patronage, when the Estates of Holland, indignant at the publication "with privilege of the king" of the masterly *Justification of the Lawful Government of Holland and West Friesland*, strictly prohibited this book and proscribed its author. The work, translated into Latin, French, and German, placed in the clearest light before all Europe the culpable action taken against the fallen party. It was an arraignment of the victors of 1618 and 1619, and did more than any other writing to confirm an unfavourable opinion of their conduct towards Oldenbarnevelt and his followers. On this account it imbittered De Groot's enemies and made his return to the fatherland impossible. This book and his letters found their way into the United Netherlands with the help of Du Maurier, but the States did not venture to complain of this any more than of the protection bestowed in France on many other fugitive Remonstrants, as Uyttenbogaert and Episcopius. The fear of the enmity of France kept them also from complaining of their merchants' troubles in France and of the plans

there formed against the interests of the East India Company.

Weak was the attitude towards England, which took a high stand on account of Coen's treatment of the English in India, and repeatedly threatened to capture the returning East Indiamen. An effort was made not to anger Sweden by too close an alliance with Denmark, and at the same time Denmark was kept as friendly as possible. The same feeble policy was adopted towards the German cities and princes. There was giving and promising on one side, taking and refusing on the other, and so nobody was really satisfied.

The war was waged also in listless fashion. When Spinola laid siege to Jülich, relief was so slow in coming that its commander, Pithan, had to surrender in February, 1622. Prince Maurice took the field but remained inactive. It seemed as if there was a disposition to prolong the Truce upon any favourable terms, in accordance with Oldenbarnevelt's policy, and the partisans of peace took heart in south and north. The death of both the king of Spain and Archduke Albert in 1621 impeded the enemy's plans.

Unconquerable energy was shown by the merchants, however, who went on developing the world's commerce, although the war now compelled them again to arm themselves against the enemy and to send their ships to sea well equipped for action. Beside the East India Company a West India Company came into existence by charter of June 3, 1621. Both corporations were not simply commercial associations, but political institutions as well, designed not alone for gain, but also to injure the enemy and to stop the source of his power.¹

Such an institution was the West India Company from its beginning. The indefatigable Usselincx, himself a stern Calvinist and enemy of all "heretics and erring

¹ Van Rees, *Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland*, ii., p. 122.

spirits," saw more chance for his projects after Oldenbarnevelt's fall, and in the autumn of 1618 he returned from Zealand, whither he had fled to escape his creditors, to Holland in order to act as adviser to the Estates of that province and the States-General in the matter of the new company and its charter. He could not even now carry out all his ideas. He desired a limitation of the power of the directors over the shareholders, better and more complete accounts, the planting of colonies of free-men closely bound to the mother country, the promotion of civilisation and Christianity among the natives, and especially a regular supervision by the state of the doings of the merchants "who have gain for their north star and greed for a compass, and who would believe the ship was keeping to its right course, if it were almost wrecked by profit." Little heed was given his grievances, and the company was modelled after the East India Company, though indeed the "participants" in the new association had rather more to say, and the state possessed more influence through its deputies in the governing board of the Nineteen and through its approval required for war-like operations. The company obtained a monopoly for the western coast of Africa as far as the Cape, and for America and the islands east of New Guinea during a period of twenty-four years.

It is plain from the entire organisation of the company that it was formed for spoils and privateering. At first subscriptions, open to any one within or without the United Netherlands, did not come in very fast, since the shareholders of the East India Company, the model for the new company, were far from satisfied with the working of their charter. The States-General made every effort to promote subscriptions and changed the charter so as to give more influence to the stockholders; the East India Company, about to have its patent renewed, was compelled to subscribe one million guilders; pam-

phlets were put out in support of the affair. By the summer of 1623 seven millions were at last raised.

Disapproving of the scheme as settled upon, Usselincx would have nothing more to do with the business, to which he had devoted his life and fortune, and he now entered the service of Sweden in the hope of realising there his great plans. He secured from Gustavus Adolphus the charter for a company constituted according to his notions, but it never came into being owing to want of funds and the circumstances of Sweden after the king's death in 1632. Discouraged, he returned finally to his fatherland, where, at over eighty years of age, he died poor and forgotten about the middle of the century, persisting until his last days in writing and speaking for his cherished ideas, the accomplishment of which was contrary to the spirit of his time.

The formation of the new company was viewed with displeasure in England, as the scene of its activity was to be in the very regions recommended by Raleigh and his friends to the English merchants and already visited by them. King James was always complaining of the harm done to English interests in the East Indies by Coen and his followers who, despite the treaty of union, continued as much as possible to keep the English out of affairs in the Archipelago. There was mutual distrust, quarrelling everywhere between officials on both sides, a seemingly endless strife. Meanwhile Coen went energetically to work. Energy was necessary in the Indies of those days. The uncivilised natives of the Indian isles, exasperated by the unbridled avarice of the Netherlanders, English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, hunted down like wild beasts, robbed of their possessions, and driven from their homes, revenged themselves upon their oppressors whenever they could. How Coen and his men considered and treated the natives is horribly evident from his relation¹

¹ Tiele, *Bouwstoffen*, i., p. 272.

of the conquest of the Banda Islands in 1621, a story of death and destruction surpassing in cold-blooded cruelty anything of the kind. With the exception of the small Pularoon, on account of the disputes with the English about its possession, all of the inhabited islands were laid waste; thousands of the population were killed or starved to death; and the survivors—some eight hundred men, women, and children—were transported to Batavia, where the poor unfortunates perished in misery. This group of islands had to be repopled—a fearful testimony to the methods of the Netherlanders in securing commerce and supremacy in the Indies.

The picture Coen himself gives of the "bad life" of the Netherlanders around him, of their drunkenness, immorality, and greed, shows us how great was the need of an iron hand like his to rule over these rough men. And the women sent out to the Indies by the company in the beginning, the "scum of the land," were not much better than the men. Unquestionably many noble deeds were done by the Netherlanders in India during these years; heroic was often the conduct of those carrying the company's flag over the Indian lands and seas; admirable talent was exhibited in managing the affairs of the company; but the dark side of it all must be indicated, and it should not be forgotten that, in accomplishing so much worthy of praise, much occurred which cannot bear the light of to-day. Coen's own doings prove that a great man in a time of blood and iron may go beyond what is allowable. No brave acts, no ability in governing and waging war, no brilliant success can quite atone for the cruelty inflicted upon the unfortunate natives of the Banda Islands. Where the governor-general acted thus, his subordinates naturally followed his example. The English did likewise upon occasion, and it is not surprising that the differences between the two nations often assumed in these remote regions a character recalling the

most barbarous times, when the question of right was simply one of might, when the worst sides of human nature were openly displayed.

These things were differently regarded in Europe than in India, particularly by the weaker party, in this case the English. At the request of King James a new embassy from the Netherlands appeared in England at the end of 1621. Sommelsdijk against his wishes was appointed head of it. The tone of the discussions was anything but mild. The king in the earliest interviews made the most odious remarks about the Dutch merchants and fishermen, "bloodsuckers of my kingdom," as he called them. There was negotiation and wrangling for more than a year, until an agreement was reached concerning Indian affairs. Peace was now hoped for in these quarters, and a considerable indemnity was granted to the English for their losses.

The war with Spain became more serious in the second year. With the support of the States the expelled Bohemian king kept one army in the Palatinate under the Count of Mansfeld and another in Westphalia under Duke Christian of Brunswick. The king soon went to the Palatinate for a last attempt to recover his hereditary land. But this attempt failed also, and the unfortunate prince disbanded all his troops. The armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick, thus made independent and still numbering 25,000 men, threatened to move into France to aid the Huguenots. The States and the prince succeeded by the promise of subsidies in persuading Mansfeld to turn to the Netherlands and to act with their army in opposing Spinola's designs.

The plans of the Spanish general had begun to excite alarm in the border provinces of the States. These plans resulted from the changed condition of the Spanish monarchy and the southern provinces after the deaths of Philip III. and the archduke. The world-monarchy of

Spain, no longer what it was in the early time of Philip II. and having constantly fallen lower under Philip III., appeared once more under the latter's son, Philip IV., with the pretensions of the greatest of European powers, and, as leader of the Catholic reaction, it exerted all its strength in the European complications. In place of the insignificant Lerma the young king had confided the management of affairs to Don Gaspar de Guzman, Count de Olivares, an able statesman, whose dearest wish was to bring Spain back to the policy of Philip II., and to have her closely allied with the German Hapsburgs and the papal see. Although weaker than formerly, Spain could still give her antagonists enough to do. This policy required a more intimate union between Spain and the different portions of the monarchy, including the loyal Netherlands. Archduchess Isabella, now a childless widow, showed no inclination to make her territory into a separate realm; she contented herself with the office of governess of the land; and she consented to have the States of the various provinces take the oath of allegiance to her nephew, Philip IV., as duke and count, this actually occurring in 1623.¹ The war was now to be continued from Spain. Spinola received his orders and the financial means to execute them.

A short raid by Prince Frederick Henry, who with his cavalry laid the Brabant country as far as the gates of Brussels, Mechlin, and Louvain under contribution in the spring, excited dismay in the south, but Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelderland were so open to the enemy that tribute had to be paid him in various districts, and on all sides reports were rife of a secret understanding of some Catholic noblemen and peasants with the Spaniard. There were also complaints of excessive taxation, of Holland's predominance, and harmony in the north left

¹ Waddington, *La République des Provinces Unies* (Paris, 1895), i., p.

much to be desired, all the more so because the prince, suffering from a severe disease of the liver, could display but slight vigour.

Suddenly Spinola laid siege in July to the important fortress of Bergen op Zoom, but it held out well and blocked the "Spanish hosts." Fortunately Mansfeld's army, early in September, had penetrated to Tilburg, and the prince was able to approach the endangered fortress, so that Spinola had to raise the siege, which had lasted three months, and to quit the neighbourhood of the city so valiantly defended by its governor, Ryhove, to the great joy of the whole country. This success was of benefit to Zealand and Holland and inspired a song of triumph by Starter. It was now hoped that King James would earnestly adopt his son-in-law's cause and take Mansfeld into his service, but this did not happen. The States also were not anxious to keep the German general's force through the winter and sent it into East Friesland, whose count urged the evacuation of his fortresses, but now saw his land overrun by Mansfeld's wild bands. For more than half a year Mansfeld's troops levied tribute upon the little country and Oldenburg, and the count of East Friesland, almost a prisoner in one of his castles,¹ considered it lucky that the garrisons of the States protected his chief fortified places. Mansfeld refused to leave until 300,000 guilders had been given him to pay his debts. In the autumn the States loaned this sum to the Estates of East Friesland in return for a bond signed by the latter and making the country dependent upon the United Netherlands.

An attempt by Maurice in December to capture Antwerp by surprise failed on account of the weather. The Netherlands were little satisfied with the weak attitude of the prince, who was known to be secretly negotiating with the enemy, Juffer Tserclaes constantly travelling

¹ Aitzema, i., p. 131.

between The Hague and Brussels and hoping that Spanish offers would win him over to favour peace. Abroad also there were complaints of his inactivity and of the slight vigour displayed in foreign affairs by the United Netherlands since Oldenbarnevelt's fall. This general discontent with Maurice was somewhat allayed by the discovery of a shameful plot against his life. Some persecuted Remonstrant preachers, rural functionaries, and private individuals with the financial aid of Oldenbarnevelt's sons and his nephew, Van der Dussen, formed a plan to put the prince out of the way by hiring unscrupulous sailors to murder him during one of his regular visits to his mistress at Ryswick. These seamen, mistrusting the business which had only been obscurely proposed to them as something for the welfare of the country, went to the prince for further information and thus revealed the plot in January. Search was at once made for the conspirators. Most of them were arrested. A few, including Stoutenburg and Van der Dussen, escaped and sought the protection of the archduchess. Fifteen, among whom were Reinier van Groenevelt, Oldenbarnevelt's eldest son, and Slatius, the Remonstrant pamphleteer, lost their lives upon the scaffold, suffering a righteous punishment for their criminal attempt. Groenevelt could not be saved, though he showed repentance and his proud mother begged for his life.

Maurice seems to have felt increasing dejection at the slow course of affairs, and he longed for rest and peace. The efforts made anew from the southern provinces to bring him to serious negotiations for a truce found him less unwilling than before, partly because Holland also was complaining loudly of the burdens of the war. In the spring of 1623 a secret emissary from Brabant, Van Petersom, appeared repeatedly at The Hague with the commission to open negotiations, and he was not immedi-

ately repulsed. It was plain enough that without allies the war would, in the long run, be too much of an undertaking for the States, an old truth confirmed again by facts and calling attention—as in the days of Prince William—to France and England, the only allies worthy of earnest consideration, and yet offering scanty hopes.

England was less than ever to be depended upon, now the old king seemed about to attain his long-cherished purpose, and his son Charles, having departed for Madrid, was received so cordially at the Spanish court that his marriage to a Spanish infanta looked settled. The attitude of England towards the Netherlands, moreover, had always been so ambiguous that no close alliance was thought of between them. This was rather to be expected with France. The possibility that England, by a league with Spain, might either obtain the Netherlands or help put the hereditary enemy in possession of them appeared so threatening to France that the French government, immediately after the report of Charles's success¹ at Madrid, reverted to the policy of Henry IV. and promised a renewal of subsidies to the States, if they would cease negotiating with Spain for a new truce and would not support the Huguenots or rebellious noblemen in France.

It was resolved in the Netherlands to send an embassy to France. A better understanding thus prepared with France caused a renewal of the old alliance to be expected shortly, although the friend of the States for many years, Jeannin, had died in 1622. It was apparent that the French administration was inspired with a new spirit. Cardinal de Richelieu, the greatest political genius of the seventeenth century, entered the royal council in April, 1624, and soon ruled the course of affairs in France. His domestic policy sought to uphold the king's power, his foreign policy aimed at the humiliation of the house

¹ Ranke, *Franz. Gesch.*, ii., p. 200.

of Austria, of Spain. A more vigorous policy was now to be looked for from France towards the United Netherlands. The renewal of the former friendly relations between the two governments had to be arranged. This task could scarcely be intrusted to Du Maurier, for he was not on good terms with Prince Maurice and the statesmen surrounding him. The ambassador understood this himself, and before he was "thrown out of the window," he sent in his resignation which was at once accepted. In April, 1624, he left the provinces never to return. He was replaced by the Catholic d'Espece, an agent of the new policy that was to make France under Richelieu's guidance play so great a part in Europe.

The condition of the United Provinces was still far from brilliant in 1624. The eastern sections, menaced on one side by the Spanish garrisons and Tilly's victorious troops, ravaged on the other by the fierce bands of Brunswick and Mansfeld and by undisciplined Italian deserters from the Spaniards, were unfortunate enough. The Veluwe, Drenthe, and Overijssel were laid under contribution in February by Spanish forces. Floods, snow, and frost did uncommon damage in the country. Few were the gleams of light also in European politics. Although the English marriage at Madrid was broken off before the autumn, England continued unfriendly towards the States, which did their best to keep James in good humour by acceding to his demands. Coen's return from India to the fatherland offered some opportunity for a better understanding.

The disappointment of the English government at the failure of the Spanish matrimonial plans was so great that it soon showed a more friendly countenance to the Netherlands. Carleton, still representing his government in the Netherlands, had a very serious talk with the prince about the causes of the mutual estrangement during recent years. Shortly afterwards Sommelsdijk and

Joachimi went to England¹ at the request of the English administration, and in July, 1624, a treaty was arranged, by which England agreed, as in 1585, to assist the United Netherlands with 6000 men, while the money expended was to be paid back on the conclusion of peace or a long truce, although no cautionary towns were to be placed in English hands. About the same time an embassy to France made a treaty of subsidy for three years at Compiègne with Louis XIII., the treaty like that of 1608 promising reciprocal aid in case of war, and the States agreeing to conclude no peace or truce without the king's intervention. The subsidy was to be 1,200,000 livres for the first year, 1,000,000 for the two following years, and the provinces were to repay the money within three years after the making of peace or truce. The States in case of war were to help France with the half of this amount or with troops and war-ships, whenever their situation allowed. Commercial dissensions were settled as well as possible. This was a plain indication of the course France intended to follow.

The summer of 1624 thus brought a fine chance of improving matters. France and England again stood towards the States in the same relation as before the Truce, and the friendship between these two powers seemed lastingly confirmed, when the Prince of Wales, the later Charles I., married Henrietta Maria, the French king's sister. So close appeared the bond connecting the two powers and the United Netherlands that even the quarrels between English and Netherlanders in India, the news of which just reached Europe before the conclusion of the treaties of alliance, could not disturb the harmony for the time being. There was hope of a renewal of the Triple Alliance of 1596. If this came about, Spain's misfortune was boundless, the freedom of

¹ Arend, Van Rees, and Brill, iii., 4, 10.

the United Netherlands an accomplished fact, the conquest of the south probable.

The dissensions with England were serious enough. In February, 1623, there was discovered upon Ambon a conspiracy of the English settled there and some Japanese to take possession of the fort. The governor of the Moluccas, Henry van Speult, by means of torture, obtained first from a few Japanese, then from some of the Englishmen, confessions which appeared to place the affair beyond doubt, although objection might well be made to the regularity of his method of procedure. Governor and council condemned the guilty men to death, and the sentence was immediately carried out upon twenty, half of them being Englishmen and including Towerson, the agent at Ambon, and several merchants and officials of the English company. Only two of the condemned Englishmen were spared to look after the property of their company, and later received pardon at Batavia.¹ This trial, as soon as it was heard of in England, aroused the most violent indignation, and the governor-general and directors of the Dutch East India Company also regarded Van Speult's action, though not illegal, as very imprudent on account of his harshness and irregularities. Carleton protested strenuously in August against the treatment inflicted upon English subjects and opposed the sending out again of Coen, the mortal enemy of the English, as governor-general. He demanded an investigation by the States-General, punishment of the Dutch officials, compensation for the damages done the English company, and permission in accordance with the treaty of 1619 to build forts in the Moluccas. His tone was so sharp that the States-General requested him to moderate it. A vehement pamphlet against the English on the affair awakened more bad feelings on both sides. There was again talk of

¹ De Jonge, *Opkomst*, v., p. v.

England making reprisals on the returning East India-men. At last the States-General were obliged to summon Van Speult and the other judges home to give an account of their conduct. Furthermore they did their best to meet the wishes of the English with regard to the general situation in India.

Coen was meanwhile engaged in persuading the directors to adopt the measures recommended by him for India. He wanted economy and better government, encouragement of the immigration of Europeans, development of commerce with China, promotion of free trade and free cultivation of land and products. These principles conflicted with the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by the company, but Coen's knowledge of Indian affairs and his persuasive eloquence so influenced the directors that before the end of 1623 a beginning was made with the introduction of a system which was to establish Indian commerce upon other foundations. Naturally Coen was desired to execute his own ideas, and the office of governor-general was again offered to him in October, 1624. He wished for delay in order to be married, then sickness detained him further, giving Carleton an opportunity to protest against his appointment, so that the directors held him back, when he was ready to embark in the spring of 1625, and the States-General forbade his departure from fear of complications with England. The champions of monopoly seized the chance to thwart Coen's plans. Supported by the States-General and Carleton, they succeeded in winning over the not very zealous directors to let the scheme rest for a time, and when Coen in 1627 finally set out, he was half a year later prohibited from doing anything about free trade as proposed. This deprived the energetic governor of the opportunity of reforming the management in the Indies according to his ideas and therefore played into the hands of the English.

In the summer of 1624 the chance of success in war seemed not unfavourable for the United Netherlands. With England and France in close friendship, with Venice and Savoy, Denmark and Prince Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania in alliance, themselves equipped with a large army and fleet, while Mansfeld with French and English help prepared to renew the war in Bohemia and the Palatinate and Christian of Brunswick was ready to try his luck again, the States-General appeared in a condition not only to defend their own territory but also to act offensively as in Maurice's best years. The news from the West Indies, where Admiral Willekens and his valiant vice-admiral, Piet Heyn, in the service of the new company took possession of San Salvador in Brazil, sounded promising. From the East Indies came reports of the increasing power of the Netherlanders in the Archipelago.

But Spain also was strongly armed and in good spirits after the discomfiture of the armies of the Protestant princes in Germany. Spinola was stationed with a considerable force in Brabant and menaced the frontiers of the States. Moreover, the prince was not the same man as of old and was now more averse than ever to offensive operations in the open field, this feeling being shared by the army. There began to be doubts of the courage of the commanders, and they were suspected of an inclination quietly to enjoy their good pay, of a distaste for war after the delights of the Truce, which had indeed caused the soldiery to degenerate not a little. The troops of the States remained inactive, until Spinola in August, with 18,000 men, laid siege to Breda, which had been strongly fortified by Maurice and was regarded as a model fortress and a sort of military academy.¹ The old and experienced Justin of Nassau was governor there at the head of a garrison of nearly 3000 men with 1800

¹ Aitzema, i., p. 324.

armed citizens. The prince really took the field at this report, but now also not much was accomplished, although he had almost 30,000 men and 200 pieces of ordnance.¹ The army, gathered near Nimwegen, soon moved across the rivers apparently to relieve Breda, but in fact to support a new attack upon Antwerp, where there was only a small garrison. Repeated attempts to surprise the place failed, and the prince finally confined himself to harassing Spinola in the neighbourhood of Breda in order to force him to break off the siege. The city itself seemed well enough supplied with troops, artillery, and provisions to resist the enemy for a long time. But Spinola drew close around Breda, could not be enticed from his positions, and so strengthened himself by inundations and earthworks or forts that the prince's measures to drive him away had little result. Then the prince in the middle of November returned to The Hague, peevish and discouraged, suffering severely from the disease of the liver which had so long been undermining his constitution, leaving the command of the troops to his brother and Count Ernest Casimir. So came the spring of 1625. The troops of the States had much sickness on account of the continuous rains and were impeded by storms in their efforts at relief. Mansfeld's arrival from England with nearly 20,000 men brought no change, for the prince's illness gradually grew worse and paralysed all action on the side of the States.

At the end of March, 1625, this sickness became so serious that the prince, more and more emaciated and feeble, feeling his end approach, and wishing to assure the future of the state, summoned his brother from the camp to The Hague. He advised this brother, who was over forty years old and still unmarried, in the interest of the country and his family, to marry as speedily as

¹ Van der Capellen, i., p. 312.

possible. Before the end of the month Frederick Henry yielded to the desire of his dying brother and offered his hand to his cousin, Countess Amalia of Solms-Braunfels, twenty-eight years of age and a lady of the court of the queen of Bohemia. The marriage took place in great haste on April 4th. Frederick Henry, made captain-general by Maurice with the authorisation of the States, departed for the camp again a week later, leaving his brother in a deplorable condition, but unable to tarry longer on account of the circumstances.

The sick man died on the 23d, attended in his last days by the preacher Bogerman.¹ His deathbed was surrounded by only a few persons, among them being his beloved sister Emilia, the wife of Prince Emanuel of Portugal, some members of the States-General, the councillor Vosbergen, and the chief officers of his court. He died, as he had lived, a simple, courageous, honest, faithful, Christian soldier, not fearing death, but preparing to pass away, and until his last hours looking after the interests of the state, whose head he was, and of the war, which he had directed during forty years. His body was not laid to rest at Delft until September 20th.

The last years of the great general had not been fortunate. The victory, won in 1618 and 1619 under his guidance by a strong party over its political opponents, had unquestionably brought him almost monarchical power in the state, but his clear understanding must quickly have seen that this great power was of importance to one so averse to affairs of state as he was only so far as he was aided by capable servants, and that there was a sad want of them. As long as peace continued, this was not so apparent; but when the war broke out again in 1621, the unsatisfactory state of things became evident. Disappointed now that matters did not go to his liking, unlucky

¹ Aitzema, i., p. 376.

in his enterprises, worn out by illness, he saw finally his popularity decline and his star setting amid general uncertainty.

During years he had a liaison with Margaret of Mechlin, a former lady of the court of Princess Louise, and by her he had two sons, William and Louis, whose names became favourably known and were mentioned in his will. Two other sons and three daughters he regarded as illegitimate. The irregular life¹ of the great general is not the darkest stain upon his memory. Far more injurious to his reputation was his cruelty towards Oldenbarnevelt, a moral and political mistake which had the most fearful consequences for his house and country. Even his inestimable services to the land and the fame of his military operations cannot efface this stain, cannot stop "the springs of this murder," as Vondel sings, and posterity remembers mournfully how two great minds, whose coöperation had once wrought so much good, were separated at the end of life by bitter enmity. But posterity at the same time honours in Maurice the great soldier, the excellent mathematician, the talented creator of the army which became in his and his brother's hands the efficient instrument for assuring the independence of the Netherlands first achieved by their father.

¹ Van de Kemp, *Maurits van Nassau*, iv., p. 165, 171, 394, 400.





CHAPTER II

FREDERICK HENRY'S BEGINNING

THE way in which Prince Maurice had ruled the country of late years and the great power allowed him without opposition by the States had disaffected many and made them fear for the permanence of the existing government. This feeling was not improved by the slight successes of the war, and we find traces of a desire to limit the might of his successor and thus to find a remedy for the threatening greatness of the Oranges.¹ It was done neither in Holland, nor in the other provinces, where Prince Frederick Henry became stadtholder. Holland immediately chose the prince in his brother's place and soon persuaded Zealand to do the same. The commission of Holland to the prince, dated May 24, 1625, is simply a copy of that of 1585 to Maurice, but it speaks of the "Lords States," by whose opinion or by the advice of whose committees he was now to be bound. Of any further limiting instruction, such as Maurice had had, there is no mention in the appointment of Frederick Henry owing to the extension of the stadtholder's influence in recent years. In Groningen and Drenthe the Frisian stadtholder, Ernest Casimir, was elected in the place of Maurice, probably by previous arrangement between him and Frederick Henry. The States-General, in accordance with their promise to the dying Maurice, had made his

¹ Van der Capellen, i., p. 349 ; Aitzema, i., p. 384.

brother captain and admiral-general at once, and without first consulting the separate provinces, which rightly caused some dissatisfaction; but the arbitrary action was accepted under the circumstances and with the army in the field.

The new "dominant personage" differed in many respects from his predecessor. Frederick Henry, inheriting diplomatic talent from his father, and courteous manners from both mother and father, had learned much about war from his brother, of whom he was a great admirer. From the campaign of 1600 he was fully initiated into the great general's military plans and ideas, and had been formed entirely in his school. Carefully educated under his excellent mother's guidance and by the intelligent Uytenbogaert, he had broader views than his brother, and an eye for other than military affairs. His intellectual culture was not so exceptional as some of his panegyrists would have us believe, but he manifested interest in art and literature, so far as the camp and politics allowed him time. We possess military memoirs planned and revised by him, if not written by his hand. Cautious and slow in carrying out his projects—"I must sleep over it," he was accustomed to say—he was mild in his judgment of others, without the passion of party, noble toward his enemies, generous toward those he deemed worthy of his friendship and confidence. His diplomatic utterances and art of concealing his true meaning sometimes conveyed the impression of hypocrisy. His wife was a gifted woman, although she cannot be exonerated from a love of power and pelf, from a certain inclination to intrigue. The birth, on May 26, 1626, of their son, who was to bear the name of William, was celebrated as an event of national importance, and Vondel's *Geboortclock* of the young prince seemed to ring out over the cradle of a royal child. Both had a taste for outward splendour, for a brilliant court. Their environment showed a great difference from the

simple state maintained by Maurice. Visited by young French noblemen and by the sons of German princes, their court was soon *l'une des plus polies* of the time, and the palaces built or beautified by them could bear comparison with the abodes of sovereigns elsewhere. But this princely pomp, unusual in Holland, was not openly displayed until some years later, after the prince had won fame and wealth by his glorious campaigns and sieges.

The beginning of his stadtholdership was not so brilliant. The large army designed for the relief of besieged Breda failed to drive the strongly intrenched Spinola away and had soon to withdraw, while Mansfeld's weakened forces encamped in the territory of Jülich. Breda was forced to capitulate in May, 1625, its garrison marching out with the honours of war. The sensation produced by the loss of the important fortress was profound, as is manifest in contemporary pamphlets and other writings. There was some thought of an agreement with Spain, and the prince appeared not averse to it.

Hope for the future was raised by the death of King James, who expired some days before Maurice and was succeeded by Spain's bitter enemy, Charles I. An extraordinary embassy on the occasion of the departure of the ambassador of the States, Joachimi, Caron's successor, was intended to induce England to engage in a common war. Sommelsdijk, still at the head of foreign affairs, managed negotiations and with Buckingham brought about before autumn an offensive and defensive alliance, the commercial dissensions being thrust aside. Buckingham soon appeared at The Hague to broaden the alliance into a great European league against Spain and the emperor, in which France, Denmark, Sweden, Venice, Savoy, the German Protestant princes, and Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania were to take part. A beginning was made in these plans with Denmark, which was supported in its war

against the emperor by subsidies from England and the States and by a fleet. But Charles's want of money, his trouble with Parliament and the nation, and the unreliability of his advisers turned great expectations into disappointment.

More was to be looked for from France under the powerful Richelieu, now inclined to help the Netherlands against Spain. Frederick Henry and Sommelsdijk set their hopes on this country. During 1625 a close alliance with France was prepared by aiding the contest of its government against the Huguenots of La Rochelle. Maurice had reluctantly agreed to France's desire to borrow or buy twelve Dutch ships, while twenty others under Haultain, destined to fight the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, might first be employed against La Rochelle. Haultain was actually left before the harbour of the Huguenots, and in November Sommelsdijk himself went to Paris to bring this delicate matter to a happy ending. Just then Haultain received orders to return to the Flemish coast on account of the condition of his ships. The States were rejoiced to find a reason for stopping the unpopular action of the fleet against the Huguenots. Besides arranging affairs with the Huguenots, Sommelsdijk had also to persuade France to join the great alliance. Richelieu seemed not unwilling, if the Huguenots would submit. The mediation of Sommelsdijk and the English envoys aided not a little to induce the Huguenots of La Rochelle in February, 1626, to conclude a disadvantageous treaty with their king. Now the way was open for France to enter the league against the house of Hapsburg. But Richelieu showed slight desire to engage in a great European war and negotiated secretly with Spain until a pacific agreement was speedily reached. An alliance between France and the Netherlands soon appeared impossible, and Sommelsdijk left Paris in April without attaining his object. The Huguenots had been sacrificed without receiving the price

hoped for, and Sommelsdijk had been overreached by the crafty cardinal.

The alliance with England also did not answer expectation. The king of England had formed it more from personal enmity to Spain than from political considerations, and Parliament was not disposed by strong financial support to make the war really possible. Money could only be secured for it with difficulty, not even by pledging the jewels of the royal family, upon which Buckingham was unable to get a loan at Amsterdam. Under the circumstances, England's part in the war was limited chiefly to privateering upon not very extensive a scale. All efforts to obtain money failed. The English people would have nothing to do with the frivolous Buckingham and his policy. A combined expedition of English and Dutch ships to the Spanish coast, undertaken in the fall to intercept the Spanish silver fleet from the West Indies, did not accomplish its purpose; an attack upon Cadiz was a complete failure; and a new Netherlandish fleet was very slowly equipped in the spring of 1626 owing to lack of money, bad management, and domestic discord. In Friesland dissensions prevented the regular collection of the taxes, and Zealand declared its inability to pay the excessive imposts. The suspension of revenue from these two provinces naturally had a bad effect upon the progress of the war both by sea and by land.

In 1626, as in 1625, little of importance was accomplished on either side. Spain and the archduchess also had to contend with want of money, and the war in Germany so held their attention that there was no thought of great operations in the Netherlands after the siege of Breda. The enemy was content with laying the Betuwe under contribution. In the summer the army of the States took the field, and Count Ernest Casimir got possession of Oldenzaal after a short siege. The prince failed in an attack on the district of Waes, and later some

marching to and fro on the Rhine ended the campaign in anything but a brilliant fashion.

There was much talk of secret negotiations, of a possible renewal of the Truce. The prince was supposed to desire peace, while it was known that the archduchess would not be in the least averse to it, and that only Spain's refusal to recognise the independence of the north remained the great obstacle. Nothing was effected beyond a liberal exchange of prisoners, which gave opportunity for mutual courtesies.

The successes won by the imperial arms against Denmark made the States fear for their eastern frontiers, when the Protestant cause seemed lost after the defeats of Mansfeld at Dessau and of King Christian IV. at Lutter, and after the death of Prince Christian of Brunswick. Northern Germany lay open to the imperial forces, and at any moment Tilly or Wallenstein was expected to move towards the Netherlands. Friesland and Groningen urgently demanded protection by more troops. Spinola's activity in Flanders, where he began threatening Sluis, and the boldness of the Dunkirk privateers caused uneasiness also in Zeeland. This made the border provinces more than ever disposed to keep their engagements and regularly to pay up their contributions, which brought some improvement in the prospect for the following year.

While foreign affairs thus took a critical turn, it was anything but quiet in the country itself. The Remonstrants placed all their hopes upon Frederick Henry. Knowing his slight sympathy for the other party, they expected everything from him after his advancement, while their opponents were far from assured about his intentions with regard to religion. But the cautious prince was too much of a statesman to lend himself to thorough measures in favour of the weaker party, knowing well that he would thereby rouse the opposition of the

preachers and people, and would make the recently ended contest break out again. The discord, which had torn the state so terribly during the Truce, would in time of war do more than anything else to favour the enemy's plans. His policy was to gain time, slowly to secure acceptance for the idea of mutual toleration, and meanwhile not to change existing conditions. Of course the Remonstrants were disappointed by this attitude of the prince. Their chiefs, including still Uyttenbogaert and De Groot, sharply expressed themselves concerning his "politic" reserve and "fair words."

The prince, however, advanced slowly but surely towards his object. Everywhere he supported the moderate elements, suppressed the zealots, and promoted conciliation, undisturbed by reproaches from one side or the other. Through his friend Van der Myle he kept in touch with the leaders of the Remonstrants and often calmed and moderated them. The fate of the Remonstrants quickly improved after his accession. At Rotterdam, Gouda, Alkmaar, and Hoorn, where they were still numerous, and at other places also the edicts against their conventicles, though not abrogated, were regarded as antiquated and treated as a dead letter. Even in Amsterdam this course was adopted to the great vexation of some of the ministers who thundered from the pulpits against the cursed adherents of Arminius and complained in pamphlets about the "exorbitancies" of their adversaries. The policy of the States toward the Huguenots came in for reprehension. Was it not a shame to help put down these poor fellow-believers by force of arms? Were they not bringing down the anger of heaven upon themselves by aiding the "papist" in the destruction of the "true religion"? The French minister Doucher at Amsterdam preached a violent sermon against the moderate magistrates of the city, several editions of it reaching the people. The synods of North and South Holland sent

to the States a remonstrance "concerning the great insolence of the Arminians." Grevinchoven, Uyttenbogaert, Paschier de Fijne, and other Remonstrants did not lag behind with answers to these attacks. Joost van Vondel's *Palamedes*, in which political allusions to circumstances of the time were rightly discovered, excited violent indignation and led to persecution of the poet. Coster's *Iphigenia* with its sharp assault upon "foolish popery" awakened new interest. Vondel's satires angered the opposite party more than ever. The tumult against the Remonstrants at Amsterdam in 1626 showed how serious the movement threatened to become, how the populace might be stirred up by vehement words from the preachers and by the growing boldness of the Remonstrants. But Frederick Henry adhered firmly to his conciliatory policy, and the municipal governments supported him and each other in making ready for an "amnesty" and in opposing such popular movements.

Although the majority of the Estates of Holland was still called Contra-remonstrant, its words and deeds showed that it was far from the ardour of 1618. Nothing was done beyond preparing for a new publication of the ordinances relating to religion, but there was some hesitation about this, and in the summer of 1627 it was merely resolved to urge the municipal governments and judges to observe them as perpetual edicts, a course of action which did not content the zealots and was not pleasing to the Remonstrants. In Utrecht the edicts were enforced, but in Holland the magistrates of some cities refused more or less roundly to proceed against the disobedient.

The third year of Frederick Henry's administration had begun, and very little was as yet accomplished in the war. Now, however, the prince seemed to have something great in mind. At the end of July he laid siege to Grol, from which place the Spaniards had for years ravaged the district of Zutphen, and which Maurice had twice at-

tempted in vain to capture. Notwithstanding the enemy's approach, the prince succeeded within a month in conquering the strong fortress, and his fame as a besieger was immediately established. Such was the enthusiasm of the country at this news, that all doubt about the future gave way before the thought of the great general, who, as "Holland's pilot," would now steer the ship of state "to safe havens." The fear of secret negotiations with Spain vanished, now that the States had once more taken the offensive, now that "William's valiant son" had in his turn avenged his father's blood. The bells, which the year before had announced the birth of his heir, now saluted the victor, and for many as for the poet there was henceforth in the darkness of the great war and of internal disturbance "no guiding star but the light that glittered from his helmet's crest."¹

Self-reliance was encouraged. This was quite necessary, because England and France could be depended upon less than ever, now that the capricious policy of Charles I. and his favourites had brought about a war between these two powers, which lasted over two years and only ended after the cause of the Huguenots in France had been lost by the conquest of La Rochelle and when Buckingham's death seemed about to release England from his unprincipled statecraft. The States suffered some injuries from this war coming so close to them. The condition of affairs in the Baltic was anything but favourable to Netherlandish interests, especially when Wallenstein, the emperor's successful general, after his victories over Denmark, set about forming an imperial navy to the great uneasiness of Sweden as well as of the States. The war between Sweden and Poland still continued. Tilly's troops approached the eastern frontiers and moved into East Friesland before the end of 1627.

Thus the winter of 1627-1628 brought many perils.

¹ Vondel's *Verovering van Grol*.

The States made efforts to reconcile both France and England and Sweden and Poland. The latter was finally successful in 1629, having been undertaken by a brilliant embassy, the soul of which was Andries Bicker, burgomaster of Amsterdam. Earlier peace between Denmark and the emperor enabled the latter to concentrate his forces in the west. The ambassadors, Randwijk and Pauw sent to England, Sommeldijk and Vosbergen to France, were less fortunate, and friendly relations were not promoted by the departure first of d'Espesses, who had had personally disagreeable experiences at The Hague, later of Carleton, who returned to his home after a sojourn of fourteen years.

Carleton's departure furnished an opportunity of making one desired change. Although the cautionary towns were restored and the money advanced had been paid off, the English ambassador still had a seat in the council of state. Now it was intimated to the English government that Carleton's successor would not be admitted to the council. This seemed to the council of state a favourable time to increase its influence in the government. Asked by the States-General how a new levy of 10,000 men was to be raised, it resolved in March of 1628 to appeal to the provinces in a missive complaining of the course of affairs. The confusion in the finances, causing an unsatisfactory condition of army, fortifications, and fleet, was rightly ascribed to a lack of coöperation in the government. The council saw a remedy for the evils in the enlargement of its own power over against that of the States-General. The prince advised against sending this communication, but the council carried out its plan after a month's delay. A serious contest was threatened, but the States-General quickly settled it by denying the competence of the council in the matter, although a willingness was expressed to consider the points in question. The ecclesiastical troubles in Amsterdam waxed so violent that the prince thought it

necessary in April to go there. The city government had invited him, as it seemed no longer able to assert its authority over the people excited by turbulent ministers. Received joyfully by the Remonstrants and their friends, as appears from Vondel's jubilant "welcome," the prince promised to prevent Remonstrant meetings, provided the Contra-remonstrants would stop their agitation and petitions. Scarcely had he departed, when the municipal government again connived at the assemblies of the Remonstrants, and the prince, approving of this attitude, sent towards the end of the year a garrison of six companies to the city. Some of the agitators were soon banished and fined, but the ministers were not yet molested. This all led to a sharp war of pamphlets—"it snows blue booklets," wrote Uyttenbogaert—to numerous satires, even to popular tumults. Amsterdam was continually disturbed. A "massacre or some other dire peril" seemed not impossible, but the Amsterdam government remained firm. There were now and then violent disputes in the Estates of Holland, and the Calvinistic majority threatened to withhold their votes, if their friends were persecuted, but the prince managed finally to moderate affairs, although the zealots had the council pensionary Duyck on their side. The latter's temporary substitute, who succeeded him at his death in September, 1629, Jacob Cats, pensionary of Dordrecht, stood on the side of the Contra-remonstrants, but he was not a strong character, and the prince easily persuaded him of the necessity of moderation. The ministers continued to agitate, and even spoke of the return of their exiled partisans and of the strict enforcement of the edicts. Then at last the Amsterdam magistrates determined to expel from the city the most turbulent of the preachers, Smout, and to demand that the council of the church should thenceforth admit representatives of the municipality to its meetings (January, 1630). Smout's colleague, Kloppenburg, was after-

wards led out of the city. The Amsterdam affair was debated in the Estates of Holland during the entire spring, and finally the majority resolved to refer it to the synod of North Holland. But Amsterdam refused to have this "political" matter settled by an ecclesiastical authority. Then the prince intervened and had the resolution repealed, but not until the end of the year was the decision intrusted to him by the Estates, when he arranged that the church council was not to be troubled by municipal representatives for a year and Smout was to remain out of Amsterdam and keep his salary. The prince's garrison made it possible for the government of Amsterdam to preserve order amid these disturbances.¹

The result of these dissensions had a great influence upon the condition of the Remonstrants here and elsewhere. Two seditious Contra-remonstrant ministers were expelled from Rotterdam in 1630. So matters went in other places. Favoured by the magistrates, the Remonstrants were soon holding meetings everywhere, no attention being paid to the prohibitory edicts. Hundreds of them came together without fear of the murmuring multitude or of the Calvinistic town councils, which even at The Hague dared not prevent these meetings. "Moderation, moderation!" was the prince's usual reply, when he was requested to use his military power to enforce the ecclesiastical laws. "Go gently!" was his constant admonition to the magistrates. When in September, 1630, an appeal was made to the States-General by the violent Contra-remonstrants, their cause seemed lost. Of the seven provinces, Friesland and Gelderland alone favoured prompt execution of the edicts, and by the influence of the prince and of Holland the appeal was buried without debate.

With the beginning of 1631 it may be said that an end came to agitation about ecclesiastical affairs. Pamphlets

¹ Wagenaar, xi., p. 86.

on church matters diminish in number and in vehemence, although they do not yet disappear entirely from the literature of those days. The appointment of the orthodox but "politic" Adriaan Pauw, Reinier's son, to be council pensionary in April of that year could not promote the revival of the edicts. Freedom for the Remonstrants proved advantageous to other Protestant dissenters, such as the Mennonites and Lutherans. With the adherents of Arminius they had suffered under persecution; with them they now enjoyed greater liberty. This result was due to the prince, to fear in the city governments of ecclesiastical domination, to the calm attitude of most Remonstrants, to the moderate disposition of the great majority of the population. The seven Remonstrant preachers still imprisoned at Loevestein were allowed to escape, removing this memory of the persecutions after 1618. Many exiles, with the connivance of the authorities, returned to their fatherland.

De Groot and Uytenbogaert had also hoped for this privilege. Ten years De Groot had spent in Paris or at a castle near Senlis, studying and writing, living often in straitened circumstances upon his French pension.¹ There were produced some of the works, with which he enriched science, and there he brought out new editions of his earlier writings. Before Maurice's death his spirited wife had succeeded in getting back the half of his confiscated property coming to her. During a trip to Holland she saw signs of a better future, and flattered herself and her husband with the possibility of return to their country, of restoration to honour and office, whenever Frederick Henry should be at the head of affairs. And this seemed about to happen. After Maurice's death, De Groot's own brother-in-law became a member of the high council. But the disturbances of the following years soon made Frederick Henry more cautious, and the author of the formid-

¹ See Fruin, *Hugo de Groot en Maria van Reigersbergh*.

able *Justification* learned this to his sorrow. Episcopius and Uytenbogaert ventured in 1626, Grevinchoven in the following year, to return secretly to Rotterdam, still the chief seat of the Remonstrants. At first they had to hide from their enemies, but circumstances improved a few years later. The exiles showed themselves in public, preached to their fellow-believers, wrote pamphlets, and led in the struggle for freedom of conscience. Their work was the organisation of the seminary for Remonstrant preachers, which was finally established at Amsterdam in 1634. Episcopius became its first professor.

For De Groot there was no place in his fatherland so long as he proudly demanded to be rehabilitated in honour and in his office of pensionary. At last he determined to go openly to Holland, whence his wife had brought him encouraging reports. In the autumn of 1631 he arrived at Rotterdam far from secretly, making indeed some display. This indiscreet attitude had evil consequences. His enemies bestirred themselves, his friends supported him only lukewarmly, and the majority in the States offered a reward of 2000 guilders for his arrest. He concealed himself at Amsterdam, but steadfastly refused to sue for pardon, "neither the half, nor the fourth, nor the eighth part of a pardon; he wanted to forgive those who had done him harm." Whatever Hooft, Vossius, and other friends said or did, he declined it all, and in April of 1632 he angrily quitted his country, migrating now to Hamburg. Two years later Oxenstierna, chancellor of Sweden, took him into Swedish service. While Episcopius quietly devoted his last years to study, while Uytenbogaert looked after the interests of his church at The Hague until his death in 1644, De Groot as Swedish ambassador at Paris spent ten years full of honours and political business, a life not suited to his nature, and ending with an undesired honourable discharge. His demise at Rostock, in 1645, during a journey from Sweden, has caused discus-

sion down to our time as to whether he died a Protestant or a Catholic, a question occasioned by his wavering ideals of a church that should combine both opinions so far as possible, but, undoubtedly, this remarkable man is not to be considered a Catholic, not even as a secret Catholic. His "pious and good" mind, which, under the motto *hora ruit*, was always seeking truth and peace, could never forget his fatherland, that honoured him as one of her most talented sons, when the memory of the wicked dissensions ruining his life had grown dim.

Amid turmoil and rumours of war the material prosperity of the population in all the provinces had increased greatly. The two companies, pillars of Dutch commerce in east and west, were uncommonly flourishing. In the struggle with the English for supremacy in East Indian waters, the victory had been won under the strong guidance of Coen, who in 1627 again took over the post of governor-general from his weaker substitute De Carpentier. The league formed in 1619 between the English and Dutch East India Companies had given rise to so much "dispute and question," as "with a shrewish woman,"¹ that both parties regarded its disruption as a relief. The English were soon settled and doing business on their separate account in Bantam, and they removed their offices from Batavia, where Coen made all trade impossible for them. Co-operation with the English company was at an end.

De Carpentier had prudently managed the delicate Ambon affair, had organised education, finance, and justice, and had endeavoured to settle the difficulties with the native princes. Relations became so strained with the kingdom of Mataram that an attack upon Batavia was expected. Before a year Coen had to oppose a great Javanese fleet, soon supported by forces on the land. He beat off the enemy, but in August, 1629, a new Javanese army appeared before the town, in which the greatest

¹ De Jonge, *Opkomst*, v., p. xli.

general, statesman, and merchant ever known in the Indies died unexpectedly from an intestinal malady (September 21). The council of India chose for his successor Jacques Specx, and he repulsed the enemy again. Thus the position of the Netherlanders in Java was permanently settled, and when in 1632 Hendrik Brouwer was sent out as a new governor-general, under whom the excellent director-general Anthony van Diemen was to manage affairs, attention could be devoted to the improvement of the government. Much needed to be improved. A large number of "useless servants" did the company more hurt than good and sought in every way to make their fortunes. The officials were more assiduous for their personal profit than for that of the company, and the chambers in the fatherland were much to blame for this, because they sent out all sorts of people to India, either to get rid of them or to give them a chance to acquire wealth. The connection between the different offices left considerable to be desired. Brouwer's instructions directed him to look after these matters, but the company's niggardliness in the payment of its officials, the eagerness to receive the richest possible returns with the least possible outlay, and the pressure of *patria* upon the Indian government impeded the reform of the administration.

The dividends paid to the stockholders were extraordinary, and one readily understands that complaints of too low dividends ceased after 1625, when it is considered that in that year 20% was paid, in the following $12\frac{1}{2}\%$, in 1628 double, in 1630 $17\frac{1}{2}\%$, in 1632 as the normal dividend for the future $12\frac{1}{2}\%$, the latter figure being generally exceeded in the following years, and sometimes doubled.¹ The shares stood far above 300 per cent. and were speculated in at Amsterdam. Great wealth was thus accumulated in Holland and Zealand. The prize money also, the

¹ See list of dividends in Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick*, Beil. vi.

share of the state and of the crews of the ships in the captures, ran up to large amounts. Some idea of the prosperity diffused by the great commercial corporation may be formed by recalling the huge sums acquired by directors and officials of the company, the millions spent in fitting out about 40 large East Indiamen¹ every year, the pay of thousands of sailors and soldiers sent out by the company.

Less important were the results, of which its sister, the West India Company, could boast, yet it saw prosperous days. Its first fleets sailed under Lhermite and Willekens in 1623 towards South America. The second fleet, 26 ships with 500 cannon, 1600 sailors, and 1700 soldiers, achieved a great success in the conquest of Bahia or San Salvador in Brazil, the seat of the Portuguese government, where the vice-admiral, Pieter Pieterszoon Heyn, distinguished himself uncommonly.² Similar expeditions went out annually and brought great profit in the spoils of the Spanish and Portuguese merchantmen and of the African and American coasts and in the money expended in the harbours of the fatherland on the equipment of the fleets. In two years 80 ships with 1500 cannon and above 9000 soldiers and sailors were sent into the Atlantic Ocean. Bahia was conquered again in 1625 by a Spanish-Portuguese armada, and the fleets sailing out in this and the following year did not succeed in recapturing it or in gaining permanent possession of other places, although Pernambuco and Porto Rico were occupied for a time and many a richly laden galleon was taken. Sugar, wine, fine woods were thus brought to the fatherland in large quantities. In 1627 alone 55 large and small vessels were captured from the enemy, and in the next year three great squadrons steered toward the west.

One of them, under command of Piet Heyn, was

¹ See Luzac, *Holl. rijkdom*, i., p. 299.

² Netscher, *Les hollandais au Brésil*, p. 12.

specially destined to intercept the "silver fleet," sailing every year from Cuba to Spain. This had long been the dream of many a mariner, excited by tales of the fabulous wealth conveyed by the galleons from the Spanish possessions of America and Asia. Piet Heyn had 31 ships with 700 cannon and nearly 4000 soldiers and sailors. Cruising along the northern coast of Cuba he met on September 8th the coveted fleet, consisting of 15 large vessels, of which a part was immediately seized by his shallops while another part, fleeing into the bay of Matanzas, fell into his hands with slight loss. Fabulous indeed were the captured treasures of silver, gold, pearls, indigo, sugar, Campeachy wood, and costly furs, which sold in the Netherlands for no less than fifteen million guilders. The rejoicing over the news was boundless, and Heyn himself showed some vexation at the excessive praises bestowed upon him for this easy victory, after his previous and more important exploits had been greeted with much less enthusiasm. But the capture of the "silver fleet" is what keeps his name alive with posterity. The company was enabled by this rich booty to distribute to its stockholders the unprecedented dividend of fifty per cent., double what it had ever before paid. Brazil was not forgotten, and in 1630 Admiral Loncq succeeded in conquering Olinda and the Recife of Pernambuco, the former being evacuated after a defeat.

The settlement on the Hudson River in North America, taken over from some merchants by the company, began to yield considerable profits, especially by its trade in timber, beaver and otter skins, which in 1630 brought in over 68,000 guilders,¹ not a very important figure in itself but growing in significance when it is remembered how small an amount of money had to be invested in the wilderness. The management of the colony of New Netherland by the

¹ De Laet, *Kort verhaal van de diensten en nuttigheden*, etc., p. 26; Van Rees, *Staathuishoudkunde*, ii., p. 332.

Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company had this commerce particularly in view. A small colony of Walloons quickly settled near the factory, which after the purchase of Manhattan Island in 1626 by the first director, Peter Minuit or Minnewit, became the foundation of the little town of New Amsterdam. Later the settlement of other colonists was allowed there, although under restrictions with regard to trade in their own products even and under the close supervision of the company, so that in the beginning very few availed themselves of the permission.

Small trading colonies were established by the company on the "wild coast" of Guiana, first in Essequibo, in 1627 on the Wiapoco and the Berbice.¹ The settlements on the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone were limited to a few little factories and a fort.

The chief concern of the company remained the spoils to be taken from the enemy by privateers and costly expeditions. Colonisation stood quite in the background, since neither stockholders nor directors saw so much immediate profit in it as in privateering or military expeditions against the enemy. This immediate profit was converted into dividends without the formation of a reserve. Such poor financial management had fatal consequences. In 1630 the company was struggling with a lack of money, so that it had to resort to loans, while aid from the States consisted more of promises than of actual payments, although the company had advanced large sums to various provinces in the difficult situation of 1629. Notwithstanding all this the dividends and great expeditions of this company enriched many in the country.

Less considerable were the profits of the Northern Company. At first the prices secured for its wares had brought "golden days" to the shareholders,² but they

¹ Netscher, *Geschiedenis van de koloniën Essequibo, Demerary en Berbice*. 's Gravenhage, 1888, p. 61.

² Muller, *Geschiedenis der Noordsche Compagnie*, p. 127.

soon dropped. The whale fishery was a lottery. In the long run the failure of this company was to be expected.

The student of conditions in the Netherlands about 1630 should give attention not so much to the gains of the great companies as to the progress of commerce and industry in general. The chief source of prosperity lay in the activity prevailing everywhere, in the rich returns from commerce which made of the Netherlanders the merchantmen for all Europe. It was calculated that the navigation on the Baltic, on the Mediterranean Sea, and the great fishery, each in itself, brought several times more profit than the commerce of the East Indies. The competition of neighbours, of France, England, and Hamburg, was already felt, but fortunately the trade was kept. This carrying trade in Dutch ships went on even between foreign ports. An effort was made to have the United Netherlands become more and more a "free warehouse" for goods imported from abroad and to be sold abroad, a sort of "canal" for the transportation of merchandise. So it was necessary to have the burdens upon commerce as light as possible. There was always fear of the rivalry of Antwerp or the Flemish cities, which carried on a trade by land with northern France, of such neutral places as Hamburg and Bremen, which profited by the exclusion of the Dutch from Spain and Portugal and traded also with Calais, Rouen, and Muscovy. Freedom of trade was the watchword of most Dutch merchants, and they opposed the formation of monopolistic companies for commerce with Muscovy, Africa, Australia, and the Levant.

It is almost impracticable to give reliable statistics of the Netherlandish commerce of those days. We are restricted to general accounts of the prosperity of commercial cities and merchants by contemporaries, sometimes guilty of exaggeration. These testimonies, unanimous from native and foreigner, friend and foe, leave no doubt that the last years of the long war mark the highest point in the development

of commerce and industry, wealth and prosperity. A flourishing state of affairs is shown by the numerous descriptions of cities put forth by proud citizens. Thus Orlers for Leyden, Ampzing for Haarlem, Pontanus for Amsterdam and Nimwegen, Velius for Hoorn are all unwearied in recounting the splendours of their cities. The rapidly increasing population and the necessity of expanding the walls of the cities were further proofs of this prosperity.

Much depended upon the course of the war. The safety of the sea was a question of existence for commerce and the fishery, and this was conditioned not only by the sea-power of the Netherlands, but by the relations between other countries where the Dutch merchants traded, between France and England as became manifest during their war from 1627 to 1630, and between Sweden and Denmark, watching one another with growing jealousy. Difficulties with England and France in their war, concerning the search of Dutch ships for contraband, furnished all sorts of grievances, although domestic and foreign dangers prevented the English government in these years from asserting its old claim to the *Dominium Maris*.¹

The greatest damage was inflicted by the ships of Dunkirk. After the end of the Truce the Dunkirk pirates appeared in the North Sea with new strength, zealously supported by Spinola. War ships and privateers were fitted out in the Flemish ports, while the harbour of Dunkirk was protected by Fort Mardijk and a "wooden jacket," a palisade in the sea.² The idea speedily arose of making Dunkirk a centre of commerce as well as of naval action. The "twelve apostles," as the twelve large war vessels fitted out there were called, had to form the nucleus of a new navy. Philip IV., in conjunction with the infanta, estab-

¹ Muller, *Mare Clausum*, p. 224.

² De Jonge, *Zeewezen*, I., p. 234.

lished a Company of Commerce there in October, 1624, which with twenty-four ships was to revive the trade between the "obedient provinces" of the Netherlands and the Spanish ports, while in 1625 all intercourse between these provinces and the "rebels" was prohibited. The States took measures to protect commerce and fishery by war ships and privateers, and merchantmen faring to the Mediterranean were commanded to go only in regular fleets of from thirty to forty sail.

In the following years both sides fought bravely on the sea, and their hostility was embittered by the custom of "foot-washing," the barbarous cruelty of throwing overboard the beaten enemy without any form of trial. The names of Mooi Lambert and Houtebeen, Swartenhondt and Alteras, Joost de Moor, and Marinus de Hollare are enrolled in the history of the contest against the men of Dunkirk and the Spaniards in these years of the apprenticeship of Tromp, Van Galen, De Ruyter, Jan and Cornelis Evertsen, and many another hero of the sea, who acquired in this fierce piratical war the seamanship, with which they later astonished the world. The fast ships of Dunkirk robbed the richly laden merchantmen, plundered and murdered the fishermen on the Scottish coasts, and sailed into the rivers for booty. Their spoils were ten times as great as those of the Zealanders and Hollanders. Even war ships were captured by them, hundreds of ordinary merchant vessels fell into their hands, and Enkhuizen lost a hundred fishing boats in one year.

The reason of such unfavourable results for the States lay in the speed of the Dunkirk "frigates" and in the much greater number of Dutch merchantmen. It was not to be denied also that the management of naval affairs was far less vigorous with the States than with the enemy. Another cause of the decline of the Dutch seapower was the heavy expenses of the war by land, to which more attention was given in Frederick Henry's first

years than to the war on the sea. There was further ground for complaining of the lack of good captains, of poor discipline, of abuses in the command of ships. The conduct of the highest naval authorities left much to be desired.

At last it began to be understood that naval matters needed vigorous direction. After some advance had been made in the standard of the captains, Piet Heyn, covered with glory in the service of the West India Company, was appointed lieutenant-admiral of Holland in 1629. This was starting on the right course. The new commander of the Dutch fleet began at once to introduce important improvements. The "Delfshaven terror of the sea" unfortunately did not long rule over the fleet. Two months after his promotion he perished in an encounter with Dunkirk ships on the Flemish coast. The fearless mariner, whose reforms laid the foundation for the great sea-power of the States, was entombed with honours at Rotterdam. His death was a severe loss to the fatherland, and in that same year the Dunkirk men captured sixty ships.

All sorts of plans were formed for increasing the naval strength. In 1631 Amsterdam, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Edam, Medemblik, and Harlingen proposed a new way of protecting the Baltic commerce. The maintenance of safety on the sea by means of a private fleet had been considered in 1629. Some Amsterdam merchants had devised a great insurance company which was to fit out at least sixty war ships for the protection of commerce, all the merchantmen having to pay a certain insurance premium. This ingenious plan was never carried out, because the merchants objected to the tax it would impose upon commerce. The cities mentioned now offered to equip ships, provided a portion of the convoy money should be granted them. These vessels were really of great service against those of Dunkirk. In order to strengthen the unity

of the fleet, the prince's power as admiral-general was considerably extended. Though this all brought some improvement, the damage done by the Dunkirk privateers remained very great, and complaints continued of the insufficiency of the sea-power despite its brave deeds. Maas-luis alone, from 1631 to 1637, mourned the loss of two hundred fishing vessels, and hundreds of fishermen and sailors met death in the North Sea or languished in Flemish prisons. Not a village by the sea but had to complain of heavy losses, and Dunkirk flourished by its millions in spoils. The long-dreaded attack of the Spanish-Dunkirk fleet on Zeeland, in September, 1631, when this province was assailed by a new armada of about one hundred ships and a large army, showed plainly how much the enemy's strength had increased. But Hollare's brilliant victory over this fleet proved that Zeeland's water-wolves were still able to defend their inheritance against a superior force. A satisfactory regulation of naval matters could not, however, be indefinitely postponed.

Military affairs during these years were in a much better condition. That Prince Frederick Henry saw his first duty in carrying on the war by land was not surprising in his brother's pupil amid the great dangers still threatening the United Netherlands from the Spanish side. People living forty years later experienced what neglect of defence on land meant. Spinola at first had charge of matters in the south, but at the end of 1627 he was recalled to Spain on account of the loss of Grol, as was thought, and he served the Spanish cause afterwards in the war against France in Italy, where in 1630 after the unsuccessful siege of Casale he died insane. The great general's departure caused uneasiness in the southern provinces, because no one could fill his place there, neither the brave but frivolous Count Henry van den Bergh, his successor in the army, nor the unskilful cardinal-diplomat, Alfonso de la Cueva, marquis de Bedmar, Spanish ambassador at the Brussels court,

who was now to be the actual head of the government under the infanta.

This government was again organised in the Spanish fashion. The old council of state after existing a hundred years was replaced by two *juntas*, one composed entirely of Spaniards, the other under the cardinal's guidance, and both dependent upon the council of Flanders and Burgundy at Madrid, which consisted almost wholly of noble Spaniards. The able Pieter Roose, later president of the privy council of Brussels, now first councillor of Netherlandish affairs at Madrid, formed an exception to the rule of governing the Netherlands by Spaniards, but he was quite ready to help carry out the king's plans. This Spanish administration aroused discontent in the Netherlands, and the unpopular Bedmar was succeeded in 1629 by the Marquis d' Aytona, an abler man. He acquainted the king with the possibility that such an internal policy, which in Granvelle's time had been one of the chief causes of the uprising, might again make the faithful provinces disloyal and inclined to side with the "rebels." This was not inconceivable in the wretched material condition of these provinces, and some among the nobles of the south might have been willing to put themselves at the head of the malcontents and, while apparently faithful to the king, to remove the Spaniards and take the government into their own hands. Some would not have been averse to friendly relations with the insurgents of the north. A plan for the general defence of all the Spanish lands was not favourably received at Brussels in 1627, and little inclination was shown to help the monarchy so long as it did not act more energetically for the interests of the Netherlands. The insignificant attacks upon Bergen op Zoom and South Beveland in 1628 could scarcely be regarded as serious efforts.

A whole year passed without anything being done. The armies of both sides did not take the field, which was un-

doubtedly due to the prevailing want of money.¹ In the spring of 1629 Frederick Henry collected a large force for an assault on Bois-le-Duc. This important fortress, strong by its situation amidst marshes, had, besides about 5000 citizens, a garrison of 3000 foot soldiers and some hundreds of horsemen under the lord of Grobbendonck, while the Spanish army under Van den Bergh was stationed near Wesel and threatened Gelderland. The prince's army was equal to the task. No less than 24,000 infantry under Ernest Casimir, Wolfert van Brederode, the two Veres, the count of Châtillon, Coligny's grandson, and others, and 4000 cavalry under Stakenbroek and the young duke of Bouillon, brother of the later famous Turenne, were gathered in April upon the heath of Mook and started before the end of the month for Bois-le-Duc.² Hundreds of peasants aided the soldiers in quickly throwing up intrenchments. These were about all the troops at the prince's disposal, and the eastern frontier lay open to the enemy's attack. The money and supplies required by so large a force could only be procured with great difficulty, and Holland was above all importuned for advances.

Soon it was reported that preparations must be made against an attack by the enemy. The prince raised 6000 mercenaries in Holland, who with a few thousand newly arrived Scotchmen and what could be recruited or spared from before Bois-le-Duc formed an army of observation numbering perhaps 20,000 men. The enemy made desperate efforts to take the field, but week after week went by, while the prince remained before Bois-le-Duc, drawing off the rivers, the Dommel and the Aa, into new channels, constructing great works of attack and defence, and ever approaching nearer to the beleaguered city. By the end of June Van den Bergh with 30,000 men and over 6000 cavalry endeavoured without success to relieve the place. His

¹ *Mémoires de Frédéric-Henri* (Amsterdam, 1733), p. 50.

² De Bordes, *De verdediging van Nederland in 1629* (Utrecht, 1856).

attacks upon the prince's positions and the simultaneous sorties of the garrison were repulsed. News came in July that an imperial army, disengaged by the peace between the emperor and Denmark, was nearing the eastern frontiers. Van den Bergh moved off to join the imperial forces, hoping by a vigorous diversion elsewhere to prevent the fall of the city.

The prince had to detach some of his men to cover Gelderland. First Count William Frederick of Nassau was sent with some thousands of soldiers to the Bommelerwaard, then Count Van Styrum with about 10,000 men towards Nimwegen and Arnhem. The Spanish governor of Lingen, Caïro, crossed the Yssel and fortified himself at Westervoort after repelling the Arnhem militia and a band of Englishmen. Van Styrum's attempt to dislodge Caïro failed completely in consequence of his bad management.

A panic was caused by this news. Gelderland used Van Styrum's troops to reinforce its garrisons. Utrecht opened sluices and put the country under water as far as Amersfoort. Treason was mentioned in some provinces. But the prince and the States did not lose their heads. The former remained undisturbed before Bois-le-Duc, and the latter would not hear of giving up the siege. Regiments were taken from Denmark and Sweden; new English and Scotch battalions were recruited; money, stores, and troops were borrowed from the companies, especially from the West India Company; mercenaries and militia were sent from Holland's cities to threatened points; and thousands of peasants were armed for the defence of Utrecht. Soon Count Ernest Casimir was near Arnhem at the head of over 20,000 infantry and cavalry. The defence of the endangered provinces was directed by the prince and the deputies of the States-General in his camp. Meanwhile the enemy ravaged the Veluwe, but dared not quit his strong position on the Yssel for fear of being flanked by Ernest Casimir's army. The people of

Gelderland fled from country to town; many families departed from the towns to Holland; some villages were burned by the Spaniards; others offered the enemy substantial contributions. The days of Parma seemed to have returned.

At length, early in August, came from the Rhine the expected imperial army, over 14,000 infantry and about 3000 cavalry, under Count Montecuculi; later 10,000 men more under Count John of Nassau.¹ Van den Bergh moved over the Veluwe towards Amersfoort, a weak town with a weak government, and so poorly garrisoned that it could not or would not offer a long resistance. The Estates of Utrecht, like those of Gelderland intent upon their own salvation, now began to waver. Then the States-General, with the council of state, moved their sittings to the post of danger and settled down at Utrecht on August 15th. But the prince did not stir from Bois-le-Duc, even when Amersfoort surrendered on the 14th, after being surrounded for one day, which led to the arrest of the commander and two burgomasters of the town. By its brave attitude the town of Hattem warded off an attack of the enemy.

Almost all Utrecht was inundated, and it resembled a lake, where "salt and fresh waves foam and dash over cattle and stable"; the smaller towns were provided with earthworks; all the troops obtainable were dispatched to threatened points. Not for an instant did the States-General and the Estates of Holland lose heart. It was otherwise in the now endangered Utrecht, where Johan Wolfert van Brederode had command. The panic there was not to be calmed; people took to flight, concealed or sent away their money and valuables; and the measures

¹ This was a grandson of Count John, Prince William's brother. He had formerly been in the service of the States, but, fancying himself wronged, he had become a Catholic on his marriage with a princess of Ligne and entered the emperor's service. Later he joined the Spanish army. John Maurice (the Brazilian) was his brother.

adopted by the magistrates showed slight wisdom. In the country and the more easterly provinces there was fear of the Catholic peasants, who formed the great majority. The behaviour of some noblemen also caused anxiety. And to all was to be added the cramping lack of money. Things looked worse, when Van den Bergh with friendly letters sought to kindle disloyal feelings in some towns of Gelderland and Utrecht, while Montecuculi awakened terror everywhere by his devastations.

Suddenly came the rescue. The governor of Emmerich, Otto van Gent, lord of Dieden, had long fixed his eye upon Wesel, the important fortress on the lower Rhine, supporting the enemy's rear, commanding his communications with Brabant, and well stocked with supplies. On August 19th Van Gent, with some of Count Ernest's troops and with the help of citizens of the town, succeeded in surprising it, an event which revived the sinking spirits of many and greatly dismayed the enemy. The chance that Holland would bow its proud head and consent to negotiate now disappeared utterly. This chance, with which Van den Bergh had flattered himself, had been very slight, for Holland was determined to resist to the last and, if needs be, to put the whole province under water. The army before Bois-le-Duc was furthermore relied upon, since in case of extremity—only then was the siege to be raised—it could hasten to repulse the enemy. A few days later Montecuculi evacuated Amersfoort, and before the end of the month retired with Van den Bergh behind the Yssel. John of Nassau, with twelve to thirteen thousand men, remained to guard the bridge of boats over the Yssel at Dieren, across which the poor peasants of the Veluwe could be continually harassed and the raiding troops could retreat.

Meanwhile Count Van den Bergh, who with the bulk of his army had withdrawn into Westphalia, opened negotiations in the name of the infant for a new truce, mani-

festly the best expedient for the southern provinces in the impossibility of conquering the northern provinces or of persuading Spain to a real peace based upon the independence of the north. Relations had existed since 1628 between the States and the Brussels government concerning the exchange of prisoners, and the prince was free to use the services of the well-known Juffer Tserclaes. Her going and coming excited suspicion in the spring of 1629. The fear was apparent that the prince might be induced by personal advantages to work for a truce. Offers were then actually made of a truce for twenty-four years. They were repeated in September by Van Marquette, who was negotiating for the exchange at Rozendaal on behalf of the infanta. The States-General resolved to hold these offers until the fall of Bois-le-Duc should be decided.

Cautiously but with increasing success the prince had continued the arduous work of the siege, by means of water mills draining the marshy ground for his trenches and dikes. When the moat of the city was at length reached and a great breach had been made in the wall by the explosion of the mines laid by the prince, Grobben-donck began to negotiate. At this joyful news the States-General moved from Utrecht to Bommel and from there to the camp at Vucht in order to deliberate with the prince about the terms of the capitulation which was signed September 14th. Stipulations favourable to the clergy were due to the prince, who sought to temper the zeal of the Calvinists, and thus gave another proof of his moderation in ecclesiastical matters, even with regard to the Catholics.

The fall of Bois-le-Duc and the surprise of Wesel, celebrated in a day of thanksgiving appointed by the States-General, gave a breathing time after the anxiety of the summer. Further military preparations were discontinued, and only a watch was kept on the enemy in the

Veluwe. Van den Bergh had quickly moved from Westphalia to the Meuse in order to guard against an invasion of Brabant by Frederick Henry, but John of Nassau remained on the Yssel. The prince seemed inclined to an honourable peace, if this were possible, or otherwise to a truce for a long period, unless support could be given him in conquering the south, which now appeared not entirely unattainable.¹ He answered to this effect an inquiry of the States as to his views, and they then determined to get the opinions of the provinces in the matter, and to do something more in the spring of 1630. In October, John of Nassau, fearful of being surrounded by Ernest Casimir, withdrew to winter quarters in Jülich.

The danger was now over, and the army of the States was broken up before the end of the month. Great and well deserved were the honours, with which the prince and his cousin, the leaders of the brilliant defence, were received on November 3d at The Hague "seated upon the chariot of victory." But the States-General, the Estates of Holland, and a considerable portion of the population had helped to save the country by brave conduct amid the greatest dangers, and the prince gratefully recognised this.² The rejoicing was universal, and Vondel sang: "Here is, here is the war's end," because "Frederick has completed the work."

This year's trials made it impracticable to take the field during the next year. The enemy also attempted little, and the only fact of importance was the capture of Count John of Nassau in a skirmish before Wesel. Negotiations for peace resulted in nothing. The powerful West India Company desired not to lose its profits from the spoils of the enemy; Amsterdam sided with it; and the northern provinces and Zealand showed slight inclination to consent to a suspension of hostilities. Old

¹ Aitzema, i., p. 900.

² *Mémoires de Frédéric Henri*, p. 90.

objections were raised again, and although the prince was not unfavourable to the affair¹ and thus incurred much suspicion, it became manifest that the States did not seriously consider it. A treaty of exchange was concluded in April, 1630, but the talk of a truce ceased. War was once more to decide, and the prince insisted that it should be vigorously and offensively waged. He remained true to his old principles: a lasting peace, if necessary a long truce, or otherwise war for the destruction of the enemy, if possible with the help of France, which seemed ready to join the States in the contest against the Hapsburg monarchies.

For 1631 the States planned something great: the conquest of Dunkirk, an undertaking similar to that of Maurice in 1600. Frederick Henry was aware of the difficulties of such an expedition, but resolved to venture upon it. The army was brought together at Emmerich from the eastern garrisons, and 10,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry took ship for IJzendijke, whence they moved towards Ghent and Bruges. The approach of a Spanish army so alarmed the deputies of the States-General, who were with the prince, that they represented to him how dangerous a farther advance would be, and begged him to give up the expedition, which he reluctantly did. The army returned to Brabant.

Scarcely had it arrived there when rumours became rife of great preparations of the enemy at Antwerp. A fleet was gathering for an attack upon Zealand, which had seen no enemy within its borders for more than half a century. Some twelve or fifteen war ships were hastily collected in Zealand's waters, but they had to retreat when the hostile *armada* finally appeared, September 8th. Great were the expectations of the Spaniards and Netherlanders of the south from this last effort. There were 35 large vessels and about 50 smaller ones, all armed and carrying

¹ Wagenaar, xi., p. 111; Aitzema, i., p. 899; *Res. Holl.*, Dec. 11, 1629.

6000 troops under command of the ransomed Count John of Nassau and the prince of Barbançon, while the marquis of Aytona with Admiral Boy of Dunkirk was at the head of the fleet, and the deserters Stoutenburg and Wissekerke acted as guides. The armada sailed by Bergen op Zoom, where the prince was stationed with a considerable force, towards Tholen, probably with the design of assailing Briel. The ships began to run aground, just as the fleet of Zeeland, under Marinus de Hollare, came upon the scene with the flood towards the evening of September 12th, reinforced by vessels with soldiers sent out from Bergen op Zoom after the foe. A naval battle followed on the Slaak, continued during the night by the light of the moon, until an autumnal fog came up—another romantic page in the history of Zeeland. The enemy was totally routed; his ships were mostly destroyed or run ashore, and hundreds of his men perished miserably in the dark water, while 4000 prisoners, including many officers of high rank, and the entire fleet of transports were captured. This was the last time that Spanish troops appeared in the northern provinces.

The general state of affairs in Europe had meanwhile changed to the advantage of the Netherlands. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden took up the task of Denmark in Germany and landed in Pomerania early in 1630. Brilliantly led by their great king, the Swedes advanced ever farther into Germany, defeated the imperial army at Leipsic, and prepared to conquer the Palatinate and Bavaria. The king of Bohemia once more cherished hope of his restoration, at least as elector of the Palatinate, and in the spring of 1632 he betook himself to the Swedish camp with a subsidy from the States of 150,000 guilders. Under these circumstances there was no fear of the imperial forces on the eastern borders.

France, in consequence of the victory of Bois-le-Duc,

agreed, in the summer of 1630, to a new treaty of subsidy, promising one million livres annually, provided the States, within seven years, would conclude no peace or truce with Spain without asking the advice of the king, quite different from the requirement of his consent as a condition. The States could not depend so much upon England as upon the closer relations with France. Even the failure of Richelieu's secret attempts to bring the principality of Orange under French influence by bribing the prince's governor there, the lord of Valkenburg, who was killed on the occasion of his forcible displacement by Johan de Knuyt, the prince's councillor,—even this very doubtful attitude of the French government could not disturb the joint opposition to Spain. Together France and the States supported the Swedish king with subsidies. The interests of both were directed against the Spanish Netherlands, whence Richelieu's numerous foes thwarted his plans at court, and where his greatest enemy, the queen-mother, Marie de Médicis, had found a refuge. In 1631 there was much consultation between the French ambassador Beaugy, the prince, and the States-General.

The condition of the Spanish provinces was especially favourable to united action there. The loss of Bois-le-Duc had augmented the misery in the south, and the longing for a cessation of hostilities was ardent after the defeat on the Slaak. In December, 1631, the artist Rubens visited The Hague on a secret mission from the infanta without success. Discontent in the south waxed greater, particularly among the nobility, angered by the Spanish influence, by the preference shown the government's favourites, by the appointment of the marquis de Santa Cruz as commander of the army instead of Count Henry van den Bergh. About the latter were grouped many noblemen: the princes of Espinoy and Barbançon, the duke of Bournonville, the count of Egmont, and others.

Most of them were inclined to coöperate in secret with Spain's deadly enemies¹; others, as Philip of Aremberg, duke of Aerschot, refused to participate in the conspiracy against the Spanish rule. This conspiracy received a large development in the course of 1631. It was proposed, with the help of France and the States, to throw off the Spanish yoke. Some thought of renewing the Pacification of Ghent, others of the establishment of a Catholic republic, corresponding to the Protestant republic of the north and allied with it or entirely independent.

Richelieu was interested in these plans and hoped for some profit to France. He had the old claims of France to Flanders and Artois investigated, and secretly communicated with the heads of the conspiracy through François Carondelet, dean of Cambrai, whom he had bribed. He was alarmed by the growth of the flourishing northern republic, which was becoming a great power and ranking with France and England, and he did not want to put it in possession of the southern provinces or have them too closely allied with it. About England's plans he was also uneasy, when he heard that Gerbier, the English agent at Brussels, had long been intimate with the conspirators.

In February, 1632, one of the leading conspirators, René de Renesse, count of Warfusée, who, though president of the council of finance, was often embarrassed for money, and now sought to mend his fortune by treason, went to Bokhoven near Bois-le-Duc, and later visited his friend, Count Henry van den Bergh, at Venloo. Afterwards he sojourned at Ryswick in Holland, accompanied perhaps by others, some say by Van den Bergh himself. These mysterious journeys concerned a plan for persuading the States and France to join in an invasion of the Belgian provinces, which would be regarded by the

¹ Waddington, *La république des Provinces-Unies*, etc., i., p. 147 et seq.

conspirators as the signal for insurrection. Warfusée negotiated at Ryswick and The Hague with the prince, the council pensionary Pauw, and the French ambassador Beaugy. The plan was for Frederick Henry from the north and a French army from the south to make a simultaneous attack. Operating with the nobles, the Spaniards were to be driven out, and the country was to be divided. The two noblemen and their friends were to be rewarded with money, estates, and offices. Richelieu was hardly prepared to proceed so far. The States-General and the prince were more eager to engage in the enterprise. They made their army ready to march in the spring, ostensibly directing it against Antwerp, and sent the council pensionary with 100,000 guilders for each of the two counts to Venloo, where he delivered the money to them. Everything had been done so secretly that the Brussels government had no suspicions. The chance of conquering the southern provinces seemed better than ever before.

At the end of May the prince assembled his army at Nimwegen,¹ from where he moved on June 1st along the Meuse towards Venloo with over 20,000 men, while his cousin, Count William of Nassau, with a small division descended the Meuse and fell upon Flanders, capturing some forts near Antwerp. A manifesto of the States-General called upon the people of the south to expel the Spaniards, promising help and maintenance of privileges and of the old religion. Venloo, deserted by Bergh on the prince's approach, capitulated on these conditions after two days. The vanguard under Count Ernest Casimir pushed on to Roermond which surrendered on the 6th. The loss of Ernest Casimir was here mourned,

¹ See concerning the campaign: De Boer, *Het verraad van Hendrik van den Bergh en de veldtocht langs de Maas*, in *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, xiii., pp. 17, 88, 145; De Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden*, p. 21.

for he was killed during a reconnoissance of the place. Four days later the prince laid siege to Maestricht. Great was the terror of Brussels at this rapid and victorious march. The treason of Bergh and Warfusée now became evident. The former went to Liege and issued a number of manifestoes justifying his conduct and inciting to revolt against Spain. The Spanish commanders without an army, their troops having been mostly sent to act against Gustavus Adolphus, resolved to watch the course of affairs. There was yet time to throw some reinforcements into Maestricht.

Little or nothing came of the insurrection in the southern provinces. Aerschot refused his coöperation, and the others dared do nothing without him. Some of the conspirators, including Egmont and Carondelet, fled to France. The people were quiet in general, although excitement prevailed here and there, and seditious cries were uttered. Nothing was heard from France. A new rebellion of the French nobles against the government, supported by Spanish money and Spanish troops, made Richelieu have his hands full. The army returned from the upper Rhine to the Netherlands, and the Brussels administration preserved order, threatening and promising according to circumstances, and using the infanta's popularity.

Meanwhile the siege of Maestricht went on, although disappointment was felt also by the besiegers, and the efforts of Bergh to gather an army at Liege completely failed, so that in fear of his life he left the city early in July and withdrew to Aix-la-Chapelle. Here, too, he found no support, whereupon he moved northwards in search of troops, but his career was over. The Spanish army under Santa Cruz appeared for the relief of the place at the end of the month, but by that time the prince had strengthened his camp and in his customary manner was drawing nearer with trenches and mines to

the beleaguered fortress, which valiantly defended itself. Frederick Henry renewed before Maestricht the works by which he had captured Bois-le-Duc. The labyrinth of earthen ramparts, lines and sconces, redoubts and moats, traverses and hornworks, approaches and galleries of mines in and about the prince's camp awakened the admiration of contemporaries. He succeeded in holding Santa Cruz on the left bank of the Meuse and thus in separating him from the approaching imperial army under the celebrated Pappenheim, which really excited great uneasiness in the Dutch camp, where there was fear of being cut off from the fatherland. The prince continued his works calmly, called back Count William from Flanders, and fortified himself. Early in August Pappenheim reached the neighbourhood of Maestricht and soon joined Santa Cruz, so that the enemy had 40,000 men, and on the 18th made an attack in force, aided by a sortie of the garrison from Maestricht. Both combats resulted in favour of the Dutch, though they suffered severe losses, Robert de Vere, earl of Oxford, being among the killed. Two days later the prince had the city stormed through the breach made by his mines. Attack followed attack, but the brave garrison held its own and repulsed the Dutch. The citizens, afraid of being conquered and plundered by storm, now insisted upon surrender, so the governor, De Lede, consented on the 22d to a capitulation. Honourable withdrawal for the garrison, freedom for the Catholic religion, and retention of ecclesiastical property by the possessors, were the principal conditions. Some days later Pappenheim with his army returned to Cologne, Santa Cruz with his to Brabant. The Dutch army remained for a time in and near Maestricht, smaller forts and castles being captured without much trouble, and the neighbouring rich coal-mines being seized by the prince for the States-General.

Before the fall of the city, during the approach of the Dutch army along the Meuse, the discontent in the south had grown so great, the misery in all the provinces had become so unbearable, that Isabella no longer dared to resist the universal wish for a calling together of the States-General as had occurred in 1600 under similar circumstances.¹ The Spanish king had earnestly warned her against this, but the panic was so intense that she listened to Aerschot's counsels and resolved to apply this most heroic remedy. Early in September the States-General assembled at Brussels amid the immense alarm caused by the loss of Maestricht.

All sorts of efforts were in the meantime made to induce the prince to suspend his operations and enter into new negotiations for a treaty. The intriguing Gerbier had come to Liege and Maestricht to offer English mediation; Rubens appeared again in the infanta's name, and later Philip Le Roy. But the prince did not seriously consider these secret advances until the States-General of Brussels, with the infanta's consent, sent three representatives to discuss the terms of a treaty of peace. These negotiations seemed for a moment to promise some results. The Brussels States-General were ready to renew the Truce upon the basis of withdrawal of the Spanish troops, even with a surrender or neutralisation of several cities near the borders to the northern States, which would have the Flemish ports under their observation, while an offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded for upholding this truce *contre tous et chascun, sans exception de personne*, thus, if necessary, against Spain.

So far the people of the south were willing to go from fear of the army at Maestricht, although these conditions were deemed very hard; even Isabella agreed to negotiate, anxious as she was about the impending rebellion.

¹ See Gachard, *Actes des États Généraux de 1632*.

At the end of September the prince communicated in writing to the States-General at The Hague the terms discussed with the southern gentlemen. The matter was referred to the provincial Estates of the north, and thus several precious weeks were lost, while later in the general deliberation there was opposition encountered from Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen, and from the preachers and merchants who had disapproved also of the Truce in 1609. The prince waxed impatient, because peace could no longer be compelled under terror of arms, now that his army had suffered much from sickness and was growing weaker. The southern deputies urged patience upon him and concessions upon the infantia. They declared to the latter that peace was necessary at any price and entreated her to yield to the demands of the northerners. Finally came the report that the general body by a majority of votes had determined to take up the negotiations, but it was desired to conduct them not at Maestricht but in The Hague.

This decision displeased the prince, who was continually incited by the noble conspirators to risk an invasion on his own authority. It was obviously due to the antagonism of the war party, backed up by the French and Swedish ambassadors, and partly perhaps to bribery. The opportunity for an invasion of Brabant was lost by all this postponement, and early in November the prince marched northwards with his army, capturing Orsoy on the way. November 24th he reached the Binnenhof, greeted on his victorious return with great marks of respect and rejoicing, with ringing of bells and booming of cannon—a well-deserved honour after the brilliant campaign.



CHAPTER III

THE PRINCE AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWER

THE glorious victories of the Orange prince had the greatest influence upon his position in the country and upon his authority in affairs of state and society. Frederick Henry, decorated with the "municipal crown" of the conquered fortresses, occupied thenceforth in the United Netherlands the place of the prince, whose power, maintained according to existing political forms, all acknowledged, whose will nobody dared oppose. More and more his high dignity acquired a monarchical, even a dynastic character, far more so than had been the case in Maurice's last years. His son at three years of age received in 1630 the honorary appointment of general of the cavalry, as a compliment to the prince who had held the post years before his stadtholdership. A year later the "survivance" was bestowed upon young "Prince" William, the right of succession to the offices of his father. The prince showed great satisfaction at this. "His Excellency," already often addressed as "His Highness" and entitled by the States "Serene Highborn Prince," had for a New Year's present, in January, 1637, the honour from the French king of being thereafter called *Son Altesse*, "His Highness," after the manner of the lesser sovereigns and of the princes of the blood at the French and Spanish courts. The States-General approved, though sensitive at this foreign interference and affirming that the title used by them signified about the

same, and in 1639 they fixed officially their own designation—"High Mightinesses," previously in use. The title of "Noble and Mighty Lords" was reserved for the council of state and the provincial Estates; inferior titles were devised for other governing boards. The nobility of Holland offered the prince the dignity of "First Nobleman," the presidency of their body, which gave him great influence in the States, where he had a seat since 1612 as lord of Naaldwijk, hereditary marshal of Holland, and where he won further consideration by the purchase of the lordship of's Gravenzande. The same year, in which the prince began wearing his title of Highness, Prince William, aged eleven, was solemnly named for captain and admiral-general in case of his father's death, and shortly afterwards the young prince was granted a seat in the council of state.

With all these honours the princely house of Orange rose high above all other families in the state, above also their Nassau relatives in Friesland. Count Ernest Casimir had obtained the survivance there for his son, Henry Casimir, who succeeded him at his death before Roermond. Groningen and Drenthe also elected the young Nassau count their stadtholder, evidently in order "to divide the authority somewhat." In both provinces Count Henry had to accept restrictions, because Frederick Henry's attitude showed his willingness to receive the stadtholderships of his cousin even under limitations. When Count Henry Casimir died in 1640, the prince again did his best to secure the succession to these stadtholderships. The rapidity, with which Count William Frederick of Nassau, younger brother of the deceased, went to work in Friesland, rescued this stadtholdership at least for the Frisian branch. In Groningen and Drenthe the prince succeeded better, and after some discussion the succession here was given to the young prince. William Frederick and his people were greatly displeased, and the

feeling between the two families left much to be desired. There was a better understanding when William Frederick with the Estates of his province bestowed the reversion in Friesland upon his young cousin of Orange.

Still higher rose the house of Orange in repute when a great marriage was arranged for the young William with the oldest daughter of the king of England. Marie de Médicis, mother of the English queen, helped bring this about from gratitude for the honourable treatment which she, an exile from her country, had received in 1638 in the United Netherlands, and particularly at the court of The Hague. A confidant of the prince, Johan van der Kerkhoven, lord of Heenvliet, prepared the affair, and while at first the king's second daughter was considered, news soon came that the proud but financially and politically involved Stuart did not account his eldest daughter too high for the young prince, the heir of the wealth and power of the Oranges. An embassy from the States-General came to ask officially for the hand of the princess and to fix the conditions of the marriage. Shortly afterwards the young prince, escorted by a fleet of twenty Dutch war ships, appeared in England on a visit to his betrothed who was scarcely ten years old; two years later she arrived for good in Holland. This brilliant marriage, which put the house of Orange on an equality with the royal families of Europe, was in part a consequence of the English crown's difficulties, making it desire the support of the States and the prince, but it could also be regarded as a recognition of the height attained by the house of Orange.

A proposed marriage of the prince's youngest daughter to the young count of East Friesland did not take place; the princess married later the prince of Anhalt. The eldest daughter, Louise Henrietta, married in 1646 the elector of Brandenburg, the most powerful of the German princes after the electoral house of the Palatinate, which

was already related to the Orange family. This house of Orange, springing from a German countship, now ranked with the electoral families; the English marriage gave it even higher claims; and the splendour of the state, at whose head it stood, placed it with the most powerful princely houses of Europe. The taste displayed in adorning the princely palaces at the Binnenhof and elsewhere enhanced the brilliancy of the prince's environment. The literary taste there was of a lower standard. None of the geniuses of the time saw themselves particularly distinguished at court, although Frederick Henry was pleased to have literary men do him honour. The sometimes witty, always clever verses, with which the prince's secretary, Constantijn Huygens, amused the court, and the erotic, moralising effusions of the council pensionary Cats, which found access there, were unquestionably not the noblest Dutch poetry of those days.

The princely court of The Hague was, about 1640, one of the most brilliant in Europe, a school for courtiers and young princes, as the army of the States had been from the commencement of the century a school for generals and officers of high and low rank. German, French, English, Swedish, and Danish noblemen sent their sons here to learn what a nobleman ought to know. The number of officers frequenting the court *en équipage guerrier* was once estimated at no less than two thousand. Despite the etiquette maintained by Amalia of Solms, the tone amid such military surroundings was freer and rougher than at the French or English court. The soldatesque airs of the officers, the frivolity of the young nobles and aristocratic dames, the lavish display, the sumptuous banquets, gave to everything a dazzling but not always spotless splendour. Well known are the brilliant festivals, theatrical performances, concerts, masquerades, tournaments, balls, hunts, games, and

aces that entertained the court circles. This joyous and stirring life differed not a little from the simplicity of former times, from the sober gravity of the Dutch people who often viewed these things with anger. Sometimes their anger mounted so high that the ministers and churches meddled in the matter. This happened in 1642, when a magnificent ball was to be given in the great hall of the Binnenhof in honour of the queen of England. The church-council of The Hague went to the prince to complain and to prevent it, but was dismissed by him with the observation "that one could not forbid all honest recreations; that even clergymen attended banquets; that dancing was an affair of no consequence, against which there was no ecclesiastical prohibition." The prince and his wife and daughters kept their good name unstained in the midst of all this festivity, but the same cannot be said of the young heir to his power.

The Hague had two other courts besides that of the prince. One was the court of the States-General, where could be met Dutch respectability "clad in black velvet with the broad ruff and the square beard, marching gravely in public places," the world of deputies and high officials assembled around the most influential members of the States. The other was the court of the queen of Bohemia in the Voorhout, where the four daughters formed a *cour des Grâces*, doing honour to literature and science. But both these circles only served to heighten the glory of the prince's surroundings.

His power was constantly increasing after 1632. In war affairs the prince exercised the functions of captain and admiral-general without the intervention of the States-General. The deputies from the States accompanying him in the field were little more than advisers. So it was also in diplomacy. He had, in fact, the conduct of foreign relations in his own hands and could carry through his project of coöperation with France.

This was effected by making the council pensionary in charge of foreign affairs dependent upon him. The old and friendly Duyck and after him submissive and careless Jacob Cats were easily won. It was not so with the able and independent Adriaan Pauw, in whom some feared a new Oldenbarnevelt. So troublesome was he to the prince that the latter temporarily took him from his important post in 1634 by sending him in the embassy to France for the conclusion of a close alliance. Only after his resignation (March, 1636) could he return, when his successor, Jacob Cats, was fully established as council pensionary. Cats was a conscientious man, a not undeserving poet, a sober, practical, and moderate character, but not very independent; furthermore timid and far from disinterested, a willing tool in the hand of the prince, whom he greatly admired. A more dangerous intriguer was his son-in-law, Cornelis Musch, from 1628 successor of the elder Aerssens as clerk of the States-General and consequently one of the most influential statesmen in the United Provinces. He, too, was the prince's willing servant, and he was much attached to his office on account of the financial advantages it brought him. Musch was undoubtedly one of the most avaricious officials of the States at this time, when it was the custom to accept presents for favours. Opposition to him became general at the end of the prince's rule, as his actions drew attention too openly. The two other "ministers" of state, the treasurer-general, Johan van Goch, later Govert Brasser, and the secretary of the council of state, Maurits Huygens, brother of the prince's secretary, were known as faithful and able functionaries who would throw no serious obstacles in the prince's way.

Foreign affairs came still more into the prince's hands through the institution of the "Secret Work." After Oldenbarnevelt's death they were managed by Maurice in conjunction with influential members of the States-

General. This committee of advisers was called the cabinet. About 1630 the custom arose of allowing Frederick Henry by resolution to choose some members of the States-General as deputies to consult with him about certain negotiations requiring secrecy, and to make decisions in the name of the full States-General. Notes of these private deliberations were soon kept by the clerk and entered in the "secret register" of the States-General existing since 1593. The prince thus secured the direction of foreign relations, as the members of the "Secret Work" were naturally among his most intimate confidants. In each province the prince always had influential friends who took care that affairs were managed according to his wishes. Johan de Knuyt of Zealand occupied a prominent place among them. The council of state also, in which Sommelsdijk still had a seat, showed itself submissive to the prince's proposals.

The "quasi monarchical" government of the United Provinces, of which Aitzema and others repeatedly speak, was more than appearance about 1640. There was talk also of the secret desire of the prince and of his ambitious son to see a royal title conferred upon them. In 1644 a plan was broached of making the prince duke of Guelders. Spain often sought to induce the prince to conclude a peace or truce by offering help in procuring the dignity of sovereign in the northern provinces, but there is not a shadow of proof that he yielded to temptation. He understood the great opposition that would have to be overcome in bringing the States to convert their servant legally into their master, although they practically acquiesced in his predominant influence. So he contented himself, like his brother, with the supreme power in fact, the splendour of which was great enough to place him and his in the circle of the sovereign princes of Europe.

There could be no thought of any extensive change in

the form of government so long as the war lasted. When that was ended, it might seem desirable to make some alteration, if not in the position of the prince of Orange, at least in the mutual relations of the provinces politically and financially, and perhaps in their governments. In these years the prince and the States had to contend with many a domestic difficulty, like those of former days, the consequence of unsatisfactory relations between the various political powers. Financial troubles were numerous. The finances of Holland were in the best condition, for in 1632, after years of investigation, it had revised its antiquated land tax and adopted a new assessment proportioned to the rental of houses and lands. Now it could justly demand that the other provinces should do their duty, so that the receiver-general, Doubleth, on account of arrears, would not always be compelled to ask Holland for money, or to make the purveyors of the army and fortifications wait for their pay. Millions were appropriated annually from 1626 for the ordinary expenses of the war, but Holland alone duly met its obligations, paying most of the interest on the general debt as well as for the army. The other provinces could only be brought with great difficulty to tax their inhabitants as heavily as were those of Holland. They remained always slow in paying the sums agreed upon, so that the council of state more than once declared it saw no way of avoiding the total ruin of the finances and of the country but to decree "execution" of the recalcitrant provinces, either by arrest of the inhabitants, or by quartering of troops, because "extreme disorders and confusion can only be remedied by extreme and hard means."

The disputes between Groningen and the Ommelands were repeatedly submitted to the States-General, but no matter how fair their decision might be, both parties would not accept it. Gelderland was also menaced with differences between the quarters of the province concern-

ing the payment of the taxes. But Friesland especially suffered from dissensions in these years. During the stadtholdership of Count Ernest the three rural quarters and the cities had trouble about the distribution of the war taxes and the oligarchic abuses by the nobility in the country. The great power of the lords of the manor awakened indignation, because all the provincial and municipal offices and unrestricted control of the finances threatened to fall into the hands of a few eminent families. In 1634 there was an uprising against the farmers of the revenue and some hated magistrates. The States-General sent soldiers to Friesland to support the government. It was demanded that the cities should be allowed to appoint their own officials. This reform was carried through, and Friesland now obtained town councils. Not until 1637 did a deputation of six members of the council of state succeed in restoring order in Friesland, and the provincial finances were also regulated. In 1640, a new system of election was introduced in the country districts, but abuses could not be abolished, as the lords continued powerful and their union made a dead letter of the best arrangements. Municipal patriciate and rural nobility aided one another more and more in defending their authority against the efforts of the common people to secure the old influence on the government, and to throw off the selfish dominion of the united city and country aristocracy. The limited power of the provincial stadtholder could not serve as a counterpoise. Nowhere was the aristocracy stronger than here and in Groningen, burgher and peasant being subject to the arbitrary will of the great mercantile families in the cities and of the ancient Frisian and Groningen nobility.

The intervention of the council of state at the instance of the prince of Orange showed that Frederick Henry's strong arm could reach out to the provinces where he was not stadtholder. His authority even in Friesland

appeared sufficient to bring order. This action of the council of state, upon whose members the prince could rely, allowed him to do what he pleased, and was not agreeable to the States-General. The relation between the States-General and the council of state became somewhat strained at times. Holland, in 1643, insisted that the provinces should give sharper instructions to their representatives in the States-General. This was evidently directed against the prince, who managed usually to gain great influence over the gentlemen long resident at The Hague and active in various governing bodies. The prince opposed this move successfully in several provinces.

Restrictions proved of slight avail so long as the prince kept a vigorous hold upon the reins of government. As he grew older and became more of a sufferer from the gout superinduced by years of service in the field, his influence declined. About 1643 it was apparent that he was no longer as strong as formerly. Holland, under Pauw's lead, raised its proud head higher and struggled free from the grasp of the powerful stadtholder. Fearful of the rapidly approaching future, when the old prince should have passed away, and the young one should rule in his stead, it resolved upon measures for supporting the authority of the States against the tendency to monarchy. The movement of 1643 for fixing the instructions was a notable sign of the times. And this sign stood not alone. Holland, and in Holland Amsterdam, had long watched the dangerous increase of the prince's power and looked with suspicion upon every step that seemed to bring the state nearer to the dreaded monarchical government, which would deprive the States of authority and its advantages. Moreover, a monarchical government meant a foreign policy devoted not so much to the promotion of commerce as to dynastic interests and to the whims of princes; it was risking a repetition of what had caused

the great revolt against Spain. In France and England the troubles of monarchy were to be seen. Fear of encroachment upon existing liberties, of loss of influence, of personal injury, of general material decline, all combined to form a party becoming bolder as the prince grew older and weaker, and as the time neared for a younger and more ambitious ruler to take his place.

The supreme authority of the prince appeared especially in the power he exercised over war matters on land and sea. He had long kept the army in good condition and usually had at his disposal a force of about 25,000 men, nearly twice as large as that of Maurice around 1600. Mercenaries were often enlisted to garrison the frontier towns. The fortresses were not so well provided as the army in the field, notwithstanding the urgency of the prince and the council of state, but the enemy was fortunately not in a condition to make serious efforts for the conquest of fortified places within the borders of the United Provinces.

Vigorous measures were at last taken to improve affairs on the sea. Premiums for the capture of Dunkirk ships had contributed somewhat to the safety of commerce. The "new beggars" of Zeeland, privateers fitted out chiefly at Flushing by the Lampsins brothers, were for some years the terror of the Dunkirk mariners. The power so liberally bestowed upon the prince and his "cabinet" in maritime matters had not yet produced the expected effect. The prince lamented the "miserable condition" of the admiral and captains, whose "reputation depends on the lowest fishwife" who complains of her husband's captivity. Hundreds of sailors and fishermen became victims of the Dunkirk pirates, and although the barbarous custom of "foot-washing" was gradually renounced by both sides, imprisonment in the dungeons of Dunkirk was a grievous trial to many. The establishment of an insurance company was again considered in

1634, but the merchants opposed it tooth and nail on account of the expense, and the project was postponed from year to year and given up in 1640. General dissatisfaction forced Admiral van Dorp and Vice-admiral Liefhebber to resign. The prince now determined to put no noblemen but experienced "tars" at the head of the fleet and appointed Marten Harpertszoon Tromp as lieutenant-admiral and Witte Corneliszoon de With as vice-admiral. Complaints, however, did not cease. Whenever Tromp took his fleet into port for repairs or provisions, thirty or forty Dunkirk ships appeared on the coasts of Holland and Zealand. The prince and his deputies were constantly reminded of the sad state of affairs on the sea. Holland threatened to withhold its payments for troops, if maritime matters were not better managed. The great companies had to provide strong convoys, and the rates of marine insurance rose.

At last recourse was had again to the promise of premiums for privateers from a fund of 200,000 guilders a year. Private parties in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the small cities of North Holland and Zealand undertook with a government subsidy to send out privateers, but they were too few to suppress altogether the pirates. Despite Tromp's alertness and bravery, displayed year after year on the Flemish coast and in the English Channel, many a ship fell into the hands of the men of Dunkirk, and many were the fights with the bold enemy. The new resources, with which the equipment of privateers was encouraged in 1645, made them increase in number, so that safety upon the sea could be attained to some extent. But the circumstance, that private enterprise accomplished what the fleet of the state could not do, caused serious complaints of the prince's conduct of naval affairs and corroborated the assertion that the war on the land was and remained the chief concern of the prince.

About 1640 no real antistadtholder party existed in the United Netherlands, but the elements of such a party were present among those who were dissatisfied with the course of affairs and feared worse things in the future, when young Prince William, known to be ardently military and attached to the French alliance, should have succeeded to his father's dignities. These elements stood towards the Prince of Orange in the attitude characterised by Aitzema in the words, "that people could not do without him but would rather not have had him." They joined hands with the survivors of the old party of the States of Oldenbarnevelt's days, who of late years had come again into the government here and there, and in whom bitterness over the events of 1618 and 1619 was far from extinguished. Limitation of the power of the princes of Orange was the main purpose of these statesmen. There was slight chance of this so long as the war on land lasted, because the power of the princes of Orange was never greater, their presence was never more indispensable than in a time of war. As soon as Spain should give an opportunity for the conclusion of an honourable peace, it would find support in these desires of some very influential leaders of Holland. There was also hope of advantage for Spain in the unmistakable striving of the house of Orange for the actual supremacy in the United Provinces, and Spain used the allurements of this supremacy in endeavouring to persuade the Oranges to conclude an acceptable treaty.

Under these circumstances the possibility of an honourable peace gradually dawned upon many people. Spain's evident exhaustion caused the expectation that it would make efforts to bring about this peace. The only question was which of the two parties was to get the upper hand: that which desired in alliance with France to wage vigorous war in order to force Spain to a general

peace as advantageous as possible to both allies; or that which sought to use Spain's discouragement in winning it over to a separate peace, which in any case would secure the independence of the northern provinces, actually existing for a long time, with the possession of the conquests thus far made in Europe, Asia, and America.





CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED NETHERLANDS IN 1640

TESTIMONY as to the condition of the United Netherlands about 1640 is universally favourable, and in the history of the Dutch people this time is called "the golden age." A petition of the council of state said the country had become so flourishing that "the report of it had gone over the entire world." Commerce was the chief source of the prosperity of these provinces, ever flowing more abundantly both in Europe and in the three other parts of the world then known, to which the famous voyages of Abel Tasman in 1642 and 1644 added the "South Land," as a newly discovered part, with a great continent and a number of large and small islands hitherto unknown. The names of New Holland, New Zealand, Van Diemen's Land, and others recall the brave enterprises of this celebrated native of Groningen, whose simple journal is among the most fascinating stories of travel at this period. Like Tasman in warm Australia, the Dutch whalers penetrated the barren north and diffused more knowledge concerning Spitzbergen and thereabouts, while other merchants visited the remote coasts of North and South America.

The chief purpose of these expeditions was the search of new routes for commerce, while the old ones were followed with increasing energy, and the competition of other seafaring nations, especially of England, was victoriously overcome. Fear of rivals caused the new

discoveries to be held back, so that the finds in Australia remained for years the secret of the company. Commerce with Japan, established by Jacob Specx and François Caron and about 1634 successfully carried on at the factory of Hirado, was in 1641 confined by the disaffected Japanese to the small island of Deshima and surrounded with humiliating restrictions, but with the complete exclusion of the Portuguese, the last European competitors, the coveted monopoly of Japanese trade was secured for the East India Company. In 1635 the profit of this trade, silver being the chief article of export, amounted to over one million guilders,¹ but the year 1640 showed no profit. Commerce with China and Farther India also did not furnish the expected gains. The company settled down upon Formosa, where a Dutch colony was planted about 1640. This became an important point for trade with China in silk, lacquer work, precious metals, carpets, etc., just as Ceylon did for Indian wares. The latter large and rich island, still under Portuguese rule and so valuable for commerce with Hither India, received more attention under the governor-general, Anthony van Diemen. From 1636 the company's fleets often called there, and the Dutch factories increased in number, until two years later a small fleet commanded by the energetic Westerwolt with the co-operation of Rajah Singha, the ruler of Kandy, attacked the Portuguese and after a struggle of two years got possession of their principal settlements. The most consideration was bestowed upon the Indian Archipelago. After the short administration of Jacques Specx, arrived Hendrik Brouwer at Batavia in September, 1632, as governor-general of the company. Brouwer endeavoured to please the directors by reducing expenditures in India and by furnishing as rich a revenue as possible to the

¹ See Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der Niederl. Ostind. Kompagnie zu Japan* (Berlin, 1897), p. 226.

fatherland. His weak rule was followed in 1636 by the government of Anthony van Diemen, who extended the company's possessions very much and may be compared with the great Coen. In the Moluccas the company's authority was firmly established and strictly maintained by him, especially by favouring the terrible annual hongi-expeditions for the systematic destruction of the superfluous clove-trees and for wreaking vengeance on rebellious natives. His power was chiefly directed against Malacca, the Portuguese capital, for centuries the centre of East Asiatic commerce, where Arabs, Persians, Indians, Siamese, Chinese brought their wares to market. Since Matelief's attack in 1606 repeated attempts had been made to conquer or at least to blockade the city, until in the spring of 1640 a regular siege was undertaken, which resulted in its fall after a valiant defence on January 14, 1641. This brilliant victory expelled the Portuguese from the Archipelago and enhanced the prestige of the company. The Netherlands were now indisputably the rulers of India.

Van Diemen, who desired, like Coen, that the affairs of India should be intrusted to the governor-general and his council, and who objected to the interference of the directors in Indian politics, demanding vigorous action and dwelling upon the necessity that "whoever will mow, must first sow," was no such cheap governor as his predecessor. His vigorous administration brought uncommon advantages to the company, although the ten years' truce concluded in June, 1641, with Portugal, which had thrown off the Spanish yoke after sixty years of slavery, put an end to the contest with that power. Van Diemen, under whom the able Johan Maetsuycker managed affairs in Ceylon, died in April, 1645, the illustrious head of a grand commerce reaching all over the southern and eastern coasts of Asia and to the newly discovered Australia. Batavia was the centre of this

commercial realm, and its splendour attracted all eyes, thanks to the two great governors who had resided there and established an impressive tradition of power. The circumstances of Van Diemen's rule were less favourable than those Coen had contended with, but he had vanquished them as fortunately. Batavia was better fortified and built, and with every year it resembled more a European city transported to the tropics. But the population, chiefly Javanese and Chinese, with some European officials and soldiers and a small number of freemen, was still of the same character. The freemen had come out for the sole purpose of making their fortune, to earn much money in a short time and then to return with their wealth to Europe. There was a lack of good European colonists, and so long as the condition of the motherland remained so flourishing, little improvement could be expected. No inclination to permanent emigration was shown in the United Netherlands. Free emigrants could not sustain the competition of the company and the Chinese. The slender pay of the officials did not better the European population in India, a mixture of rough and energetic or physically and morally degenerate elements, which could hardly inspire respect for the name of the Netherlands, although it might make that name feared.

Rich revenues and large dividends with small expenditures in India and Europe—that was and continued to be the watchword of the directors. They could well be satisfied with Van Diemen in this respect. The anxiously awaited return of the richly freighted East Indiamen seldom occasioned disappointment in his days. He sent back millions. The dividends amounted generally to 25, in 1642 even to 50 per cent., the latter being paid with an eye to the approaching expiration, for the second time, of the company's charter. Prosperity was manifested by the rise of the shares to 500 per cent. It was desired to make

new terms for the charter, allowing more people to profit by this gold mine. During years the subject was debated in a flood of pamphlets concerning free trade and monopoly, abuses and reforms. Meanwhile the charter was prolonged for a year at a time, once for only six weeks, until in the summer of 1647 a new charter for twenty-five years was agreed upon. It gave the directors a fixed salary and granted to the stockholders some supervision of the administration with the promise of an accounting every four years to the States-General. For this the company paid 1½ million guilders for the benefit of the West India Company.

Far less favourable was the condition of the West India Company, which saw its prosperity speedily end in the sharp contest with the Portuguese for Brazil. The conquest of Olinda by Loncq in 1630, later of other sections of the Brazilian coast, with the fortified Recife and Pernambuco as the chief points, had cost much money and trouble, especially under the management of Colonel Artischowsky, a Pole in the service of the States and the real founder of the Dutch possessions in Brazil. Count John Maurice of Nassau, one of John of Nassau's many grandsons, and covered with laurels as a military commander, was appointed head of the new colony in 1637 for five years.¹ He went out with a small force of nearly 3000 men and 12 ships and began to establish the government upon a firm foundation, showing himself in all respects an excellent governor. The conquest in 1637 of St. George del Mina on the coast of Guinea, the fortification of Curaçao taken three years earlier, and the seizing of Angola and St. Thomas in 1641 were his work. Africa was to furnish negroes for the cultivation of the Brazilian plantations. A new India seemed to rise up here under the Dutch flag.

At first the work of civilising natives and immigrants

¹ Netscher, *Les hollandais au Brésil*, p. 83.

progressed along with the extension of the company's authority, so that the governor ventured to undertake the siege of San Salvador, the Portuguese capital. By his advice free trade was allowed between Brazil and the United Netherlands, while the company kept its monopoly only for slaves, munitions of war, and Brazil wood. The intolerance of the Calvinistic ministers towards the Catholic and Jewish inhabitants of Portuguese descent excited among them great dissatisfaction with the Dutch rule. The company supported feebly the governor's plans, and the Portuguese strained every nerve to defend the last of their possessions. The failure of the siege of San Salvador, the dissensions between John Maurice and the Nineteen and between the governor and his lieutenant Artischowsky, the lax way in which the financially embarrassed company carried on the war against the enemy's large fleets, all made this new colony totter and finally fall. Bravely did the governor fight against fate. In January, 1640, his little fleet won a brilliant victory over twice as large an armada before the Rio Grande, and this was followed by another attack upon San Salvador.

Portugal's rising against Spain at the end of 1640 influenced greatly affairs in Brazil, but not in favour of the authority of the West India Company. The liberation of the motherland inspired the Brazilian Portuguese with hope. Negotiations with free Portugal led in June, 1641, to peace. A truce of ten years was agreed upon for the colonies, each party retaining the possessions then held by it, and in Europe joint war was to be waged against Spain. The company's stock dropped immediately from 128 to 114 per cent. and could not long be maintained at that height. Hostilities in Brazil between Portuguese and Dutch ceased for a time, but the uneasiness among the Portuguese population of territory possessed by the Dutch so increased that the 5000 men

and the few ships at the governor's disposal were insufficient to keep order. He repeatedly threatened to resign, if he were not better supported; but the company, eager to retrench expenses, heeded little his warnings, and even cut down the number of his troops and left him to his fate amid a mutinous and faithless population. The company plainly showed that it wished to be rid of this "dear" governor, hoping to bring up again its depreciating shares by resorting to its former privateering operations against the Spanish fleets from America. John Maurice would not coöperate in this. With the consent of the States-General he returned in July, 1644, bitterly complaining of the opposition encountered, to the fatherland with a rich fleet—the last from these regions.

His departure from Brazil, mourned by Dutch, Portuguese, and Indians, was the beginning of a period of confusion, soon leading to open insurrection against the company, by which from 1645 considerable territory reverted to the Portuguese sway. The long discussion of a consolidation of the two great companies was not conducive to progress, and the state's help finally appeared indispensable to the company which, in 1647, saw its charter renewed for twenty-five years. The States-General assisted the company with a fleet of 12 war ships and 6000 men under Witte Corneliszoon de With, seeking to rescue everything possible of the Brazilian possessions, now reduced to Recife with three forts on the coast. De With arrived before Recife in March, 1648, but it was too late to recover what was lost, and the Dutch troops suffered defeat after defeat. The time was coming when the Dutch flag would disappear from all Brazil.

The company's lack of money prevented its doing anything for its other colonies and possessions. Berbice advanced little under the management of Abraham van Pere, to whom it was really given in fief, and Essequibo

was not much better off. The trade there in salt, tobacco, cotton, sugar, and logwood afforded some profit, but this was of no more importance than that in New Netherland, where the number of colonists gradually increased, partly by immigration from neighbouring English colonies, but where the colony's development was impeded by outbreaks of war with the Indians. Success attended at first the introduction here of the patroon system (1629), providing an opportunity for wealthy patroons to improve some regions as fiefs of the company, but dissensions between the patroons and the company and Indian wars interfered with these enterprises.¹ The opening of free trade with New Netherland in 1639, which greatly promoted the settlement of emigrants there, and the succession in 1646 of the vigorous governor, Peter Stuyvesant, brought better times. There was slight profit from the African conquests, now that the company was losing Brazil and its slave-market. The decline of Spanish commerce with the Antilles almost put an end to the privateering which had been in former years the company's greatest source of revenue. So this commercial corporation could only prolong its existence with difficulty. The dividends and stock of the company dropped, the former to about 5 per cent., the latter to far below par—an eloquent proof of its decline, a sure omen of its fall.

The Northern Company was no more profitable than the West India Company. Convulsively it held fast to its monopoly of the whale fishery, and in 1633 secured its renewal for eight years to the end of 1642. But heavy expenses, the uncertainty of the catch, foreign and domestic competition, and disputes within the company itself did it great injury. The Estates of Holland

¹ See O'Callaghan, *History of New Netherland* (New York, 1846); de Roever, *Kiliaan van Rensselaer en zijne kolonie Rensselaerswijk*, in *Oud-Holland*, viii., p. 32 *et seq.*

could not agree about the renewal of the charter, and the States-General without discussion abolished it. The whale fishery was thenceforth free, but it was still too hazardous to be enumerated among the causes of the great prosperity of the United Netherlands about 1640, although this excellent school of seamen, forming them amid ice and snow in the north, continued to be of great importance to Dutch navigation in general.

The Baltic trade was more flourishing than ever before. The hundreds of Dutch ships, which three or four times in the year passed through the Sound to sell or take on cargo in the Baltic ports, numbered in 1645 twenty times as many as the vessels of other nations traversing the Sound.¹ Enterprising merchants, like Lodewijk de Geer, Gabriel Marcelis, Elias Trip, exploited upon a large scale the mines of Sweden and the Danish grazing lands, furnished the Swedish and Danish governments with supplies of all kinds, and became their importers and exporters, bankers, and agents. Thus the two northern powers were quite dependent on the Netherlands. Favourable results for the Dutch merchant proceeded from the close political alliance between the States and Sweden in the time of Gustavus Adolphus and, after his death in 1632, during the minority of his daughter Christina under the chancellor Oxenstierna. Relations with Denmark, which possessed in the Sound the means of annoying the Dutch, were often strained, partly on account of the evasion of the toll by Netherlandish captains, partly on account of the extortions of the Danish officials and the unnecessary delay caused by them. Denmark must be kept as a friend, or it might side with Spain and expose Dutch commerce to even greater dangers. A treaty made with Sweden in 1640 to assure freedom of commerce in the Baltic and North Seas, if necessary by a joint recourse to arms, proved

¹ Kernkamp, *De sleutels van de Sont*, pp. 3, 5.

that the Dutch were ready to show their teeth to the Danes. Negotiations at Copenhagen, The Hague, and elsewhere, a prominent part in them being taken by the representative of the States at Elsinore, Van Cracauw, could not end the threatening complications, when Sweden in 1644 entered upon the long-prepared war against Denmark.

The government of the States tried to mediate between the two powers, while Frederick Henry felt slight inclination for Sweden's sake to go to war with Denmark, whose king, Christian IV., was the relative and ally of Charles of England, young Prince William's father-in-law. In accordance with the treaty of 1640 Sweden desired the help of the States against the proud Dane, who on his side used all means to convince the States of the importance of a free passage through the Sound and consequently of a friendly attitude towards Denmark. The spring of 1644 was spent in negotiations. Not until July could the Baltic fleet of 700 vessels leave the Vlie under the protection of 40 war ships commanded by Admiral Witte de With. The merchants complained that the year was advancing, their cargoes were spoiling, and estimated their loss at 100,000 guilders a day, while now on account of the lateness of the season they could only make two voyages out and back. These figures show how important the Baltic trade was and how necessary to Dutch commerce was the restoration of peace in the north.

At first more sympathy towards Sweden was shown by the people of the Netherlands, who had long regarded the Danes as enemies. Both parties provided themselves in the Dutch ports with ships, troops, and munitions of war, the Danes with the help of Marcelis, the Swedes with the coöperation of De Geer and Trip, who sent out to the Danish coast a whole fleet of 30 ships manned by Dutch sailors under the Dutch admiral, Maarten Thijssen.

This "Swedish Dutch fleet" was twice defeated on the Schleswig coast by the stronger Danish fleet under Christian IV. himself and had to return to the Vlie in June, but the Danes suffered severe losses on land. Holstein and Jutland were conquered by the Swedes under Torstenson, the greatest general of the school of Gustavus Adolphus, and so also was Schonen by Horn only a little less celebrated. Menaced by imperial troops, Torstenson had to evacuate Jutland, but Thijssen sailed again out of the Vlie at the end of July with 22 large ships, passed through the Sound in the face of the Danish fleet, united with the naval force of Sweden, and under command of the Swedish admiral, Wrangel, won a victory over the Danes near the island of Femern. Thijssen was raised to the Swedish nobility under the name of Anckarhjelm, entered the service of Sweden, and did much to reform the Swedish navy. The convoy fleet of the States under De With was meanwhile cruising in the Skager-Rack, while their ambassadors were endeavouring to mediate in Sweden and Denmark. The Danes in their distress were ready to accept mediation, but the Swedes demanded joint action against Denmark, as provided by treaty, and threatened otherwise to settle the matter alone.

Now the commercial interests of Holland, of Amsterdam, came into conflict with Frederick Henry's policy. Holland saw a chance of doing away with the injury to its commerce from the Sound toll. The prince was unwilling by a new war in the north to divert the impaired financial resources of the state from the great national undertaking of the struggle with Spain. While he sought his leading motive in alliance with France against Spain, Holland, and in Holland Amsterdam, desired nothing more ardently than vigorous action in the north in behalf of commerce. Holland wished to aid Sweden with the fleet in bringing Denmark to reason; the prince

proposed to let the fleet cruise in the Sound only as a threat. The contest between the two views lasted in the provincial assemblies and in the States-General until the spring of 1645. Finally a sort of compromise was concluded, by which Holland promised to keep the engagements with France, while the prince no longer opposed a strong naval demonstration in the Baltic. On April 19, 1645, the States-General resolved in compliance with Sweden's request to send a fleet of 50 ships with 5,000 men to the Baltic "for the protection of commerce." Even in Holland actual war with Denmark was not desired, but it was hoped that this demonstration would force it to yield before the country was too deeply committed with Sweden.

At the head of the "armada" the fight-loving De With sailed in the middle of June, 1645, towards the Sound, escorting 300 merchantmen and intending, in case of war, to unite with the Swedish fleet against the Danes. The weaker Danish naval force at Copenhagen did not prevent his entrance into the Baltic, and amid the salutes of the rejoicing Swedes the entire fleet of 350 vessels sailed majestically in order of battle through the Sound, while there was no thought of paying toll, and the Danes looked on from their forts, armed to the teeth and enraged at this unprecedented violation of Danish rights, but not daring to attack the powerful enemy. On reaching the Baltic De With allowed the merchantmen to go their way. He remained in the Sound and cruised threateningly before Copenhagen, possessing "the keys" of the strait. Under his protection the Dutch ships sailed unmolested to and fro through the Sound during the whole season.

The aggressive but cautious action of De With and the Dutch envoys accomplished their purpose. Soon the Danes showed themselves ready to yield, and concluded on August 23d with the ambassadors of the States the

treaty of Christianopel (not far from Kalmar), which did not put the Sound toll at the low figure of the Speyer treaty of 1544, but fixed the toll lists at a moderate height for a period of forty years. After those forty years the Speyer provisions were again to come into effect. Supplementary tolls were abolished; the time-consuming visitation in the Sound was restricted; Dutch goods in the Danish kingdom were not to pay a higher duty than domestic wares; the passage through the Sound was not to be obstructed; and Dutch goods in foreign ships were to be taxed as if in Dutch ships. The purpose of Amsterdam and Holland was in large part, but not wholly, attained. That complete freedom of navigation could not be secured was due to differences in the States, to fear of the growing pretensions of Sweden, to the venality of some officials of the States, who were induced by money to inform the Danish government how far the Netherlands would go, so that in negotiating the Danes were accurately acquainted with the instructions of the ambassadors of the States.

Peace in the north was restored by the treaty of Brömsebro concluded on the same 23d of August between Sweden and Denmark through the mediation of the emissaries of the States. Denmark was able to rescue a large part of its Swedish possessions with the support of the States. It had to cede only Halland with Gothland and Oesel to its adversary, but both shores of the Sound remained Danish. The Swedes attributed this less favourable result of the war to the States which, by more vigorous aid, might have procured better terms for their ally. It was not desired to make Sweden too powerful, and there was satisfaction with the fact that the "wooden keys of the Sound" could really be considered as lying "before the piles of Amsterdam." In this feeling of and against Sweden was the germ of later difficulties with this power, hitherto the ally of the States in the Baltic, as

Denmark had been their enemy. De With did not return to the fatherland until the Baltic merchantmen had finished their voyages for the year. Thus he prevented all imposition of the toll to the vexation of the Danes, to whom he did not make his presence especially agreeable, annoying them by his sarcasm and referring in his letter of farewell to "the services" which he had rendered the Danes "in this season," although they had been "very uneasy over his sojourn." His tone showed what the United Netherlands might do in the Baltic and how their "steel blade" could dominate everything there. The commercial interests in the Baltic were out of danger, and the Dutch merchants could contemplate with pride the results obtained.

The Levant commerce about 1640 was less important than the "mother commerce" on the Baltic, but it was growing, thanks to the efforts of the able "orator" at the Turkish court, Cornelis Haga, who defended Dutch interests there with great talent during 28 years, until 1639. No ambassador stood in such high estimation with the Porte as Haga.¹ He procured all sorts of privileges in the east for Christians in general and for the Protestants in particular, and even persuaded the sultan to grant his Greek subjects a certain liberty of worship. The studies in the oriental languages of Erpenius, Golius, Warner, and others were favoured by the Turks. This good understanding between the States and Turkey was of more help to commerce than that with declining Venice which could not hold the Barbary pirates in check and paid badly the subsidies for the war against Spain stipulated by the treaty of 1619 with the States. There were relations with Morocco, and a Moroccan agent resided at The Hague. Occasionally negotiations took place with Algiers and Tunis, usually concerning the release of captured seamen and sometimes under the influence of

¹ Vreede, *Geschied. der ned. Diplomatie*, ii., 1., p. 401.

one or more war ships sent thither. The great development of the Levant commerce dates from Haga's time, and he laid the foundation for it in the "capitulation" of 1612 with Turkey. He established Dutch consulates in the chief ports of Italy, Dalmatia, Greece, Turkey, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Algiers, and Tunis. The operations of individual merchants were strengthened through the formation by Amsterdam (1625) of a "Board of Directors of the Levant commerce and navigation in the Mediterranean Sea," followed by similar "chambers" in other Dutch cities. Never was there a Levant Company equipped with a monopoly, for it was not desired to shackle private commerce, now that the East and West Indies were really closed to it. The States-General allowed the salaried directors to have a supervision over commerce, to pay the ambassador at Constantinople and the consuls and agents, to judge commercial disputes, etc. So the Levant commerce was not left entirely to private enterprise, but was subject to fixed rules. The "strait navigation" increased in these years. From Hoorn alone we are told that in 1627 from fifty to seventy ships sailed regularly past Gibraltar. Piracy in the Mediterranean between 1641 and 1650 inflicted damages every year to the amount of nearly one million guilders, and important must have been the commerce that could endure such losses.

With this commerce extending over Europe and Asia the carrying trade to neighbouring coasts, to England, Scotland, France, Germany, Denmark, Norway, was ever being developed. In 1625 half of the ships hailing from Hamburg sailed to the Netherlands. The number of vessels in 1642 plying between Hamburg and the Netherlands was estimated at 3000, without allowing probably for the many ships making the voyage three or four times. From 1613 there was a weekly service between Hamburg and Amsterdam, and similar service with

Bremen was established in 1647. The once important commerce with Spain and Portugal and the southern Netherlands gradually declined. The liberation of Portugal from 1641 allowed this country again to be included in the Dutch carrying trade. The river commerce along the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt, likewise transacted with licenses, brought great profits and employed hundreds of small vessels.

It is difficult to determine how much advantage the inhabitants derived from all this commerce, equipment and sailing of ships. Among the few figures extant those concerning the increase of revenue from the convoys and licenses attract our attention. In 1628 this revenue amounted to over 1½, in 1642 to over 2½ million guilders, while in Amsterdam alone the amount rose from 800,000 to 1,200,000 guilders.¹ As the convoys and licenses produced usually 2 per cent. of the value of the goods, this would bring the imports and exports around 1640 to about 100 millions, which assuredly is much too little. When we learn that at Hoorn in the winter of 1618 no less than 200 ships were lying in the harbour, mostly belonging to the town and employed only for foreign commerce, while 100 ships of Hoorn were wintering elsewhere, we do not wonder at hearing commerce praised as the chief source of prosperity in the Netherlands.

That industry was likewise flourishing needs no demonstration. The fisheries, however, experienced hard times on account of the depredations of the Dunkirk rovers in the North Sea. For weeks in succession the fishermen dared not leave the coasts of Holland and Zealand, or, if they did, they were exposed to severe losses, to imprisonment in the dungeons of Dunkirk, or to heavy ransoms. The herring and haberdine fishery, estimated to feed

¹ Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtsch. Entwicklungsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1890), p. 12 *et seq.*

100,000 families, the cod and haddock fishery, employing thousands of others, suffered exceedingly, and the greatest misery often prevailed in the villages by the sea. Not until after 1645 could this branch of industry attain its former height, when security became greater, and fear of the Dunkirk pirates less.

The cloth, linen, and other textile industries, flourishing from about 1580 in various towns of Holland through the settlement of many exiled families of artisans from Flanders, Artois, Hainaut, and Brabant, were long maintained at the high point reached with the aid also of the municipal governments. Some branches gave place to others, and the cloths and serges of Leyden and the linens of Haarlem temporarily eclipsed other industries. Competition caused recourse to doubtful expedients, as when goods were manufactured in other places and sent to Holland to be dyed and sold as Holland fabrics. The guilds with their strict regulations sometimes did much harm by shackling freedom, and the supremacy of commerce often made the interests of industry subordinate. In general it may be said that the cloth, woollen, and linen industry was very prosperous about 1640, though not yet carried on in large factories. The vigorous development of industry is shown by the increase of population in the industrial centres of Holland despite the pestilences that swept away thousands of inhabitants. One of the most important sources of information on the textile industry of these days is the Deduction (of 1647) of all the Dutch "cloth-drapers," who asserted that their business was the most considerable of manufactures with respect to the workers necessary in it, the washers, weavers, pickers, spinners, carders, fullers, dyers, etc., as well as with respect to the taxes imposed on it by the state, and who asked for protection by the enactment of a duty on exportations of Baltic and Spanish wool, or by prevention of the importation of

foreign fabrics, which was opposed by Amsterdam as harmful to the cloth and woollen commerce—a proof of the favour always shown in the United Netherlands to commerce above industry.

About 1630 it was especially the fine cloth and woollen industries, the *passementerie*, and Gobelin work that began to develop with the general increase of wealth and luxury. The same cause helped the progress of the diamond industry in Amsterdam, of the goldsmith's and silversmith's art in many cities, and of the manufacture of tiles at Delft and other places. The memory of the great Amsterdam jewellers, the Rensselaers, the Van Welys, and others, who furnished the courts, the richest noblemen and merchants of Europe with jewelry, pearls, diamonds, and other precious stones, the description of the brilliant productions of the Amsterdam diamond-polishers of this period may testify to the perfection of these branches of industry, as the beautiful gold and silver plate preserved from the melting pot in some old families and museums offers striking proof of former artistic skill. Best known are the tiles from this flourishing epoch of pottery, made chiefly at Delft, but speedily imitated in other cities.¹ Thus industry collaborated with commerce in throwing great wealth into the lap of the Netherlanders.

This wealth gave occasion to terrible abuses. The success of the great companies brought out many a commercial undertaking which resulted in heavy losses to the shareholders. The impulse to risk much in order to gain much, the pernicious spirit of speculation, claimed many victims in these times. After long dealing with the commerce in grain, oil and whalebone, Indian spices, and other articles subject to great fluctuations in price, speculation in Holland found in the autumn of 1636 a new field in the tulip trade. It took advantage of the fashion of raising bulbs and blossoms for the gardens of town and

¹ See Havard, *Les faiënces de Delft*.

country, where in some regions almost no more fruit trees and shrubs were to be seen, everything having been rooted up so that coloured flowers, tulips especially, could be grown. The meetings of the florists, where they came together in the cities of Holland to dispose of their bulbs, were soon centres of the rage for speculation, at first among the florists themselves, then among other citizens. These "chambers" were besieged by rich and poor, hoping rapidly to become wealthy from the colossal prices attained by the bulbs, sold for delivery in the following summer but hardly yet standing in the field. Hundreds, thousands of guilders were paid for some growing bulbs, plants of the future. In a single city transactions amounted to over ten millions. Large sums of money were made upon paper, and, when there suddenly came a decline early in February, 1637, lost by people of all ranks, men and women, magistrates and citizens, peasants and tradesmen, seamen and carters, who had deserted their work to get rich quickly by the traffic in bulbs. At Leyden, Haarlem, Alkmaar, Hoorn, Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam much was won and lost, and finally many a household was broken up, and many a life was ruined, more than figures can tell us. On the sudden fall an effort was made to save matters by providing that upon delivery only 10 per cent. of all prices agreed upon after November should actually be paid. But this afforded no relief, since many had bought for large amounts and were without sufficient means. All had counted upon great profits, and many men of property saw themselves robbed of everything—a "brainless business" that reduced thousands to beggary. The Estates of Holland and various town-councils did all possible by the suspension of payments to avert the severest injury, but they could not prevent countless financial failures, as sale and purchase had taken place in the customary form and with written engagements.

Thus ended miserably in April, 1637, the tulipomania amid the curses of hundreds who were bitterly disappointed or had anticipated their great expectations of wealth after the manner of the milkmaid in La Fontaine's fable.

This excrescence on Dutch commercial genius was not the only bad result of the great development of commerce and industry in the "golden age" of the United Netherlands. The evils of a society so eager for money, of such a mercantile state as the United Netherlands, became manifest in the predominant influence of material over spiritual interests, in bribery among the rulers and the ruled, in shameless smuggling, in the close limitation of the circle of governing families with an eye to the advantages to be obtained from the administration. The *mercator sapiens* was not particular as to how he accumulated wealth, did not scruple to sell ships to the enemy, and would have ventured "into hell" until "his sails caught fire," if any money was to be made there. The venality of the Dutch diplomatists was proverbial abroad, and people at home knew the best way of securing attention to their interests, so that fraud and thievery were the order of the day. Shameful irregularities in the management of naval affairs could not be averted by the punishment of the most prominent offenders; many captains of war ships were no less guilty of financial abuses than many captains and higher officers in the army. As to their illegal gains, the directors of the companies were in as bad odour as the officers of justice in city and country charged with the enforcement of the laws. Indifference under the mantle of toleration coined money from the lax execution of the placards against the Roman Catholics.

With the increasing prosperity of the richer citizens there is to be noted a relatively great poverty among the tradesmen, more inequality in the distribution of wealth

than before the Truce. Drenthe in 1621 had a famine, so that men died of starvation and the thatch from the roofs of houses was used as fodder for the cattle, while the cattle plague swept away 2500 horses, 10,000 cattle, and 50,000 sheep. Pestilences raged repeatedly in the cities of Holland, especially about 1625 and 1635, and carried off thousands of the inhabitants. The difficulty of aiding the poor made "heavy subventions" necessary. There were complaints of the growing mendicancy in the country. The treasuries of the guilds paid out large sums for the benefit of their numerous poor brethren. It is estimated that charity was bestowed upon about one-seventh of Amsterdam's population, one-third of that of Leyden. Facts like these show that by the side of the great wealth of many the abject poverty of a far larger number was characteristic of the time.

Although the material life in this portion of Holland's "golden age" thus left something to be desired, in art and science it was a period of the highest development. Painting was undoubtedly foremost among the arts in the days of the great "prince of painters," whose equal the world has not yet seen, whose fame eclipses that of all other Dutch geniuses. About 1648 Rembrandt reached the zenith of his talent, and posterity looks with admiration upon the radiant light of the "Night Watch," upon the charming picture of beautiful Saskia, upon the proud faces of the "Syndics of the Cloth Guild," upon the masterly group of the "Anatomy Lesson," upon many a striking portrait and artistic creation worthy of the master. With this greatest of the great, this wizard of light, the history of the time mentions a series, more considerable than any other nation can show, of other great painters, all excellent in one or more directions, all characterised by the union of strong reality in representation with almost perfect technical skill. Who can number the masterpieces produced by these remarkable artists

and giving utterance to the thoughts that haunted the souls of simple burghers, struck by the beauty in their environment or drawing from the fulness of their fancy?

In what a small territory they flourished! A circle, of which Dordrecht, Delft, Haarlem, Amsterdam, and Utrecht are the chief points, embraces the region where most of them lived. They were not divided into local schools, although now and then the influence of a great genius made itself felt in one place. Jan Lievens and Gerard Dou, Rembrandt's contemporaries and under his influence the founders of the celebrated guild of St. Luke at Leyden, settled in Rembrandt's native city which had not entirely lost the tradition of its Lucas van Leyden. The elder Frans Hals, next to Rembrandt the first of the portrait painters, formed at Haarlem an Adriaan van Ostade and an Adriaan Brouwer, the inimitable depictees of Holland's joyous peasant life. Men of independent talent like Bartholomeus van der Helst, the famous painter of regent-pieces, worked at Amsterdam besides the great master and the numerous pupils, whom he developed there from 1631 and who continued his renown and tradition until the end of the century. At Haarlem lived the excellent landscape painters, Jan van Goyen and Salomon van Ruysdael, experts in the colours and shadows of Holland's dunes and fields. Aelbert Cuyp settled in Dordrecht and immortalised the broad river, the canals and houses of the picturesque town as Cornelis Saftleven of Rotterdam did the pastures of South Holland abounding in cattle. The skilful portrait painter, Michiel van Mierevelt, resided in Delft; Johannes van Ravesteyn was active in the same branch at The Hague; Utrecht had Abraham Bloemaert, the landscape and historical painter under Italian influence, the head of a large school of imitators of Caravaggio. There were, in addition, painters of still life like

Abraham van Beyeren and David de Heem, painters of churches like Gerard Houckgeest, animal painters like Paulus Potter. Many other names might be mentioned, often little less notable, some of them forgotten until the present, when pride in the past glory of art has caused them to be exhumed from the archives and cellars of museums to testify to the feeling for art that then pervaded Holland's cities and made its influence strongly felt as far as Groningen and Leeuwarden, Deventer and Middelburg.

Many of these painters were also draughtsmen, etchers, and engravers, and their work belongs to the best of its kind. The medallion art, the art of the goldsmith and silversmith, was approaching its best days. Architecture found in Jacob van Campen, Pieter de Keyser, Daniel Stalpert, Pieter Post, worthy successors to the great architects of about 1600. Sculpture had at Amsterdam besides Artus Quellinus, the younger, an eminent representative in Pieter de Keyser.

The love of art existed in the whole people. The handsome gables and carpentry of the houses of magistrates and merchants, the beautiful towers and gates of cities, numberless drawings, sculptures in churches, elegant patterns for silversmiths and goldsmiths, for weavers and embroiderers, and for tasteful tapestries give evidence even now of the ripe development of the Dutch Renaissance. Art had penetrated deep into the popular life and formed an indispensable element of society more than was the case in any other country. In the massive furniture of the simply arranged dwelling of the merchant with its marble steps and handsome railings, in the ornamented bindings of books, in the song of young women in the household, art showed itself in its everyday dress, living and flourishing amid a living and flourishing society. No difference of faith or ancestry prevailed in it: the Catholic priest Ban, the Protestant

Sweelinck, were alike distinguished in music, many artists belonged to the old church or rose from the lowest ranks of the people.

There was also vigorous life in literature at this time. Vondel reigned as first of the poets and enriched Dutch literature with the mature works of his powerful genius. Besides the strictly classical drama and epic he cultivated the lyric art of daily life, the elegy, the cutting satire; he used historical motives from his own time and did not disdain occasional poems for weddings or family feasts. Successful in all branches of literature, he was a sorcerer of language as Rembrandt was with the brush. After his conversion to Catholicism in 1641, "wearied with vain wandering," and some years earlier, in the days of doubt and hesitation, he delighted in biblical and theological subjects and drew inspiration from them for new masterpieces. His change of religion estranged him temporarily from many of his earlier friends and hurt his popularity. Hooft, Cats, and Huygens, all three higher in rank than the dealer in hosiery, but his inferiors in talent, appealed better to the Protestant majority. Hooft, the learned bailiff of Muiden, whose later life did not fulfil the poetical promise of his youth, was not generally successful in hitting the popular taste, although the prose of his *Historien* proves him an artist in words. More popular was Huygens who, even in jest, handled the language like a perfect virtuoso, but his many-sided mind and extensive learning, his keen reason and merry satire could not, as a rule, atone for his poverty in genuine poetic feeling. Cats, the erotic-moralising council pensionary, the popular poet of the fatherland, was the most successful, and he put into rhyme the happenings of daily life, the lyrics, epics, and dramas of the domestic hearth, of rural life, of the coach of matrimony, being a poet only in form, without elevation or passion, abounding in commonplace morality and didactic respect-

ability. Around these men were a number of "planets,"¹ small copies of Vondel, Cats, Huygens, looking up to them with admiration and equalling them only in the mania for making books. There were the Fleming Van Zevecote, poet of the "Siege" and "Relief of Leyden"; Westerbaen of The Hague, reminding one of Huygens; the Amsterdam grocer, Jeremias de Decker, whose "elegant neatness" was praised by Vondel; Jan Hermanszoon Crul, a follower of Cats; the young poets of Vondel's school—Anslo, Brandt, and Oudaen; the classical Jonctys and Broekhuizen. Among the more independent minds, with Coster and Rodenburgh, must be reckoned Pels and the young glass-maker, Jan Vos, who in opposition to the classical tendency of the drama gave the impulse to a new romantic school by his *Aran en Titus* in 1641.

In 1622 Coster had been obliged to sell his Academy building and seemed to yield to the hostility of the orthodox preachers, while the Brabanters had to give up their separate Chamber and the Old Chamber languished. Coster survived for many years the triumph of the rhetoricians over their bitter enemies. After the arduous time of Smout and Trigland the rhetoricians went on undisturbed in the performance of their dramas until in 1634 they united in one "Amsterdam Chamber." The erection in 1637 of a great "temple of art" by the city government itself was very important to the drama which found a centre in the "city theatre" dedicated on January 3, 1638, with Vondel's *Gijsbrecht van Aemstel*. This was really the end of the old rhetoricians, because professional actors now took more the place of the amateurs of the rhetorical chambers, and this was promoted by the performances of English and French companies, visiting the United Netherlands and giving the example of a

¹ Jonckbloet, *Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letterkunde*, ii., p. 107 et seq.

more modern conception of art than could be developed in the chambers of the rhetoricians so attached to ancient forms.

Prose, hitherto cultivated solely as a means of edification or pastime, now began to develop into an artistic form upon the foundation laid by Marnix and Coornhert.¹ Such popular books as *Amadis de Gauwele*, the *Vier Heemskinderen*, and the old collections of anecdotes were now superseded by romances patterned after those of foreign lands, like the *Batavische Arcadia* of 1637, the work of Johan van Heemskerck. Greater, more original, and more national was Hooft's work, *Nederlandsche Historien*, the production of his maturity inspired by the glory of the fatherland and by Tacitus's classical writings, whose concise style was imitated after long years of study and preparation, to which the *Life of Henry the Great* and the translation of the whole of Tacitus give evidence. Until Hooft's death in 1647, the centre of literary life was his castle of Muiden, where the bailiff received with courtly hospitality his numerous visitors of all ranks, where first Roemer Visscher and his friends, representatives of the old Holland, later the finest Dutch intellects of the newer time showed themselves: the learned Casper van Baerle, the cultivated Laurens Reael, clever Gerard Vossius, many-sided Van der Burgh, the even more versatile Constantijn Huygens, the prince's adviser in artistic and literary affairs, his brother-in-law De Wilhelm, the daughters of the "round Roemer," their song-loving friend Francisca Duarte, De Groot's brother-in-law Nicolaas van Reigersbergen, the Doubleths, Plemp, Daniel Mostert, Brosterhuyzen, Hooft's brother-in-law Joost Baeck, Vondel, Cats, Coster, Sweelinck, all welcome guests in this circle. Even the princes of Orange visited there the bailiff. Like Hooft's residence to the neighbouring Amsterdam, Huygens's beautiful

¹ Kalff, *Litteratuur en toneel te Amsterdam*, p. 14.

dwelling at The Hague was a place of meeting for Holland's lovers of literature, although the "Muiden circle" remained unequalled. Thus reigned in the Holland of this period a vigorous intellectual life among the higher ranks, where art and science went hand in hand.

In science Leyden unquestionably was foremost in "the new Attica," as the Netherlands were sometimes called. There flourished the celebrated family of Vossius, whose most brilliant representative, Gerard Vossius, the father of Dionysius, Matthaeus, Isaac, and Cornelia, all renowned in the republic of letters, moved to Amsterdam in 1631 to increase the reputation with Barlaeus and Episcopius of the newly established "illustrious school." Salmasius, coming from France and continuing the traditions of his countryman Scaliger, took his place at Leyden with the friend of De Groot's youth, the famous philologist, Daniel Heinsius, who made good in part the absence of the most celebrated of the Dutch scholars, an exile from his fatherland. Scriverius and Boxhornius with the German Hornius represented there the study of history; Jan de Laet that of geography; l'Empereur and Golius developed the study of oriental languages; the many-sided Frederik Spanheim from Germany, the mathematician Van Schooten, the naturalist Burgersdijck, the theologian Trigland, the philosopher Heereboort, and many other distinguished professors attracted there numerous students. The Elzevirs published works there which carried their name over the entire learned world; their Leyden house was a centre for the erudition of all nations; branches of this noted firm flourished in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. In Groningen also, where lived the historian Emmius, the philosopher Schoockius, the jurist Matthaeus; in Utrecht, where a university was established in 1636 and with the Cartesian Regius the famous orthodox theologian Gisbertus Voetius lectured; in Deventer,


where Gronovius taught; in Harderwijk, in Franeker at the Frisian university celebrated for its excellent jurists, learned studies flourished, and hundreds of foreigners—French, English, Scotch, Germans, Swedes—sat with the sons of the land at the feet of the Dutch scholars in all these institutions of higher education. Outside of them men like the rector Beeckman and the philosopher Van Beverwijck at Dordrecht, like the versatile Catholic priest Marius and the rabbi Menasseh ben Israel at Amsterdam augmented the reputation of the country.

A great influence upon scientific life in Holland proceeded from the sojourn of René Descartes, who from 1629 to 1649 sought refuge there from the persecutions of his orthodox Catholic enemies in France and rest for his philosophical work. Soon he became the centre of a philosophical and scientific movement which was widely extended among the leading Dutch circles. The erudite Palatine Princess Elizabeth, eldest daughter of the "winter-king," the learned and artistic Anna Maria Schuerman, Constantijn Huygens, and the prince's councillor De Wilhem, both very potent at court, numbers of scholarly men at the universities of the Netherlands, theologians, physicians, mathematicians, naturalists, were subject to the powerful influence of the famous works which he wrote here, the most notable being the *Discours de la méthode*. He wandered from Amsterdam to Utrecht, from Franeker to Leyden, from Deventer to the little Egmont, diffusing his ideas. Here also he had to wage a sharp war on the orthodox who feared his philosophical propositions, his doctrines concerning the relation between soul and body, concerning God and the world, and who contended against him as a Romanist Vorstius or Arminius, his ideas in their eyes being pernicious to religious life. Voetius and Schoockius were vehement opponents of Descartes, of the *mendax Gallus*, whose studies in mathematics and natural history meanwhile

gave new life to science in Holland, not the least by the communications which he and his Dutch friends maintained with Gassendi and Mersenne, celebrated French mathematicians and naturalists of the epoch.

Frederick Henry's time, if not in all respects a "golden age," was yet a period of great material and intellectual development, and merits consideration as the brilliant beginning of a flourishing state which assured to the people of the United Netherlands a large share in determining the fate of the world and the evolution of political and social conditions. The United Netherlands about 1640 were not only admired by all Europe but had become in many ways a model for imitation. "What other place," writes Descartes from Amsterdam in one of his letters to Balzac, "could one choose in the world where all the comforts of life and all the curiosities to be desired may be so easily found as here? What other country where one may enjoy such perfect liberty, where one may sleep with less uneasiness, where there are always armies commissioned expressly to guard us, where poisoners, treasons, calumnies, are less known, and where more of the innocence of our forefathers still abides?"

Besides the prosperity it was ever this liberty which astonished the foreigner, this personal liberty of thinking, under certain conditions of writing and doing also whatever one pleased. The unprecedented prosperity, the brilliant results of warlike and commercial enterprise, the splendour of learning and art, the power developed by this little, somewhat rude and awkward but in its very simplicity original and freedom-loving nation upon its small territory, made other peoples look up to it with a sense of inferiority, which awakened perhaps jealousy but indubitably respect. With interest men waited to see what part this little nation would play in the political circumstances that then threatened to bring Europe to the verge of ruin or at least to lead to great changes.



CHAPTER V

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE

THE prince's campaign along the Meuse was intimately connected with the movement among the nobility in the southern provinces and indicated the importance of a closer alliance with France. If France could be persuaded to join in vigorous action, Spanish authority in the southern provinces would be seriously menaced. If these provinces themselves actively coöperated, independence might be given them. In the contrary case a joint conquest and proportional division would be considered. Richelieu, embarrassed by his difficulties with the seditious French nobles and the party of the queen-mother now in Brussels, continued secret relations with some of the southern leaders, even aided them privately with money, and had his ambassador at The Hague, de Beaugy, attentively watch the doings of the States in the matter. But he was not yet ready to gather in "the harvest which was offered in Flanders"¹ and endeavoured to gain time in order to strike his blow under more favourable circumstances. He was unwilling to leave to the Dutch their opportunity of acquiring all the spoils expected. His plans were assisted by the fear of the Belgian clergy for the Catholic religion in case of union with or dependence upon the northern States. The position of the southern malcontents was weakened by the slight eagerness manifested in the north for strong action in the southern provinces. People were afraid of

¹ Waddington, i., pp. 161, 171.

a reënforcement of the Catholic elements, of the rivalry of Antwerp with Amsterdam, of the growing power of the house of Orange. The States-General by their new proclamation of August 11, 1633, inciting the south to rebellion, showed they had by no means given up the idea of resuming the plans of 1632.

The conspirators, thus left to themselves, without energy, money, troops, or real influence upon the people, and surrounded by traitors, were greatly embarrassed by the attitude of France and the States. The Brussels government ventured to arrest Carondelet and to surprise the governor of Bouchain who wished to deliver this place to France. Warfusée was condemned in the spring, and his property was declared confiscated. The shameful treason of the English agent Gerbier did the rest, acquainted as he was with everything. The Brussels government was thoroughly informed in November, 1633, consulted with that of Madrid, and directed its attention chiefly to the weak duke of Aerschot commissioned to go to Spain by the States-General still sitting in Brussels. He was made a prisoner in Spain in April, 1634. His confessions showed that he had remained outside of the affair, but he was kept under a sharp supervision in Madrid and died there in 1640.

The death of Archduchess Isabella on December 1, 1633, delivered the compromised noblemen to Spain's vengeance, and Aytona's vigorous action at the head of the Brussels government prevented all thought of actual revolt. The count van den Bergh on account of treason was condemned in default to death by the court of Mechlin; the prince of Barbançon was arrested at Antwerp; Epinoy and Bournonville escaped the same fate by a hasty flight to France, where Egmont was already. Barbançon long remained a prisoner; the three others were later sentenced to death by default. A general amnesty wisely threw a veil over what had occurred in

order not to bring discredit to the recently restored Spanish sovereignty by too great severity.

Meanwhile the negotiations¹ concerning peace between the States-General of the south and those of the north resulted in nothing. Aytona and his faithful helper, Roose, the president of the privy council, tried to thwart the "in all times and for all monarchies pernicious" States-General and wanted no peace concluded by them. But the Brussels States laboured under illusions for a long time. From the end of September, 1632, their deputies negotiated in the camp before Maestricht with the prince of Orange for a new Truce with an alliance of the two Netherlands, an arrangement not advantageous to Spain's interests and made more unacceptable when the north proudly appointed The Hague for the scene of further deliberations. The negotiations at The Hague from early December seemed in good faith, and the powers interested were officially informed of them. The Dutch were represented by sixteen delegates, prominent among them being Adriaan Pauw and Johan de Knuyt with some influential members of the States-General; from the other side came Jacob Boonen, archbishop of Mechlin, seven others, and Aerschot.

It had cost much trouble to overcome the opposition to negotiating of Zeeland prospering by privateering, and of Friesland and Groningen jealous of Holland and suspicious of Spain. But there was a strong peace party in Holland, led by the council pensionary Pauw himself, aiming at the renewal of the Truce and following the policy of Oldenbarnevelt. This party pushed matters energetically and was helped by the land provinces in fear of the enemy's invasions and by the peaceful disposition of the

¹ See Gachard, *Actes des États Généraux de 1632, passim*; De Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden*; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, la France & les Pays-Bas espagnols*. i., p. 186.

prince who held fast to his old alternative—an acceptable peace or a war waged vigorously in alliance with France.

Difficulties seemed to grow greater. Prospects were not improved by Spain's unwillingness, now that the dreaded king of Sweden had fallen at Lützen in November, 1632, to consent to an unfavourable peace proceeding not from the Spanish government but from the States-General of all the provinces, as in the Pacification of Ghent. It soon appeared that the southern deputies had really no authority to negotiate in the name of their States-General or of Spain, but that they came only in the name of their provincial Estates. They objected to continuing on the basis discussed at Maestricht and to binding themselves to maintain a treaty against their sovereign. This attitude nearly caused a rupture. The prince managed to calm the perturbed minds and had the demands of the north incorporated in twenty articles. Five of the deputies, including Aerschot and Boonen, took these articles to Brussels. Although the States-General of Brussels declared themselves ready for concessions, the infanta's Spanish advisers would not go so far, and the new instructions of the southern deputies consequently gave slight hope of a happy ending of the negotiations, while the plan of sending Rubens, the former secret emissary, as a check upon the other deputies was not pleasing to Aerschot and his friends. Direct authority from the king could not be shown at The Hague on the return of the deputies in February, 1633, unless that of 1629 given to the infanta and by her transferred to the deputies might be so regarded. The prince and the States were angered because this was not in proper form and by the rumoured attempts of the southern gentlemen to bribe members of the peace commission. As the negotiations made little progress, Holland urged a reduction of the demands. By a vote of

four to three the States-General of The Hague determined early in March not to end the parleying, and this result was due to the prince's intervention. Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen formed the minority. Zealand was especially vehement, and Friesland and Groningen presented a strong remonstrance against all negotiation with these "masked Spaniards," as they called the States of the south.

The continuation of the negotiations began to make Richelieu uneasy about the result. Peace or truce in the Netherlands would not at all suit his policy. In February, 1633, therefore, he sent to the aid of the old and not very vigorous Beaugy at The Hague the able Hercule de Charnacé, who was to offer the prince larger subsidies, even a corps of auxiliary troops under a French marshal, or, provided the war was actively prosecuted, a treaty of coöperation for the conquest of the south, thus preventing any peace unless France were included in it. This attitude of France and similar pressure from Sweden naturally influenced the war party and the prince. Charnacé held back his offers cleverly as long as possible in order not unnecessarily to bind France. So the States at The Hague early in April offered an ultimatum of eighteen articles somewhat milder than the preceding. One addition was that the war in the East and West Indies should be continued unless Spain granted free trade in its colonies to the Dutch. It was not to be expected that Spain would consent to this. Furthermore, the States demanded a reply within fourteen days, impossible to obtain on account of the distance from Spain, which of course had to be consulted. To avoid a prolongation of the negotiations the States declared their purpose to open a campaign towards the end of the month.

The southern delegates again asked for instructions in Brussels, but the deliberations there lasted so long that the prince took the field before they returned from the

south, and encamped before Rijnberk, which fell into his hands early in June. Not until the middle of May could negotiations be resumed at The Hague, but the instructions of the southern gentlemen once more appeared unsatisfactory. Judging the time ripe, Charnacé now came out with more liberal offers than he had previously made. In private interviews with the prince and influential members of the States-General he had already intimated that France would be found ready to engage in a joint war against Spain, provided negotiations were immediately ended. These general declarations were incorporated in the draft of a treaty proposing a division of the southern provinces to be conquered. France demanded for its share Luxemburg, French Flanders, Artois, Namur, Hainaut, Tournay, and Cambrai with surrounding territory, while the Catholic religion must be allowed in the other provinces and they were to go to the north—a proposal that had a great effect upon the representatives of the States. The ultimatum of June 5th consequently adhered to these conditions: continuation of the war outside of Europe, full power from Spain to conclude peace in Europe on the terms proposed, closing of the Scheldt, cession of Breda and Gelder and one other city.

This ultimatum was not promising. Even the most zealous partisans of peace cherished few illusions more, and Charnacé did not regard the actual offer of auxiliary troops as necessary in order to attain his end—the breaking off of negotiations, although he feared the intrigues of those favouring a truce and sought to strengthen the war party by giving lavish presents in money to De Knuyt and others. Thus little more was done at The Hague than to beat about the bush. In August the prince of Orange, now determined upon war, moved across the Rhine into Brabant and menaced Breda and the heart of the hostile provinces. The measures of

Aytona, who had assembled a considerable army, prevented his further advance, and the attitude of the southern nobility, already betrayed by Gerbier, roused the infanta's suspicion. The disposition of the people also in the south was untrustworthy, to judge from the deep impression made by the pamphlet of Puteanus, the Louvain professor, *Statera Belli ac Pacis*, the *Scales of War and Peace*, favouring peace and the States. The *Anti-Puteanus* of Barlaeus, on the contrary, did not meet the popular taste.

The southern deputies still remained at The Hague, but negotiations were at a stand for want of the necessary powers from Spain. Meanwhile the uneasiness was increasing in the south, though the prince of Orange's campaign ended in a retreat to the Meuse. The admonitions and promises of the adroit Charnacé now secured their immediate purpose. The prince himself, Charnacé constantly offering him French aid, saw the uselessness of further negotiation, while the king's authority was waited for, and Aerschot, going to Spain for it, did not set out until the middle of November. A fortnight later the conspiracy in the south was completely discovered and the infanta died, the authorisation of 1629 thus lapsing. Although the peace-loving provinces of Holland and Overijssel were unwilling to stop negotiations at once, the States-General, at the instance of Charnacé, resolved, by a majority of the five other provinces to these two, upon the dismissal of the representatives of the south. On December 16th this resolution was made known to them, and they received permission to remain ten days longer to put their affairs in order. Before the end of the year they had left the territory of the United Netherlands and all negotiations ceased.

The States-General of Brussels now lost their importance. They continued in session for a time after the infanta's death, still hoping for the king's warrant and

for peace. When this appeared unattainable, they dissolved at the king's command July 10, 1634, to the relief of their own government. Thus failed the last serious attempt of the south to restore peace by negotiation between the two separated divisions of the old Burgundian lands. Spain could not possibly consent to a treaty which would have placed all the Netherlands outside of its influence and would have caused the loss of rich Brazil. Aytona was now alone at the head of the Netherlandish provinces, awaiting the new Spanish governor of the blood royal, the cardinal infante Ferdinand of Austria, the king's brother, who was still carrying on war in southern Germany. From both Aytona and Ferdinand a government in Brussels might be expected that would continue the traditions of ancient Spanish policy, and with Roose's help all remembrance speedily disappeared of the apparent independence which the south had possessed in Isabella's last years. The failure of the negotiations at The Hague and of the conspiracy of the nobility rendered the Spanish authority stronger than ever, and "reliable" Spanish and Italian officers again saw themselves intrusted with the highest positions. The provinces under Spanish rule came back once more to the sceptre, from which thirty-five years earlier they had hoped to withdraw. The south's destiny was accomplished further, and the unhappy country sank ever deeper in the slough of social and political misery.

A closer alliance between France and the United Netherlands was now at hand, though Charnacé's offers shrank as the chance of peace diminished. An anti-French party, still existing in the Netherlands and drawing strength from the ambiguity of the French policy, opposed a new treaty with this power. Fear of secret favour to the Catholic population was repeatedly expressed in the ensuing negotiations. Thanks to Charnacé's ability, the French money, the support of the

prince and of the war party, they led in April to a treaty of subsidy notwithstanding the antagonism of Amsterdam. By it the States promised not to negotiate during eight months for peace or truce and not to conclude it within a year, while France in this time was not to make any agreement with Spain. France, unless it began a war itself with Spain, was to give, besides the customary subsidy of a million, another million and 300,000 livres for a regiment of French troops in the service of the States. Both parties were satisfied with this result. France was assured of the continuation of the war in the Netherlands without directly taking part in it, and the States secured considerable money. Most pleased was the war party in the United Provinces, which had vanquished Amsterdam's opposition. Highly honoured by the States and by his own government, Charnacé returned to France, not without making liberal presents to his friends in the administration of the States, especially to Musch and De Knuyt.

The war meanwhile brought slight advantage in this year. Aytona laid siege to Maestricht, the prince to Breda, but neither gained possession of the beleaguered fortress, and when Aytona came to the relief of Breda, Frederick Henry drew back to the Meuse country and from there went into winter quarters. After his victory over the Swedes at Nördlingen the new governor proceeded along the Rhine to the Netherlands and made his entrance into Brussels early in November. Don Ferdinand was an intelligent nobleman of twenty-five years, energetic, valiant, remotely resembling Archduke Albert, but more of a fighter, one of the best of the Hapsburg princes. His aim was not a truce or peace, but vigorous war. Richelieu also had become convinced that war was for France the only means of settling Netherlandish affairs. He believed that a division, between France and the States, of the country to be conquered could not be

effected without great dangers. "It might happen soon afterwards that, there being no barrier between us and the Dutch, we should enter upon the same war, in which they and the Spaniards now are," said he with the statesman's far-seeing vision. Better for both parties would be the formation of an intermediary Catholic state. These views were held when an embassy from the States came to France—the envoy Langerak having died—to bring the ratification of the treaty and to settle the coöperation proposed by Charnacé. The ambassadors, Pauw, or Heemstede, as he was called from his lordship, and De Knuyt, representatives of both parties, received besides an ordinary instruction a secret one, both determined in consultation with the prince and his cabinet "in the chamber" of His Excellency and not in the assembly of the States-General. They were to persuade Louis XIII., if possible, to engage in actual war against Spain and to propose an eventual division of the south according to the linguistic frontier, so that France would obtain the regions where French was spoken, and the remainder would go to the States, making them the "neighbour and firm bulwark" of France. Thus the prince had the entire conduct of this important affair in his own hands and deliberated only with a few trusted members of the States-General—a new proof of his great power in these days.

At the end of June the ambassadors arrived in Paris and began immediately negotiations which led some days later to the draft of a treaty. By it France promised with 8000 men to conquer Dunkirk and Grevelingen, afterwards with the prince Breda, Hulst, and Gelder, to help drive out the Spaniards, and not to divide the south but to make it into a "free and sovereign country." De Knuyt took this project home in August, and Pauw remained in Paris, where a readiness was soon manifest for anything, even for a partition, so great was the im-

pression produced by the battle of Nördlingen. De Knuyt returned to Paris in September, but in November he had to go home again for new instructions on the subject of the Catholic religion in the provinces to be conquered, which was disputed over for a long time until the States yielded. To the vexation of Richelieu and Pauw the offensive and defensive alliance was not actually concluded before February 8, 1635. Each party furnishing 30,000 men, a joint war was to be waged for the liberation of the southern provinces, if they manifested a willingness to coöperate within three months, otherwise they were to be divided up following a line from Blankenberghe between Damme and Bruges along the southern border of Brabant and Limburg. The Catholic religion was to be maintained as it existed in the territory to be divided, and negotiations with Spain were to be only "conjointly and with common consent."

It was a question whether this alliance might be called an advantage to the United Netherlands. The danger of having France for a neighbour was great, but the Dutch rightly thought that it had not yet gone so far. It was evident that a reasonable peace could not be secured. What could then be more desirable than France's powerful help against Spain, which had been urged ever since the days of Prince William? The treaty embodying Richelieu's idea of forming a Catholic state in the south—the old plan of Jeannin and Oldenbarnevelt—was to a certain extent a victory for the policy of the States, since France was drawn into the war. Even Holland had to give way to this argument. Much seamanship was still necessary to bring the Calvinistic statesmen to an approval of the provision, abominable in their eyes and contrary to the "old maxims," concerning the maintenance of the Romish faith in conquered districts. In May, France formally

declared war and sent its troops under de Brézé and Châtillon to the frontier to act in concert with the prince. In case of coöperation the prince was to have supreme command over all the troops, unless the duke of Orleans or the cardinal de Richelieu joined the French army.

This league between the cardinal-diplomatist and the diplomatist-general endured eight years. It was aided by Richelieu's trusted agents in the prince's army, by Charnacé succeeding Beaugy as ambassador, by d'Estrades and other French officers in the Dutch service, and was characterised by friendly letters and mutual gifts and courtesies, in which the most influential statesmen had no small share.¹ The prince looked after the mutual interests more in his camp than did the newly appointed ambassador in Paris, Willem van Lier, lord of Oosterwijk, who merely performed the functions of a consul.

The united power was great enough. In May, 1635, a French army of 20,000 men was already in Luxemburg to join the prince's equally large force. But Spain had able and energetic defenders in Don Ferdinand and Aytona, while the French generals were far from able and energetic. The allies succeeded in uniting their troops at Maestricht and moved into Brabant, but the expected uprising of the south did not occur. Robbing and plundering, the combined force advanced to the neighbourhood of Brussels and sacked Tirlemont, but Don Ferdinand adopted Alva's old strategy, avoided battle, provided the cities with strong garrisons, and thus obliged the hostile army, after an unsuccessful siege of Louvain, to fall back in disorder to the Meuse.

¹Thousands of francs were repeatedly paid to them. Musch, Cats, Ploos, Haersolte, De Knuyt, Noordwijk, and others are mentioned by name among those who did not hesitate to accept payment for services rendered or to be rendered to France in the negotiation of agreements and treaties (Waddington, i., p. 283).

Disease and famine ravaged the French-Dutch army which in July lay at Roermond. At the end of the month a Spanish force surprised Schenkenschans on the Rhine, so that the Betuwe was endangered, all the more so when Don Ferdinand occupied Goch, Cleves, and Gennep. The governor returned gloriously to Brussels in the fall; the most serious harm he had suffered was the loss of Aytona, who had died of fever.

The recapture of Schenkenschans now became the chief purpose, and it was only accomplished after incredible exertion in April, 1636. Great was the disappointment over this first campaign. The French complained bitterly of the neglect and misery that brought a pestilence upon them. It raged also in the Dutch cities, while the French troops, badly organised, commanded, paid, and provisioned, died by hundreds in the Veluwe and the garrisons. Each tried to throw the blame on the other, but even French writers admit the bad condition of the French army in those days before Turenne and Condé, not to be compared with the Dutch army under Frederick Henry, whose talent shone less in the open field than in war on fortifications.

The following year was no more profitable for the allies. A Spanish army invaded Picardy, frightening Paris itself, and was repulsed with difficulty. An attempt of the prince to take Breda failed owing to the approach of the Spaniards under Feria. In Holland people complained of financial distress, demanded a reduction of the troops to 22,000 men, and were inclined to participate in the negotiations preparing at Cologne for a general European peace. When France noticed this and Spain's desire to negotiate separately with the United Netherlands, Richelieu warned Charnacé to be on his guard, and the latter protested vigorously. The war, however, went on. For 1637 a joint attack on Dunkirk was planned, but storm and contrary winds

detaining the troops in Zealand, the prince, on July 21st, suddenly laid siege to the coveted Breda, which he surrounded with an intrenched camp as was done with Bois-le-Duc in 1629. Don Ferdinand's army sought to draw him off by a campaign on the Meuse and really captured Venloo and Roermond. The siege of Breda, ending with its surrender on October 10th, was one of the most brilliant military exploits of the time, one of Frederick Henry's most remarkable feats, but it cost much money and many dead and wounded. Among the killed was Charnacé fighting valiantly in an assault upon the stubbornly defended city.

This victory was the most important advantage for a time resulting to the Dutch side from the alliance. Year after year campaigns were planned on the French and Dutch frontiers. The new French ambassador at The Hague, d'Étampes, succeeded in 1640 by La Thuillerie, and the military agent, Godefroy d'Estrades, made agreements with the prince who, supported by the aged Sommelsdijk, negotiated in the name of the States concerning the troops to be furnished by both sides, the subsidies to be given by France, and the fleet to be sent out by the States. But the results remained far below expectations. The severe defeat of the Dutch before Calloo in 1638 during one of the repeated attempts upon Antwerp, the prince's unsuccessful attacks on Gelder and Hulst, where the Frisian stadtholder Henry Casimir perished in 1640, the combined Franco-Dutch operations of 1642 on the lower Rhine, in which the French general, de Guébriant, could accomplish little after a victory over the imperial troops at Kempen, increased the disappointment of France and gave occasion to complaints of the slight power developed by the States and the prince. Ridicule was heaped on the indecision and slowness of the prince, which did not diminish with years and made him

hesitate to undertake such great enterprises as the French demanded with Gallic vehemence. Only Gennepe, a "villainous hole" in the Cleves territory, was taken in 1641 by the prince's army. The slender results of the much desired alliance awakened vexation in the United Netherlands also and strengthened the peace party. Frederick Henry's continued sufferings from the gout made him likewise less eager for war. The French conquests in Artois and on the borders of Hainaut and Cambrai were mostly lost, and the condition of affairs was not changed by the death, in 1641, of the young Don Ferdinand, who was succeeded by the equally energetic Francisco de Melo as governor and captain-general of the Netherlands.

Better fortune attended operations on the sea in 1639. Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, the worthy successor of Piet Heyn, was now in command of the Dutch fleet. Under his direction great reforms were effected in naval affairs, and the victory won by him before Dunkirk in February, 1639, with a squadron of eleven vessels over the enemy's fleet of twenty ships promised much for the future. Some alarm was felt concerning this future, because there had been talk for years of an armada fitting out in Spanish and Portuguese harbours and destined to bring a considerable army to the Netherlands. Dunkirk ships had already departed for Spain to accompany the armada through the English Channel. Tromp received orders to cruise with thirteen vessels in the Channel and watch for the enemy, while Banckerts with twelve others was to blockade Dunkirk and Witte de With with five ships remained not far away. In the middle of September this divided force was surprised by the approach of a great fleet from Corunna under the Spanish admiral d'Oquendo who had no less than 67 heavy galleons with 1700 cannons and 24,000 sailors and soldiers. D'Oquendo's fleet had commands to avoid an engagement and,

according to a very general agreement with the English government, which, however, did not expect so large a force, in case of danger from the Dutch or French fleet to run into the Downs on the English coast. From there his troops under the protection of the English fleet were to be conveyed over to Flanders in the Dunkirk ships, as his galleons were of too deep draught for the Netherlandish harbours.

On receipt of definite information about the armada the prince had set the admiralty boards to work in order to collect as many ships as possible for the reënforcement of Tromp, who was to unite the three squadrons already at sea. Work in the yards went on with feverish haste, especially when news came that the armada was in the Downs. The West India and East India Companies, the owners of privateers and cruisers, were asked to lend their vessels, which were speedily equipped and sent to sea. Meanwhile Tromp had engaged the enemy on the 15th with his own ships and those of De With, repelling the attack of the enormously superior force and causing d'Oquendo to seek refuge on the English coast. In the night of the 16th to the 17th Tromp intrepidly renewed the unequal conflict and chased the flying enemy. Then Banckerts joined him, and the fleet, after laying in ammunition at Calais, took its station before the Downs, whither d'Oquendo had steered his course. Tromp immediately sent his report to Holland with a request for reënforcements, especially of fire ships, and for instructions how he was to act towards the English. The States-General resolved on the 21st, without deliberation, to order him, while awaiting reënforcements, to keep the Spaniards busy, or, in case an opportunity should offer, to attack the enemy without regard to the harbours, roadsteads, or bays of the kingdoms where the hostile fleet might be reached, and—this he must keep secret as long as possible—if he were strong enough, to defend

himself with arms against such nations as should seek to prevent his taking advantage of the enemy.

The attitude of the English was really suspicious. Admiral Pennington with some thirty vessels lay between the two fleets and warned Tromp earnestly of the consequences of an attack upon the enemy guarded by English cannon. Tromp's council of war hesitated to move, although about thirteen Dunkirk ships had already escaped, and numbers of Spanish soldiers were going over to Flanders secretly from other points of the English coast. But the States-General adhered to their resolution, notwithstanding the English, desirous of obtaining from Spain a large sum for their protection, threatened vengeance for any violation of their law. There was a moment of halting at The Hague, because the prince, who was just then negotiating about the English marriage of his son, wished not to offend the English court, and began to be "scrupulous." Tromp, however, failed by chance to receive ambiguous orders sent him, and the English nation now expressed its favour for the Dutch side, so that the arming of the English fleet had to be suspended. In the middle of October it was definitely decided to persist in the "vigorous" resolution, considering the state of opinion in England and on the fleet before the Downs, which had gradually been increased to over sixty vessels and eleven fire ships, manned by sailors attracted by Tromp's name as a guarantee of victory. The Dutch admiral endeavoured to get the enemy out of the Downs. He let one of his own ships bring spars and masts from Dover for d'Oquendo, and offered a quantity of powder to the Spanish admiral, who courteously declined the offer and refused to leave the Downs. Then Tromp determined to attack as soon as the wind veered to the west. This occurred on October 21st, when he ranged in order of battle his fleet now grown to ninety-five vessels and eleven fire ships, announced his plan to the English

admiral, and at break of day fell upon the foe, while a strong squadron under De With watched the English fleet. A fierce battle ensued, and thanks to the superior sailing of Tromp's ships, to the bravery of Jan Evertsen, Houtebeen, and other commanders, to the skill and seamanship of captains and sailors, it ended in the complete defeat of the Spaniards. Under cover of a heavy fog d'Oquendo escaped to Dunkirk with ten of his ships; forty of his vessels destroyed or burned, fourteen carried off in triumph, over 5000 dead and 1800 prisoners formed the loss of the Spanish side, while the Dutch lost but one ship and a hundred men. On "Triton's chariot of victory" the valiant admiral returned to The Hague, greeted by the acclamation of the whole country, which in a day of prayer gave expression to the feeling of thankfulness inspiring all for the great triumph that had broken Spain's power. Don Ferdinand's army meanwhile was reënforced by troops from the Downs and the English coast, later by the remains of d'Oquendo's force—the chief purpose of the entire expedition. The French were made to feel this to their great vexation through the vigorous invasion of the Spaniards into Picardy. They had more reasons to be vexed. The visit of the queen-mother Marie de Médicis, who in 1638 unexpectedly travelled from Brussels to the United Netherlands and was honourably received there, displeased Richelieu and the king, particularly when Frederick Henry was moved to send his favourite De Knuyt to Paris to attempt a reconciliation which was politely but firmly declined. There was some resentment because so little was accomplished on land and sea in the following years by the great general and the great admiral. Moreover the French still mistrusted the peace party, which constantly grew bolder, in Amsterdam especially, where people feared a conquest of Antwerp and urged a reduction of the land forces.

Spain sought to use this feeling among the Dutch by offering anew to negotiate. Incessantly Spanish and imperial agents bestirred themselves to induce the United Netherlands to discuss a truce or peace and thus to separate the two allies or rouse mutual distrust between them. In the autumn of 1635 the States negotiated through their recorder Musch with the Spaniards first at Arnhem, afterwards at Cranenburg. Not a year passed but Spain made some effort to bring the United Netherlands to a separate negotiation or to show the prince the advantages to be derived from it for him and his house. Now a Brabant pastor, then a monk, or a French noble opposed to Richelieu, or the Danish ambassador was employed as intermediary. In 1641 an imperial ambassador, Count Auersperg, accompanied by the Spanish agent Friquet, appeared at The Hague, causing the French government annoyance. But Spain cherished too many illusions of the conditions it could secure in case of peace or truce, and of the power of its money and promises over the Dutch leaders. Negotiations between Spain and the United Netherlands were not yet serious, but France understood that it must keep an eye upon the sail, the more so because deliberations at Hamburg concerning a general European peace resulted, towards the end of 1641, in preliminaries fixing the terms on which representatives were to be sent by the different governments to a peace congress at Münster and Osnabrück. Much was still to be done before this congress could meet, but its foundations were laid.

The aged Richelieu died in December, 1642, and, although his follower Mazarin was immediately intrusted by Louis XIII. with the conduct of affairs, the States felt uneasy about the course of events in France, especially when in the following May the king himself passed away, and his widow took the government into her hands for her young son. Thus began again in France a period

of internal disorders, little calculated to persuade a wavering ally to vigorous coöperation and steadfast adherence to treaties. The peace party from now on worked earnestly for negotiation, if necessary for separate negotiation with Spain. In the long run Spain would see that it must moderate its conditions in order to end the war with France and the United Netherlands or with one of them.





CHAPTER VI

LAST YEARS OF THE WAR. PEACE OF MÜNSTER

THE United Netherlands had now become a state which could not possibly submit again to the sceptre of Spain's king. Laying down the law in northern Europe, showing their preponderance in the neighbouring, small, German states, mediating in England driven through dissensions between king and Parliament into civil war, and ruling the seas, they stood the strongest power of Europe with France and against Spain, honoured or feared by those who needed their help or dreaded their enmity. And the arch-enemy saw its world-embracing empire fall. Portugal became free; Catalonia threatened revolt; Italy was in a ferment; the Philippines alone remained Spanish in the East Indies; all Spain's possessions in the West Indies were harassed by Dutch fleets; commerce was destroyed, industry was broken up, bankruptcy of the state was at the door. Then came May 19, 1643, the great defeat of Rocroy, when the young duke of Enghien commanding a French army annihilated the old Spanish regiments. Spain's ruin seemed near at hand.

But Philip IV. did not lose heart. His minister Olivarez was forced to resign, and De Melo in the Netherlands was dragged down in his fall. In the summer of 1644 De Melo was replaced by the excellent diplomatist, Manuel de Moura-Cortereal, marquis of Castel-Rodrigo, with whom the veteran imperial general Ottavio Piccolomini was to restore the lustre of the Spanish arms.

Later the king's illegitimate young son, Don Juan of Austria, was to be above them as governor in name in order to have a chief ruler "of royal blood." Castel-Rodrigo would then only be his lieutenant-general.

These changes gave little satisfaction to the southern Netherlanders. The illegitimacy of the expected governor and his being under age appeared humiliations to them, and the new Italian-Spanish government recalled the darkest years of the war, the most unpopular rulers of the luckless provinces. The nobility began to lift up its head again; there were disturbances in Brussels, Ghent, and Bruges; pamphlets stirred the fire; Mazarin even tried to win over De Melo from Spain. But Holland's waxing influence and the waning power of the sickly and aged prince made the Dutch less eager for a joint conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, and uneasiness was felt at the pretensions of France. *Gallum amicum, non vicinum* became more and more the maxim of Holland's statesmen with Pauw, a former friend to France, at their head. Mazarin's plan of putting the duke of Orleans in possession of the southern Netherlands and forming them into an intermediary state found slight favour in Holland.

Mutual distrust assumed alarming shapes, and France feared that peace would be concluded by the United Netherlands as much as the latter were apprehensive of the attitude of the French government which sat far from firm in the saddle and might any day see the factious nobles arrayed against itself. The Catholic sympathies of the French court seemed quite strong under the new government, and some effort was expected from it to assure at least the free exercise of their religion to the Catholics in the United Netherlands, still numbering little less than one-third of the population. Catholic activity developing here as everywhere since the beginning of the century, a great increase of the clergy, the

rumoured zeal of the Beguines, sisters in secular garb exhorting Catholics to take part in their religious solemnities, noteworthy conversions like that of Vondel excited great indignation. Calvinistic synods and church councils made many a complaint of "popish insolences" and "Romish exorbitancies," and soon there was a temporary strictness in enforcing the placards against the "Romish superstitions." Although the avarice of officials, whose hands were stopped by bribery, and the moderation of many magistrates, who were supported by the prince, worked in favour of the Catholics, the Protestants could not be expected to remain content with visitations of houses and condemnations to fines, by which means the government wished to hold the Catholic population within the bounds of a narrow personal liberty of conscience. A general prohibition of the Catholic faith was urged. In this respect also agreement between the two allies left much to be desired.

The alliance continued. Five years more—Mazarin's *felix quinquennium*—the joint war lasted, year by year carefully planned by d'Estrades and the prince of Orange. But the Dutch army accomplished little. In 1643 Holland secured a reduction of the army of the States to 46,000 men by a considerable limitation of the number of men in the companies. An attack on Flanders was executed with slight energy by the apathetic prince, and the army returned early to winter quarters, satisfied with having made possible Enghien's victories in Luxemburg and Hainaut. The fleet, too, had little success on the Flemish coast. The results of next year's campaign were better. Sas van Gent, the key of the Scheldt country, fell into the prince's hands after a brilliant siege. To the vexation of the French no use was made of this conquest to cut off supplies from Flanders, Brabant, and Hainaut. Still more resplendent was the campaign of 1645 in Flanders. On the French side with the help of

Tromp's fleet, Mardijk, the bulwark of Dunkirk, then Ypres, Cassel, Comines, Menin, Bethune, and other places in Flanders were taken, so that this province was as good as lost to Spain. The prince's army and that of the French marshals Gassion and Rantzau approached one another near Ghent, but they could not agree upon coöperation and separated again. Then the prince laid siege to Hulst and captured it within a month (November 5th).

Once more the great general took the field and threatened Antwerp in 1646 despite his suffering from an attack of apoplexy. But he was no longer able to carry such an arduous undertaking to success and returned to The Hague in a pitiable condition, almost a wreck. The French got possession of Courtrai and other towns and finished the campaign brilliantly in October by conquering Dunkirk with the aid of Tromp's fleet. The fall of this nest of robbers caused an outburst of joy in the Netherlands, but in recent years so many difficulties had arisen with the French government, respecting the trade of the Dutch merchants with the enemy and in consequence of French privateering, that people asked whether Dunkirk in French hands might not become a centre of dangerous commercial rivalry or of new piracies.

Flanders now lay at the feet of the young French king, who was absolute master of Artois and a portion of Hainaut, Namur, and Luxemburg, while Brabant, Limburg, and the northern section of Flanders were already partly subject to the States or exposed to their invasions. The Spanish troops were stationed under the walls of Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, Namur, and Mons to defend the chief cities as long as possible, and the duke of Lorraine placed some of his forces at the disposal of the Brussels government. Indescribable was the misery of the country plundered by its own soldiers as well as by the enemy, and the finances were exhausted. Not-

withstanding all this, the population remained faithful to its old sovereign and would not hear of rebellion, so the discontented party of the nobility did not venture to move. The States of the southern provinces showed themselves ready for more sacrifices and new taxes. The appointment of Archduke Leopold William of Austria to the governorship of the Netherlands, the emperor's brother, an able general, a good administrator, and a devout Catholic, raised the hope of the unfortunate country, where he appeared in April, 1647. But it was then almost peace, as the prince had declared to the gentlemen greeting him at The Hague in the autumn of 1646.

Richelieu was still alive when the French government finally consented with its allies, the States-General and Sweden, to open negotiations for peace at Münster and Osnabrück with Spain, the emperor, and the Catholic German princes. The papal nuncio Chigi and the Venetian ambassador Contarini were to act as mediators. The imperial envoys arrived at the appointed place in July, 1643, and the others slowly appeared. Not until November did Mazarin send two French ambassadors, Claude de Mesmes, count d' Avaux, and Abel Servien, count de la Roche, to Münster by way of the republic, where they were received by the States-General.¹

The result of this French embassy was entirely satisfactory to Mazarin. Two treaties were concluded in The Hague at the end of February. One related to the next campaign. The other, a guarantee treaty, concerned the Münster negotiations and stipulated that there should be a joint negotiation with Spain, that all conquests must be retained, and that no treaty of peace could be made otherwise than *conjointement et d'un commun consentement*. Thus the States bound themselves anew to

¹ Aitzema, *Verhael van de Nederlandsche Vreedehandeling*, i., p. 457; Waddington, ii., p. 46.

France, a triumph for Mazarin, the war party, and French diplomacy. The ambassadors took a formal leave on March 3d, but not without a *coup de théâtre*.

Before their arrival two violent pamphlets had appeared against the peace, entitled *Necessary considerations of the faithful Netherlanders* and *Considerations on the ten-horned and seven-headed truce or peace of Münster—Monster*. The first asserts the desirability of not laying down arms until the "Seventeen Provinces" are liberated. Truly, war is "the remedy for all our illnesses." God has set our country "for a wonder to all the world," as it flourishes by war. May He therefore make "the meeting at Münster like a Babel, so that Münster will not bring forth this Monster." The second, the *Considerations*, is even sharper, railing against the "children of Belial" and sounding the watchword *bellum securitas* with vehement abuse of Spain and the pope.!

With the treaties of the spring of 1644, the war party, supported by the prince of Orange, won a victory which was, however, diminished by the imprudence of one of the French ambassadors. D'Avaux, himself a devout Catholic and urged on by some zealous Catholics of the country,¹ ventured, against the advice of his colleague Servien, in the farewell audience of the States-General to insist in a sharp "harangue" upon greater freedom for the Catholics in the Netherlands. This incautious act raised a violent storm in the provinces and brought the alliance with France into great danger. That was just what the enemies of France had been expecting ever since 1572. The preachers inveighed from their pulpits against the "popish ally"; Holland's regents were confirmed in their opinion that France could not be trusted as a neighbour; half a score of pamphlets appeared immediately against the Catholics. The *Anatomy or dissection of the pernicious design of the papists of to-day*

¹ *Négociations secrètes de Münster*, i., p. 194; Waddington, ii., p. 46.

was particularly savage in its accusations. The uneasiness was calmed by the effective action of the States-General, whose president refused d' Avaux's request, secured at once the adoption of a "vigorous" anti-Catholic resolution, and referred sharply to the impropriety of this "ticklish" proceeding, but distrust continued and hurt the cause of France here more than anything else. A severe placard against the "papists" and stricter supervision of their religious worship were the immediate consequences. The desire of coöperating with France either in war or in negotiations for peace was not increased.

Negotiations at Münster progressed very slowly. The States-General refused to send representatives there, unless they were addressed as "Excellency" and treated with the same courtesies as the envoys of Venice received. These questions of etiquette are more than a mere form in diplomacy. This form was to show the Netherlands to diplomatic Europe as completely independent even of France and "sovereign." Monarchical France, still more or less in the habit of regarding itself as the guardian or saviour of the young state from Spanish tyranny, hesitated long but finally yielded to this demand "in order to take from our enemies the hope of dividing us, on which they are incessantly working." Affairs were far from being advanced enough for the ambassadors of the States to enjoy these ceremonies. During the whole of 1644 the provinces deliberated upon the embassy of the States-General to Münster and upon the instructions to be drawn up. This slowness angered the French allies who were afraid of Spanish intrigues and gold. In the matter of the instructions the first question was whether a truce or a definitive peace should be proposed. The following year was also spent in interminable discussions, and still the Dutch envoys did not appear at Münster to work in concert with those of France as had been agreed. Spain, long anxious to per-

suade the States to a separate peace, cleverly sought to take advantage of this procrastination. In the spring of 1645 the lord of Noirmont came from Brussels to The Hague ostensibly to ask a safe-conduct for a Spanish ambassador to Münster but really to see whether there was any inclination for a separate treaty leaving out France. To this Spanish emissary as well as to others from Brussels it was speedily evident—what was no longer a secret to anybody in the country—that the Estates of Holland wished to see an end to the war, and the prince of Orange, on the contrary, hoped for much from vigorous hostilities in conjunction with the French army. Diplomatically active Spain endeavoured by all sorts of intrigues to estrange the two allies from one another and then to induce the States to consent to a separate peace. Spain thought it could bring France alone to reason, where civil dissensions seemed ever on the point of breaking out during the minority of Louis XIV. The States appeared for the time being the foe most to be dreaded, and it was hoped to satisfy them by a recognition of their independence without any further loss of territory.

Until the middle of 1645 both the States-General and the Spaniards thus neglected to send ambassadors to Münster. In July appeared there in the name of Spain the count de Peñaranda, outwardly a grandee of the old stamp, cold and haughty, but an experienced diplomatist. With him were the archbishop of Cambrai, a shrewd ecclesiastic, and the Burgundian Antoine Brun, skilled with pen and speech, the writer of important pamphlets, and a born diplomatist. Further efforts were made with the help of Castel-Rodrigo in Brussels to win over Frederick Henry by seductive offers to a peace advantageous to him. Dom Miguel de Salamanca, a monk of noble birth, appeared in the prince's camp in September. But neither he nor other secret emissaries

succeeded, for the prince declared that "he would never separate from France." Spanish intrigues had more success with peace-loving Holland. The accomplishment of Holland's plans for armed intervention in the war between Sweden and Denmark against the prince's judgment; Holland's refusal to do anything for Charles I. of England; the impossibility in conquered Hulst of carrying out the agreement concerning freedom for the Catholics, which impossibility, the prince saw, would render more difficult the winning of the south—all these facts show that the prince could not manage the Estates as he pleased. Spain took advantage of these differences. While the two French envoys in Münster, so much at variance that the duke de Longueville had to be sent as a third person to keep order, were dancing the "ballet of peace," Spain started in the winter of 1645–1646 an intrigue which extorted admiration from Mazarin, an expert in such matters.

Dutch negotiations at Münster advanced a great step. Eight representatives of the States-General, two from Holland and one from each of the six other provinces, arrived in Münster on January 11, 1646. A stately commission they formed, consisting of: Barthold van Gent, lord of Meinerswijk, representing Gelderland and acting as chairman; Johan, lord of Mathenesse, and Adriaan Pauw, lord of Heemstede, for Holland; Johan de Knuyt, the prince's adviser, for Zealand; Godard van Reede, lord of Nederhorst, for Utrecht; Frans van Donia for Friesland; Willem van Ripperda, lord of Hengeloo, for Overijssel; Adriaan Clant of Stedum for Groningen. The ablest and most influential members were undoubtedly Pauw and De Knuyt. The delegation was bound by oath to ample instructions, no less than 116 articles in length, the substance being that a truce of at least twelve years must be sought with full recognition of independence, and that the agreement of 1644 for joint action with France

must be maintained, so that a close correspondence must be kept up with the ally's ambassadors.

This correspondence was just what the Spaniards wished to destroy. At Münster the Spanish plenipotentiaries were extremely courteous to the Dutch and suggested a renewal of the Truce of 1609. But they began something else at the same time. In the history of the revolt of the Netherlands there had been talk of an arrangement between the Spanish and French crowns to have a marriage of a member of the royal family of France to a Spanish infanta who was then to receive the Netherlands as her dowry. In 1644 the Venetian ambassador at Münster, Contarini, had sounded the French envoy d' Avaux about such an approach to Spain. Contarini came back to the subject in the summer of 1645, but the French government cautiously declined or postponed all negotiation. If it could be made to appear that France herself had proposed such a marriage between the young Louis XIV. and a Spanish infanta, the existing distrust of France would increase, and the States, or the prince himself perhaps, might be induced to anticipate France by consenting to a separate treaty with Spain. Especially would the distrust become great, if suspicion were raised that France had bargained with Spain for the sovereignty not merely over the Spanish Netherlands but over all the Netherlands. With the deepest secrecy everything was prepared and discussed by the Spanish ambassadors at Münster with Castel-Rodrigo. Something had probably leaked out of another plan, conceived much earlier by Mazarin, for persuading Spain to cede the Spanish Netherlands to France, which in return would stop supporting the insurrection in Catalonia, would give up Roussillon, and would not be averse to the king's marriage with a Spanish infanta. In February Mazarin sent d'Estrades to The Hague to sound the prince concerning this plan. The

States might then obtain Antwerp either for the prince or themselves. D'Estrades was cautiously to bring up the subject of the marriage, but only with a view to the possession of the Spanish Netherlands, while Spain and France were to declare the northern provinces free.

Castel-Rodrigo sent from Brussels to the prince a report¹ of the pretended French offer to Spain concerning a mediation by the queen-regent of France. The prince grew suspicious and received d'Estrades coolly at first. The affair was just the reverse, and this time Spain had first spoken of the marriage. D'Estrades communicated Mazarin's plan to Frederick Henry who seemed finally not unwilling to consent to it. On February 28th the prince, appearing personally in the Estates of Holland and the States-General, made known what d'Estrades had told him and urged that the project should be approved, but that more should be asked from France, the division of the Spanish Netherlands in accordance with the 1635 treaty of partition. While the matter stood thus, a cleverly constructed pamphlet in French appeared from the Spanish side,² entitled *The discovery of the depths of Spain concealed under this proposition of giving the infanta of Spain in marriage to the king of France with the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands as a dowry*, in which, under the guise of a violent attack upon Spain, France was much compromised as desiring sovereignty over the States. There arose great indignation³ in the Dutch provinces under the influence of the rumours, coming from all sides and diligently spread by Spain, about the real plans of France. The prince himself, on account of his attitude towards d'Estrades, fell temporarily into suspicion with the States

¹ Chéruel, *Minorité*, ii., p. 276.

² *Négociations*, iii., p. 131, where Mazarin says this in a letter to his plenipotentiaries at Münster.

³ Van der Capellen, ii., p. 142.

of having conspired secretly with France and Spain, while Pauw, warned by Spain, hastened from Münster and thought of carrying through rapidly a separate treaty with Spain. Mazarin considered that his only safety lay in caution and perfect sincerity. No "useless reproaches, which would lead them to do worse," he said, but frank declarations both at Münster and The Hague. Before the end of March such a declaration was made in the name of the queen-regent of France. She asserted that she would refuse all Spanish offers and would negotiate according to the treaties concluded with the States "conjointly and to the satisfaction of this state."¹ Mazarin congratulated himself that he had not given into the hands of the Spaniards a single bit of writing relative to the affair.

It was high time, for Holland, "full of suspicion," had already declined to furnish money for the new campaign in Flanders. Public feeling improved at once and early in April a treaty was signed for the campaign of 1646. Spanish machinations had failed this time. What had occurred caused an outburst of distrust of France. From the pulpits men preached against France, alluding to the night of St. Bartholomew, the French Fury, Richelieu's persecution of the Huguenots, and the separate peace with Spain concluded by Henry IV. in 1598 at Vervins. A series of anti-French pamphlets appeared, discussing also Mazarin's ambiguous attitude, plans ascribed to the Catholics, and d' Avaux's harangue. Characteristic of the popular opinion is the *Münster gossip*,² of which at least six editions came out in 1646, and which advised separate truces in the interest of commerce—"when it goes well with the merchant, then it goes well also with hundreds of thousands of common workmen"—and on account of the dangers now manifest

¹ Aitzema, *Vredeh.*, ii., p. 29.

² Knuttel, No. 5289-95.

from the French side. France, it asserts, is beginning with its connections to surround us on all sides and to predominate over all Europe. To the same category belongs the pamphlet *St. Anne's dream*, in which a woman enlightens her husband on the danger of having France for a neighbour; the *French gossip* remarks on the matrimonial plans; the *Sibyl of Holland* makes a fierce assault upon *Ryckstadt* (Richelieu) and *Zamarin*; the *Copy of a letter sent to The Hague* in French describes, as perilous to the state, the ambition of the prince of Orange "who has no other design than to raise his fortune upon our ruins."

Pamphlets in favour of France flowed out slowly against this broad stream of libels. Mazarin invited his ambassadors at Münster to answer *Le caquet françois*, and in April, 1646, appeared for this purpose the *Letter of a Venetian gentleman to his friend in Turin*¹ with a Dutch translation. This letter referred to the Spanish intrigues of the spring and to the Spanish desire for "universal monarchy," which must have made Spain, the "sick man" of those days, smile sadly at the contrast between its former pretensions and present weakness. Of the same kind are the *Earnest and faithful discourse* and the *Holland gossip*. One pamphlet supports the interests of the fatherland against opponents of all sorts. It is the remarkable little book, *The unfeigned Netherland patriot*, repeatedly printed and afterwards continued, in which the much reviled Musch is pilloried and both Spaniards and Frenchmen are made out all that is bad, with the result that nothing more than truces ought to be concluded. It shows that Dutch neutrality must be maintained between the great powers and may pass for the first rough sketch of the later policy of the States toward Europe.

Amid all the talk raised by more than twenty-five

¹ *Négociations*, iii., 410.

pamphlets in this year both the negotiations in Münster and the war in Flanders continued. In both it appeared that the seed of suspicion had grown up luxuriantly between France and the States. The prince's increasing weakness of mind and body was also harmful in the prevailing mistrust of the intentions of the princess and her son. The events of the spring of 1646 had made the best friends of France waver: the "blue little books scattered among the people" show this plainly. Popular opinion, regarding the Spaniard as the country's enemy, now changed completely and for good,¹ as is evidenced by numerous anti-French pamphlets and the desire for peace expressed in them. Even the prince had been unable to keep his old sympathy for his mother's native land and had turned angrily from his former friends, especially when Spain showed a willingness to satisfy his wishes. He was reconciled with d'Estrades again and between the severe attacks of his malady seemed inclined to coöperate with France, but the old confidence had disappeared. This was only too evident to the French envoy at The Hague from the attitude of the prince's friends and from the increasing influence of the princess, whose sympathies for France had never been strong in spite of all its presents to her of pearls, diamonds, and money. But France's greatest enemies were the principal regents of Holland, as sufficiently appeared from all their acts, and they would gladly have concluded a truce or peace with Spain.

From 1646 Mazarin could not count upon the aged prince and his friends among the ambassadors at Münster, who inclined more and more to the side of Pauw and the party of peace. De Knuyt became very suspicious to the French, because he and the other Dutch representatives, with the exception of Nederhorst, conferred openly and secretly with those of Spain and concealed from the

¹Compare *Doc. inéd.*, T. 82, p. 356.

French the subject of their deliberations. There were murmurs of the bribery of Pauw and De Knuyt, even of the princess, by Spanish gold. Both those gentlemen dined and wined at Münster with the Spaniards and were extremely intimate with them. From intercepted correspondence of Peñaranda the French ambassadors saw plainly what was doing. Spain conceded everything to the States, and in May agreement had been reached on many articles of a proposed treaty for a truce. In the summer the Dutch envoys went home in turn, apparently to seek an approval of their actions from the provincial Estates. The French protested to their Dutch colleagues at Münster and to the States-General and the province of Holland at The Hague. The States answered satisfactorily, but their army, taking the field late in the summer, lay still, and everything indicated the expectation of a suspension of hostilities preliminary to a treaty. The Hollanders at Münster tried with little success to mediate also between Spain and France. In November, 1646, however, the preliminary treaty between Spain and the republic, seventy articles long, was ready. It was no truce but a treaty of peace.

In the autumn Holland had urged upon the other provinces to negotiate not for a truce but for a definitive peace, to which Spain seemed well disposed. This proposal prevailed at length, although the ever bellicose Zeeland long opposed it. The word truce was replaced by peace in the provisions already agreed upon. After much wrangling, negotiations were so far advanced at Münster in January, 1647, that seven of the eight Dutch envoys resolved to sign the terms made with Spain on condition that this signature should only be valid when a treaty between France and Spain became possible. This stipulation was dangerous to the work of peace, as France positively refused to give back its conquests in Italy, and Spain would not consent to the interference

of France in the affairs of Catalonia and Portugal. The States might be expected to let this condition drop, whenever peace between Spain and France should be impossible to bring about.¹

A profound difference of opinion arose between the Dutch ambassadors at Münster in the course of these negotiations. The Utrecht delegate, Nederhorst, did not feel justified in thus working against France, continued his consultations with d' Avaux and Servien long after his colleagues had stopped them, and refused to sign the preliminary treaty with Spain as long as the States-General and his province had given him no special authorisation to do so. France understood that matters had taken a serious turn and determined upon extreme efforts to bring the States back to the right road at the eleventh hour. It had to contend against the newly awakened distrust of France, to remind the house of Orange of its old relations with the French royal family, and to bribe, if possible, some prominent persons in Holland, in order to prevent the conclusion of a separate treaty between Spain and the States. Early in January, 1647, Servien came from Münster to The Hague ostensibly to make new guarantee and subsidy treaties with the republic but really to disturb the work of peace. He brought 30,000 livres for the bribery of statesmen and of clerks who could furnish him documents of all kinds.

A superficial acquaintance with the correspondence between the French plenipotentiaries and their government shows such expectations to be far from baseless. So thought also the Spaniards. Peñaranda wrote concerning the States: "it is a government in which everybody takes pay."² From the Spanish side, 200,000 guilders were provided for the first expenditures to pro-

¹ On all this see *Doc. inéd.*, T. 83, pp. 3-118, and *Négociations*, iv., *passim*.

² *Doc. inéd.*, T. 84, pp. 123, 169, 178.

mote an exchange of the ratifications. Seldom does one encounter such a positive proof as can be given of the bribery attempted by Servien in the spring of 1647. It is his accounting for the 30,000 livres.¹ After reading this document one ceases to wonder that the accusation of bribery was so often heard in those days. Repeatedly Nederhorst charged his opponents Pauw and De Knuyt with it and they him. Servien managed matters very cleverly. During half a year he worked assiduously to break up the newly concluded peace. Vehement harangues to the States-General, letters no less sharp, special missives to the provinces outside of Holland, pamphlets against peace, conversations with the leading statesmen, visits to the chief cities—he spared nothing to attain his end.

The death of the prince in March, 1647, made little change in the situation. The health of the long suffering Orange prince had rapidly deteriorated in the last year. His legs were swollen, his hands stiffened, his throat and lungs gave out, his mind now and then entirely failed him; a sort of childishness began to appear, which unfitted him for the serious consideration of affairs and made him wish more for peace and rest. He was now ruled completely by his vigorous wife, while his son, afraid of the father's jealousy, kept in the background and dared only act in secret with d' Estrades and Mazarin. The son, who longed eagerly to distinguish himself in war, was a decided adherent of the French policy of coöperation, and influenced by Mazarin and his agents he privately opposed the party of peace.² The Spanish intrigues did not miss their aim in these circumstances, although the old prince would not allow himself to be led into compromising engagements with Spain.

¹ See Blok's essay: *De Nederlandsche vlugschrijven over de vredesonderhandelingen te Munster*, in *Vers. en Med. Kon. Akad.*, iv., 1, p. 321.

² Waddington, ii., p. 133.

Suddenly his condition grew worse and within a few days he was dying. On March 14, 1647, he breathed his last.

His young successor, William II., twenty-one years of age, ardent and energetic, but frivolous and, though brave, inexperienced in war, little of a statesman, and, despite his indisputable rights, not immediately put by the provinces in the place of his dead father, showed himself at first more inclined to enjoy questionable pleasures with his friends at court, in the ballroom and the chase, in the theatre and on the race-course, than to take a strong hold of affairs. He let them go as they pleased, not without manifesting sympathy for the French government, but, under his mother's influence, not declaring himself sharply as to the desirability of peace. No great help could be expected from him by the peace party but also no opposition, provided the interests of the house of Orange were not neglected.

The advocates of peace saw their plans succeed. Almost simultaneously with Servien appeared in the name of the Spanish government Philippe le Roy, secretary of finance at Brussels, provided with over a million and a half guilders, to work for peace. Le Roy came on behalf of the marquis de Castel-Rodrigo, who was anxious to convince the States-General of the unwillingness of France to conclude peace upon any terms whatever and to give them the means of overcoming the opposition of this power. To the vexation of Servien, le Roy was admitted to the States-General and delivered his message in a long document, the *True Relation*,¹ a survey of the negotiations, which was printed like Servien's harangues and propositions and distributed everywhere as a pamphlet. Thus was published in the spring of 1647 another series of pamphlets, numbering with reprints no less than fifty, in which Servien and the war party contended in

¹Cf. *Vredeh.*, ii., p. 203; *Négociations secrètes*, iv., where several other pamphlets are also printed.

“many beautiful discourses and tracts” with the party of peace.¹

Some of these writings proceeded from Antoine Brun, the well-informed diplomatist, who crossed the frontiers on pretext of a journey to Brussels and wished to visit The Hague. The French ambassador moved heaven and earth to prevent this, so that the Estates of Holland from fear of public opinion begged Brun to give up his purpose. The negotiator returned by way of Leyden, Amsterdam, and Deventer, not without conferring with various persons, distributing money, and praising the peaceful disposition of Spain in a *Representation* dated from Deventer, which was supported by some *Observations* attributed to Adriaan Pauw. By the latter was a collection of pieces relating to the negotiations and personally assailing Servien. The most noteworthy work of this time is Brun's *Touchstone of the true interests of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and of the intentions of the two crowns concerning the treaties of peace*. In this Servien's productions were contested point by point in excellent French, among others the sharp *Letter written from The Hague by a French gentleman to a friend in Paris*, and the advantages of peace were contrasted with the evils of war. The violent tone of Servien's speeches, calling out violent replies, tended with these pamphlets to stir up the minds of men. Servien openly accused Pauw and De Knuyt of “impostures which they have forged in concert with the ministers of Spain”² and demanded the punishment of these faithless ambassadors.

The other Dutch plenipotentiaries now left Münster³ for The Hague, as for lack of integrity they were also attacked,

¹ *Vredeh.*, ii., p. 249; Van der Capellen, ii., p. 176.

² Aitzema, *Vredehand.*, ii., p. 336 *et seq.*

³ *Négociations*, iv., p. 119; *Doc. inéd.*, T. 83, p. 226. Pauw remained there the last—until April—but he was finally left completely alone by the French ambassadors.

Nederhorst by the Spaniards, the others by the French. None of them was present at Münster in the summer. They were of little use there, when negotiations terminated between Spain and the ambassadors of the States, and the only question was whether the provinces would sanction the conclusion of peace without France. This long continued uncertain, and great excitement prevailed about it in all the provinces. Holland, where Amsterdam, under the lead of Pauw and Andries Bicker, turned opinion against France, was ready for this course and sent delegations in advocacy of it to the other provinces. War stopped in fact, and notwithstanding the urgency of France it was resolved not to take the field in 1647, the Spanish responding with a suspension of hostilities on land and water. A weak attempt of William II. to keep up the war by sending troops into the district of Waes, under the pretence that Spain was also collecting soldiers in Flanders, was sharply countermanded by the States-General. It was really as good as peace.

To save appearances the States-General on July 29th signed at last a new treaty of guarantee with France, but only for the not very probable contingency that peace should be concluded at Münster also between France and Spain. Satisfied with having given another check to the Spanish policy, Servien returned immediately to Münster, where the temporarily interrupted negotiations were resumed in September. It was evident that the States might make peace with Spain at any moment. Like genuine traders, they sought to bargain for more than was already obtained. Pauw, "the shrewdest and most dangerous of all,"¹ feigned after his return to Münster a willingness to coöperate with France, aiming naturally to render Spain more pliable. Spain gradually yielded upon nearly all points, so that Sweden and

¹*Négociations*, iv., p. 80; compare for these last negotiations especially *Doc. inéd.*, T. 83, p. 476; T. 84, p. 5.

Austria intervened in order not to raise the States too high. Then Pauw and his friends restrained themselves, and everything was ready at Münster by November. Pauw and De Knuyt with Mathenesse, indisputably the three chief personages, left for The Hague on October 16, 1647, and endeavoured to carry the affair through. Violent discussions took place in the States-General, but it was finally agreed that for the sake of the existing treaties one more attempt should be made to bring about peace between France and Spain.¹

Thus began again the mediation of the States at Münster, but at the same time the treaty of peace with Spain was brought into shape. The mediation between France and Spain seemed at first to have some success, but the agreement between the latter and the States was already so far advanced that Spain urged peace upon the republic, threatening to break off everything. The signature of the treaty was alone lacking, and Nederhorst's opposition gave the French hope that the affair would not be settled, especially when De Knuyt, veering with every wind and apparently influenced by the warlike young prince, exhausted himself in assertions of his willingness, with Zealand and the house of Orange, to help France to a satisfactory peace.

The French soon had no more illusions. At The Hague the French ambassador La Thuillerie still protested, and by Nederhorst's advice France endeavoured to secure postponement so far as possible. But nothing availed. De Knuyt became more intractable every day, and Nederhorst observed that he would eventually have to give way to the general wish. He declined to participate on January 30, 1648, when the others after some hesitation signed under pressure from Spain, which declared it would consent to no further delay. The French government continued to protest at The Hague,

¹ Van der Capellen, ii., p. 204.

first against the signing, then against the ratification, but Holland, always guided by Pauw, pushed the affair through in spite of the resistance of Utrecht and Zeeland. The end was that the States-General by five out of seven votes resolved on April 4th to confirm the peace. Utrecht yielded a few days later, but Zeeland persisted in its refusal until after the formal exchange of the ratifications on May 15th in the city hall of Münster.

It may be imagined that these varying opinions brought out another flood of pamphlets over the Netherlands in the course of 1647. These pamphlets show that three parties existed: the strong and active peace party which more and more won the upper hand; the small war party¹ whose writings are most violent in tone; and the quite numerous neutrals who would have preferred to make peace in conjunction with France but in the end, like middle parties usually, displayed little force and went over to the camp of the peace party. The prince of Orange was of slight aid to the war party, the less so because his mother ardently desired peace, but Zeeland's stubborn opposition was to be ascribed to him. His later opinion of "these Amsterdam rascals who made peace" is well known, but the French government had reason to complain of his far from vigorous attitude in these critical days. It did not hold to his view that the war must be continued in any case.²

The stream of pamphlets flowed on in the spring of 1648.³ The French ambassador's *harangues* and *propositions* were followed by *Ingredients and amplifications of answer*; the French *Corrective* was replied to by a sharp *Lenitive*; and the war party resorted to the anti-Spanish weapons from its old arsenal to oppose the ratification of the treaty of January 30th. Remarkable is the paper

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 226: "Those who favour us are few in number and hardly dare to speak."

² Chéruel, *Minorité*, ii., p. 488.

³ Knuttel, No. 5672-5740.

war between Nederhorst and Pauw, who had become fierce personal enemies at Münster. Nederhorst's friendliness towards France at Münster roused the ire of Holland's representatives as much as their supposed Spanish leanings did his. The numerous visits made openly and secretly by the French upon their Dutch ally, the interviews in his house and theirs, were excused by the conscientious Nederhorst on the ground of the original instructions given the envoys of the States, commanding them to act in close harmony with the French. On the same ground he reproached his adversaries for their intimate relations with the Spanish plenipotentiaries, who treated Pauw and De Knuyt especially with extreme civility and would have nothing to do with Nederhorst after his refusal to sign the first draught of peace of December, 1646. Matters were no better between Nederhorst and the others in the course of 1647. Mutual accusations of bribery occur in the pamphlets of the spring. The *Deductions* presented to the States-General by both parties in January, 1647, had not bettered the situation. There was serious talk in the Estates of Holland and even in the States-General of dismissing Nederhorst, but the support given by the Estates of Utrecht to their representative prevented this. His refusal to sign the definitive treaty of peace of January 30, 1648, caused renewed exasperation. He was sickly and often did not attend the meetings of his colleagues. Although he signed later, his repeated absences prevented action for the time. The *Reasons* for his new refusal he presented to the States-General on February 3, 1648. They were immediately answered in a vehement *Contrary advice and refutation* by Mathenesse and Pauw, to which Nederhorst replied in an equally violent *Representation*. These writings were widely read in the spring of 1648.

A sequel to this contest of pens was that waged in the

summer of 1648 and occasioned by the appearance of a sharp anti-Spanish pamphlet, entitled: *La Confession de l'imprimeur*, almost simultaneously coming out in Dutch as *The printer's confession*. Servien, apparently with Nederhorst's aid, made a last powerful effort, shortly before the signing of the ratification, to throw suspicion upon Pauw and his friends. This remarkable pamphlet explains clearly once again the advantages of a close alliance with France in opposition to "Bicker and his adherents" and "Pauw and his cabal," whose avarice and eagerness for the profitable commerce with Spain are scourged. The ambition of Pauw and Bicker, "those great personages who have become friends like Herod and Pilate," is ridiculed. Pauw was indeed the generally recognised leader of the peace party.¹ The *Answer to the printer's confession* (by De Knuyt?) is no less violent against the "French tributary Nederhorst," the "little devil" from Utrecht. The following *Reflection*, with its coarseness directed against the "jaundiced scoundrels," Bicker and Pauw, and De Knuyt alias *Guyt* (rogue), surpasses all in vulgarity of language. The long *Penitence* and the worthier *Netherlandish absolution*, attributed to Pauw himself, finish this unpleasant confession series. Soon afterwards Nederhorst died.

The tone of the writings last mentioned shows the prevailing bitterness and how weak the opponents of peace were to descend to such means in order to avert their coming defeat. The *Dialogue between Waraer and Frederick*, written between April 17th and 25th, refers to the dissensions between Holland and Zeeland, which latter province threatened with the support of the prince and of France to continue the war and to live by privateering like Tunis or Algiers. It refers also to the strife between Holland and the other provinces which made a

¹ Hence the gratitude of the Spaniards towards him (*Doc. inéd.*, T. 84, p. 96).

regent say: "rather French than Hollandish." This discord was indeed a great peril. But the views of Holland triumphed likewise over the not very serious opposition of William II. coming up at the eleventh hour. The popular rejoicing at the peace in Holland and elsewhere was manifest in the performances given in June in honour of the peace with words by such men as Samuel Coster, Gerard Brandt, Jan Vos, with verses by Vondel and others addressed to Andries Bicker and his colleagues. Vondel's *Leeuwendalers* immortalised this feeling in the charming idyll of Hageroos and Adelaert, "united by unfeigned love," and sung the song of peace.

Joy was not everywhere. The war party smarted under its defeat and abstained from festivities. The representatives of France, Sweden, Portugal, and Hesse declined to burn before their dwellings the tar-barrels offered them. The prince did not yet openly venture to show displeasure, but to his friends he expressed his indignation at the intrigues of the peace party. Zeeland and Leyden had no celebration, and in many a city and village the preachers inveighed from the pulpit against the promoters of peace. People remembered on June 5th, the day of the proclamation of peace, that just eighty years earlier Egmont and Hoorn had been beheaded, and the festivities seemed somewhat forced, "like a marriage that takes place without the consent of friends," as Aitzema jestingly remarks.

In truth a dark shadow upon the treaty was this lack of the "consent of friends," particularly of that of France, with which country a close alliance had so recently been made. The excuse often heard for this breaking of faith with France, that this kingdom only feigned a wish to conclude peace and never really desired it, rests on an unjust conception of the facts.¹ It is not to be denied that the United Netherlands for their own advantage left

¹ Compare Chéruel, *Minorité*, ii., p. 475.

France in the lurch, and they were certainly not in such dire distress that peace became absolutely necessary. This was rather the case with Spain, and if France and the States had acted "conjointly and with common consent," as was the phrase of sworn conventions, it would have led to peace also between Spain and France, which was now postponed for eleven years. No other apology for the conduct of the States towards France can be found than the very dubious morality embodied in the proposition that treaties are only valid so long as they coincide with the temporary interest of the powers concerned, an idea that has countless times been put in practice.

The peace of Münster was brilliant indeed, and the United Netherlands might well be proud of the place it gave them among the powers of Europe. The famous treaty,¹ seventy-nine articles in length, declared in Article 1 "the States-General of the United Netherlands and the respective provinces of the same with all associated districts, towns, and appertaining lands" as "free and sovereign States," on which the king of Spain "makes no claim now, nor ever hereafter shall claim anything for himself, his successors, and descendants," and with which he concludes "an eternal peace." With the German empire there was to be a continuation of neutrality and friendship, the king coöperating until the confirmation of the emperor and empire should be obtained. The territory was indicated by the possessions then held, so that all the conquests of Maurice and Frederick Henry were kept, unless they had been recaptured by Spain. A court, consisting of an equal number of judges from each side, was to settle the minor differences regarding frontiers and rights. The *status quo* was maintained in the East and West Indies, and each party was not to trade there in the ports of the other. The intercourse in Europe between the two countries was restored to the old

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 259.

footing of friendship, with prohibition of higher taxes than their own subjects paid, retention of the former exemptions from toll, and abolition of the king's rights to tolls on the Meuse, Rhine, and Scheldt within the borders of the United Provinces. The Scheldt and its canals were kept closed by the States; the vessels and goods coming in and out of the Flemish ports were to pay duties equal to what was imposed on those entering and leaving the Scheldt, so that the dreaded competition of Antwerp and Flanders would be finally suppressed. In the matter of religion everything likely to cause scandal was to be avoided in public exercises both in the Netherlands and in the dominions of the king, and ecclesiastical property in the United Netherlands was restored or paid for. Restitution was to be made of the property of the house of Orange, even in Burgundy, with exceptions previously agreed upon. The members of the house of Nassau were not to be prosecuted for the debts of the late Prince William I. of Orange. Prisoners on both sides were to be released without ransom and with complete amnesty for all political offences. All records and documents relating to places ceded, also those concerning litigation, etc., were to be mutually delivered. The allies of both sides, who within three months after the ratification should wish to accede, were to be allowed to participate in the peace, especially Hesse, East Friesland, Emden, and the Hanse towns. Both sides promised to protect the seas and rivers as much as possible from piracy.

Such was the treaty alike honourable and advantageous to the United Netherlands. It put an end to the war, which had been waged during eighty years with varying success, which under the able guidance of the three princes of Orange and of the States of Holland, Zealand, and the other provinces had called into being the strong and independent state now making its appearance among

the powers of Europe. That state was destined for at least a hundred years to hold an important place in the history of the world—the glory of its citizens and their descendants, an object of admiration to contemporaries and later generations.





CHAPTER VII

FIRST YEARS OF PEACE

THE young republic of the United Netherlands after the peace of Münster appeared resplendent amid Europe's states. Her territory, inconsiderable compared with that of the great powers of the time, would scarcely have given her a claim to a modest place in the council chamber of Europe, but the glorious history of her origin, the energy of her relatively large population, and the development of her strength often allowed her a deciding voice. She owed this not merely to herself, but also to the political circumstances which for the moment prevented other, greater, and more populous states from exerting their full force.

France, after the battle of Rocroy, that lowered Spain's military renown, coming up more and more as the first power in Europe, beheld itself weakened in the midst of an arduous foreign war by internal commotions, by the contest of the Fronde against the omnipotent Mazarin and the court of the reigning queen-mother. The brilliant Paris of Henry IV. and Richelieu was the scene of civil war and a strife of barricades, and the restlessness prevailing there and in the provinces acted unfavourably upon the influence of France abroad. Unhappy is the country where the king is a child, even though this child is named Louis XIV. The old enemy, Spain, lay exhausted and now sought more in diplomacy than in war the means of preserving some of its importance in Europe. England, since Elizabeth with greater mari-

time pretensions than its actual sea-power, and now, in Cromwell's days, disposing of a disciplined army under one of the greatest generals it has ever known, was paralysed by the civil war which in 1649 brought King Charles I. to the scaffold. The German empire, enjoying long desired peace after a barbarous war of thirty years, had seen in this war the bonds uniting its states still further loosened: neither the emperor, constantly menaced by the Turks, nor Brandenburg, Cologne, Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, or any other German state could match the republic in power and prestige. The Baltic powers did not feel equal to her: Denmark sued for her favour to hold Sweden in check; Sweden, although proud of its victories on sea and land, hesitated to oppose the States, its old allies; Poland followed unwillingly the Danish example. Asiatic Muscovy respected the strong commercial state of the west more than any other in Europe. The Turks still considered the republic as their ally against Spain in the Mediterranean Sea. The piratical states of Africa's northern coast feared to exercise their calling too openly at the expense of the Dutch merchant ships, remembering the sharp lessons inflicted upon their corsairs by such commanders as Tromp, Evertsen, De Ruyter, and Van Galen. Italy's antiquated little states, mostly chained to Spain, were of slight consequence in Europe; Venice asked the support of the States in its hard fight against the Turks. Little Portugal alone ventured to thwart the republic. It was not really the republic but the West India Company, the commercial corporation, with which it contended for the mastery in Brazil, calculating that the States were enjoying the just concluded peace too much to engage again in war.

How proud the Dutch must have felt at the place in the world won by their country! We find the echo of this feeling in the contemporary prose and poetry. The

historian Wicquefort, commissioned by the Estates of Holland to write the history of the time, reminds his readers "that this history may be put upon a parallel with the finest histories of past ages,"¹ and says of the republic "that there is no power in Europe which has not sought her friendship and which has not found advantage in her alliance." In his *Song of Peace* Vondel sings to "hollow and hungry Europe":

"Netherland's peace doth now laws give
To all realms and princes around,
Light she sheds on healthful ground,
With torch and trump to make joy live."

And he compares his "Batavians" with the "State of the valiant Latins." The pamphlets of those days show the plain Dutch citizens expressing their opinions on the monarchs and countries of the world. Over the beer, in the boat, on the waggon, in the bookshop political events are discussed without fear and with a remarkable knowledge of affairs. Citizen and peasant judge and condemn Charles I. and Cromwell, Mazarin and the French nobles with equal freedom. The good people of Amsterdam seek the latest news from distant lands every morning and try to profit by it. "Thus the world all seems to be built about Amsterdam."

The "profit" of the merchant became more and more the principle guiding the policy of the States, especially of the Estates of Holland. And in Holland it was Amsterdam that gave the tone, as was shown by its pushing through the peace of Münster despite all opposition. The interest of commerce was to rule the politics of the republic so long as Amsterdam had its way, supported as it was by many regents in Holland, whose cities were dependent on Amsterdam or considered commerce as necessary to the existence of

¹ *Histoire des Provinces Unies*, i., p. 2.

their country. But on the other side stood a powerful party with quite other interests in domestic and foreign politics, the old Orange war party. It could still count upon the preachers, whose hatred against Spain and Rome was coupled with a strong aversion to commerce, which they abominated as incompatible with true religion. It found a vigorous leader in the young prince of Orange who did not conceal his dislike of "those rascals who have made peace," of whom he wished he could "break the neck," and who now rising from his life of "debauchery and pleasure" hoped for a resumption of the war. It was supported by the army and its officers, whose income fell off in time of peace, and by Zealand, which sadly needed its rich revenues from privateering during war. The opposition between the two parties speedily appeared in foreign affairs. Amsterdam and the prince soon antagonised one another secretly and openly in all things.

This was evident from the attitude of the republic towards Spain, the latter country being represented from June, 1649, by its ambassador, Antoine Brun.² More than anybody else on the Spanish side, Brun was convinced that peace with the republic had alone rescued the southern Netherlands, placed between two fires, for Spain from the danger of a partition between France and the States. So he came with the purpose of maintaining this peace as long as possible. In the beginning there were naturally many matters to cause friction, particularly with reference to disputed territory, to commercial interests, and to the possession of ecclesiastical property. But Brun settled everything quietly with the support of Archduke Leopold William, governor of the southern Netherlands. The able Spanish

¹*Archives*, iv., p. 314.

²P. L. Muller, *Spain and the parties in the Netherlands*, in *Nijhoff's Bijdr. N. R.* vii., p. 136; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies*, ii., p. 270.

diplomatist kept on good terms with the princess-mother, Frederick Henry's influential widow, and with her friends. Through her and them he attempted to win the young prince, but he quickly observed that the prince, full of aversion to Spain, the arch-enemy of his house, was not to be persuaded by any large pensions or promises of future revenues. Brun's hope remained fixed upon Holland, and with its statesmen he coöperated to prevent the prince from throwing himself into war again in alliance with France. The courtesies he heaped on the States, the pompous phraseology in which he recognised their independence on every occasion, were intended to show Spain's good and loyal feeling towards such plans.

France, both Mazarin and his opponents of the Fronde, desired nothing more than this renewal of the war, and the prince himself was burning with impatience to resume the ancient strife of his fathers. Like his cousin William Frederick of Nassau and his confidant Cornelis van Aerssen, lord of Sommelsdijk, he believed in his heart that Spain in 1648 was only saved from ruin by the peace and must have given up the southern Netherlands, if the war had been continued. By a new alliance with France to retrieve the loss suffered, by a joint conquest of the southern Netherlands to prevent Spain from ever attacking the republic again at a more favourable opportunity, and thus to realise the brilliant plans of his father, the old vision of his grandfather who was so foully murdered by Spain's hireling—this was the prince's ideal. In August, 1649, we find him in secret relations with d' Estrades, who, under Frederick Henry, had repeatedly been the intermediary between the Oranges and the crown of France. Willem Boreel, arriving at Paris in 1650 as Dutch ambassador, remained outside of these affairs. The French ambassador at The Hague, Brasset, zealously aided in them, as did William Frederick and Sommelsdijk who maintained relations with

Brasset and through him with Mazarin. But the prince's ideal was opposed by Holland, not merely from aversion to war, from fear of Antwerp's competition and of the greater influence of the prince of Orange in time of war, but also because it did not want powerful France for a neighbour and was unwilling to strengthen the threatening supremacy of France in Europe by conquering a part of the southern Netherlands. The large number of *Mazarinades* in French and Dutch distributed in the Netherlands proves an extraordinary interest in French affairs.

With regard also to the attitude towards England the prince and Holland were in sharp antagonism. Both abhorred the sentence of which Charles I. had been the victim, but the prince, with whom the prince of Wales, now King Charles II., had been sojourning since July, wished for nothing more than vengeance for his father-in-law's death and help from the States for his brother-in-law. His dynastic interests made him hostile to Cromwell and Parliament, and he desired, even before a war with Spain, a joint war, in alliance again with France, against revolutionary England for the restoration of the Stuarts. Holland did not want what would have been chiefly a naval contest and most injurious to its commerce and fishery. It had supported the attempt by a special embassy to dissuade Parliament from carrying out the sentence against Charles I. The influential Pauw himself went to England with Joachimi on this mission. But when the sentence was executed, Holland wished to remain as neutral as possible between Parliament and the new king, who was greeted as "King Charles II." without adding "of Great Britain."¹ Holland prevented the States-General from lending an ear to the requests of Charles II. for help in money, ships, or ammunition.² It acquiesced in the *Victrix causa*

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 324.

² Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, i., p. 68.

placet Deo, translated in a pamphlet: "the justice of a war is always decided by the victory." The preservation of neutrality brought many difficulties. When in the autumn of 1648 two envoys of Parliament, Dr. Isaac Doreslaer, a Hollander by birth, and Walter Strickland, appeared at The Hague to announce an embassy from Parliament and to urge that the royal fleet should not be received in the harbours of the Meuse, where it had taken refuge from the Parliament's fleet, Holland recognised the justice of this claim, and the prince had to yield, though he continued to aid the royal family with advice and money. While Holland rendered all honour to the two envoys as ambassadors of a friendly power, it could not secure their reception as such by the States-General, the royal English resident Boswell continuing to be recognised. The horrible murder of Doreslaer on May 12th by Scottish partisans of Charles II. in The Hague remained unpunished, to the vexation of Parliament, under the pretext that the perpetrators could not be discovered among the many English refugees in the capital. The assassins fled to the southern Netherlands, and nothing was done but to protect Strickland, who tarried longer to keep an eye upon the intrigues of the royalists. But the States-General persistently declined to receive him, so that, bitterly complaining, he left The Hague in the summer of 1650. After this treatment of its envoys Parliament sent his passport unasked to the Dutch ambassador in London, the old Joachimi, but in order to please Holland assented to the dispatch of Gerard Schaep of Amsterdam as commissioner or consul in charge of the interests of Dutch subjects and even honoured him like a real ambassador. Thus the republic and its new English sister were on a very delicate footing, and not much was needed to precipitate a conflict, especially as the royalists started from here all manner of plans, equipping ships and soldiers for Scotland, where Charles II.

was recognised as king and whence he hoped to win England. Numerous pamphlets printed in the Netherlands concerning events in England showed the interest of the people in these complications and were often violent in tone against the regicides and sympathetic towards the distressed English royal family and the Bohemian court, now also in very embarrassed circumstances.¹

Less sharp was the conflict of opinion with regard to the Baltic states. Denmark saw that it could only oppose Sweden with the help of the States-General, and the inducement it offered for this help was naturally a reduction of the burdens of the Sound toll. In the name of Frederick III., who had succeeded Christian IV., the Danish statesman, Corfitz Ulefeld, appeared in 1649 at The Hague to propose to the republic a defensive alliance and a redemption of the Sound toll. The provinces having no commerce with the Baltic objected to an alliance with Denmark from fear of offending the Swedes, and the prince was on this side. But Amsterdam, so greatly interested in the Baltic commerce, carried through the "redemption treaty" in 1649 together with the defensive alliance, both for thirty-six years. The treaty was really concluded by the three provinces only, Holland, Friesland, and Gelderland. The amount to be paid Denmark for the redemption was fixed at 350,000 guilders a year.²

Another commercial affair was the great question with Portugal concerning Brazil. Renewed for twenty-five years in 1647, the West India Company, whose stock stood at thirty per cent.,³ endeavoured in every way to obtain financial and material aid from the state against Por-

¹ The queen of Bohemia begged the States for assistance, as she could not pay baker and butcher (Aitzema, iii., p. 324).

² Aitzema, iii., p. 332; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies*, ii., p. 261.

³ Netscher, *Les hollandais au Brésil*, p. 155.

tugal, continually victorious in Brazil. The Portuguese ambassador at The Hague, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, sought to prevent this help by clever diplomacy. In October, 1649, it was finally resolved to assist with a fleet the company, which had long ago lost Angola and Loando in Africa, and only retained possession of a few places in Brazil, but before action was taken, its condition became so bad that all help seemed superfluous. After Count John Maurice's departure Witte Corneliszoon de With appeared unable with his small force to sustain the rapidly declining Dutch authority in Brazil. He retired in 1648 to Recife and asked for reinforcement, but he was left to his fate and gave vent to his indignation in numerous letters, complaining of his pitiful want of provisions, etc., and declaring he would serve "rather the Turk than the company." At last his circumstances grew so desperate that in the spring of 1650 he returned, upon his own responsibility, with a few ships to the fatherland. He arrived in May, but, for leaving his post without orders, the prince, after consultation with the States-General, had him thrown into prison at The Hague, while his captains were imprisoned by the admiralty at Amsterdam. Holland was exasperated at this asserted violation of its sovereign rights by the prince, the States-General, and the admiralty. The captains were liberated from prison by violence. Without the consent of the provincial Estates the States-General had no jurisdiction in any of the provinces, and De With, as a subject of Holland, could only be tried before a judge of Holland. Fearing Holland would release the admiral also on its own authority, the prince allowed him to be conducted to his lodging. Meanwhile the Portuguese rule was restored in Brazil at the expense of the company, and war with Portugal did not break out. There was no desire to engage in a new war for a dying company, whose misfortune was chiefly due to poor

management and neglect,¹ no matter how loudly the stockholders cried.

Relations were reasonably good with the smaller states on the eastern border, especially with the friendly elector of Brandenburg, now related to the house of Nassau. The States remained on amicable terms with the "Great Elector," one of the "most considerable" German princes of his day, who then resided at Cleves and later appointed as governor there John Maurice the Brazilian, although they kept possession of his fortresses Emmerich, Gennep, Wesel, etc. They were friends also with the energetic landgravine of Hesse, who extended her garrisons far over her frontiers to the Rhine and to East Friesland. The States held Emden and Leeroord in East Friesland as strategical points. East Friesland, as well as Bremen and other Hanse towns, needed the support of the States against Oldenburg, which had established a toll upon the Weser, thereby getting into serious difficulties. But the States were unwilling to begin war even with little Oldenburg, for the sending of a few war ships to the Weser might have caused general hostilities to break out in northern Germany, so lately pacified.² Here in the east also it was plain that so long as Holland and Amsterdam had their will, the republic would not be inclined to enter into war, even when, as in the case of Portugal, the honour of the state was at stake. Holland had urgently needed peace, had secured it by great exertion, and would not allow it to be disturbed, even though the direct opposition of the young prince must be encountered. It was now the question whether the prince would yield in the long run to Holland's wishes so at variance with his personal inclinations, with the dynastic interests of the Stuarts especially, and with

¹ Van Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde*, ii., p. 211.

² See for all these affairs Aitzema and Wicquefort *passim*, Waddington, ii., p. 263.

the political traditions of his family. Young and ardent in spirit, personally popular, surrounded by young officers, urged on by the family of his English wife, full of sympathy for France, and sharing its indignation at the peace of Münster, he would be a dangerous adversary for Holland's statesmen, if ever he could win as much influence as his father had enjoyed. The policy of the republic would then be ruled not by the commercial interests of Holland but by dynastic and political considerations of a general nature. Thus the republic's foreign affairs were closely connected with the influence of the prince,¹ and her internal condition must be of importance to the rest of Europe. And just in these years came a domestic crisis which was attentively watched from abroad.

Holland's endeavour was to prevent the prince from obtaining the great influence which his father had secured between 1630 and 1640. Naturally it aimed at a diminution of the prince's power by cutting down the army, the excellently organised instrument which his father and uncle had used to establish their authority. There was cause enough in the present state of peace to disband some of the troops become superfluous after the treaty with Spain. The financial burden, under which Holland had groaned for years with its debt of 120 millions of guilders, would be lessened by such a disbandment. This had been one of the chief reasons of Holland's eagerness for peace.² On the conclusion of peace the army consisted of about 60,000 men, cavalry and infantry, costing annually nearly ten millions. The prince, the council of state, and the Estates of Holland agreed that so many troops were no longer necessary,

¹ Mazarin refers to this at the end of 1649: *Archives*, iv., p. 326. Cf. Waddington, ii., p. 251.

² Wijnne, *De geschillen over de afdanking van't krijgsvolk* (*Werken Hist. Gen.*, No. 41), p. xiv. Cf. De Beaufort, *Geschiedk. Opstellen*, ii., p. 66.

and July 30, 1648, a reduction was effected,¹ by which all the cavalry companies were brought down to sixty horses, and fifty men were taken from each company of infantry, retrenching one-third of the cost and making the troops less than 35,000.

But Holland was not satisfied with this. In the spring of 1649 further economy was discussed with the prince, who would not hear to it, and who with the council of state and Count William Frederick urged that, in face of the large armies of other countries and on account of possible domestic disturbances, sufficient troops should be kept to guard the frontiers and to garrison the fortresses. They thought that 30,000 men at least were needed as during the Truce. Holland wished to see fifty men more mustered out from each company, which the prince and council considered too much. After some discussion the Estates of Holland resolved in October that the payment of money to citizens for the lodging of the soldiers should cease and that the soldiers should receive full pay and provide their own lodgings; that the heavy cuirassiers should be changed into light arquebusiers; that 600 foreign troops paid by Holland and fifty-five companies of them in the whole army should be disbanded besides half of the remaining cavalry. The prince deemed this reduction too considerable, and when Holland on its own authority discharged the 600 men, the council of state and later the six other provinces in the States-General declared this action unlawful, which Holland on further consideration acknowledged. The prince finally consented to the transformation of the cuirassiers into arquebusiers and agreed to subscribe to the disbandment of the 600 men, if this were accomplished by the States-General, alone sovereign in military matters according to him, but he refused to send off more than a few com-

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 273. There is a difference in the statements concerning the amount of the various reductions.

panies of the excellent foreign troops. After remonstrances from Holland in the interest of its involved finances, the prince made some further concession, but Holland insisted upon the disbandment of fifty-five companies of infantry and nearly half of the cavalry, reducing the army to less than 25,000 men. During the autumn of 1649 the wrangling continued, while Holland justified to the other provinces its attitude by official letters and secretly, and the States-General sought to dissuade Holland from the threatened arbitrary disbandment.

Little progress was made in the spring of 1650. Holland asserted that it would have an annual deficit of one million guilders even with its proposed disbandment, and flatly declined to approve of the number of troops desired by the prince, appealing to its right to be taxed no more than it wished. It was no longer simply how many and what troops should be mustered out, the difference at last being only about a few hundreds, but it was chiefly the difficult constitutional question how far a province, as paymaster of the troops standing to its apportionment, had a right to consider itself invested with sovereign power over those troops,—whether the army of the republic was a whole or whether it consisted of seven separate armies. This was connected with the important question, how far the provincial sovereignty went as opposed to that of the States-General—the old apple of discord which had caused so much mischief in Oldenbarnevelt's time. The antagonism between what may be called the federal and the unionistic conceptions of the state of the United Netherlands appeared sharply, joined as in the days of the Truce with the not unjustified dread of too great power for the princes of Orange. Just as Maurice in 1618 championed the rights of the States-General against the Estates of Holland, William II. now defended the same rights. As Oldenbarnevelt then

accused the prince of aspiring to sovereignty, the Estates of Holland now ascribed the same desires to his young nephew. There was already talk of the uselessness of a stadtholder in time of peace, or at least of a captain-general.

The contest was a matter of personal and financial interest to many noble officers in the army, while the prince, intimate with the French and English officers and in case of civil dissension relying more upon the foreign than the native soldiers, would not consent to a disbandment of just those foreign troops. With an eye to his English plans and to the possible renewal of war with Spain, the prince was unwilling to weaken the army too much. On the other hand, Holland's friendly attitude towards Spain and the Parliament of England showed plainly that it would have nothing to do with any such plans. The opposing parties expounded their views in bitter pamphlets, and the whole country took part in the strife, as in 1618, though not with the violence natural to religious disputes. There were not wanting efforts to bring religion into the affair: preachers like Stermont at The Hague, Goethals in Delft, and Teelinck in Middelburg warned against the religious ideas of the Holland party, which seemed to them merely a later edition of the Arminian faction. This time the Hollanders were not led by the council pensionary, as the land's advocate was now called. Jacob Cats had been too faithful a follower of Frederick Henry to oppose his son, and the aged Pauw kept in the background. At the head of the party stood the burgomasters and ex-burgomasters of Amsterdam, the most prominent being the brothers Andries and Cornelis Bicker, of whom the former was considered an ambitious magistrate and the head of the "cabal." Attracting attention with them were Jacob de Witt, formerly burgomaster of Dordrecht, a violent and obstinate man, and Van Beveren, burgomaster there.

A minority even in the Estates of Holland favoured a middle course or stood on the prince's side.

The prince was powerfully supported by his cousin, Count William Frederick, who was now playing the part of William Louis in 1618, urging his young relative to resistance and consulting with him on the measures to be adopted.¹ Also the prince was much under the influence of his confidant, Cornelis van Aerssen, lord of Sommelsdijk, a friend to France, the son of François, a colonel in the service of the States, a rich and influential man, who with less ability dreamed of acting the part of his father against the "Spanish-loving Arminians." Further the prince was influenced by the dangerous intriguer, Cornelis Musch, clerk of the States-General, and among the prince's advisers must be named his secretary, Hildersich. These four constantly appear in the pamphlets as the trusted counsellors of the prince, mention sometimes being made of Alexander van der Capellen, lord of Aartsbergen, and Johan van Rheede van Renswoude of Utrecht. There was a close connection between domestic and foreign politics in these dissensions. While no shadow of proof exists that the Holland party consulted Spain secretly, as the prince and his friends supposed, it is certain that the prince himself sought the advice of the French crown concerning his measures and that, for the contingency of civil war in the republic, he counted upon the support of France for the six provinces against Holland. France was to be promised that peace with Spain should be broken after the restoration of internal tranquillity. Though the French government actually bound itself to nothing, it evidently desired to see the prince victorious. But it was unwilling to compromise itself and waited for the turn domestic affairs would take. For the time being, the young and inexperienced prince seemed the weaker party as

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 320 *et seq.*, especially p. 336. Cf. Wijnne, p. lxxxv.

compared with rich and powerful Holland which, led by Amsterdam, opposed his plans vigorously and might be able to lift him from the saddle.

As early as December, 1649, William Frederick in a letter written partly in cipher advised his cousin to break with reliable troops the resistance of Amsterdam. A month later he conjured him not to yield too much and particularly to keep an eye upon Amsterdam, pointing out that matters were going as in 1618 and threatening the Union with dissolution. Holland's uncompromising attitude excited fears of a repetition of the disturbances of 1618. The majority in the Estates of that province urged ever more vehemently the arbitrary disbandment. There were attempts at a settlement. The moderate council pensionary submitted proposals to the prince, who persisted in his own opinion. A new proposition from Holland was rejected, whereupon the province determined not to bring the affair before the States-General again. An earlier proposal of some Leyden lords to agree to the prince's last offer, but first to subject the companies of foot and horse to a small reduction, was accepted on June 1st in the meeting of the Estates of Holland, though with a protest of six opposing cities. The request, immediately made by the States-General, not to carry out the intended disbandment was refused, and three days later discharge papers were sent to twelve companies of cavalry and thirty-one of infantry belonging to Holland's quota. The Estates of this province then separated.

There was no doubt that the six other provinces stood together in opposition to Holland in this matter. Naturally the prince, advised by his cousin who had come to The Hague, and appearing with him and the council of state in the States-General on the 5th, desired the highest body to remind the officers that they owed obedience to no provincial Estates.¹ Further the States-General

¹ Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, ii., p. 283.

resolved to send a "very notable deputation" to the cities of Holland, which deputation was to be appointed by the prince, while full authority was given him to take measures for the preservation of peace and the maintenance of the Union.¹ This most important resolution invested the prince temporarily with dictatorial power and was hastily passed. But the difficulty was that the resolution was adopted only by a majority of votes and under protest from Holland, while Utrecht opposed but yielded later, and Gelderland objected to the "authorisation" of the prince. Considering further that the voters were not numerous, the whole assembly consisting at most of about thirty persons, the authority granted the prince assumes a doubtful character. The prince's presence during the discussion influenced the course of affairs, although he departed before the voting. On the following day the prince came again to the meeting and informed it that he would himself head the deputation, to which he had appointed four members of the States-General: Aartsbergen of Gelderland, Mauregnault of Zealand, Renswoude of Utrecht, Clant of Groningen; two members of the council of state, Asperen of Holland and Lucassen of Zealand, besides the treasurer-general Brasser. This communication was accepted as a notification, and the prince was asked to persuade the cities of Holland to yield "by all means of induction."

The deputation started out on the 8th of June, accompanied by a brilliant retinue of about 400 officers, designed to impress magistrates and population. Only one town, Medemblik, was not visited, but the prince appeared in all the other towns of Holland entitled to vote. The result, however, did not equal the expectations. Some cities showed themselves ready to consent to the prince's will. No less than nine refused more or less roundly to yield. Dordrecht set the example: its town-council,

¹ Wicquefort, i., *Pièces justificatives*, No. xiv.

sharply addressed by Aartsbergen, complained of his tone and politely broke off negotiations. Schiedam, Alkmaar, Monnikendam, and Edam, the citizens of the last place receiving the prince brilliantly, declared they would answer only in the assembly of the States. Haarlem and Delft reported a willingness to receive only the prince, which he did not desire. Amsterdam repeatedly besought him to come merely as stadtholder and without the deputation, but the prince declined this, and, when he came with the deputation, the town-council refused to receive the latter and afterwards the prince himself.¹ On the 25th the deputation was back again at The Hague. Two days later the prince made a report to the States-General, declaring in substance that the answer of the members of Holland had been various.

The prince was very indignant at the attitude of some cities. According to Aartsbergen, however, he had hoped to be insulted in order "to seek reparation in other ways." He made his complaint of Amsterdam's treatment in the Estates of Holland on the 30th and had it printed. Amsterdam issued a reply at the end of the following month, but after a few days it advised the Estates of Holland that the deputation as "unusual" must be disapproved of, and nothing like it could be allowed, further that Holland ought to protest to the States-General and the separate provinces, and without offending His Highness should request of him new proposals for diminishing the taxes. The Estates of Holland resolved upon the latter and appointed a commission for the affair. Thus negotiations began again and on the 15th brought a proposition from the prince, his cousin, and the council of state, to keep 3000 cavalry and over 26,000 infantry, to reduce the money for lodging to a

¹ Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, ii., p. 292 *et seq.* These notes of Aartsbergen himself deserve more consideration than the somewhat deviating reports elsewhere.

half, while officers mustered out were to obtain a pension, and those remaining in the service received the same pay or a little less. The commission from the Estates of Holland wished to discharge 1125 men and 116 cavalymen more, to abolish the allowance for lodgings, and to cut down the pay of the officers. From a "conciliatory advice" soon presented to the Estates of Holland it appeared that they wanted to disband only 585 more men than the prince, so that, "the difference being of slight importance," no great trouble would have resulted, if much more had not already happened between the prince and Holland. It was determined on July 29th to make this advice into a resolution.

But Holland on the 27th had sent a letter to the six other provinces defending its "separate discontinuation of the payment of some militia," and the prince, angered by opposition, now decided to make use of the resolution of June 5th and to throw the sword into the scales. In concert with his advisers he concluded to arrest six members of the Estates of Holland, who, as he said later, had shown "insolent obstinacy," and with a reliable armed force to occupy Amsterdam or some other cities. The double plan was carefully arranged weeks beforehand and was now to be rapidly executed.

Early on the morning of Saturday the 30th, Jacob de Witt of Dordrecht, Jan de Wael, burgomaster, and Albert Ruyl, pensionary of Haarlem, Jan Duyst van Voorhout, burgomaster of Delft, Nanning Keyser, burgomaster of Hoorn, and Nicolaas Stellingwerff, pensionary of Medemblik, were summoned to the prince, but on their arrival the lieutenant-colonel of his guard, Van Meteren, arrested and locked them up each in a separate room of the prince's quarters. The persons named were chosen, not because they all had especially declared themselves against the prince's plans, but to punish the respective cities for their opposition. The prince, who

was ready to depart for Amsterdam, requested Cats to report the arrest to the Estates of Holland, and the council pensionary, "amazed as by a rare wonder," so he himself testifies, obeyed in fear and trembling.¹ The Estates remained in session but resolved to consult their principals in order to find expedients "in these quite unexpected and perplexing affairs," and Monday was appointed for the return of the delegates sent to the cities. Meanwhile an armed force from neighbouring garrisons and the prince's guard occupied all entrances to The Hague. The president and members of the States-General were summoned to the prince and informed of what had occurred. The prisoners on the following day were conveyed under military guard by Van Meteren as commandant of Loevestein to that fortress. Thus the first part of the plans was carried out to the prince's satisfaction.

The operation against Amsterdam was not so successful. The management of this affair, which the prince himself wished to undertake at first, was finally intrusted to Count William Frederick. From different provinces forty-eight companies, numbering about 6000 men, were collected at Amersfoort, Utrecht, Muiden, and Ouwerkerk, and later were joined to them 4000 men more under command of the count himself and of the lords of Noordwijk and Sommeldijk. The intention was to surprise the city, and this was to be effected by Major Gentillot, a Frenchman, who, leaving Utrecht by the night boat with fifty picked officers and soldiers, was to seize upon a gate early in the morning and let in the count and his troops. Thus it was expected to master the city without bloodshed, which the prince desired to avoid in any case. Gentillot lay concealed with his men at Ouwerkerk early on Saturday morning, waiting for the promised approach of the other troops. But disaster befell. The

¹ *Tweentachtigjarig leven.*

commander arrived in the night from The Hague at Abcoude, and Sommeldijk and Dohna from Gelderland were also there in time, but the cavalry, ten companies from Arnhem and Nimwegen under Captain Mom, went astray in a storm near Hilversum on the heath and came much too late. At the appointed time there were only four companies of cavalry in Abcoude, with which it was not dared to begin operations from fear of armed resistance, so that Gentillot, tired of waiting, drew back upon the main force at Abcoude.

Meanwhile the wandering cavalry had been observed by the postal messenger from Hamburg to Amsterdam. He had been incautiously allowed to proceed to the city, and just after eight o'clock he informed the burgomaster, Cornelis Bicker, that he had seen unknown troops a few hours away. The report was soon confirmed by the governor of the castle of Muiden and by fleeing peasants. Bicker, who chanced to be the only burgomaster present, had the gates closed at once, raised the drawbridges, and assembled the town-council, believing some Swedish or Lorraine soldiers from Jülich or Brabant were approaching, and remembering recent rumours of hostile designs against the city. Later in the day vigorous measures of defence were taken: the council of war was summoned, the militia was called to arms, cannon were dragged to the walls, armed vessels were stationed in the Y and Amstel, and preparations for inundating the surrounding country were made. Count William Frederick, at last in possession of his whole force, moved from Abcoude close to the city, but he found it so ready for resistance that he did nothing but send in a letter from the prince, which was to have been delivered to the town-council after the surprise. The prince expressed a wish with the support of his troops to give his message to the council. Not until evening did two members of the council come in an armed boat to inform the count that

Amsterdam had reported to the Estates of Holland what had occurred and would await the reply, meanwhile repelling all violence. The count determined to remain where he was and to ask the prince for further orders.¹

The next day, Sunday, Amsterdam deliberated upon what should be done and considered the possibility of cutting the sea-dikes in order to drive away the soldiers by water. Count William by command of the prince posted his troops so as to begin the surrounding of the city from all sides. The prince himself remained at The Hague until after the morning sermon, and departed for the camp with a great company of noblemen and officers to conquer the city by a siege. At Halfweg his cousin met him, the ever moderate Louis of Nassau, lord of Beverweert, directed his attention to the danger of inundation and offered to go to The Hague and bring about a conciliatory deputation from the States-General to him, while the prince was negotiating with Amsterdam. Thus the affair might still be arranged. This negotiation began on the 1st of August, and an agreement was concluded on the 3d. Already experiencing some of the injury a siege might cause to its commerce, and perceiving that the other cities would let it fight out its battle with the prince alone, Amsterdam submitted and promised for the next three or four years to conform to the will of the States-General concerning the disbandment, while the prince agreed to raise the siege. A separate article, which the city vainly endeavoured to escape, stipulated that the two Bickers, the leaders of the opposition, should leave the government. The deputations of the States-General and Holland to the prince found the matter settled. The soldiers departed on the following day, and Amsterdam resumed its usual appearance without having had actual fighting.²

¹ See his report to the prince: *Archives*, iv., p. 388.

² See on all this Wijnne.

The prince had attained his object, although not quite in the anticipated way. The six arrested members remained a few weeks longer in confinement at Loevestein, but after consultation with their cities they were released one after the other in the latter part of August, the cities having to remove them from office. The "reasons and motives" for the imprisonment were delivered in a sealed packet by the prince to Holland and the States-General, and so this affair came also to an end.¹ The disbandment was taken up again in August, and the prince met the universal wish for economy by a sacrifice of the foreign troops so dear to him. This was agreed to by a unanimous vote of the States-General, while it was also established that no province could disband on its own authority, and differences must be settled by amicable agreement or by the stadtholders. Twenty French, thirty-two English, and three Scotch companies were designated for discharge besides twelve companies of cavalry; four companies of cavalry and 1000 men of the infantry continued in service six weeks longer, while an effort was made to decide about them. In response to the prince's communication the Estates of the six provinces thanked him for the trouble he had taken. At the end of August the prince went to Dieren to amuse himself, after his success, with hunting, and Cats says in rhyme:

"All that trouble great, 't was gone in a moment's flash
Like the thick clouds, which the heavens with wonder dash."

The result of the contest increased the prince's credit, although the opposing party, now again called the "Loevestein faction," was still dangerous because so numerous represented in the town-councils of Holland. The attitude towards France was modified in accordance with the known partiality of the now powerful Orange

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 398.

prince, who in August expressed to d' Estrades¹ his hope of soon seeing war break out again with Spain. If mediation between the two warring powers failed, peace could be forced upon Spain by arms. After the conclusion of peace between France and Spain, English affairs might be taken in hand, and the republic's influence would be exerted for the benefit of the Stuarts.

In September matters were fully discussed, and the prince consulted with Brasset and in deep secrecy with d' Estrades, who was then in command at Dunkirk, as to how mediation could be best arranged. He wished the States-General to send an urgent communication to the archduke at Brussels, intimating that he should not let his victorious troops penetrate farther into France, but should accept the mediation of the States. But the States determined simply to offer their mediation to both parties, and this was chiefly due to Holland's efforts. The French wanted the affair to be taken up more vigorously, though it was evident that much must happen before Holland could be persuaded to an actual war. In October the draft was made, probably by Mazarin,² for a treaty between France and the republic, stipulating a joint war against Spain in the spring of 1651 in case the official mediation of the States should fail. The time was not ripe for such far-reaching plans, and under the circumstances the prince would certainly not have approved of the draft. Yet he did not give up all hope. Before the middle of October he went from The Hague to Dieren again, ostensibly for hunting, but really to win over the Estates of Gelderland to his designs. A negotiation concerning the sale of Cleves and Mark by

¹ *Archives*, iv., p. 404. See Blok's *Archivalia te Parijs*, pp. 34, 35, and Fruin's articles on these plans for war and mediation in *Bijdr. 3de R.* ix., p. 1, and x., p. 197; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies*, ii., p. 348.

² Fruin in *Bijdr.* ix., p. 21.

Brandenburg to Prince William seems to indicate other plans, connected perhaps with a ducal title in Gelderland—plans and prospects of much importance for the republic's internal condition.

While all this was in suspense, and nobody could tell the result, the news suddenly came that the prince had been taken sick at Dieren. Some days later the illness was pronounced a light case of small-pox. Although the treacherous nature of this malady was well known, the reports at first excited no alarm. The patient was brought to The Hague, and the disease was supposed to be taking its ordinary course, when it was announced that the prince had died late in the evening of the 6th of November. It was a terrible blow to the house of Orange and to the fatherland. Although the exasperation of the Holland party gave utterance to many a bitter word concerning the departed, although an unknown donor thus exulted in the contribution box of an Amsterdam church:

“The prince deceased,
My gift's increased;
No news pleased more
In years four score,”

there was nobody untouched by this sudden death. Is it strange that murmurs of poisoning were heard and have continued even to our time? They arose from the apparent carelessness of the physicians in their early treatment of the case, and Spain's presumed interest in the prince's death strengthened the otherwise baseless suspicion.¹ Deep was the dismay of the people attached to Orange, and only the birth of a son, eight days later, afforded some consolation, or at least some hope for the future, which seemed at first dark for Orange as well as for the fatherland, that felt the absence of a prince of

¹ See De Beaufort, *Geschiedkundige Opstellen*, ii., p. 102.

Orange as a national misfortune, as the beginning of the young republic's fall.

In these circumstances the regents, especially those of Holland, showed themselves fully equal to the task of governing. They took the opportunity to organise the state without any chance for confusion and to establish upon a firm basis the influence of the Estates recently menaced by the prince's vigorous proceedings. This was accomplished not by the "Loevestein faction" alone. The moderate elements of the Orange party, disabled by the prince's sudden death, helped in maintaining the government of the States on the old footing. Of the two parties the former, headed by the aged Pauw, with the Amsterdam lords and Jacob de Witt, long remained the more powerful; the other could do little under the lead of the rather unprincipled William Frederick, of the very moderate Beverweert, and of the marshal Johan Wolfert van Brederode insignificant as a statesman, and paralysed by dissensions, particularly by that flaming up between the princess dowager, Amalia, and the young princess royal.

The jealousy between the ambitious grandmother and the proud mother of the new-born prince injured the Orange party greatly. While still confined to her bed the princess royal, who aspired to the sole guardianship over her son, quarrelled with Princess Amalia, who adduced the youth of the princess as a reason for appointing another guardian, having her own son-in-law in view, the elector of Brandenburg. The affection of the princess royal for her English family in exile, which she was eager to assist with the money of the Oranges, the arrogance of the English king's daughter towards her mother-in-law, the former lady of the court of her aunt of Bohemia, augmented the division in the Orange family. It was furthered also by the mutual jealousy of the "Nassau counts": William Frederick and John Maurice,

and Brederode, the "born count of Holland," a scion of the race that asserted its descent from the ancient family of counts, all three having an eye upon the military posts of the dead prince, by the opposition to the elector as a foreigner, and by discord between him and the chief advisers of the princess royal, Beverweert and Johan van Kerchoven, lord of Heenvliet. Under these circumstances some universally hated Orangemen, like Johan de Knuyt in Zealand and Musch in Holland, became victims. De Knuyt was removed from his post of first nobleman, and the clerk escaped a similar fate and an investigation of his far from spotless life by a speedy death.

The question of the guardianship was referred by the Estates of Holland to the court of Holland, which pronounced for the mother as guardian with the addition of the elector. The grandmother and the elector appealed from this decision to the High Council, which declared all three guardians with the prince of Landsberg, a Palatinate relative of the Orange house. This met with the approval of none of the parties, and after much wrangling an agreement was reached in August, 1651, that the guardianship should be exercised by the princess royal as guardian, together with the princess dowager and the elector. The cradle of young William Henry of Orange was surrounded by quarrelling members of the family. Even over his name difficulties arose, the mother wishing to call him Charles after her brother, the English exile. But uncommon princely splendour was displayed at his christening as also at his father's funeral.

Naturally the Estates of Holland and of the other provinces encountered slight opposition in getting possession of the rights enjoyed by the princes of Orange. Immediately after the prince's death the States-General came together hastily, informed the different provinces of the event, and requested them to

take the necessary measures "in this highly important conjuncture." The Estates of Holland at once declared their readiness to maintain the union, as well as religion in accordance with the principles of the synod of Dort, while regarding the militia they appealed to the resolutions adopted in 1646. Some days later they invited the other provinces in "General Convocation" to send a number of extraordinary delegates to regulate affairs, and deputations went to the provinces to advocate this matter and apparently to see that the "General" or so called "Great Assembly" was made up as much as possible to Holland's liking. The sitting States-General had acted under the prince's influence and were not so easily to be managed. The States-General did what Holland proposed and summoned for the middle of December the seven provinces to a "Great Assembly." Meanwhile the Estates of Holland resolved to settle the question of the appointment of magistrates. Every town desiring it received from the Estates the privilege of naming its own magistrates, the town-council usually nominating two persons, and one of them being chosen by lot. Evidently the plan was not to appoint a stadtholder or a temporary "lieutenant" for the young prince in that capacity. It was asserted "that it was quite uncertain what he would grow to," and the appointment of a lieutenant was dangerous for the future of the prince himself.¹ Zealand, where the friends of the house of Orange were daily losing influence through the reaction against their omnipotence during the life of the first three princes of Orange, coincided in this opinion, as did also Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overysse. A few days after the prince's death Groningen had chosen Count William Frederick in his place. The Estates of Holland seized upon other rights of the deceased Orange prince, such as the bestowal of the higher military offices, of the forestership, the naming of

¹Aitzema, iii., p. 467.

the rector of Leyden University, the granting of pardons; the prince's guard became the guard of the Estates; the keys of the gates were thenceforth to be kept by the magistrates of the town instead of by the military commander. Holland likewise entered into "private correspondence" with the other provinces, particularly with Zealand, in "preparatory conference"¹ over all sorts of affairs, which it desired to carry through the "Great Assembly" to be convened.

The Great Assembly did not meet in 1650 but was solemnly opened on the 18th of January, 1651, in the old knightly hall of the counts decorated with trophies of the Spanish war, with conquered flags and streamers.² The large hall offered by the Estates of Holland was provided with benches arranged around the sides in the manner of an amphitheatre. In the middle before the chimney there was a table for the officers and for the foreign ambassadors to be received. A considerable number of deputies from the seven provinces was present; especially from Holland and Friesland came many of the ablest magistrates, mostly members of the States-General; and this assembly might have passed for an extraordinary meeting of that body. After a short address by Pibo van Doma from Friesland, whose turn it was to preside over the States-General, Jacob Cats in the name of Holland made a long speech—"after his manner quite long and more polite than strong or touching" Wicquefort says of it. He affirmed that, nobody of the house of Orange now being capable of assuming the dignities of its fathers, circumstances made necessary deliberation upon the maintenance of the union of 1579. Three preliminary points had to be kept in view: the

¹ Joh. de Witt to Dordrecht, Jan. 7, 1651 (*Rijksarchief*). These and later notes from De Witt's correspondence are mostly taken from Fruin's full extracts.

² *Holl. Mercurius*, 1651, p. 60. Further, Wicquefort, ii., p. 3; Aitzema, iii., p. 496.

union, religion, and the army, but the rule for the first two was already laid down in the union of Utrecht and the synod of Dordrecht, and consideration of the army was alone needed. Holland opined that the appointment of a new captain-general should be omitted, and that it would be enough to have a field marshal and to regulate the rights of the provinces towards the council of state in the matter of the army. The province plainly indicated the Estates as the paymasters and consequently supreme commanders of the army.

These subjects were discussed for several months, until August, though not always in a fashion acceptable to Holland. Much negotiation ensued upon one point of the union: the ever difficult question of how mutual differences were to be settled. Friesland and Groningen held that the stadtholders were indispensable for this purpose. Friesland secretly suggested the house of Nassau, now that the house of Orange could furnish no suitable stadtholder, with an eye of course upon its own stadtholder, William Frederick. The other provinces considered the States-General, or the courts of justice, or chosen judges as the proper arbitrators in such cases, and Holland, that would have nothing to do with William Frederick, the besieger of Amsterdam, declared the matter of the appointment of a stadtholder "purely provincial," to which the other provinces finally agreed with the exception of the two named. Holland and its four partisans maintained in fact their resolution of appointing no stadtholder, while naturally Friesland and Groningen adhered to their view. The question of arbitration was so little decided that both parties persisted in appealing to their right. The marriage of Count William Frederick in 1652 to Princess Albertina Agnes, the second daughter of Frederick Henry, brought him later into prominence in case a temporary representative should be

thought of for the young prince, a contingency by no means impossible.

With regard to religion an agreement was soon beyond question upon the principles of Dort. They were to be maintained by each province in its territory "with the power of the land." But the five delegates from the provincial synods desired further vigorous action against "popish idolatry, superstition, and hierarchy," against the "innumerable Jesuits, priests, curates, and monks," who were overrunning the land "in thousands like locusts"; they asked also for enforcement of the placards against other sectaries, against the public worship of the Jews and the calumnation of the reformed doctrine in books and other writings, finally for observance of Sunday and for measures against brothels, theatres, luxury, and such crying sins, in order to show that the authorities had not in vain received "the sword." The "politic" Estates of Holland were unwilling to go so far, although the more orthodox Zealand urged that satisfaction should be given to the preachers. Friesland, Groningen, and Overijssel sided with Zealand, but Gelderland and Utrecht hesitated. A proposal of Holland was, on January 27th, converted into a general resolution of the assembly. It declared that the Dort principles were to be conserved, that other sects should be kept "in all good order and quiet," that the placards against the Romanists should remain in force.

There was much more discussion concerning the army which had lately given rise to such dissension. Four things were prominent: the chief command, the transfer of garrisons, and the secret correspondence about military affairs within and without the country. The provinces were of most varying opinions, but Holland and Zealand agreed in wishing to intrust the chief command to the council of state and not to the States-

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 506.

General; furthermore they wanted in this time of peace no captain-general or admiral-general, but simply the field marshal—now Brederode—at the head of the army and the Holland lieutenant admiral, Tromp, at the head of the fleet. Endless was the wrangling over these points, and over the appointment of the young prince as captain-general with or without a lieutenant. The two princesses addressed vigorous representations to the Estates in favour of the young prince, Princess Amalia in Holland, the princess-widow in Zealand, where the Orange party was still so strong that the Estates of Holland deemed it necessary to send a deputation thither to keep the province on the right path. This deputation, among whose members were Jacob van Wassenaar, lord of Obdam, and John de Witt, pensionary of Dordrecht, opposed successfully the intrigues of the Orange party. A proposition emanating from Holland attributed the transfer of garrisons to the States-General, but by advice of the council, which was to obtain a report or instruction drawn up by the separate provinces, and to them was to belong the right of moving troops within their borders and of giving consent to the movement of troops into or out of the province; the soldiers were to swear allegiance to the general government as well as to the Estates harbouring and paying them. This proposition became a resolution of the assembly. A captain-general was not named as Holland wished, no decision being reached. Nothing was settled about the appointment of army officers, so that the provinces did what they pleased. The secret correspondence on military affairs was left to the States-General. Other military matters were arranged, the supreme power of the provincial Estates coming out strongly. Several minor affairs were regulated in the Great Assembly. A sharp resolution introduced by Zealand to prevent bribery¹ “by gifts and

¹ Wicquefort, ii., p. 25. “It could not be denied that this corruption

pensions'' was followed by a placard, which naturally did not remedy the evil. New instructions were drawn up for the council of state, the chamber of accounts, the boards of admiralty, the higher and lower officers of the general government. The foreign embassies remained subject to the States-General. The sittings and travelling expenses of the deputies of the States-General and the council of state were established.

Towards the end of the important meetings, to which it was sought to give a more solemn character by decreeing that the resolutions adopted should be considered ''of the same power and vigour'' as the union of Utrecht,¹ the council pensionary, Cats, in an evil hour raked up the troubles of 1650. He had repeatedly offered in the Estates of Holland to resign on account of his great age, but no action was taken so that in June, in order to bring out a decision, he simply laid upon the table important papers in his possession, among them being a written ''Complaint'' against Amsterdam and the carefully guarded ''Reasons and motives'' of Prince William ''both with regard to the arrested gentlemen and to what is begun at, by, and about the city of Amsterdam.'' The reading of the latter violent document excited at once such indignation that special commissioners were authorised to investigate it further. They proposed to offer a written refutation of it to the Great Assembly, to request it to declare illegal the resolutions of June 5 and 6, 1650, which had led to one thing and another, and to withdraw the thanks previously offered to the prince. Holland examined the whole affair thoroughly and learned that Musch was the chief author of this document as well as of the complaint against Amsterdam. Musch was dead,

had reached the noblest parts of the state." Cf. Pamphlet Thys., No. 5900.

¹ The resolutions are sometimes comprehended under the name ''Further union of The Hague of 1651'' (Pamphlet Thys., No. 5879, 5880, *et seq.*).

but Sommelsdijk, whose conduct naturally came under discussion, considered himself in danger and found it desirable to defend himself before the commissioners by appealing to the orders of the prince as captain-general and of Count William Frederick.¹ The latter also was now seriously implicated and menaced with a judicial investigation, whereupon Friesland, on July 20th, proposed to the Great Assembly a "resolution of amnesty, forgiving, and forgetting," so that no further dissension should arise over these affairs of the past.² Holland desired each province should do strict justice for itself, evidently with an eye to its subject, Sommelsdijk, who had not succeeded in clearing himself. Not until Sommelsdijk had promised not to appear in the Estates of Holland unless the nobles again admitted him, and upon strong pressure from Friesland, which, with Groningen's support, threatened to hold all the resolutions of the Great Assembly as null, if amnesty were not accepted, did Holland yield, and amnesty was unanimously resolved on the 19th of August. The towns of Holland, from which the six members came, had already sharply declared that those gentlemen had faithfully performed their duty; Amsterdam received from Holland over 54,000 guilders for its expenditures of 1650 "in the service of the country."

Two days after the adoption of the amnesty Cats in Holland's name delivered a flowery farewell address, lauding the harmonious spirit of the assembly and testifying to its important achievements, its forgiving disposition, and God's apparent blessing upon its work. A religious service was attended by all, and in the evening the ringing of bells and the firing of cannon announced the end of the Great Assembly. In the middle of September followed a day of public thanks, fasting, and prayer, and

¹ *Archives*, v., p. 411.

² Aitzema, iii., p. 582.

men exulted loudly: "now the Lion has again a clog upon his claw."¹

The work of the assembly was unquestionably important. By its resolutions, as well as by what it left undone, it fixed the government of the republic in the form resulting from the insurrection against Spain. Availing itself of the temporary eclipse of the sun of Orange, it organised the government of the States, with all its faults and without great changes, for the needs of the moment. The aristocracy of the regents, whose representative it might be considered, maintained through it, under the lead of Holland's statesmen, the principle of "aristocratic government" in opposition to the monarchical tendencies of recent times and to feeble democratic utterances here and there. The principle set up by Oldenbarnevelt and his partisans was most plainly subscribed to by the Great Assembly in all its acts. John de Witt thus formulates this principle in one of his letters: "these provinces are not together *una respublica*, but each province is separately a sovereign *respublica*, so that these United Provinces must be called not by the name of *respublica* (in the singular number) but by the name of *respublicæ federatæ* or *unitæ* (in the plural number)."² This principle may be regarded as of great importance for the future of the United Netherlands, although it was far from finding universal acceptance.

¹ Jer. de Decker.

² Dated May 10, 1652 (*Rijksarchief*).





CHAPTER VIII

FIRST ENGLISH WAR

THE Great Assembly had not confined itself to the regulation of internal affairs, as was at first intended, but had considered also the foreign relations of the republic. This resulted naturally from its giving audience to foreign ambassadors. Important was the announcement of the coming of an embassy from the English republic on account of recent difficulties with England. These difficulties concerned not alone the attitude of the United Netherlands towards Parliament and towards the pretensions to the English throne of Charles II., the "king of Scotland," as he was officially called, but were of a more critical nature.

Between the English and the Dutch nations there had long existed a commercial jealousy which, from the beginning of the seventeenth century, brought their seamen and merchants into sharp rivalry almost over the whole world. The disputes respecting the fishery on the English coast and the question of the *Dominium Maris* in the time of James and Charles I., though not entirely forgotten, were not taken up by the English during their internal troubles. Shortly after the battle of the Downs, that denial of English supremacy even in English harbours, the aged Aerssen had been sent (1639) to London to conjure the expected storm, but the ambassador found little to do. Although King Charles's first minister, Lord Strafford, complained seriously of the "greatest affront of the world" done to England, nothing came of

the complaint. Seeing that England could do little, the States paid no attention to the English pretensions. Meanwhile the English claims had excited a deeply rooted hostility to the English in a large portion of the population of the Netherlands. Many merchants, seamen, and fishermen showed aversion to everything that was English. There was further since the king's execution a universal detestation among the Dutch of the English regicides, who had laid hands upon their sovereign. The old complaints of English arrogance towards foreigners were repeatedly heard in the Netherlands and appeared in numerous pamphlets dealing with English affairs of the day. As England's power rose under Cromwell's energetic rule, these complaints did not become less, especially when English war ships about 1650 began annoying Dutch merchantmen with the search of their cargo and crew on the pretext of acting against the piracy of the French and of the English royalists in the Channel.

The feeling in England towards the Dutch was not kindly. A self-conceited contempt for the smaller nation and ridicule of its peculiarities, of its slowness, its intemperance, its distrust, its thirst for gain, the comparative roughness of its "mynheers," its exaggerated neatness, led to sharp criticism of the republic's inhabitants. English travels and pamphlets of the time are full of all this. The protection granted in the Netherlands to those now considered as England's enemies, the unpunished murder of Doreslaer, the preference shown to the king's ambassadors over those of Parliament, the memory of the unfortunate Ambon affair, commercial difficulties in India and elsewhere — all had occasioned much bad blood and increased in England the national enmity toward the Dutch. As long as the civil war continued, the attitude of the States with regard to the old pretensions was without danger, but conditions changed

when, in 1650, the English republic seemed permanently established and Cromwell powerful enough to uphold it at home and abroad. The death of Prince William, the protector of the Stuarts, apparently lessened the chance of further troubles, and late in January the Great Assembly resolved to recognise the English republic as "free and sovereign." Joachimi, the able old ambassador, was to depart for London in his former capacity, and thus diplomatic relations with England actually broken off would be resumed.

Before he crossed the sea, the English embassy arrived at The Hague for the purpose of securing a much closer union between the republic and its English sister. The government of the English republic earnestly desired an alliance based upon agreement in religion and political institutions, in economic development, in all sorts of interests, and upon the friendly relations of former days, "for the general good of Christendom as well as for our own." In 1649 the English government had voiced this feeling to Heenvliet and Pauw,¹ and Doreslaer had been commissioned to offer a closer union.² The brilliant embassy of the Lord Chief Justice Oliver St. John and Strickland, with a retinue of nearly 250 persons including many noblemen, reached the Meuse escorted by five war ships at the end of March, 1651, and later The Hague. St. John was unquestionably the head, one of the most influential English statesmen of the period and possessed with the idea of a closer alliance, while "the wild scheme of political union"³ was to come up only in case the offers of alliance were favourably received. The reception on the side of the States left nothing to be desired, but the populace showed open enmity and abused the embassy

¹ Mitsukuri, *Englisch-niederländische Unionsbestrebungen im Zeitalter Cromwells* (Tübingen, 1891), pp. 25, 26.

² Aitzema, iii., p. 377.

³ Gardiner, p. 357.

in the worst way. St. John proposed "a more strict and intimate alliance and union" for the promotion of "a more intrinsical and mutual interest of each in other," founded upon similarity of religion, government, and commercial interest. The idea encountered cool reserve upon the part of the Dutch. The majority of the population of the Netherlands, favouring the Orange family and the Stuarts, wanted no close connection. Not to displease the ambassadors, it was declared that "a treaty over common interests" would be concluded. But this was altogether too general for St. John. He desired a "clear and satisfactory answer" and formally offered a close, defensive alliance which was then discussed seriously in the provincial Estates.

While the affair was in suspense, news came that Tromp, sent out to curb the royalist privateers on the Scilly Islands, had occupied one of these islands. This act, viewed with suspicion in England, also the attitude of the populace and of the Bohemian royal family, Prince Edward being especially conspicuous, in The Hague towards the Englishmen of the embassy so angered Parliament that it summoned St. John home and only rescinded this resolution, when Holland promised to stop the insults and actually prosecuted Prince Edward. Negotiations were resumed, the English now considering chiefly the support given the Stuarts in the Netherlands, while the Dutch sought reciprocity of commercial advantages with restoration of the *Magnus Intercursus* of 1496. The English, showing little diplomatic talent, reverted often in vague terms to the plans of union, but the States, ever dreading public opinion, made answer more in general. The English demands concerning the royalists appeared on the contrary very definite. In certain cases they asked for the confiscation of the property of those daring to support the royalists, thus also of the princess of Orange, a request impossible to grant. Pro-

posals were made on both sides, until St. John understood that little was to be obtained from the States and took his departure on the 30th of July in great vexation at the failure of his mission. Neither the banishment of the Stuarts nor the close alliance was attained.

Parliament's tone in reply to St. John's communications was very bitter. The English government now thought of war to force the obstinate States into an engagement with England that would prevent them from ever harbouring England's enemies. The fear of such an extremity induced the States-General, after the close of the Great Assembly, to resolve upon the sending of a Dutch embassy to England. There it soon became evident that hostility was wanted. England was beginning to appreciate more and more the importance of its fleet which was coming up under able managers like Cromwell's colleague Vane and excellent commanders like Blake and Penn. The English republic exerted itself to put its navy into a condition to oppose the fleets of other nations, perceiving that England's power, peace, and commerce could only be satisfactorily sustained by a strong navy. Charles II.'s defeat by Cromwell in the battle of Worcester on September 3d, his flight to France, the subjection of almost all Scotland by the English army, and victories in Ireland soon afforded Parliament an opportunity to devote its attention entirely to the navy and commerce.

Naturally it came into conflict with the interests of the United Netherlands, the greatest maritime power of the time, whose ships covered the oceans, whose commercial spirit sought to overcome all competition. England was still dependent upon Dutch commerce, which had made itself master of nearly all the carrying trade of northern and western Europe. Trade between England and France went on largely in Dutch vessels, and the treaty just concluded with Denmark gave them greater influence in the

Baltic than ever before. St. John after his return urged strong measures and in August presented his famous Navigation Act to Parliament, which made it a law October 9, 1651.¹ The Navigation Act, undoubtedly directed first of all against Dutch commerce, prohibited the importation into England of foreign, non-European products otherwise than in vessels belonging to Englishmen or inhabitants of English colonies and manned by crews, of which half at least must be Englishmen. European products might alone be imported in English vessels or in vessels of the country where the products were grown or made. The Act would assuredly injure the Dutch carrying trade to England and Dutch commerce in general, and it might serve to develop English navigation. It was the beginning of the vigorous commercial policy that was to make England great as a nation and a maritime power and has inscribed upon its banner "rule the waves." It sounded like a challenge to the whole world, and first to the commercial nation on the other side. But the men putting through the Act did not wish it to cause war at once, for they intended it only as a piece of competition in commerce. And it would not have led to war, if new fuel had not been added to the long smouldering fire of dissension. This new fuel consisted chiefly of a larger number of seizures of Dutch ships by English cruisers which repeatedly searched neutral vessels for contraband and even brought them into English ports. That this took place not merely in the "seas about England," but out on the ocean, and even upon neutral coasts, was very disagreeable to the Dutch and quite opposed to their cherished theory of the "open sea."

In these circumstances it was of great importance that the conduct of foreign affairs in the republic should rest in able and experienced hands. After the resignation of

¹ Gardiner, ii., p. 82.

Cats as council pensionary of Holland, the aged Adriaan Pauw had been unanimously chosen for this office so influential when there was no stadtholder. Reluctantly the venerable man assumed for the second time the dignity of the *Atlas belgicæ libertatis*. But with him a young statesman soon began to attract attention, the 26-years old John de Witt,¹ pensionary of Dordrecht. John de Witt, second son of burgomaster Jacob de Witt, was brought up in the best circles of Dordrecht, where his family had been in the government since the fifteenth century. He studied law with his brother at Leyden University, then travelled through France on horseback with his brother, and visited England. Obtaining his degree at Angers, John, the younger son, settled at The Hague in 1647 as an advocate; Cornelius, the older, entered the government of his native city. At The Hague John moved in the society of the magistrates, taking part in the social life of the gay capital of the Oranges, studying mathematics as much as his law business would allow, and now and then amusing himself by writing poetry, by translating Corneille's *Horace*. Accounts of him at this time² depict him as a grave and tall young man, with an oval face, a yellowish complexion, brown hair and eyes, simply but carefully dressed, attracting notice by his extraordinary knowledge and development, by his clear insight, his love of order, his uncommon talent for the persuasion of others, further by his capacity for work and by tranquillity of mind, making his maxim *ago quod ago*, by his honesty and his inaccessibility to bribery and flattery.

¹ He was born at Dordrecht, September 24, 1625, according to Wicquefort (iv., p. 537), who knew him well. Geddes, i., p. 30, makes him two years older, but that is impossible, as his brother Cornelius was born July 10, 1623.

² On the youth and pensionaryship of De Witt: Geddes, *History of the administration of John de Witt*, i., the first chapters, and Lefèvre Pontalis, *Jean de Witt* (Paris, 1884), i., p. 81, 133 *et seq.*

The father's imprisonment by command of the prince must have shocked the son who with Cornelius set about securing his release. The exclusion of the father from any place in the government menaced their future also, when the prince's death suddenly improved their position. Jacob de Witt returned immediately to the government of Dordrecht, and John became pensionary of his native town on December 21, 1650. With a few members of the government he then represented the city regularly in the Estates of Holland, soon also in the Great Assembly, where he exercised an important influence, especially in the treatment of the English proposals. Concerning them and domestic affairs we possess noteworthy information in his correspondence with his city.¹ In the autumn of 1651 he assisted Pauw in managing relations with England. He was a member of the committee appointed January 25, 1652, by the Estates of Holland to give advice on English affairs. As pensionary of the "first city" of Holland he could claim a place on that commission, but his ability drew attention to the young statesman who was soon greatly to influence the fate of his country.

After negotiations with St. John were broken off and the Englishmen had departed, the Great Assembly, upon motion of Holland, resolved to send an extraordinary embassy to England. The unexpected promulgation of the Navigation Act lessened the chances of its success, and some months elapsed before the embassy started. It consisted of Cats, the former commissioner Schaep, and the Zealander Van de Perre. These gentlemen landed at Gravesend on Christmas, receiving all the marks of honour, though hooted at by the people of London, where caricatures and pamphlets appeared against them. The embassy was to negotiate not only over the *Magnus Intercursus*, but also for the repeal of

¹ The letters are in the Royal Archives.

the Act, the cessation of the troubling of Dutch merchantmen by English ships on pretext of searching for French goods, the revocation of the letters of reprisal already granted against the Dutch, and for an indemnity to the injured merchants—in short, for the recognition by treaty of the theory of the “open sea.”

Parliament, after listening amusedly to the bombastic Latin oration of the aged Cats, did not decline to open negotiations, and immediately suspended the letters of marque, but the English statesmen met the complaints of the States with counter complaints, embodying old and new grievances. With the murder of Doreslaer, the insults heaped on the English ambassadors, the protection of England's enemies, the Sound treaty, etc., came up again the questions of Ambon, the Downs, the fishery, of the obstacles to English commerce in Russia, the East and West Indies. Large demands for reparation were made, while the repeal of the Act and indemnity for the damage to Dutch commerce were refused. Another demand was that the Dutch with all nations should acknowledge England's supremacy in “English waters”—a very elastic expression—by striking flag and sail before English ships. If a Dutch ship or fleet met an English squadron, the Dutch ships were accustomed to strike flag and topsails and to fire a salute. The number of shots fired, 9, 7, or 5, depended upon the English commander's rank, whether he was admiral, vice admiral, or rear admiral. For a single ship without a commander of this rank, salutes were sufficient without any striking; on sailing into English harbours the flag was struck and replaced by a pennant, while salutes were exchanged.¹ All this, particularly the last demand, caused exasperation in the Netherlands. It was seen that England wanted war, and the leading statesmen, De

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 731, according to Tromp's own explanation of the custom.

Witt especially, dreaded this as a great misfortune for both nations. First of all the increase of the navy was an urgent necessity.

Economy had been introduced in the navy after the peace of Münster. Some ships of war were sold openly or secretly, also to England, or dismantled; many seamen were discharged; and good captains went into the merchant marine. In February the States-General resolved to fit out fifty, later one hundred more vessels, for the protection of commerce¹ which could not be well enough guarded by the fleet of nearly seventy-five ships then in existence. The resolution to enlarge the navy was brought to the notice of the various powers, including England. It was regarded by the English government as a threat and occasioned a considerable increase of the navy on that side also, so that it soon numbered far over one hundred sails. The English vessels were larger and better manned than the Dutch, even than Tromp's flagship, the *Brederode*. While both sides prepared, the Dutch ambassadors continued to negotiate, but the long list of grievances with the indemnity desired, which the English government in March laid before them, was not promising. A month later that government requested before further negotiation "settlement of the demands, which are a matter of right and justice and touch our honour." Negotiations went on until the end of May, when an unexpected event precipitated the crisis.

The question of the right to search the cargo of neutrals and to confiscate the enemy's goods in neutral vessels gave rise to it. During the prevailing tension between France and England the English admiralty desired their cruisers to exercise this right without restriction. On the other hand, the States-General in

¹ Gardiner, *Letters and papers relating to the first Dutch war*, i., p. 85; Wicquefort, ii., p. 122.

1650 had incorporated in a treaty with Spain the principle that a neutral flag covered the cargo except only in case of contraband. The English government would not accept this new rule of international law, but the States-General wished its recognition and the guarantee of Dutch ships against injury. It was again the oft-disputed question of the "open sea." Tromp, the aged lieutenant admiral, who was to command the fleet, was personally opposed to the English demands, particularly to that concerning the flag. The brave seaman was wont to say that he would only strike the flag "when the English were the strongest." He was now sent to sea in May with fifty vessels. According to his instructions he was to protect the Dutch ships from search, defend them against molestation, and free them from seizure. With regard to striking the flag, he was told generally that he must have a care that the state should suffer no affront,¹ so that this delicate matter was left to him, although he was recommended to approach the English coast as little as possible, and to keep rather to the Flemish shore in order to avoid a collision.

Tromp anchored between Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort, but encountered a storm and sailed on May 29th to Dover to repair damages, while he informed the English ships in the Downs of his intention. At Dover, however, he met Captain Van der Zaen, who reported that he had fought with a British frigate of Blake's fleet about striking the flag and that seven merchantmen convoyed by him through the Channel were in danger of capture. Tromp, who had not yet saluted the castle of Dover, now sailed towards the English coast and there came upon Blake cruising with fifteen ships in the Channel. On Blake's approach Tromp made ready, as he insisted later, to strike the flag; he struck his pennant and stationed a man by the flag, when Blake, presuming that

¹ De Jonge, *Zeewezen*, i., p. 413.

Tromp was unwilling to strike, began hostilities and fired repeatedly upon the Dutch admiral's ship, first with warning shots across the bow, then straight at the ship. After some hesitation Tromp answered with a shot which was followed by Blake's full broadside and by a regular fight between the two fleets. Twelve English vessels hastened from the Downs, and the battle soon became general until darkness separated the combatants. Tromp had lost two ships and withdrew to the French coast, confining himself, as he afterwards declared, to defensive tactics.¹

There was great indignation in London at Tromp's attitude. A commission of inquiry, of which Cromwell was a member, pronounced him guilty. Opinion differed in the Netherlands, where many disapproved of Tromp's action and attributed it to his Orange partisanship, it being well known that the Orange party desired war in the interest of the Stuarts and of the young prince, who might then be made captain-general. John de Witt and others hoped for peace. They believed peace to be more to the Dutch interest than war. The English would have the "golden mountain" of the rich Netherlands to attack, while the Dutch would have to assail the "iron mountain" of England impoverished by civil war. If the Dutch were victorious, what advantage would result to them? And what might they not lose? New instructions commanded Tromp to act only on the defensive and to strike the flag "according to ancient custom." It was immediately resolved to send Pauw himself to England in order, with the help of the Hollander Willem Nieuwpoort already there, to convince Parliament of the peaceful disposition of the States and to cause the battle of Dover to be forgotten, as the consequence of a misunderstanding. At the same time the fitting out of

¹Gardiner, ii., p. 119; Geddes, p. 209; Gardiner, *Letters*, i., p. 170 *et seq.*

the 150 ships was hastened. On the English side also great zeal was shown in strengthening the fleet under direction of the admiralty committee of the council of state, with the navy commission subordinate to it,¹ and with the advice of the excellent general, Robert Blake. Under Blake, William Penn and George Ayscue were appointed vice admirals, and Bourne was rear admiral. Cromwell himself at Dover looked after preparations for the war. As early as June, sixty English vessels lay ready in the Downs, while Dutch merchantmen were seized in all English ports.

Pauw, hastily departing for England, made the greatest exertions to preserve the peace. But the feeling in Holland grew more warlike, as its people considered themselves stronger on the sea, and in Parliament also many urged war, expecting great profit for the developing English commerce. Cromwell desired no war with the sister republic of a like faith and ancestry, for he hoped to win it over to his religio-political plans in Europe, to the great Protestant alliance against the Catholic powers. He seems to have pushed preparations for war in order to dissuade the Netherlands from war by a development of force and in order to strengthen the English war power. Pauw did not fully understand his disposition. Seeing England's preparations, he feared a declaration of war at an unfavourable time and advised more firmness. At the end of June the States-General sharply formulated their demands, ordering the ambassadors in case of refusal to return. Soon nothing else was left for them to do. The torch of war was lighted and Tromp received instructions to inflict all possible injury on the English. With his fleet of nearly 100 ships and 11,000 men he was to keep commerce and fishery from harm. Both governments issued long manifestoes in justification of their conduct.

¹ Oppenheim, *Administration of the Royal Navy*, i., p. 346.

What had been feared soon came to pass. The great extension of Dutch commerce promised England an advantage with its situation in the path of almost all the Dutch merchantmen. Vice Admiral Ayscue, summoned from the West Indies, succeeded in destroying a fleet of Dutch merchantmen near Calais, while Blake himself fell upon the fishing fleet off the Orkneys and captured the Dutch war ships protecting it. Tromp first blockaded Ayscue in the Downs, but did not fight him on account of the efficient defence of the coast. He then followed Blake northwards and found him late in July, but was prevented from attacking him by a violent storm and returned home with scarcely half of his storm-ravaged fleet. Ayscue sailing out again was repulsed near Plymouth by the Zealand commander, De Ruyter, who was convoying a merchant fleet through the Channel.¹ The disappointment over Tromp's expedition, the distrust of his loyalty to the existing government, the heavy loss sustained in the fishing fleet, caused his suspension immediately after his return. There was talk of bringing him to trial. Vice Admiral Witte de With was given chief command in his place to the great vexation of the disorderly crews of the fleet, who would not allow the strict captain upon Tromp's ship. With difficulty he succeeded in joining De Ruyter menaced in the Channel by the English superiority, and united they encountered Blake in the Downs October 8th after a severe storm. De With contended valiantly, but without much discretion, against Blake's larger force. The cowardice of a score of his captains, who took to flight during the battle, so reduced his strength that after a sharp engagement he ordered a retreat on the following day.²

The injury suffered and the stoppage of commerce and

¹ Geddes, p. 227; De Jonge, i., p. 422; Gardiner, *Letters*, ii., p. 1 *et seq.*

² Geddes, p. 254; Gardiner, *Letters*, ii., p. 217.

the fishery caused increasing discontent and led in the autumn to a movement in favour of the young prince of Orange. "Although our prince is still so small, stadtholder he must be for all," sang the people. And the partisans of Orange in the States sang with them. In Zeeland and Gelderland there were disturbances, and the elevation of the young prince was proposed in the Estates. Holland deemed it necessary to send a deputation to Zeeland to avert the threatening peril. John de Witt was at the head of this deputation. On its arrival it ran the risk of being assailed by the populace which "seemed to have grown above the government."¹ People flocked from the country around into Middelburg, so that the deputation had to be guarded by armed men. But De Witt spurred his frightened colleagues into courage, and they delivered their message. Zeeland, nevertheless, endeavoured to persuade the other provinces to appoint the prince captain-general, and his cousin William Frederick as his lieutenant. The Estates of Holland took great pains to combat such ideas and managed to draw out the affair without entirely stopping it, because the Orange leaders by pamphlets and secret machinations continued to stir up the people against the government of the States.

Thus far the Dutch unmistakably had the worst of it. But on the Tuscan coast Jan Van Galen in August had succeeded in blockading two small English squadrons in Leghorn and Porto Longone. In the North Sea also the year did not end without more encouraging results. After De With's defeat the recreant captains, mostly belonging in Zeeland, were punished or at least sentenced by a special court to severe punishment, but it appeared impossible to restore discipline on the fleet without Tromp's all-powerful authority. Tromp was persuaded to take up his task again for the father-

¹ De Witt, *Brieven*, v., p. 11.

land, though not without bitter complaint of the lack of confidence shown him. In November the hero sailed into the North Sea with a fleet of almost one hundred ships escorting nearly five hundred merchantmen. Storm and fog compelled him to bring back the latter, but with some sixty ships he put to sea again early in December and on the 10th met Blake off Dungeness. The English fleet was now somewhat less in number, though its vessels, as usual in this war, were larger and better manned. This time many English captains left their admiral in the lurch, and Blake suffered a severe defeat, making Tromp for a time master of the sea, so that he threatened a landing upon the English coast and caused people to fear an attack on the Thames, where many war and merchant ships were as good as unprotected.

The reorganisation of the English fleet was effected under Blake himself and the two able generals of the army, Monk and Deane, who were placed on the fleet. By the middle of February it was again ready to put to sea. It found Tromp in the Channel on his voyage back to the fatherland with a convoy of 150 merchantmen. Off Portland the fleets met February 28, 1653. A fierce fight ensued during two days with the English vanguard—the English had adopted the Dutch custom of a division into squadrons,—but Tromp, who had already been at sea nearly three months, perceived speedily that his powder would soon run short, and the merchantmen impeded his operations. On the third day only thirty of his ships appeared able to offer resistance, bravely led by himself and by his subordinates, Johan Evertsen, Pieter Floriszoon, and De Ruyter, who had also covered themselves with glory in the first and second days. With unsurpassed seamanship Tromp fought through the enemy's strong force, losing but a few of his vessels, and in the evening of the third day, almost without powder,

he reached at Grisnez the French coast with its chalk reefs, and during the night outsailed the pursuing enemy in a masterly manner. The three days' battle, which went on from Portland to the mouth of the Channel, was one of those engagements, in which the Dutch, though worsted, so often displayed not merely valour but especially their seamanship in a way to extort admiration from the enemy.¹

The party, opposed with Cromwell and Vane to the war and regarding it as against brethren in the faith, as fratricide, was growing stronger meanwhile in England, particularly now it appeared that the Dutch Republic was not so easily to be conquered as the war party had imagined. In August the old diplomatist Gerbier had been sent to The Hague as a secret agent; the strict Puritan admiral, Ayscue, had refused to serve longer in this war and had laid down his command at the instance of the former Puritan exile, Peters, now an influential statesman after living for years in Rotterdam. The enthusiasm for the war had quickly subsided on the Dutch side also; the defeats, commercial losses, increasing want of money, the defects of the fleet, had changed public opinion. England was disagreeably affected, furthermore, by the hostile attitude of Denmark, which at the instigation of the Dutch ambassador Keyser closed the Sound to English vessels. Sweden also, whither Van Beuningen had been dispatched in September, 1652, as ambassador of the States, seemed more inclined to the Dutch than to the English side. Gerbier's secret discussions amounted to little, but they were soon continued by Dolman, an English colonel in the Dutch service who was sent to England, and by Stone, an English captain of horse. Finally in the early spring of 1653 a secret letter was drawn up from Pauw to the master of ceremonies of Parliament or to some other member

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 447; Gardiner, ii., p. 157.

with an offer to open negotiations. Pauw made some difficulty about signing this letter, although he was authorised by the Holland committee for English affairs, so the matter was brought "under oath of secrecy" before the Estates of Holland, the letter was then signed by Pauw and handed to Stone, who immediately departed with it for England.¹

The sending of this letter in the name of the leading Dutch statesmen was a dangerous sign of exhaustion. There was no mistake about it. Fishery and commerce were at a stand, bringing thousands to beggary; the harbours were crowded with vessels; the lack of grain was seriously felt; and money was no longer to be found in the public treasuries. All sorts of means were thought of to provide money for pressing needs, but it quickly appeared that the only satisfactory way was—peace. This feeling was welcome to the Dutch statesmen who had tried to prevent war and were now waiting for a chance to restore peace. The most influential of them was the young man who had become the right hand of the enfeebled council pensionary and might already be considered as his presumptive successor: John de Witt. He was unwilling to let the opportunity pass, and urged the other members of the committee on English affairs to work for peace. It was chiefly due to him that the secret letter was sent off. This had scarcely taken place, when Pauw died (February 21st), and De Witt, who had repeatedly shown uncommon capacity and energy in filling his place temporarily, was a few days later again invested temporarily with the important office by an almost unanimous vote, a proof of great confidence in the young statesman, who might be regarded as Pauw's pupil. The secret letter carried to London by Stone made its way, but the war party in England, considering

¹Concerning this, see the very important letter of De Witt to Van Beuningen dated February 13, 1653 (Royal Archives).

the battle off Portland as a victory, was stronger for the time being, and more vigorous action appeared necessary to enable the peace party there to assert itself. So De Witt in March requested in deep secrecy the Estates of Holland to send official letters to Parliament and the council of state, proving that peace was really desired by the government of the most powerful province. The Estates agreed to this, although Leyden, always favouring Orange, objected to acting without the other provinces. It was further resolved upon De Witt's motion, as soon as Parliament took up the plan, to do away with secrecy and to reveal all in the States-General.

The affair appeared for a moment to go wrong. The letter of the Estates became known to all England and was printed as a "humble supplication" for peace, which made a very bad impression upon the people in the Orange provinces extremely sensitive concerning England. De Witt cleverly righted this by communicating quickly the whole matter to the States-General which, contrary to his expectation, were soon reconciled to the separate secret negotiation. The Orange party violently opposed the action as against the provisions of the Union regarding treaties with foreign powers. But De Witt surmounted these difficulties, when the answer of Parliament seemed favourable and it showed a readiness to take up again the negotiations of July, 1652. He wanted to propose a truce and send an ambassador at once, but the Estates of Holland would not go so far. A friendly letter only was sent requesting Parliament to indicate a neutral place for resuming negotiations (April 30th); De Witt accomplished this merely by a majority of four to three provinces, which was really in conflict with the Union.

This letter found conditions in England changed not unfavourably. Cromwell with the army's support had dissolved Parliament on the same 30th of April and

established another government with himself as actual dictator, until England should give itself a more monarchical form of government, either by his restoring the Stuarts, as the royalists hoped without good reason, or by his assuming the royal title himself or some other corresponding to it. The last occurred, and on December 16th "His Highness Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the Republic of England" took the oath as such amid the acclamations of his soldiers and partisans, while the English people quietly looked on, weary of change and longing for a strong government. A peaceful attitude was to be expected from one who had disapproved of the war, but little sign of this appeared at first. The English council of state, sufficiently informed of the enemy's desperate condition, rejected De Witt's proposition and insisted simply upon taking up the interrupted negotiation over the English demands. Meanwhile the war was to be prosecuted vigorously.

The States resolved to venture the utmost to rescue the rich fleet expected from France, before it should fall into the hands of the English in the Channel. Hope for the new year of war was inspired by the good news still coming from the Mediterranean, where Van Galen on March 13th destroyed, at the cost of his own life, Appleton's British squadron off Leghorn, the second under Badiley immediately returning to England. Success was most desirable, for should the "French fleet" be captured, innumerable people would be ruined, and still worse would become the sad condition of Amsterdam, where grass was growing in the once crowded streets and 3000 houses stood vacant, where many wharves, shops, and warehouses were closed and the want of work hurt all classes. Not alone Amsterdam, but also "the whole country was quite full of beggars."¹

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 420.

All hope was fixed on Tromp, but he expected little from a fleet that was too weak in ships, men, and armament to measure itself with the ever stronger navy of the enemy. He disclaimed all responsibility for the expedition. But he succeeded in bringing the "French fleet" to port, while another large merchant fleet came safely along Shetland past the English fleet of Monk and Deane, Blake having not yet entirely recovered from the wound received in the last battle. Early in June he sailed out again in search of the English and met them June 12th off Nieuwpoort on the Flemish coast.¹ The two fleets were nearly equal in size, about one hundred ships, but the English vessels were larger and better manned and armed. De Ruyter and De With commanded the van and rear, Tromp himself the main division of the Dutch. During two days the fighting was desperate, but the English, reënforced on the second day by Blake with some fresh vessels, won the victory, and on the morning of June 14th Tromp, impelled also by his scarcity of powder, withdrew among the shoals where the enemy could not follow. Tromp had lost twenty ships, while Deane was killed among others on the English side. The three Dutch admirals complained bitterly of the condition of their vessels compared with those of the enemy. De Ruyter would not go to sea again; De With acknowledged the mastery of the English; Tromp declared that thirty of his ships might be called unseaworthy, and any further attempt would result in the fleet's destruction.

The English now blockaded the entire coast and threatened a landing to the despair of the population, which resorted here and there to insurrection, loudly calling for the restoration of the prince of Orange, the magical remedy that was expected to bring rescue from dire distress, although the prince was still a young

¹De Jonge, i., p. 467; Gardiner, ii., p. 333.

child. The States under these circumstances resolved in June to send envoys to England. The men chosen were Hieronymus Van Beverningh of Gouda, Nieuwpoort from Holland, both intimate friends of De Witt, Van de Perre from Zealand, and Jongestall from Friesland.¹ The English council of state did not receive them in a very encouraging manner, but Cromwell put himself in touch with Nieuwpoort and showed him the way to an agreement, perhaps to a close alliance between the two republics—the resumption of St. John's plans, based now upon the conviction that God desired the coöperation of the two states for the glorification of His name and for the liberation of the world from the insupportable yoke of the Romish dominion.² Furthermore, the reëstablishment of good friendship seemed to him in the interest of both; together they might rule the whole world's market, impose their will on Europe, and regulate all commerce. Thus spoke the powerful leader of England's destiny, mingling political and religious, commercial and moral principles, as was his custom. While influential, he was then in fact only a member of the council of state, which persisted in the old demands for reparation on account of previous injuries to the English, although that council also wished *una gens, una respublica*, an idea that went farther than the close alliance between two states proposed by Cromwell—one state under one common government, with the same laws, possessions, and interests.³ These demands were unacceptable to the States. They desired no such close union, and two of the envoys went home for instructions, while Beverningh

¹ Especially important for this negotiation are De Witt's letters to Beverningh (Royal Archives), which Wicquefort, ii., p. 239, may also have drawn upon, and the Thurloe Papers on the English side. Thurloe was then English secretary of state.

² Geddes, p. 336.

³ Gardiner, ii., p. 345; De Jonge, i., p. 511.

and Van de Perre remained in England, hoping for Cromwell's support.

The decision still rested with the guns. Once more the States had exerted all their strength to free the coast from the blockade, and Tromp early in August sailed with a part of the fleet northwards from the Wielingen in search of Monk, who had De With shut up near Texel. On August 9th he outwitted Monk and after a fight off Petten took advantage of storm and darkness to unite with De With. Off Ter Heide on the coast a fierce battle occurred August 10th, in which Tromp soon received a mortal wound in the breast and died, encouraging his men in his last moments. Despite the bravery of Evertsen, De With, and De Ruyter the result was again a severe defeat for the States, which lost 26 ships, and over 6000 men. The English fleet, also, was so injured that Monk gave up the blockade and returned to his own ports. This last fact excited some hope among the Dutch so badly hit by Tromp's death, and the States showed slight inclination to discuss seriously the English demands, however much trouble the temporary council pensionary took to persuade them to do so.

Amid the rebellious disposition prevailing at Rotterdam, Delft, Haarlem, Dordrecht, Medemblik, Enkhuizen, in the cities of Zeeland, at The Hague itself, while preparations were making to withstand an English landing, while the whole government of the States seemed about to fall into anarchy, the young De Witt undismayed held with a firm hand the reins of authority. He, too, saw danger approaching ever nearer; he saw with anxiety the hundreds of ships confined in the harbours and the Zuyder Zee, the prices of provisions rising, the lack of work spreading, the tumultuous call for the prince becoming bolder. But he considered the prince's elevation a greater misfortune than all this, seeing in the feel-

ing of the princess for her royal brother in exile the germ of a new and relentless war with the English republic, of the destruction of freedom and the whole commonwealth. His own safety was in peril, but he did not hesitate to accept the doubly dangerous post of council pensionary, the "vexatious office," the "gilded slavery" now permanently offered him. His ambition and his responsibility towards the fatherland, whose prosperity he always identified with his party's victory, impelled him not to refuse the office. The young man took the oath on July 30, 1653. Like his predecessor and in view of Oldenbarnevelt's fate, he asked as a servant of the Estates of Holland a "strong act of indemnity for his assurance and security." At once he opposed energetically Zeeland's proposition to the States-General (July 28th), backed by Friesland and Groningen, to make the prince captain-general and admiral, and his Frisian cousin his lieutenant during his minority. Holland had him draw up a sharp "deduction" against the plan. Zeeland's scheme was frustrated for the time.

The report of the two envoys returning from England was considered in the usual slow fashion, and De Witt sought to gain even more time, like a fisherman watching attentively for the right instant to attain his object.¹ He managed to prevent the recall of the two envoys left behind, while Beverningh and his colleague in London kept Cromwell and the council of state busy, sometimes negotiating with both, sometimes secretly with the former only, about the grand but fantastic plans going through the English statesman's mind, and based upon a great Protestant commercial alliance with a close league of England and the Netherlands. Cromwell sent a formal proposition to the two gentlemen.² He offered an offensive and defensive alliance between the two

¹ Geddes, p. 357.

² Gardiner, ii., p. 349.

independent nations, protected by sixty English and forty Dutch ships, with a sacrifice of the English commerce in India for a money indemnity, with equal rights for both in Europe and Africa, thus abrogating the Navigation Act, while America, with the exception of Brazil, was to be left to England. The alliance was to be directed against the Catholic powers, and missionaries were to be scattered over the whole world. The practical Dutch envoys, little favouring this mixture of religion and commerce, were unwilling to go so far and prolonged the negotiations. When the other two in the middle of November returned to England, they brought merely a general offer for the renewal of negotiations concerning a treaty of peace and a subsequent alliance.

Little was done at sea all this time. The English under Monk's direction endeavoured to reorganise their navy, but mutinies in the autumn impeded this and had to be put down by force. The want of money was also felt. The Dutch made ready more speedily. The death of the beloved hero, "whose like the earth has not often borne and possibly will not easily be found in the future,"¹ had put the States into a difficult situation. His natural successor was Johan Evertsen or Witte de With, both vice admirals, after whom ranked the commanders, Pieter Floriszoon and De Ruyter. The first two were not wanted, because one was a partisan of Orange and a Zealander and the other was so hated, while the last seemed too young and could not be appointed without affronting the first. Having perhaps in mind Monk and Deane in England, who were originally army officers, the States chose for lieutenant admiral the head of the Holland fleet, Jacob van Wassenaer, lord of Obdam, governor of Heusden, a colonel of cavalry and nobleman of Holland, an

¹ De Witt to Boreel (*Brieven*, i., p. 2); Wicquefort, ii., p. 226.

adherent of the States party, but quite unexperienced in naval matters. He received only a provisional appointment; De Ruyter and Pieter Floriszoon were raised to the rank of vice admiral, Cornelis Tromp and two others to that of rear admiral. An expedition under Witte de With in September and October succeeded in protecting the East Indiamen and escorting home the fleet returning from India, which had sailed around Ireland to Bergen in Norway, but his fleet as well as Monk's was later dispersed by storm.

Meanwhile there was a "restless, factious, and grievous time" in the Netherlands, as Aitzema says, while anger against England, the cause of all the trouble, took deep root among the whole people. The heavy taxes awakened universal dissatisfaction. More and more it became evident that the country needed peace. Cromwell was made Protector in December, 1653; this gave almost unbounded power to the man in England, who had always desired peace, and circumstances there appeared more favourable, although the most violent Independents wanted to carry through the war. With tears in his eyes the new ruler declared that nothing had so grieved him as this war.¹ Now he hoped to realise his cherished plan for an alliance and urged it strenuously, deeming other disputed points of minor importance. The envoys were careful not to offend him by a refusal, showed a willingness to consider, and finally got from Cromwell the draft of twenty-seven articles. Some of them were very aggravating, stipulating that the prince or any of his family should never hold the offices of his forefathers, not even the command of a fortress or a ship, that all attempts to elevate him should be suppressed by force and, if necessary, with English help, that an annual sum should be paid for the fishery on the English coast, that only a limited number

¹ Geddes, p. 365; Gardiner, ii., p. 353.

of Dutch war vessels might appear in British waters, that the flag should be struck to English ships, etc.

The negotiation was carried on with the utmost secrecy, and even the States-General heard little about it. But such conditions were plainly "desperate," and the envoys demanded their passports. The disappointment of De Witt was great, and for a time the only expedient seemed to him a vigorous prosecution of the war. A strong fleet, brought together by a last exertion of energy, efforts to secure an alliance with Denmark, France, Poland, and the Hanse cities, were proposed by him first in Holland and afterwards in the States-General.¹ Cromwell saw the danger of this firmer attitude of the States, and his resumption of negotiations with Van Beverningh showed it. He was really anxious for peace, and the English nation wished it also, as it had suffered heavy losses and was subjected to insupportable taxation. Early in 1654 he therefore dropped several demands or modified them considerably, but he insisted resolutely upon two: the prince of Orange must be excluded from all offices, and Denmark was not to be included in the treaty of peace. Negotiations did not advance beyond this, until in the middle of January the envoys returned home for advice. At Gravesend an emissary from Cromwell overtook them with the report that he yielded on the subject of Denmark. It was already manifest that Cromwell, fearing an Orange rising among the people of the republic, would be content with a secret article regarding the prince's exclusion. But the envoys despaired of ever obtaining a secret article of this nature from the States-General, and Cromwell insisted, because he considered this matter of vital importance to the existence of the English republic and to England's safety.

De Witt was well informed of the course of affairs,

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 860.

having been in secret correspondence with the two Holland envoys, particularly with Van Beverningh. He, too, saw the impossibility of the acceptance of such a secret article in the treaty of peace with England. Such a treaty would be approved neither by the States-General nor by a single one of the provinces, he wrote to Van Beverningh.¹ Cromwell appears privately to have given the latter to understand that, if necessary, he might be satisfied with a declaration that the province of Holland would adhere to the resolutions previously taken concerning the stadtholdership and the captain-generalship, and that any captain-general to be appointed should be obliged to swear to the treaty with England. It is not quite certain whether this expedient was suggested by Holland's envoys and De Witt.² The other stipulations of the peace occasioned no serious objection, but the formal exclusion of the prince was not to be thought of, not even in Holland alone. De Witt's cleverness surmounted all difficulties in a way that proved his extraordinary diplomatic talents. Van Beverningh after a week returned suddenly alone to London. Urged by De Witt, the States-General sanctioned his mission, which was to keep an eye upon the sail in London besides secretly to appease Cromwell with regard to the exclusion. Then the council pensionary induced the States-General to resolve not to send the treaty about to be concluded with Cromwell to the provinces for advice but to ratify it immediately after its reception. The other two envoys, Van de Perre having died, now went back also, being called with Van Beverningh "extraordinary ambassadors to the Lord Protector," by which the new state of affairs in England was recognised. A new

¹ Geddes, p. 387 *et seq.* The account by Geddes drawn from the best authorities is very full upon this entire matter, and has here been followed in its main points.

² Geddes and Gardiner believe the idea proceeded from Cromwell.

official negotiation then began, and beside it in deep secrecy a second one with Cromwell, in which De Witt and Van Beverningh played a fine but dangerous game. By the middle of April De Witt had not been able to fulfil his secret assurance to Cromwell and present the exclusion to Holland, but the Estates of that province adjourned on April 20th for the Easter recess, and De Witt so managed that the treaty of peace, from which the stipulation concerning the prince was left out, was not signed at London before the day the recess began. On the following day (April 21st) he had the treaty come from England to The Hague; one day later it was ratified by the States-General, spurred by De Witt to unprecedented rapidity, and sent signed on the next day to England.

The concluded treaty¹ spoke more of a general friendly relation between the two countries than of a fusion such as St. John had desired. They were to live in peace and not to support or harbour each other's rebels or enemies. Dutch ships in the British seas were to strike the flag and lower their topsail. The States were to do justice in the so-called "massacre" at Ambon. Arbitrators were to settle the differences with Denmark. Disputes concerning possessions and commerce in India, Brazil, Muscovy, besides those about the Greenland fishery, were to be submitted to commissioners appointed by both sides and, if they did not agree within three months, the Protestant cantons of Switzerland were to arbitrate. The prince of Orange was not mentioned by name in the treaty of peace, but Article 32 provided that the States-General and the Estates of the provinces should oblige every stadtholder, captain-general, general, or admiral ever appointed by them to swear to observe the treaty, as they with their people promised to do.

But something more occurred. Cromwell had secretly

¹ Aitzema, iii., p. 918.

declared that he would only ratify the treaty with this "temperament" concerning the prince, deviating from his original demands, in case the ambassadors assured him that within two or three months he should receive the desired formal Act of Exclusion of the prince given by the Estates of Holland for that province. This was announced by the two ambassadors of Holland in a special letter to the Estates, not then in session, together with an account of their promise to Cromwell to recommend the Act. A private letter to De Witt, however, informed him that there was still hope of persuading the Protector to renounce this. The council pensionary acted as if he had not received his letter, pushed the treaty of peace through the States-General, as related above, and then summoned the Estates of Holland for the 28th of April. At the beginning of the meeting all the members were sworn to secrecy, and the official letter of the ambassadors relating to Cromwell's wish was then read to the Estates. The reading excited indignation at their conduct, and although Dordrecht and Amsterdam wanted to pass the Act, the deputies of nine towns refused to take this important step without first consulting their constituents; the nobility appeared divided. Now the matter had to go to the towns, which might have made an end to secrecy, but De Witt arranged that only the ruling burgomasters, again under oath of secrecy, should read the ambassadors' letter. If they did not consent to assume the responsibility, the town councils in their turn were to be put under an oath of secrecy before they might read the letter. Everything must be done as quickly as possible, and on May 1st the Estates met again. At the morning session voting began, and a majority was obtained for the Act, when there came a package from Van Beverningh for De Witt and a letter for the Estates from the ambassadors in London. The letter asserted apparently that Crom-

well demanded the delivery of the Act within a few days after the ratification and proclamation of the treaty, and that otherwise he would not consider the peace binding. De Witt's package contained his correspondence with Van Beverningh, which he would gladly have kept secret, and he reproached his correspondent for thus imprudently returning it. The evening sitting brought fourteen votes for the Act; the nobility had yielded under the influence of Brederode, who was interested as field marshal in not having a captain-general appointed; and the deputies of five towns were given until May 4th to see their constituents. After a stormy discussion on that day the opposition of four, Haarlem, Leyden, Enkhuizen, and Edam, appeared unconquerable. Sharp words were exchanged; and De Witt finally tried to pass the Act by a majority of votes, exciting violent protests from the minority. But nothing else could be done. De Witt drew up the Act in the evening and carried it through by a majority of fourteen to five votes, Alkmaar having joined the four towns mentioned.¹ The Act was sent to the two ambassadors of Holland on the following day, although they were commissioned to deliver it only in case of extreme necessity. Meanwhile the peace was signed and proclaimed by Cromwell in London amid great popular rejoicing, all honour being shown to the Dutch ambassadors. No less exultation attended its proclamation in the Netherlands, with firing of cannon and ringing of bells, with bonfires and waving flags, while fervent prayers of gratitude rose in the churches, now the suffering of the people seemed past.

More was to follow. During five weeks longer the Act remained in the hands of the ambassadors. But the

¹ The cautious Brederode, related to the house of Orange, remained absent in spite of De Witt's urgency, *overmits wy de purgasi huyden morgen so laet hebben ingenomen.*

secret was already betrayed. A bribed clerk of De Witt had given information to Count William Frederick, and like wildfire the report spread of a separate negotiation and secret agreement between Cromwell and Holland. In the States-General De Witt was asked for information, but he answered generally that Holland had done nothing illegal. People began to suspect something, and a storm arose. Friesland violently assailed Holland; the princesses wrote passionate letters to the States-General; there was popular agitation in several provinces. De Witt stood firm as usual, but even Dordrecht commenced to waver to his vexation. The deputies of this town absented themselves from the meeting of the Holland Estates which, themselves fearful of the consequences, thanked their ambassadors in London for not yet delivering the Act. Enlightenment was more loudly demanded in the States-General, first from Holland which evaded the question, then from the ambassadors in London, who were ordered on June 5th to send over to the States-General all secret instructions received from the Estates of Holland. De Witt succeeded in getting this order postponed until the following day, but at once he informed the two Hollanders in London of what was to be expected, intimating to them that it was now time to act, *i. e.*, to hand over the Act, provided it were done immediately.

There was again a vehement discussion on the 6th of June in the States-General, but the resolution of the 5th was definitively passed, and De Witt was obliged to acquiesce in having the Estates of Holland allow the two Holland ambassadors to send over a copy of the Act to The Hague. But in the evening of this day he persuaded the States-General at the eleventh hour to transmit their order to send over the instructions and not yet to deliver the Act, on account of the importance of the matter, in cipher instead of in the ordinary form—

a master trick Geddes rightly calls this. To this letter in cipher he joined another in ordinary writing to the two Hollanders, communicating the assent of the Estates of Holland and remarking that it would be too late, because the Act probably was already delivered. It happened as he expected after his repeated warnings. While the ambassadors' clerk in London was deciphering the letter with difficulty, and they were awaiting the end of this work, Van Beverningh, who had understood De Witt's hint, left the room, in company perhaps with Nieuwpoort, and hastily handed the Act over to Cromwell. The thing was done, and when the clerk finished, and the ambassadors could read what was wanted of them, the fulfilment of that wish was no longer possible. Thus the young council pensionary attained his end by a devious way. Peace was concluded and confirmed, and Cromwell was made content with a document that seemed also to assure the authority of the government of the States.

No doubt De Witt should have avoided the necessity of delivering an Act which sanctioned the interference of a foreign power in the republic's domestic concerns. The whole affair gives proof of the consummate diplomatic ability of De Witt, but it is only to be justified when one assumes his conviction of the absolute necessity of the Act. That absolute necessity is not certain, because from Cromwell's doings and sayings it cannot surely be made out whether he would have broken the peace, as he threatened, if the Act were not delivered. There is reason to believe that he would not have ventured it, but it is undeniable that he acted towards the ambassadors as if he intended so doing in case they broke their promise. The attitude of De Witt and the two ambassadors is, therefore, quite defensible, because it must not be forgotten that they felt the indispensability of peace for the republic, that they were

willing to do anything possible to obtain this peace and, now it was secured, not again to endanger it. Whether Cromwell first desired the Act, or De Witt originally wanted it, which is less probable on account of his knowledge of domestic politics and his cautiousness, the course of events showed that it would profit neither of them. More than anything else it served to embitter the people against De Witt and his party. It helped undermine the government of the States and finally strengthened the prince's party, which could have been neither Cromwell's nor De Witt's purpose. Its demand was an act of bad statesmanship.





CHAPTER IX

THE COUNCIL PENSIONARY AT THE HEAD OF THE STATE

NONE of the earlier or later council pensionaries ever possessed such an influence in the state as John de Witt obtained soon after the first English naval war. Oldenbarnevelt's influence alone is to be compared with it. This was due to John De Witt's rare personality, to the extent of his personal relations, and to the circumstance that no prince of Orange opposed him. No other member of the government of the States could equal him. There is but one voice as to the ability of the celebrated citizen of Dordrecht even among his enemies. Not only as a statesman but also as a financier, an organiser, a scientific mathematician and natural philosopher he stood very high. His statesmanship may be reproached with a certain narrowness, because he did not embrace in a masterly glance the past, present, and remote future, like Oldenbarnevelt, but almost exclusively watched the relations of the Netherlands to France, England, Sweden, and Denmark, and looked after the immediate future. His financial measures strengthened the republic's credit. His talent as an organiser raised the Dutch navy from its unsatisfactory condition at the time of the first English naval war to the brilliant height, at which it stood during the second war, and enabled the Dutch admirals to measure themselves with the English upon not unequal terms. His

repute as a mathematician was established by his invention of the chain shot and his writings on curves,¹ highly esteemed by such mathematicians as Christiaan Huyghens and Van Schooten, and treating of the intricate problems of hyperbolas, parabolas, ellipses, conic sections, and the determination of place in plane and space. His calculations of the chances of life and their connection with life and redeemable annuities laid the scientific foundation for the modern theories of life insurance. His share in De la Court's noted work on the political and economic condition of Holland about 1660 proves his capacity as an economist, and his extensive correspondence shows his clear insight into many things. His name has rightly been given to a period of Dutch history, because he was at once a representative and leader of his people.

One of the most important events of De Witt's private life was his marriage (February, 1655) to Wendela Bicker, the daughter of a deceased burgomaster of Amsterdam, and related to a number of the first families of magistrates.² The family connections of De Witt were thus largely extended, a great advantage in Holland governed by comparatively few families of municipal magistrates, and De Witt did not scorn this advantage. Even the appearance of bribery was always avoided by De Witt, but he used all means to secure offices for able members of his family. The appointment of his brother as governor of Putten (March, 1654), of his father as a member of the chamber of accounts (1657), of his relative Van Slingelandt, later of Vivien as pensionary of Dordrecht in his own place, of numerous cousins to all sorts of municipal and provincial posts, showed that he was often successful in widening the circle of his family in the government of Holland. His letters on these unedifying affairs afford a certain enjoyment by reason of

¹ *Elementa curvarum linearum* (Lugd. Bat. et Amst., 1659).

² Lefèvre-Pontalis, i., p. 119.

his uncommon knowledge of local interests and of mankind. A like pleasure is given the reader of his correspondence with the ambassadors of the States, either in the printed edition of his letters, or in the collections still reposing in the Dutch archives. The Holland ministers sent missives of the same tenor to the States-General and the Estates of Holland, but the most important matters were written to him alone. He always maintained personal relations with the foreign ambassadors at The Hague. Concerning domestic affairs De Witt carried on an extensive private correspondence with influential men in various provinces and towns. He kept himself informed of everything by this correspondence, sometimes of a very intimate nature and communicating the secret resolutions of governmental boards,¹ while he was in personal touch with these and other gentlemen during their repeated sojourn at The Hague as deputies to the States-General.

The first domestic affair after the peace to attract attention was the sharply criticised attitude of Holland towards Cromwell's demand for the Act of Exclusion. The excitement of May and June continued for some time, especially after the copy of the Act finally came from England. Friesland and Zealand openly complained of Holland to the States-General. A cloud of pamphlets spread over the country, and from the pulpits sounded the most vehement tirades against this new attack of the "Loevestein faction," nothing else being talked of in taverns, waggons, and boats. The Orange party tried to make all the capital possible out of the matter, and Count William Frederick appeared at The Hague to lead the movement and, with the two princesses and Zealand, to accomplish something for the young prince. But there

¹ We even hear repeatedly of the bribery of municipal and provincial clerks by these correspondents. Secret documents of importance were thus often obtained.

was no harmony in the guidance of this party. De Witt successfully replied to his opponents in the States-General. A letter from Cromwell to Zealand exhorting it for the sake of religion not to endanger the treaty missed its aim and occasioned more bitterness. Some disturbance in North Holland was brought about by a journey of Count, soon Prince, William Frederick, the emperor in 1654 raising his entire house to the rank of imperial princes. Amsterdam and other cities took measures to guard against a possible assault. The garrison of The Hague was strengthened ostensibly against the disorderly troops returning from Brazil.

Commissioned by the Estates of Holland De Witt with the aid of Van Beverningh drew up a "Deduction" in defence of Holland's and his own conduct, the manifesto of the existing government. This Deduction comprised an argument for the necessity of Holland's action in the interest of peace, which otherwise would not have been obtained; then a demonstration of the legality of the Act; afterwards a proof of the propriety of Holland's action towards the other provinces, the foreign powers, and the house of Orange. It went into a calculation of the thanks given to the Orange family in money and offices since the insurrection against Spain, on the other side alluding to the gratitude which the other provinces owed to Holland for the Spanish as well as the English war. The reading of the document lasted for hours, first in the Estates of Holland, then in the States-General (August 5th), but naturally it did not convince the opposing party. Gradually, however, minds subsided into calmness, because people began to understand that peace would be imperilled, if Holland were forced to revoke the Act and Cromwell were thus defied.

The commotion assumed critical aspects in some provinces, particularly in Overijssel and City and Land.

There had long been friction in Overijssel¹ between the Orange party and that favouring the Estates of Holland. Rutger van Haersolte, steward of Salland and bailiff of Lingen, headed the Orange party; friends of De Witt guided the other faction. The death in October, 1653, of Ripperda, bailiff of Twente, to whose office Haersolte aspired, gave rise to violent dissensions. In April, 1654, Haersolte was appointed by a majority, while the minority protested strongly and accused the majority of intrigues and its candidate of murder, perjury, and bribery. The minority prevented the installation of the candidate and absented itself from the meeting of the Estates. Though the matter seemed of slight importance, the resulting discord continued over three years to the great injury of the entire province. Majority and minority of the Estates met separately amid mutual protests and threats, and each considered itself the real Estates of Overijssel. When the States-General came to discuss the affair, Holland, standing of course on the side of the minority, wished a deputation from the States-General to restore peace, but the troubles were declared "domestic," such as should be settled without the interference of other provinces. As the confusion went on increasing, the States-General in September, 1654, offered their mediation and tried to be neutral by receiving delegates from both parties. But Holland openly supported its friends of the minority, when the majority, urged by Haersolte, chose in October the young prince as stadtholder of the province, with William Frederick for lieutenant during his minority. Prince William Frederick visited Kampen and Zwolle and took the oath as lieutenant stadtholder, but he was not received at Deventer. Both parties collected taxes and disposed of the militia, but neither contributed what

¹ See Bussemaker, *Geschiedenis van Overijssel gedurende het eerste stadhouderlooze tijdperk* (2 vols., 's Gravenh., 1888-89).

was due to the general government. Something had to be done, so the States-General in September, 1655, resolved to send a deputation to the province, but Holland in its turn now considered the affair as "domestic" and prevented the deputation. Other political difficulties had meanwhile brought De Witt and Prince William Frederick into closer relations. Their agreement was not disturbed by the discovery of the treachery of De Witt's chief clerk, Johan van Messen, who had communicated the most secret papers to the prince's agent, Theodoor van Ruyven. An important result of the deliberations of De Witt and the prince was a missive from Their High Mightinesses to Overijssel, dated January 28, 1656, requesting both parties to send delegates to The Hague for the purpose of settling their differences with the help of William Frederick. This was done, and De Witt and William Frederick undertook mediation. The draft of an agreement abrogated the resolutions of the Overijssel Estates taken in the affair after April 8, 1654, a general amnesty was proclaimed, Prince William Frederick laid down his lieutenancy and Haersolte his office of bailiff. The matter remained under consideration in the province during the whole year, while Prince William Frederick and De Witt worked less heartily together. Hasselt had long been at variance with Zwolle, and early in June, 1657, the troops of Zwolle bombarded Hasselt, cities and country in the province preparing for civil war. Fortunately Hasselt gave up its pretensions after a few shots from the Zwolle batteries and made a treaty with the majority. The minority turned for justice to its powerful protectors, Holland and Amsterdam, but De Witt presented a new agreement which was accepted. Cornelis de Graeff and John de Witt were appointed mediators to settle everything amicably in conjunction with commissioners from both parties. On August 20th all was finished, and in the

name of the Estates of Holland a decision in seventeen articles set aside opposing resolutions, decreed a general amnesty, postponed the subject of the stadtholdership until the prince's majority, and annulled the election of William Frederick and Haersolte. New regulations for the government were introduced. A meeting at Raalte on October 1, 1657, sealed the agreement that restored order in the province.

De Witt's influence here won success in most respects for the party supported by Holland, and it was not otherwise with the disturbances occurring about the same time in City and Land.¹ A revival of old dissensions was here to be expected under the weak government of William Frederick as stadtholder. The guilds of Groningen, led by the architect Gerrit Warendorp, opposed the rule of the city patricians. Further there was a strong party of malcontents among the country nobility, headed by the ambitious Osebrand Jan Rengers, lord of Slochteren, and voicing the ancient grievances of the country against the city. Another league hoped with the help of the municipal government to withstand Rengers and his partisans. In 1655 the disorder became so great in the Estates that a general massacre seemed imminent, after Rengers and a colleague were expelled by violence. The two parties in the Ommelands had separate assemblies, and government and justice stood still. A deputation was sent by the States-General under the lead of De Witt in concert with William Frederick. De Witt succeeded in restoring harmony, and both parties appeared satisfied. But a year later the condition of affairs was again bad in the province. Rengers and the influential Rudolf van Inn- und Knyphausen, lord of Lutzborg in East Friesland, formed a league, as usual in this province, with the chief purpose

¹ De Boer, *De woelingen in Stad en Lande in het midden der zeventiende eeuw* (Groningen, 1893).

of securing all the important offices. The action of the two lords led to fighting in the assembly, where weapons were finally prohibited and a guard was placed. The election of officers in February, 1657, was attended with such confusion that the deputies of the city called for the intervention of the States-General. Against the plans of the city government Rengers and Lutzborg stirred up the guilds, and they opposed the desired deputation by bribing Johan Schulenborgh, delegate from the city to the States-General. A popular rising at Groningen was led by Warendorp, and the plundering of houses and assaults upon magistrates compelled the city government to accede to the demands of the league of the Ommelands. The States-General sent no deputation, the league triumphed, Rengers and Lutzborg succeeded one another in the highest offices. After a few years the city government and its friends among the nobles felt strong enough to attack again Rengers and Lutzborg. But they resisted and remained supreme until the end of 1658, while the stadtholder looked on helplessly and De Witt from The Hague continued to support his friends in the province. A new deputation from the States-General in the spring of 1659, invited by the party of Rengers, favoured the league's opponents and a better enforcement of justice, against which Rengers and his friends had often sinned.

Dissensions in the other provinces were less important, but testified also to the necessity of a stronger central government.¹ Everywhere in the republic differences prevailed, in which Holland secretly or openly sustained the anti-stadtholder party and the council pensionary made his influence felt. He succeeded usually in restoring order without removing the root of the evil, a policy of dexterity which would lead not to thorough improvement but in difficult circumstances to great confusion

¹ Wagenaar, xii., p. 397.

and sudden upheaval. De Witt avoided this upheaval for years by many small remedies, but could never flatter himself with the hope of having escaped the danger of irremediable confusion. That was only to be done by strengthening the government, either in the separate provinces, or in the collective state, which was at variance with the principles of government adopted in 1651.

Besides these provincial affairs there were other domestic matters which disturbed the whole country and were cleverly managed by De Witt. The first concerned the office of field marshal. Brederode died in September, 1655, and his position was eagerly coveted by the two princes of Nassau, William Frederick and John Maurice, the former a general of artillery, the latter a general of cavalry. But Holland, guided by De Witt, endeavoured to postpone action, as it saw the germ of new complications in the appointment of so great a lord to this supreme military post. Especial objection was made to William Frederick, whose share in the Amsterdam affair was neither forgotten nor forgiven, and whose attempts to seize upon the lieutenant stadtholdership were too evident. De Witt had a plan for harmony adopted in the Estates of Holland, decreeing that all writings and resolutions in all the provinces against the Act of Exclusion should be destroyed, that Prince William Frederick should renounce his office of lieutenant stadtholder in Overijssel, that no field marshal should be at the same time stadtholder or captain-general in any province, that the new field marshal should swear to observe the peace with England. William Frederick sought to become more friendly with De Witt to the vexation of many of the Orange party, who complained of his treason. For a time it seemed as if the question of this high military post were to be joined to that of Van Beverningh, whom the States' party wished to appoint treasurer-general of the Union

after his return from England. The Orange adherents would not accept Van Beverningh, just as Holland opposed the appointment of a field marshal, and a compromise for both parties to agree to both candidates was not carried through. At the end of 1656 De Witt succeeded in obtaining the appointment of his trusted colleague as treasurer by a majority in the States-General, but when the other party wanted to decide about the field-marshal by a majority vote, Holland objected and appealed to the complete authority of the provincial Estates in military matters as one of the essential parts of freedom. De Witt was moved by fear of too great a military power in one hand. The Orange party was far from being equal to him and his able friends. The disputes between the two princesses of Orange, the jealousy between the two princes of Nassau, the incapacity of the party leaders, gave De Witt the finest chances to thwart their plans again and again.

De Witt kept a watchful eye upon everything, upon the attitude towards the church, upon the finances in his province. Danger threatened in ecclesiastical affairs, because De Witt knew the influential preachers must be respected, and the government of the States, mindful of what had occurred in the time of the Truce, feared nothing so much as their displeasure. One of the council pensionary's first letters aimed to remove the suspicion, which had arisen against him as a Cartesian, of laxness towards "the papal superstition and other errors." The apostolic vicar of the diocese of Utrecht, Jacobus de la Torre, could testify in his *Relatio seu descriptio status religionis catholicæ in Hollandia* (1656) to the flourishing condition of his church in these parts in spite of all the placards and resolutions and of the strife between his secular and regular clergy, the Jesuits troubling him in their struggle for greater influence. Here and there persecutions might take place, but there was generally a

connivance obtained by bribing the officials charged with the surveillance of the Catholics.¹ At The Hague an ample opportunity was afforded in the residences of the ambassadors of the Catholic powers, especially of France and Spain, for the Catholics to hold their services, and hundreds of them from the country around availed themselves of it. In many cities and villages it was an open secret where the Catholics met, and seldom were they disturbed by the authorities. This condition did not of course satisfy the Reformed churches, and complaints were often made of the weakness of the magistrates. But in executing the placards the old principle was adhered to: the States desired rest in ecclesiastical matters.

In like manner the ruling party treated the complaints of the theologians about the teachings of the Cartesian philosophers, particularly those of the vehement Professor Adriaan Heerebord of Leyden. De Witt thought the liberty of philosophising might remain untouched, but the immoderate zeal of those professing the right philosophy ought to be restrained. The resolution of the Estates of Holland of September 30, 1656, imported that the curators of Leyden had to watch over the limits between theology and philosophy, and that the philosophemes of Cartesius should not be taught for the sake of peace and tranquillity. Thus the freedom of philosophy was maintained in general, only in name it was put in bonds on behalf of rest and peace. De Witt's letters to the moderate Professor Heydanus show plainly that the States were only anxious to guard against reckless extravagance and would allow all liberty to him and men of like opinions.

To the displeasure of the orthodox Calvinists this attitude appeared in the way the sects, such as the Mennonites, the Remonstrants, and the rapidly increas-

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der katholieken*, i., pp. 223, 246.

ing Collegiants, were managed or rather left unmolested. Although a zealot occasionally insisted upon the deposition of Remonstrant magistrates, they were constantly getting into the government, even at Amsterdam, and were not troubled, if they did not make themselves or their opinions too prominent. The Collegiants, resembling in many respects the Remonstrants and Mennonites, remained at first more in the shade, being naturally quiet country people. Their chief seat, Rijnsburg, where the Van der Kodde family had placed itself about 1620 at their head, became the centre of a remarkable religious movement which, besides liberty of worship, accepted the principle of liberty of speaking or "prophesying" for every member of the community, and thus opposed the ordained clergy and considered their existence contrary to ancient Christianity.¹ The lack of Remonstrant preachers after 1619 under the pressure of persecution helped this free preaching very much. Later pious Remonstrants joined the Collegiants and extolled their principles as recalling those of the first Protestants in the country. Laymen also championed zealously their doctrines, as the former Rotterdam baker Frans Oudaen, head of the Rijnsburg society about 1660. Eminent men, Van Beuningen, Adriaan Paets and Johan Hartigveldt of Rotterdam, came into close touch with the community. Thus attention was drawn to them more and more, and their following was extended about the middle of the century.² At Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Leyden, Haarlem, in some villages of North Holland, similar "colleges" arose, striving for a regeneration of the Christian church without a binding confession of faith, without minister or prescribed church rites except baptism by immersion and the communion, without wishing to be called church communities, in perfect freedom resting

¹ Van Slee, *De Rijnsburger Collegianten*, p. 58.

² Hijlkema, *Reformateurs*, p. 10.

only on the authority of the Bible and with a liberal conception of mutual toleration, so that many Mennonites, Remonstrants, and even Catholics were received among them. A strong current was felt among the Mennonites in this direction, reviving memories of the old Anabaptists. Dr. Galenus led the movement, which caused a violent schism among the numerous Mennonites of Amsterdam, the two parties formally separating in 1664 after nine years of strife.

Other "reformers" appeared. The mystical street-preacher Johannes Rothe, the herald of the expected "fifth monarchy," was one of the most notable among them. After the peace some Quakers came over from England and won followers. But the greatest activity went out from the Collegiants, and their steady increase annoyed the preachers of the Reformed communities. The complaints made by consistories and synods of this new sort of "erring minds," "Socinians," "half Turks," of these "blasphemers of God's Holy Name," these "foxes in the vineyards," to the Estates and municipal governments accomplished little more with those "rulers of the world" than the complaints of the "popish insolences." There would occasionally be some strictness or persecution by the authorities, but in the long run it was toleration. Into their circle the young philosopher Baruch de Spinoza at Amsterdam was taken up, when he began about 1654 to turn away from the faith of his fathers.¹ He met the Catholic Cartesian Franciscus van den Ende, who made him and many others in Amsterdam acquainted with Cartesian principles. He found consolation in them after his expulsion from the Jewish community in 1656 and settled five years later in Rijnsburg, the seat of the Collegiants, with whom he might be considered as intellectually allied. The numerous freethinkers in Holland also did

¹ Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn kring*, p. 102.

not escape the vigilance of consistories and preachers, but no kind of pressure could bring any strong action against them. The governing party adhered to its tolerant principles, in part because its members often felt attracted to the new dogmas, in part from a longing for rest and peace.

De Witt's activity in financial affairs was important. The heavy debt, under which Holland groaned in consequence of the Spanish war, burdened its budget in 1650 with seven million guilders of interest upon a sum of over 150 millions, and the English war considerably increased this sum. During and immediately after the war De Witt set to work to lighten the burden by a reduction of the interest. Such reductions of interest were not uncommon. In 1640 Holland had lowered the interest on its debt from $6\frac{1}{4}$ to 5 per cent., and the States-General had followed that example in 1649. Now De Witt sought to reduce Holland's interest from 5 to 4 per cent. and encountered violent opposition. But, supported by Van Beuningen and others, he succeeded in convincing the Estates of the desirability of the matter, especially when he joined the reduction with a plan of redemption, by which Holland's entire debt would be paid off in forty-one years, and the States-General also reduced their interest from 5 to 4 per cent., so that Holland's securities yielded no less than those of the Generality. The credit of Holland was thus placed on a solid basis, and De Witt might well glory in "the great work, upon which I have for some time past exerted all my strength," by which his province profited annually to the amount of 1,400,000 guilders, representing a capital of twenty-eight millions.

If De Witt could have had his way, the maintenance of peace would have been the chief aim of the Dutch policy in Europe, because he believed in his soul that for a country living by commerce and navigation nothing

was so necessary as peace on land and sea. Pieter de la Court's work, revised by De Witt for the first edition under the title of *Interest van Holland*, said that "Holland's maxim ought to be to seek after peace for its inhabitants with all proper means and to avoid war." The general condition of Europe in these years gave reason for apprehension concerning the future. Two parties in Europe still opposed one another, France with England, now on friendly terms, and Spain with Austria, between which the republic would naturally have looked for support from the former party. The coolness of France towards the republic, which had left it in the lurch at Münster, must be overcome so far as possible, and De Witt bent his utmost energy to this end, especially when French piracies in the Mediterranean in 1657 and De Ruyter's vigorous action against them threatened to lead to serious difficulties owing to the unskilfulness of the Dutch ambassador Boreel. Watch had to be kept, furthermore, of the progress of the French in the southern Netherlands, where under Turenne in 1658 they captured Dunkirk and Gravelines and in coöperation with England, to which Dunkirk was ceded, threatened Flanders. The Spanish governor, Don Juan of Austria, was at his wit's end and gave up resistance, so that a conquest of the southern Netherlands by both powers seemed imminent.

What was to become of these lands? Neighbourhood to France was not considered desirable, and as little so was the rule of England in the Flemish ports and Antwerp. It appeared preferable to revert to the old plan of making the southern provinces a "free republic" under the protection of both France and the United Netherlands. The peace of the Pyrenees in November, 1659, put an end to these complications. That peace left France in possession of a large part of the conquered territory in southern Flanders, Hainaut, Namur, and Luxemburg. But the

marriage of the young and ambitious Louis XIV. to the oldest daughter of Philip IV. brought new perils, although the infanta solemnly renounced for herself and her descendants all claims to the Spanish crown and its possessions, while the lands and cities now obtained put France in a position to resume the subjugation of the Netherlands at any time with a good prospect of success. Spain saw the consequences of this condition and understood that its interest was to retain the friendship of the republic as much as possible.

Relations with England left at first little to be wished. The Dutch ambassador Nieuwpoort was very friendly with Cromwell and his able secretary of state Thurloe,¹ and no reason for discontent was given by allowing the Stuarts in the Netherlands. But there was no diminution of the commercial rivalry: the Navigation Act raised up English commerce and augmented the mutual jealousy. During the English-Spanish war difficulties again arose through the search of ships for contraband. England also protected Portugal, between which and the Netherlands the long threatening war broke out in November, 1657. This war was limited mainly to a naval demonstration under Obdam on the Portuguese coast and to captures of Portuguese merchantmen by De Ruyter. Cromwell's death in 1658 prevented any strong action of England against the Netherlands, as the weak government of his son, Protector Richard, was not equal to a vigorous guidance of England's policy. The arrival at The Hague of the energetic George Downing, as English ambassador, who wished to see the commerce of England upheld with strength and ability, gave occasion for all sorts of troubles, by which the old grievances were raked up again, the good understanding

¹ His papers, the *Thurloe Papers* (London, 1742), are together with the ordinary *State Papers* an excellent authority for the history of these days.

between the two nations was little promoted, and a new war seemed in the end unavoidable.

There was more imminent danger for a time on the frontier, near which the turbulent bishop of Münster constantly threatened his capital. The league of the Rhine, concluded in August, 1658, under the influence of France, in which the electors of Cologne and Mainz, the rulers of Neuburg, Hesse, and Brunswick, and other princes allied themselves with Sweden and France, pointed to new perils. The fear that the Catholic princes contemplated a mutual union for the protection of Catholic interests in the empire and the desire of the land provinces to have the affairs of Münster settled impelled the council pensionary to vigorous action on behalf of Münster's people. The siege of Münster by the Catholic princes gave the opportunity for a deputation to Münster, and, when the bishop declined the proffered mediation of the States, troops were collected in October on the eastern frontier. The resolution to this effect, passed in Holland notwithstanding Amsterdam's opposition, adopted also by the States-General, and the consequent movement of troops in Gelderland and Overijssel resulted immediately in the yielding of the bishop of Münster and the relief of the city. But this attitude of the republic embittered the haughty bishop and led later to new and greater troubles.¹

Much more serious were the complications in the north after the accession of Charles X. Gustavus to the throne of Sweden (1654). Resuming the policy of Gustavus Adolphus, he sought to establish the supremacy in these regions of Sweden over Poland, Denmark, and the Hollanders, who had endeavoured of late years to unite Sweden and Denmark by an alliance and thus to assure peace in the Baltic. The war against Poland begun by Charles X. was a critical affair for the republic, recognised

¹ See Der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster*, p. 73 *et seq.*

as the protector of the political equilibrium hereabouts since the events of 1644 and 1645, particularly when Dantzic, the centre of the corn trade, was blockaded by the Swedish fleet and threatened by Swedish troops. The States had already tried to enter into closer relations with Brandenburg and had gathered troops on the East Frisian frontier to watch the Swedes ruling over the neighbouring Bremen territory. It was resolved to send a deputation to Sweden and another to Denmark to preserve peace in the Baltic. In December, 1655, Charles Gustavus got possession of Elbing, and Brandenburg went over to the Swedish side in the hope of throwing off Poland's sovereignty over Prussia. Despite Swedish protests, De Ruyter's squadron in the spring of 1656 sailed for the Baltic and then a fleet under Obdam, who was soon in command of forty-two ships. In July he appeared before Dantzic, raised the blockade of the city after uniting with a Danish squadron, remained there until October, and then returned home, leaving in the city a Dutch garrison of 1500 men. The deputation to Sweden under De Witt's cousin and successor as pensionary of Dordrecht, Govert van Slingelandt, and that to Denmark under the experienced Van Beuningen were likewise successful. Sweden in September renewed at Elbing the old treaties of friendship with a declaration of the neutrality of Dantzic, and Denmark was brought to a defensive league, evidently designed to oppose Sweden and in case of necessity to restore peace by force of arms. The treaties with Sweden and Denmark plainly did not agree with one another.

De Witt had at first taken up the Dutch policy in the north with great caution, believing with Amsterdam in the importance of peace. The good understanding between him and Van Beuningen, who was known to him from the pensionary days in Dordrecht, who had resided at the Swedish court as "extraordinary deputy" during

the English war and had been in intimate correspondence with De Witt, influenced De Witt as much as did his consultations with his wife's uncle, Cornelis de Graeff van Zuid-Polsbroek, a prominent citizen of Amsterdam. The opinion of De Witt and Van Beuningen had first been that the interest of the republic would best be served by an alliance of the two rival northern powers under the mediation of the States, but Sweden's aggressive attitude caused this idea to be given up gradually. In its place Van Beuningen matured the plan of holding Sweden in check by an alliance of the States with Denmark and by a display of force upon the part of the Dutch for the protection of the threatened Baltic states. De Witt incautiously approved of this, while avoiding all aspirations for an actual war with the powerful Sweden, now in close friendship with England and France, so that European complications were to be feared from a war in the north, in which besides Denmark the States would have no other allies but the enfeebled Catholic powers, Spain and the emperor. This change in the Dutch policy was to be attributed to the influence of Van Beuningen and Amsterdam. De Witt reproached his old colleague for the intrigues, by which he endeavoured to lead the republic into sharp antagonism to Sweden.¹ Van Beuningen succeeded in obtaining the rejection of the treaty of Elbing by the States, a defeat for De Witt's prudent policy, and in persuading Frederick III. of Denmark in 1657 to don again the "rusty harness," while Poland, the emperor, and even Brandenburg now also opposed Sweden.

This policy exposed the republic to great dangers, as it at the same time had difficulties with France, waged war on Portugal, settled the Münster affairs with a high hand, and stood upon anything but a firm footing with England. The lamentable defeat of the Danes, who

¹ Naber, *De staatkunde van Johan de Witt*, p. 118.

were driven from Bremen, lost most of Schonen, in the early spring of 1658 also Funen and the small islands, and soon saw the Swedish king attack Zealand and menace Copenhagen, quickly led to the peace of Roeskilde, by which Denmark became almost wholly dependent upon Sweden. The struggle of opinions in the republic was just decided in favour of Van Beuningen, when the unexpected news of this peace came to take away the basis of his policy. Van Beuningen did not give up, but urged Denmark to disregard the treaty of peace, promising the support of the States. Charles Gustavus of Sweden, observing this, suddenly assailed his enemy anew in August and laid siege to Copenhagen by land and sea, closing up the Sound with his fleet and by the conquered forts of Elsinore and Kronenborg. This energetic attitude of Sweden made Van Beuningen win his cause. The Swedish power must now be curbed, and De Witt offered no further objection to helping poor Denmark. Early in October Obdam was sent to the Sound with thirty-five ships and 4000 troops under Colonel Püchler to relieve Copenhagen and to "ruin" the Swedish fleet, so that no dangerous naval power could arise in the Baltic. On the 8th of November Obdam met the somewhat larger Swedish fleet under Wrangel in the Sound and actually destroyed a large part of it after a bloody battle, in which the valiant Dutch vice admirals, Witte De With and Pieter Floriszoon, lost their lives, while Obdam himself with his ship only escaped disaster through the efficient support of Aart van Nes and some other captains.¹ The small remnant of the Swedish fleet retreated to the forts, and Copenhagen's siege was raised. The Dutch ships did not return home after this success but remained in the Sound on account partly of the appearance there of an English fleet, whose intentions were mistrusted.

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 558 *et seq.*

This English interference, backed up by the French, moved the Dutch statesmen to act with "vigour," and in May a new naval force was dispatched to the Sound under De Ruyter with Johan Evertsen and Meppel as vice admirals, so that in the spring of 1659 no less than seventy-five Dutch ships with 12,000 men and over 3000 guns were collected, exclusive of Püchler's 4000 men. Thus it was hoped to keep Denmark from making in desperation a secret agreement with Sweden. Meanwhile a treaty concerning northern affairs was concluded with England and France, chiefly maintaining the peace of Roeskilde, but leaving out the closing of the Sound to foreign vessels. Much of the year was spent in negotiations, and Copenhagen was still besieged upon the land side. The differences with England and France regarding the Baltic policy were finally removed by De Witt, and the English fleet left the Sound to return home. But matters in the Baltic went little better until in the fall Denmark, helped by the Dutch arms, began to get the mastery. Obdam, suffering greatly from the gout, had also gone home with some twenty ships after the departure of the English fleet. The rest, commanded by De Ruyter, gave powerful support to an attack by land upon Funen, where the Dutch admiral bombarded the town of Nyborg, November 24th, and forced it to surrender. Afterwards he shut the Swedish fleet up in the harbour of Landskrona and wintered at Copenhagen, where honours were showered upon him. Some difficulties still existed between De Witt and Amsterdam, in part because Amsterdam complained seriously of Obdam's conduct. De Witt took pains to come to an agreement in views with Van Beuningen, until the latter finally approved of the treaty of Elbing. Fortunately for the course of affairs the Swedish king died suddenly February 23, 1660; his young son succeeded him; and now tranquillity was quickly restored in these

regions under the mediation of the States, which brought about peace at Oliva May 3d between Sweden and Poland and on June 3d peace at Copenhagen between Sweden and Denmark. De Witt might well be content with the result, for success had at last come to his plans for the mediation of the States between the belligerents. He had raised higher than ever the consideration shown the Dutch in the Baltic without disturbing the general peace of Europe and in conjunction with the two great powers, whose enmity he most feared, whose friendship he deemed most desirable for the Netherlands.

A time of peace seemed to have dawned upon Europe. The peace of the Pyrenees, followed by that in the Baltic, had cleared away the greatest difficulties. The war with Portugal still remained, but the draft of a treaty drawn up in the Estates of Holland was soon made, notwithstanding the opposition of Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Groningen, the basis of a negotiation with Portugal at The Hague, where in the name of that kingdom the able Count de Miranda appeared. It was speedily evident that Brazil would have to be given up by the West India Company, but Zealand and Gelderland, both interested in the company, refused their coöperation, and the vote of City and Land could only be obtained, because its representative, Schulenborgh, was apparently bribed by Portugal and approved of the treaty against the wish of his province. The treaty with Portugal was signed (August 6, 1661) under the vehement protest of Zealand and Gelderland, which asserted, not without reason, that to conclude a treaty of peace by a majority of votes was contrary to Article 9 of the Union of Utrecht. But Holland carried first the peace through and after more negotiation (at the end of 1662) the ratification. The long delay was owing to the desire of the East India Company in the

interval to conquer as much of the Portuguese possessions in India as possible and to the hope of the Portuguese for better terms. Brazil was ceded to Portugal for eight million guilders, free trade except in Brazil wood with this henceforth Portuguese colony, complete freedom of trade with Portugal. The West India Company did not recover from this loss.

England had mediated in these negotiations, but circumstances there were much changed. Richard Cromwell's weak government, the omnipotence of the army, and the waxing confusion in the affairs of the English republic had turned popular opinion to the side of the exiled royal house. General Monk, the commander of the army in Scotland, soon put himself in communication with Charles II., who shortly before had gone in vain to the Pyrenees to obtain help from France or Spain in the peace negotiations, and who was now again in Brussels. Monk offered him in the spring of 1660 the crown of England, Scotland, and Ireland. Everything was prepared in deep secrecy, and in May the recall of the Stuarts was a fact. Charles received the news at Breda, the old possession of the Oranges, whither he had betaken himself at Monk's request. This important event threatened to disturb the era of peace just opening for the republic. The government of the States had repeatedly made the English exile feel its hostility, and regarded his house and that of the Oranges as its worst enemies, so how could it now assume a tolerant attitude towards him without menacing its own future? But De Witt, inexhaustible in clever moves, incomparable in the use of the means of the moment, managed to overcome these difficulties as well as those arising from the nearly contemporary change in France, where Mazarin's death, in March, 1661, introduced a very monarchical government.

In foreign affairs also the council pensionary was about

1660 the recognised leader of the republic, the statesman who, by his comprehensive knowledge of political conditions, by his rare capacity for work, and his endless resourcefulness, really merited universal confidence. Though the genius of the great advocate might be lacking in him, John de Witt was never at a loss for expedients which could rescue the republic from its temporary dangers, and he steered the ship of state with a steady hand upon the surging waves of European politics. His diplomatic activity shows us the cautious leader, the calm calculator, the acute judge of men, and his domestic policy also makes us admire him. He was not a man who excited enthusiasm, who in burning zeal conducted his party to victory along the royal road of open strife; he is the quiet thinker, who seeks to convince by plain argument, who yields where the opposition appears too great, and is moderate in triumph, the object more of rational than of passionate admiration—the best type of the Holland regent of those days, simple and worthy, incorruptible and steadfast, cool of head and heart, vigorously doing his duty to the end, *sævis tranquillus in undis* as few of the Dutch statesmen before and after him.





CHAPTER X

LAND AND PEOPLE ABOUT 1660

CONSIDERABLE in number are the accounts of the Dutch republic and its inhabitants of this time. English and French travellers visit it and describe land and people as they appeared to the foreigner. Native authors take up the pen to unfold the *Interest van Holland* in the mother tongue for their countrymen principally or the *délices de la Hollande* in the international French. The tone of all these accounts is that of high praise for the many excellent and admirable things furnished by the small territory. Twenty, forty years earlier the foreigner stood amazed at all manner of sights here in the midst of a continuous war and in a state, whose arrangement in consequence of this war showed much that was uncertain and temporary. Now everything was more established, had become more lasting, and peace seemed to invite to an investigation of the bases, upon which reposed the expectation of still greater development in the future.

Eyes were chiefly directed to Holland, the richest and most populous of the provinces, the most powerful and influential, whose supremacy had replaced that of the princes of Orange for a time at least, so long as the young heir of their traditions had not yet arrived at the years of discretion. Years must still elapse before young Prince William could act for himself; well educated, residing alternately in the Binnenhof at The

Hague and in his castle at Breda, William III. of Orange grew up, with a clear mind and promising talents, but delicate in health and needing the cares that surrounded his youthful existence. We have a description of his appearance at this time: "very handsome, with a long but well-formed face, a gentle eye, an aquiline nose, and an alert mind, he speaks well and boldly."¹

The regents now ruling powerful Holland knew well that they could not always prevent his rise, and although theoretically they might regard him as merely an eminent personage, as perhaps the most eminent subject of their commonwealth, although they hoped by adroit measures to hinder the union in his hands of all the dignities of his forefathers, yet it could not escape them also that the people considered his elevation to those dignities as a matter of course. For the time being, however, the government of the patriciate, of the municipal aristocracy, seemed to be supreme in Holland at least, and the government in the other provinces was more and more modelled after it.

Holland attracted the most attention in the republic. Only rarely were the steps of the foreign traveller directed towards the other provinces, usually towards the neighbouring Zeeland which showed so much resemblance to Holland and was so closely attached to that province. Only rarely did he penetrate to Utrecht and Gelderland, and then he confined himself to the chief places of those provinces; the north, even important Friesland, was but little visited; the regions of the south, the conquered territories, the generality lands, remained quite unknown to the foreigner. And the writers of the fatherland paid but slight attention to most of the "seven provinces"; they, too, limited themselves in their accounts principally to Holland and its cities; even the smallest of these cities found their admiring historians, while the larger places

¹ *Voyages de Mons. de Monconys*, ii., p. 127.

in the remaining provinces often had to wait long before being described.

There was a certain similarity to be recognised in the outward appearance of the cities even of the more remote sections of the republic. Whoever crossed its frontiers from the southern Netherlands or the German side was immediately struck by the neatness and prosperity prevailing everywhere. But so considerable a city as Utrecht with its numerous wooden houses failed to impress by its exterior the traveller, who visited it after Holland, either by the size and beauty of the buildings or by its clean streets, although stained glass was here to be seen in simple dwellings, although one encountered here, as in Holland even in the homes of the peasants, the paintings of the great and little Dutch masters of the time as the ordinary decoration of rooms. Country towns like Deventer might number some large and tall edifices, they could be compared with a city of Holland neither in extent nor in splendour; only as fortresses did these "frontier cities" surpass in situation and plan since the days of Maurice those of Holland.

Going from Rotterdam, which was already called "the second Venice" and attracted notice by its brisk commerce with England, particularly by its cloth trade,¹ to the elegant but quiet Delft, a region was traversed where "the whole district seems rather one single villa than the country,"² with tree-shaded canals, in which swans and ducks swam freely around the numerous canal boats and other vessels. From the never sufficiently praised city of The Hague, the exquisite "village of villages," with its magnificent Voorhout, Huygens' "Batava Tempe," its Vijverberg, and its splendid forest, the "Wood," where birds warbled and princes and lords, statesmen and merchants "sauntered gravely" under the

¹ *The Dutch drawn to the life* (London, 1664), p. 108.

² Monconys, ii., p. 132.

shady trees, with its stately palaces and bustling crowd, one travelled to Leyden, learned and industrious, but unhealthy and repeatedly ravaged by pestilence, with its umbrageous Rapenburg, through a glorious country rich in trees and meadows, which found its match in the lovely downs above Haarlem, in the prosperous region between Hoorn and Enkhuizen, but was only excelled by the beautiful banks of the Vecht with their superb lanes and villas, then already sung by the poets as the ideal of nature and rustic life, being continued in the much lauded fields between Utrecht and Amersfoort, *le plus beau chemin du monde* at this time. What a difference from the heaths of Gelderland and Overijssel, from the bad roads in Brabant, which could not be passed over even in the middle of summer without plunging the waggon up to its axletrees in the water! Astonishment was excited by the active traffic in Holland, where regular boats on the canals, famed for their clear water and environed by trees, united the cities in addition to the waggon service as of old; only some parts of Zealand and Friesland and the immediate vicinity of the city of Groningen could equal it.

These three provinces were the ones which might to some extent be compared with Holland in their abundance of meadows, drainage, diking, and laying out of canals. Zealand, however, had already seen its best days, and was beginning to suffer from the difficult communication between the scattered islands and from the continued emigration of the population to the more promising Holland; the improvement of the fens and the consequent building of canals in Groningen, though undertaken partly with capital from Holland, increased at this time, under the lead of such energetic personages as Adriaan Wildervanck, the prosperity of the province in a great measure; the construction of dikes on the islands of Zealand brought great profit to many people in Hol-

land and Zealand, those in the northern quarter of Holland were for the most part completed before the middle of the century.¹ The improvement of the Eem for the benefit chiefly of Amersfoort, the placing of the Slaper dike in the Gelderland valley after 1652 for the prevention of inundations, the plan for the canalisation of the Grift at Apeldoorn, indicate great activity in this direction in other provinces also; the clearing of the fens northeast of Meppel, begun in 1625 by Roelof van Echten, shows by the name of the "Holland Field" that Holland capital was here invested again in the "high fen"; the continuous diking of the Lauwers and the Dollart, partly with capital from Holland, was ever redeeming more land in the far north.

But the strength of the country lay in the cities of Holland, chief among which was Amsterdam, enlarged again in 1658 and now grown to a city of nearly 150,000 inhabitants. Its magnificent canals, in crescent form spanning the city in a constantly widening circle, its "islands" on the side of the Y, were set with rapidly increasing rows of warehouses and dwellings, among which the splendid mansions of the rich merchants on the Keizersgracht excelled above all. An author proudly exclaims: "whoever has not seen Amsterdam, has seen no ships and does not know what maritime affairs are."² Its magazines and harbours, its churches and orphan asylums, its celebrated house of correction, its arsenal, its city hall especially, the "eighth wonder of the world," first used in 1655, all things were worthy of the proud city which found its equal nowhere in the world. Leyden was praised as the most beautiful city of Europe, as among cities "what spring is in the seasons," flourishing from its trade in cloth and well known on account of its renowned scholars and its more

¹ See Blink, *Nederland en zijne bewoners*, ii., p. 144.

² (Parival), *Les délices de la Hollande*, p. 92.

than 2000 students. Haarlem, since 1667 connected with Leyden by a canal, was the seat of the beer and linen industry. Little and quiet Delft was a prosperous town of brewers and men living upon their income. Ancient Dordrecht was the centre of the brisk commerce on the rivers, particularly in French and Rhenish wines. Rotterdam through its English commerce had already come up as one of the greatest cities of the land. Pleasant and healthful Gouda, almost entirely spared by the pestilence in this century so often appearing in the Dutch cities, was amid a watery region a country town frequented by men of leisure and abounding in pipe factories. There were further some thirty smaller and in part walled towns and four hundred villages, many of which would have been called cities in other countries. And all this was in a territory scarcely sixty miles in circumference, whose population may be estimated at not much less than one million, half of the whole population of the republic.¹

This population, by its constant meeting with other nations over the entire world, by the settlement of many foreigners in its midst, by the influence of French civilisation upon the upper circles, was already on the road to lose some of its peculiarities, at least so far as the dwellers in the cities were concerned, but it still preserved singularities enough to fascinate the foreign traveller. Its healthy mind, its vigorous energy, its constancy, its inexhaustible patience, its steady perseverance, its ardour and power in work, its care for the poor and unfortunate, its moderation in eating generally, the respectability of its magistrates, its simplicity of dress,

¹ *Het Interest van Holland* reckons the population at nearly $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions, but with a conjecture which the author himself calls "rough and uncertain," while the calculation of the poll-tax in 1622 makes out a population of over 600,000, which is assuredly too small for this time (see *Interest van Holland*, p. 18 *et seq.*).

its interest in public affairs, its freedom of thought, speech, and writing, its good laws, its wholesome and robust appearance, its intelligent deliberation, its frugality, orderliness, and honesty, that made it save and not squander what it saved upon luxury but lay it up or devote it to the adornment of house and garden, its astuteness and cleverness in intercourse, the neatness of its dwellings, the purity of its morals, the ennobling influence of the women on society, are highly praised even by the most prejudiced critic.¹

Its mistrustful nature, its inclination to scorn the foreigner and to take advantage of his inexperience, its lesser reliability in affairs, its obstinacy, which caused it to be said in an angry mood that one could sooner convert a Jew to Christianity than convince a Hollander of his error, its slowness in decision, its coolness and reserve, its aversion to forms and compliments, its liking for drink very strong among the lower classes and not rare in the governing circles, its obtrusive selfishness, were, however, equally observed; so also was the rapid deterioration of its former military virtues in years of peace. It allowed its wars to be waged by hired troops, as had been the case since the end of the sixteenth century, so that it became unaccustomed to the use of arms, and its militia only continued in existence for the sake of the shooting festivals and the manly uniform which raised the wearers in the people's eyes.

It is not to be denied that exceptions to the rule here occur, and whoever considers the life of this time at The Hague² will be struck by the notable deviations from the picture here presented of Holland's people and their characteristics. These differences: immorality in the higher circles, idleness of the elegant ladies and gentle-

¹ *The Dutch drawn to the life*, p. 50; Temple's *Observations*, Ch. iv.

² See especially: Betz, *Het haagsche leven in de tweede helft der 17^{de} eeuw* ('s Gravenh., 1900).

men, excessive luxury, prevalence of gambling, universality of the duel for insignificant reasons, all proceed from the development of the court life at The Hague in Frederick Henry's later days and in the time of William II., when a crowd of young noblemen from France particularly, attracted by the military renown of the Oranges and by the brilliancy of the stadtholder's court, settled in The Hague and introduced the refined but corrupt French habits to the aristocratic society there, which regarded Paris as the university of civilised life.¹ And though sometimes the traces of a like spirit may be elsewhere perceived, generally they are derived from that source, and facts show them to be exceptions. Memoirs like those of Constantijn Huygens, the son, those of the lively Madame de Zoutelande, of the wearisome rhymester Coenraet Droste, such correspondence as that of Christiaan Huygens, present to us the existence of this time at The Hague in all its colours, but on the other hand stands the evidence concerning the life and domesticity of old Holland, as it was still to be seen among the great majority of the population, in the journals of Doubleth, the letters of John de Witt, the biographies of the great Dutch naval heroes, literary personages, and statesmen, in Cats's pictures of family life, in the dramas and farces of the time, in the travels and observations of foreigners.²

When Temple, the English ambassador, who spent two years here, speaks of the simplicity of the first seaman and the first statesman of the period, when he testifies to the plain life of both—De Ruyter not being distinguished outwardly from an ordinary sea captain or merchant, De Witt simply dressed, living like a common citizen, followed upon the street by a single servant, the

¹ *Voyage de deux jeunes hollandais à Paris*, ed. Faugère, 2^e éd., p. 5.

² See in general: Schotel, *Het oud-hollandsch huisgezin der zeventiende eeuw* (Haarlem, 1868).

one who waited on him and his family at their plain table,—he intimates that so all the magistrates live. But he remarks also that the officers in the Dutch service live otherwise, although in his opinion they differ favourably from those in other countries.

The same sharp-eyed English statesman divided the people here into five classes: peasants, mariners, merchants, men living upon their income, and noblemen and officers. He describes the first as diligent and dull, plain and honest, at least so long as they dwell far from great towns, simple and temperate, even poor in their way of living, so that they are content with but little nourishing food and may therefore be regarded as tall but not proportionately strong. Rougher and sterner are the mariners, sparing of words as well as in their life, hardened and tough, more valiant in defence than in attack. A little more easy of intercourse are the merchants and tradesmen in the cities, constant and energetic, dexterous and unreliable where their advantage is at stake, standing upon their rights and possessed of mercantile honesty. The magistrates come from the class of men living upon their property in the cities. They are former merchants grown rich or the sons of former merchants, marrying into mercantile families, living on the income of their estates in the country, on life and redeemable annuities to the charge of municipal, provincial, or general government, on the interest of their shares in the great companies, sometimes also on the revenue from their capital invested in large commercial affairs. Great capital is not so often found among them as among the actual wholesale merchants; their wealth, as a rule, is only moderate, because interest is at a low rate and the income from landed property seldom exceeds two per cent., while the salary of the offices is small. The young sons of the magistrates study law usually at Leyden and Utrecht to prepare for government

positions and complete their education by a journey to France and England or to Italy. The class of the nobility is hardly elevated in consideration above that of the magistrates. In Holland it is small in number, partly in consequence of the long Spanish war which extinguished many families. Only a few noble families remain there, which proudly hold themselves aloof from the families of the magistrates, even from those which by purchase have come into possession of noble estates and titles. The nobles imitate principally the French nobility, just as the officers and the wealthy merchants' sons do, and like them they would gladly shine in a stadtholder's court.

Such was the society of Holland. That of the other provinces showed about the same type: somewhat rougher, somewhat more uncivilised in outward appearance as well as in inward characteristics, somewhat less spoiled also by the less turbulent life and the less luxury. The numerous nobility of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel asserted itself vigorously in those three provinces like the influential nobility of Friesland and Groningen, less polished than that of the eastern provinces owing to the greater remoteness of the northern provinces, from which its members only went to Holland to sit temporarily in high government boards and were then wont to adopt the customs of Holland.

The foreigner saw all this with interest, but Temple says at the end of his observations on the people of Holland that a man would choose rather to travel than to live in this country, where the earth is better than the air, profit is more in request than honour, where there is more sense than wit, more good nature than good humour, more wealth than pleasure, where a man finds more things to observe than to desire, and more persons to esteem than to love.

One of the most striking peculiarities of the Hollander,

of the Netherlander in general, was his attachment to house and garden and resulting therefrom, with mutual freedom, the strong bond of family not alone in the household but in the larger circle as well. Some writers are astonished at the liberty which the children enjoy in the street and in the house, a school for the strong independence of opinion and action appearing in youth even towards father and mother. Others are moved by the free tone, the independent attitude of the servants, who do not allow themselves to be ruled by the whims and caprice of masters and mistresses. Still others testify¹ to the uncommonly great influence of the married woman, mistress in the household, where she sways the sceptre and binds even her husband to the strict rules of neatness and good order, while she not seldom meddles in affairs of state, particularly when the appointment of members of the family to office is in question.² But in his house the Dutchman suffered no interference from the authorities, no annoyance of any sort. It may be said of him too that his house was his "castle." Upon it he spent gladly his hardly earned and carefully hoarded money to beautify it and to arrange it according to his taste.

The old Dutch house,³ which as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century was distinguished by its gable in the shape of steps, still remained generally faithful to this form of building at this time, although it was growing higher and narrower and was more lavishly decorated with images and figures, with adornments to frame and crown it. These ornaments usually bore some relation to the trade or business of the owner and often, in the absence of a signboard, gave a name to the dwelling which sometimes derived its appellation from the family

¹ Temple, *Observations*; Parival, p. 25.

² See Bontemantel, ed. Kernkamp, ii., *passim*.

³ See Schotel.

of the master of the house or from his satisfied or severe, joyful or sombre state of mind at the time of the building. With the increase of wealth and of the number of independent gentlemen the former penthouses on the lowest story necessary for business disappeared, and there were more windows; the simplicity of the decoration of gable and cornice, of inner chamber and rear of the house, was less striking, while the yard from a bleaching ground became more and more of a garden, adorned with flowers and shrubs, with statues and parterres, little fountains and hedges cut in figures, again after the French style, with white sand and gravel artfully arranged in the form of mosaics. Formerly these gardens were more frequently found outside the walls of the town in the vicinity, with a summer-house for the centre and stiff beds of flowers and vegetables. These outside gardens continued in use for nearly two centuries longer, but together with the gardens near the houses they were, after the tulipomania of about 1636, richly provided with all sorts of flowering and bulbous plants. The common citizen also diversified his bleaching ground with a little flower garden, preferably by the side of the canal where he dwelt. Within and without great care was taken to secure neatness and cleanliness. Fresh paint, beautifully scoured copper or painted iron knockers and knobs on the door delighted the eye. Stoop and gable, passages and rooms were regularly, even daily, scrubbed and washed, Temple ascribing this to the desirability of avoiding the effects of the extreme moisture of the air and giving the same reason for the striving after cleanliness and neatness in the house, evidenced by the constant cleaning and polishing of furniture and metal-work, the favourite occupation of the Dutch wives and daughters who could hardly be imagined without duster or washing utensils.

This cleanliness, however, extended less to the body

and not always to the clothing. In the highest circles there was a certain aversion to washing, even of the hands and face, which remained for days without contact with water, as did the unexposed parts of the body often for weeks and months. Uncleanliness of the hair was very common, and the women in this respect were quite the equals of the men, surpassed them frequently in neglect of personal cleanliness, in carelessness and filthiness of apparel. "Dirty as an eel" is the verdict on Holland's men and women of this time, and the "shining counters" are compared unfavourably with the "foul faces."

Of the ordinary city house the front room was the most important apartment, where the family lived mainly, unless it was used as a workshop, as was the case with tradesmen. Then the small and plainly furnished little office just back of it became the living room, for which it was occasionally destined in more pretentious houses. The white sand covering the wooden floor of the rooms, whenever a small carpet did not render this unnecessary, heightened the impression of cleanliness as well as the shining tiles setting off on the walls the brightly polished wooden wainscots. Mirrors and glasses, rows of tin and copper vessels and plates shone from all sides upon the visitor, carefully arranged and scoured, resplendent as gold and silver. The sand was strewn in beautiful figures on the floor and under the chimney during the summer, if floors of Italian mosaic could not be afforded. Paintings by more or less known masters hung upon the walls, a decoration that was nowhere lacking, not even in the house of the poor townsman or of the common peasant in the country. They often served as an investment for money on account of their relatively high value. Such pictures were found especially in the rooms of state, which were mostly situated in the second story and were distinguished by the paper or gilt leather hangings or by the colour of the painted wainscot.

With plain citizens these rooms had mats on the floor, in wealthier homes they were provided with inlaid floors or with rich tapestries on floors and walls. Finely sculptured cabinets and chests, curiosities from east and west, Frisian clocks, elegantly carved chairs and tables, artistically stained window-panes with armorial bearings or figures from biblical or profane antiquity, exquisite glass and mirrors, costly porcelain and stone jars attracted attention here. But the mistress of the house was reluctant to let the careless stranger enter. Only after removing his boots or shoes was he admitted to those sanctuaries, however desirous the owner might be to have her treasures admired. In the sleeping-room carved bedsteads with heavy curtains of green damask, fine serge, or cloth were only seen in the houses of aristocratic and very wealthy people. The ordinary citizen, even though quite rich, slept in the ancestral bed built into the more or less sculptured wall, up to which one had to climb with a ladder or a stool. In all houses there were beds of down and an abundance of clean linen which comforted the foreigner as he thought of those dark "sleeping closets," carefully hidden from sight during the day by painted or carved doors. Smooth English mats on the floor augmented here the impression of neatness. Huge chests for linen with fine copper or iron trimmings, well-stocked wardrobes and cabinets furnished the sleeping apartments. The kitchen with its shining vessels, its beautifully washed tiled floor and tiled or plastered walls, its caned chairs, its full "treasury" or cupboard for dishes and plates, its amply provided tin closet where the daily tinware found a place if not received in the tin closet of the front room, its well-kept hearth or fire-pot, testified to the love of neatness, which was regarded as a cardinal virtue in the servants no less than in the mistress of the house.

Thus the worthy Hollander lived in his home, to

which he was attached, although he might like to while away an hour at the nearest inn or tavern in discussing with his neighbours the happenings of city and country, the vicissitudes of the war in remote parts, the interests of commerce and industry, while enjoying a glass of beer or wine.

The ordinary drink of the people was still beer, "small" or "thin" beer; the heavier Hamburg, English, Heusden beers, the local brews of heavier kinds of beer, were also not disliked. The Delft beer was in general use from the fifteenth century in the other provinces too, whither much of it was still exported in the seventeenth century, as well as of the Haarlem, Deventer, Harlingen, and Breda beers, the fame of the last being on the wane. In the first half of the century tea appeared chiefly in the apothecary's shop as a medicine, as a "universal" panacea "for all sicknesses and diseases," but about 1660 it came into fashion as a drink after the example of Paris, and soon the Chinese soothing syrup and chocolate became for women what coffee was later and what tobacco was from the beginning of the century for the men. "Tobacco sucking" from the long Gouda pipe might be called a masculine habit about the middle of the century, and "tobacco houses" were in high favour, for men smoked but little at home, at most on the stoop before the house. The Franco-Spanish custom of taking snuff rapidly penetrated into Dutch parlours, and the snuff-box became a common article for men and women both. The Paris fashion had great influence also here.

At banquets there was anything but moderation so far as concerns eating. The temperance of the Hollanders in the eating and drinking of daily life, often ridiculed as niggardliness by foreigners and particularly by Englishmen, was as proverbial as their intemperance at feasts and dinners. Bread and butter with milk or beer was the ordinary breakfast even of the citizen in easy circum-

stances. Butter and cheese at the same time was a superfluity. The peasant drank buttermilk; sweet milk was for the inhabitant of the city and was peddled early in the morning through "Holland rich in cream and milk," as "fine, pure morning's milk." Of the midday meal eaten at twelve o'clock the principal dish was soup with peas and beans as the chief ingredients or cabbage and bacon, and meat was comparatively little employed, mostly in hotchpot. The upper classes made more of a ceremony and in "dainty abundance" prepared the mid-day meal after the French style, having usually fish for the second course, salad for the third, and tarts and fruits of all kinds. Beer was commonly drunk at meals by the citizen; the higher classes added to the heavier sorts of beer a rich choice of French and Rhenish wines. Brandy was usual even among well-to-do people only at feasts and sociable gatherings. Gin did not make its fatal appearance until later in the train of the potato, which was little known as a food here at this time, although Raleigh as early as 1584 had brought it from Virginia to England and it had appeared some years afterwards in the Leyden botanical garden. Forks were in fashion only among the upper classes; the citizen, even though well off, ate with his fingers. Supper was eaten towards bedtime; it consisted mostly of bread and butter again; among the more wealthy people it was enlarged into a new repast. About ten o'clock the old-fashioned citizen then went to bed, it being the hour also for closing gates and taverns. Few people remained up longer, and many retired earlier.¹

In general the life of the Hollander in the middle of the seventeenth century manifests a tendency to greater luxury, even to extravagance, which gave rise to a rivalry in fine carriages, costly apparel, furniture, jewelry, and

¹ See Kalff in the work: *Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*, section "Domestic and social life," p. 7 *et seq.*

other things. Extravagance induced the daughter of a merchant of this time foolishly to use her expensive lace neckerchief in order to make the fire blaze up more merrily. Luxury appeared also in the more elegant clothing after the French fashion as well as in the fineness of the superabundant linen, hoarded in huge chests and closets and forming the pride of the thrifty mistress of the house. The costly bodices of silk and velvet decked with gold, pearls, and precious stones, the short silken jacket, the large red or blue hooped skirt bordered with silver and gold thread, the "hooped barrel" ridiculed by Huygens in his *Kostelick Mal*—that biting satire on the fashionable costume of his time—underneath the expensive satin, damask, silk petticoat, or stays of all colours edged with lace, became ever finer and more magnificent; the modest black cloak or mantle with a hood concealed all this upon the street, unless it were coquettishly held open, and sometimes the light rain-coat imported from France. From the middle of the century a quantity of ribbons and bows adorned the dress of the women in the French fashion. Stiff corsets, diamond hairpins, gold and coral necklaces, earrings and bracelets, perfumes, fans, hair dyes, cosmetics, and patches made their appearance to the vexation of the old-fashioned mothers and of the preachers and censors in prose and poetry, who often raised their voices against all this extravagance which caused the loss of Holland's "ancient fame for plain respectability." No less ire was aroused by the fine lace collars—the "sloping plaited ruff, pride of all the peasants," says Huygens—folded less stiffly since the end of the sixteenth century but not less richly ornamented and in the middle of the seventeenth worn in broad folds around the neck over the remarkably low-cut dress, by the lace cuffs about the wrists, the pretty leather or silk gloves, the numberless jewels burdening the attire, the gayly embroidered stockings, and red-heeled shoes. Poets

and prose writers like Huygens and Heemskerk describe the exaggerated elegance of the feminine costume—"more flag than covering"—in inimitable style, sometimes lashing the foolish extravagance with cutting ridicule, sometimes unfolding with ironical admiration the mysteries of the refined art of the toilet.

The costume of the men was much less extravagant, although the French fashion began to make itself felt here, too, more and more among the wealthy class. The round felt hat with broad flexible brim of old times was giving way to the small Swedish head-covering with narrow brim, to the Polish cap, to hats of round or pointed crowns with modish ribbons, plumes, and tufts of feathers, such as only fops had worn at first. The short-clipped natural hair of Maurice's time was becoming old-fashioned in comparison with the long and curly locks of the younger men unfeelingly adopting the fashion of big wigs. The sober mantle of black cloth over the modest black doublet, adorned only among the rich with gold or silver buttons, became gradually brighter and finer in stuff and colour and was soon replaced by the fashionable silken mantle, while the doublet now slashed and trimmed with gold lace was of costly velvet, silk, and satin, and the stiff linen Spanish collars and sleeves since the time of Frederick Henry made way for all sorts of French lace-work, the rings and bracelets compressing hands and fingers giving evidence also of refined luxury. The breeches, decked with ribbons and bows, slashed and pulled up in the French manner, vexed old-fashioned people who in the "laced flapping tattered smallclothes" of the younger men saw incorporated the frivolity and wickedness of their century and shunned the dangerous appearance of effeminacy and immorality presented by the borrowing of fashions for men from the dress of women and the reverse. The gilded swords of state, the cosmetics and patches used also by the dandies, the red

stockings, the expensive garters, the elegantly buckled high-heeled shoes, perfumery and hair powder became more and more the fashion for men. In all these things of beauty men went farther in the Netherlands than in France, where young Louis XIV. set an example of simplicity in dress to the court and issued placards against extravagant splendour, so that the Dutchman and the German in Paris were recognised by the lace and ribbons of their costume and were consequently openly laughed at.¹

The country people alone retained generally the old national dress as well as the captains and sailors with their great baggy breeches of the ancient time, but the dweller in the city began to imitate more the elegant costume of the wealthy, though he adhered usually to the tasteless Dutch cut. The pamphlets repeatedly mention tradesmen and storekeepers who run about dressed like "bannerets" and decorate their houses like burgomasters.

All this luxury was naturally the result of the remarkable prosperity prevailing among the wealthy classes of the population at this time, of the much discussed flourishing state of commerce and industry, which ever filled the foreigner with amazement and admiration, the native with pride and pleasure. This prosperity was not quite universal, for here also the labourer was not wanting, who had little share in the luxury, but the fact that he could easily make twelve to fifteen stivers in a day testifies to the relative welfare, while the abundant care of the poor, the constantly increasing number of hospitals and refuges for the indigent in the cities and large villages prevented actual misery. Not to mention some exceptions, the wealth was quite evenly distributed over the well-to-do class, so that an estate of 40,000 to 50,000

¹ *Voyage à Paris*, pp. 31, 56, 110.

guilders might be considered as the smallest fortune of a rich man.

People began, however, as elsewhere to comprehend the harm of this growing extravagance, and not only writers and ministers opposed it, but the municipal governments commenced thinking again of renewing the old statutes against excessive luxury at weddings and feasts, in dress and costly things, and even set about making new regulations. Repeated reference to this occurs in the pamphlets, and the luxury of some is contrasted with the dearness of bread and the indigence of others. Measures are demanded for preventing the gnawing poverty that threatens the needy, when the necessities of life grow dearer. In the trying time of the English war poverty rose to a critical height among the working class. And after that came in 1655 the evil of the pestilence to scourge the country. Over 13,000 people died then in Leyden, about one-fourth of the population, and nearly 18,000 next year at Amsterdam. The large disbursements of the almonries, amounting in 1660 at Amsterdam for the Reformed alone to 238,000 guilders, exclusive of the distribution to the indoor poor which sometimes ran up to 600,000 guilders, indicate the great number of the poor, as do the countless exhortations to charity and the establishment of poorhouses and work-houses that were no sooner erected than filled.¹ Foreigners note, however, that poverty in the Netherlands was relatively not so prominent as in other countries.

The general prosperity depended mainly upon the commerce which is depicted for us in a vivid but certainly not impartial manner by the already mentioned *Interest van Holland*, written by the Leyden manufacturer Pieter de la Court and carefully revised, improved, and aug-

¹ De Bosch Kemper, *De armoede in ons vaderland*, p. 97.

mented by John de Witt and Pieter de Groot.¹ This presentation starts from a fair consideration of Holland's natural condition, situation, and population, which is thrown upon the sea for support. Comparing the Holland of those days with that of Raleigh's time, the writer assumes that fishery and maritime commerce with everything connected therewith had increased to one-third more, an estimate that can hardly be regarded as far wrong, though it must of course be taken in the rough. The circumstance mentioned by De la Court, that a half more ships sail to the east than to the west, seems to show that the carrying trade over all Europe was large and commerce in transit was the main affair, but that the consumption in the country itself must have been considerable, though allowance be made—which the author neglects to do—for the great share of the goods arriving in Dutch ports from the east that was then exported along the rivers to Germany and the southern Netherlands. Commerce was very much helped by the low rate of interest, 3 to $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., which the Holland merchants paid for their borrowed capital in consideration of their well-deserved credit. This low interest resulted partly from the small income of real property on account of heavy taxes and from the relative absence of very rich landlords and extensive landed possessions.

Dutch commerce had at this time reached its highest point according to the judgment of the most capable writers. It did not extend further than a score of years earlier, but the merchant secured an opportunity to develop his plans unmolested now that peace was enjoyed, the dissensions with England had temporarily

¹ De la Court's little book first published in 1662 under this title, although prohibited, was speedily reprinted, and later made over by the writer into his *Aanwysingh der politike gronden en maximen van de Republike van Holland en Westvriesland* (Leiden & Rotterdam, 1669). See J. Heemskerk

ceased, the state of war in north and south was ended, the Dutch ships of war were often making the Moorish corsairs on Africa's northern coast feel the power of the States, and were upholding the honour of their flag on the seas of the world.¹ English rivalry began to come up seriously in consequence of the Navigation Act, which continued in full force under Charles II. also to the disappointment of the Dutch merchants, but for the time being Dutch commerce was a match for that rivalry. It was even more so for the French, Danish, Swedish, and German competition, which could not be so well measured against it chiefly for want of the capital so abundant here and so easily obtainable. The principal aim of Dutch policy must be the preservation of the "blessed" state of peace according to De la Court and to De Witt himself, and the "interest of Holland" seemed to profit by everything working in that direction. The rise of a stadtholder's power, therefore, had to be opposed in every way, because experience in the past had taught that another political tendency was to be expected from it, which would not be determined by commercial interests but by general politics and even by dynastic motives, inspiring naturally slight sympathy in the merchant, whenever he saw in them no advantage to himself. De la Court's book, which exhibited this tendency most plainly, excited as much satisfaction and agreement in the ruling party as indignation and protest in their Orange opponents, as appears from the violent pamphlets published for and against it in these years. The author's

Bz. in the *Gids* of 1853; Van Rees, *Verhandeling over de politieke gronden en maximen*; Veegens, in *Historische Studiën*, ii., p. 30; Fruin, in the *Gids*, 1865, ii., p. 459.

¹ Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirthschaftlichen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Vereinigten Niederlande*, p. 14, shows an increase of commerce from 1660 after a temporary depression, evidently the result of war.

person and principles were vehemently assailed in them; he was in his native town repelled from the communion table as an immoral person and had to be protected from the popular fury.¹ This did not, however, prevent him from issuing in 1669 a new, rewritten edition of his work with the title—*Exposition of the salutary political principles and maxims of the republic of Holland and West Friesland*.

The extraordinary rise of the East India Company, by which nearly all Indian wares “are fixed to Holland,” appeared to the author no less a reason for the great prosperity than peace. This assertion is not worthy of full belief, and De la Court himself really understood this, as is evident from his views concerning the evil consequences of the strict maintenance of the monopoly of the “close companies” and concerning their endeavour to secure the highest profits with the least trade.

Regarding the East India Company, the “flourishing century,” spoken of by Van Diemen’s successor, the governor general Cornelis van der Lijn, after the restoration in 1646 of peace on Java with the susuhunan of Mataran and the sultan of Bantam, had dawned upon it more in appearance than in reality. Van Diemen’s strong government had made the company’s name everywhere dreaded and established its authority both in the Archipelago and upon Ceylon, Malacca, and Formosa on solid foundations. The renewal of its charter in 1647 seemed to put it in a position for obtaining large gains during twenty-five years more, especially if it would enter upon new paths. The company, however, adhered to its old commercial principles. Notwithstanding the representations of many members of the Indian government,² the chamber of seventeen, for fear of its

¹ See Wttewaall, *Proeve van De la Court's Welvaren van Leiden*, p. xiii. See Van Rees, *Gesch. der Staathuishoudkunde*, i., p. 367.

² De Jonge, *Opkomst van het Ned. gezag in Oost-Indië*, vi., p. iv.

beloved monopoly, would not hear to greater freedom for private commerce, while by the small salaries of its officials it gave occasion for secret trading and dishonest practices of all kinds.

Van der Lijn and his successor Carel Reinierszoon, under whom the rule of governor and councils was again regulated and fixed after the old style, supported by justice and police under their management and connected with the exclusive maintenance of the Reformed religion, were not the men by vigorous action to lead the company into new ways or even to bring it to a more flourishing condition along the old ways. They obeyed the orders of the seventeen, kept up the monopoly, and manifested towards the native princes at the request of their masters "a benevolent, modest, humble, and friendly attitude," towards the English and other rivals a cautious reserve in order to afford no opportunity for grievances. Peace seemed the best means for the promotion of commerce. So far as possible the seventeen desired to avoid the costly wars of Van Diemen's time. They wished thenceforth exclusively to see efforts made for an increase of the dividends, not for an increase of power and territory. The days of Coen and Van Diemen were gone forever. It was forgotten that in these regions commerce and a display of force irrevocably went together.

The appearance of Johan Maetsuycker, as the successor of Reinierszoon who died in 1653, able as he was, did not open a new epoch. A clever diplomatist and a careful magistrate, quite after the heart of his "principals" in the fatherland, more than a brilliant warrior and an organiser as Coen and Van Diemen were, he upheld the company's authority during twenty-five years upon the whole with great success. With the help of the talented Rijklof van Goens, governor of Ceylon for a long time, he drove the Portuguese from their last footholds upon that island and the shores of Hither India; only Goa and

a part of Timor remained in their hands at the peace with them, which did not take effect in India until 1663. The important Formosa gave way before the might of the enterprising and cruel Chinese pirate Coxinga, owing also to the bad conduct of the commander Coyet who was punished by banishment to a remote island, but Palembang in 1659 and Macassar chastised in 1660 and conquered some years later by Speelman atoned for this loss to a certain extent, and on the Moluccas the company's sway continued undisturbed. The pliable governor general sought as much as possible to shun difficulties with the English and the native princes in accordance with the wishes of his masters and the policy of his immediate predecessors. But the company's commerce did not increase under his administration, and it was quite to the contrary. The spice trade of the Moluccas went first to Macassar, thence quickly to other parts, having been much limited by the company's measures, particularly during the sway of the governor De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, who destroyed the clove crop everywhere except upon Ambon and the Oeliassers and punished and even exterminated unmercifully the rebellious population for its opposition. Batavia itself languished by reason of the vigorous competition of Bantam, where an active and able sultan with the help of Arabs, Englishmen, and Danes brought about an important commercial movement that seriously threatened the company's trade. Coen's plan for bringing colonists to Batavia, supported by Maetsuycker as an excellent method of raising the rapidly sinking Batavia, began again in 1662 to be carried into effect, but the number of colonists still remained small.

The chief concern for the seventeen was that the dividends continued at a good height, 25, 30, sometimes 40 per cent., although they fell some years to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., especially at the time of the first English war

which stopped all commerce temporarily.¹ We know that these large dividends cannot be considered a criterion for the flourishing condition of the company, as they did not always proceed from actual earnings, but could often be paid only from money collected. It was precisely these dividends, however, that brought the profits most in evidence, and therefore De la Court could say for this time that the company notably increased the prosperity of the country, although these profits were not based upon the company's real progress. Outside of the circle of the company's high officials and its highest directors the actual condition of the great commercial corporation was as good as unknown. The mysterious bookkeeping of the company and the confusion pervading it made it extremely difficult for any but the initiated to see that neither the large dividends nor the resulting high prices of the shares of the company were infallible proofs of its prosperity. But aside from the large dividends it was the considerable clandestine profits, enjoyed by officials in India and the fatherland, by the managers even of the company's business, that contributed to the growth of wealth in the fatherland, a fact which redounded as little to the credit of those officials and managers as did to Holland's forefathers the often wild speculation in the company's shares on the Amsterdam Bourse, bringing naturally great gains to some but quite as great losses to others.

Very important for the company was the establishment of a small colony of Netherlanders at the Cape of Good Hope, where, under the lead of the energetic ship's doctor, Jan van Riebeeck, who governed there during ten years, a fort was built and land was distributed to the company's officers. A beginning of colonisation was thus made for the benefit of the East Indiamen sailing to and from the Indies, the Cape from this time becoming for

¹ Klerk de Reus, *Uebersicht*, Beil. vi.

them a much desired resting place, where they could take in provisions, such as water, fresh meat, and vegetables, and tarry for a time for the restoration of health. On Riebeeck's departure in 1662 there was already a nucleus of cattle-raising European colonists in the neighbourhood of the fort, and people were beginning to penetrate farther into the unknown interior. The colonies formed about the same time on Mauritius, Ceylon, and Cochin, sustained by Maetsuycker in the beginning with good result, seemed to open a new future for the development of these promising islands and coasts, a boundless field of development for the Dutch nation.

Much less important were both commerce and colonisation in the regions over which the West India Company extended its activity. Its charter also was prolonged in 1647 for twenty-five years, but it then fell into a sad state, mainly by reason of the complete ruin of its power in Brazil. On January 26, 1654, the company's dominion here ended with the surrender to the Portuguese of Recife and three other forts still occupied. General Schkoppe, who had conducted the defence in recent years, stipulated for himself and his men transportation to Holland with arms and baggage. At the trial, after his return, of him and his two chief civil officials it was very plainly evident that a longer defence had been impossible. Brazil was lost for good by the peace of 1661, but freedom of trade for the Dutch with that country and Africa was secured from the Portuguese, and, besides the artillery left behind and returned, a sum of eight million guilders came as an indemnity to the company. But this arrangement could not save it. Repeatedly it had been upon the point of bankruptcy, and neither the very lucrative slave trade, the main resource of its possessions on the Guinea coast, nor the commerce in certain products of the small islands in the Antilles still owned by it could more than postpone its fall. With

difficulty it dragged out its existence, while its shares, obstinately falling, began to approach the zero point, and most of its possessions, neglected and impoverished like itself, led a miserable life. The greatest gains in its territories were obtained by private merchants, partly through the secret evasion by the company's poorly paid officials of what still remained of its monopoly. The slave trade furnished rich revenues to some houses, notably to the firm of Coymans in Amsterdam, and anger was frequently displayed when people ventured to discuss openly this "unchristian" but profitable commerce.¹

One only of its colonies formed an exception to the unfavourable rule, New Netherland governed since 1647 by Peter Stuyvesant. Under his vigorous and intelligent, though oftentimes arbitrary, rule an end was made to the wars incessantly waged with the Indians under his predecessors, Van Twiller and Kieft. Security in the territory occupied and the generally friendly relations with the neighbouring English colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia made the population of the colony slowly increase, so that by 1660 it had risen to about 10,000 souls, chiefly settled upon Manhattan Island and along the banks of the Hudson. The capital—it had been prophetically named New Amsterdam—then contained 1600 inhabitants. Great dissatisfaction, however, prevailed in the colony with Stuyvesant's arbitrary administration and with the almost complete absence of any influence of the people upon it. Moreover, the West India Company gave itself little concern about its extended possession, except so far as this procured some gains by the revenue from the trade in beaver skins. A great danger for New Netherland lay in the fact that the English government had never recognised actually the legality of the settlement and from 1606 had

¹ See pamphlet Thys. 7374, entitled: *Tsamenspraeck tusschen een hollantsch ende brabantisch koopman.*

claimed for itself the entire coast from Virginia to the St. Lawrence River, while the white population of New England bordering in the west on New Netherland was ten times as large as that of the territory taken possession of by the company. During the first English war the fate of the colony had hung by a silken thread, and the English colonists were still clamouring for the maintenance of the presumed English rights. It was to be foreseen that the weak colony, virtually left to itself and enclosed on the north and south by English possessions, would be unable to withstand a serious attack by the English.¹

The fishery was still regarded ever as the nurse of Holland's commerce and industry. The herring fishery and the catching of cod in particular were called "very powerful means of subsistence," and a number of other trades depended upon them as of old. There was no sign of a falling off in these branches of industry at this time. De la Court estimates the number of persons in Holland employed in them as about the same as those living by commerce. Enkhuizen, Maaslandsluis, and Vlaardingen were still, according to Temple, the chief fishing towns. The Greenland fishery had become established mainly in West Friesland and flourished greatly since the fall of the Northern Company in 1642. At first it seemed as if the whale fishery would dwindle away. But it revived speedily. De la Court says that over 12,000 fishermen went north every year to engage in this fishery and that the product since 1642 had increased ten to fifteen times. The development of this fishery was very favourably influenced by the protection bestowed upon it by the Estates of Holland which prohibited Netherlanders from taking part in any foreign whale fishery, by the prevention of the export of fishing apparatus, casks, boats, and other things necessary to the business and best to be

¹ For affairs in America see the excellent studies of Fiske, especially *The Dutch and Quaker colonies in America* (2 vols., New York, 1899).

obtained in this country, by the obligation for the fishermen to bring the whales caught and the oil and whalebone into Dutch ports and to sell them there, by the strong guard given the whalers by the war ships of the States. Coupled with this industry there was a small trade with the Eskimos of Greenland's coasts and Davis Strait in wood, copper kettles, axes, knives, and trinkets.¹ "Commissioners of the Greenland fishery," composed of the principal shipowners, had the supervision of these interests.

The branches of industry connected with navigation and the fishery, not only shipbuilding on the Zaan but also the manufacture of nets, ropes, sails, anchors, and cables, flourished naturally as much as did navigation and fishery themselves. Industry in general seems in these years to have given slight grounds for complaint, although De la Court earnestly urged a reduction of the oppressive imposts and abolition of the restrictions that held almost every branch of industry in chains. The halls and guilds in his native city and elsewhere, keeping the woollen and cloth manufacture under the guardianship of the municipal government, appeared to him in conflict with the principles of freedom, from which he expected the richest fruits for commerce as well as for industry. He believed not unjustly that without great harm an attack could never be made upon liberty of worship, which had promoted the commerce and industry of the country in great measure by attracting hither so many manufacturers and merchants expelled from other lands.

These free economic principles were far from being applied to industry. It still remained locked in the fetters of the guilds of the Middle Ages. The immense importation of raw materials from all countries of the

¹See Zorgdrager, *Groenlandsche Walvischvangst*; Luzac, *Holland's Rijkdom*, ii., p. 277.

world, the facility for the Netherlander of transporting his manufactures elsewhere on his numerous ships made less palpable for the moment a large portion of the annoyances of the ancient limitation of industry in countless laws and ordinances. Obstructive regulations were in many cases accompanied by measures of protection against foreign competition or that even of other cities, which were helpful to the manufacturer. In the long run the restrictions were not to be a match for the universal longing for liberty felt by the merchant.

The foreigner at this time was struck by the flourishing condition of all industry, particularly of the cloth, linen, and woollen manufacture, of the brewing of beer, of bleaching, and of everything connected with trade, as well as by the enormous commercial activity in the small territory. The character of Dutch industry still remained in general that of small industry, divided among a number of small masters. Large factories were only exceptionally found in the cities, though appearances looking to a change in this respect were beginning to be noted especially after the settlement here of emigrant manufacturers from France. Narrow individual understanding, the absence of a proper distribution of work, continued to prevail in manufacturing; the exclusiveness and limitation of the Middle Ages were still felt strongly, while commerce had long since cast off such bonds and was making an ample use of its freedom, if necessary to the detriment of the industry of the moment. The time was soon to come—undoubtedly harmful to the excellence of the product but not to the temporary interests of the producer—when the manufacturer also would learn that the sale of goods is influenced not so much by their “inner quality” as by the purchaser’s taste, a principle that was held up by the worldly-wise De la Court to his fellow-citizens in his remarkable *Welvaren van Leiden*,

not published until our day and in many ways the basis of the later written *Interest van Holland*.

The Leyden author so well informed on economic matters, who is considered one of the most remarkable economists of the seventeenth century, was not so observant of the religious phenomena about him, to which he gave attention only so far as they might serve to explain the economic principles championed by him.

He would have been the last to deny that religion played a great part in his time. With his liberal conception of religion, which brought him into the odor of atheism, he knew very well that the inhabitants of his city and country were in general little helped by that liberality. He refers repeatedly to the self-interest that ought to prevent the ruling Reformed party from using their power to suppress people of other opinions, who even in Holland were in the majority by far. Not half the population of that province is of the Reformed faith, he says of his days; in particular most of the "old inhabitants," peasants, monied men, and nobles are still Catholics, many indeed Protestants but Mennonites or Rijnsburgers. In Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overyssel Catholicism was unquestionably far in the majority, although some districts, as the Veluwe since John of Nassau, counted many of the Reformed religion. The number was very small in the three northern provinces and Zealand, as appears from De la Torre's report of 1656.¹ The Catholics above the Meuse at this time may be estimated at about half a million.

The freedom of worship in this country astonished all foreigners extremely on comparing it with conditions elsewhere, but no less astonishing was the large number of Protestant sects resulting therefrom. Most attention was attracted by the numerous Mennonites among the

¹ Reprinted in the *Archief van het aartsbisdom Utrecht*, x., p. 95; xi., pp. 57, 374.

tradesmen, fishermen, and sailors, especially in North Holland and the country of Friesland. Much less numerous but proportionally not a little influential by their rank and fortune, abilities and possession of offices, were the Remonstrants in some cities and villages of Holland, besides the less prominent Lutherans and smaller sects.

The mercantile government of the United Netherlands understood that by bringing religious differences to the fore it would in time make native and foreigner averse to inhabiting and visiting these regions, and, considering the fact that in all Europe the number of the Reformed faith could scarcely be calculated as one-twentieth of the population, it regarded its interest to lie in the adoption of freedom of worship for all, so far as possible, for one of its maxims. The Reformed Church remained privileged above all, and it alone enjoyed complete freedom in accordance with the Dort principles fixed in 1618 and 1619, which the government repeatedly declared its wish to maintain, but all attempts to carry these principles to their utmost consequences were steadily thwarted, and the actual rights of an exclusive state church were never obtained by it. The placards against adherents of other opinions continued to be upheld in name, and the government apparently listened now and then to those who desired measures against the heterodox and dissenters, but the latter could be sure of toleration, provided they did not assert themselves too publicly. "No man can here complain" testifies Temple, "of pressure in his conscience: of being forced to any public profession of his private faith: of being restrained from his own manner of worship in his house, or obliged to any other abroad." Better acquainted evidently with the higher than with the lower circles, he exaggerates somewhat the mutual toleration found here, the absence of religious dissension, and the friendly attitude between the sects,

but he does not say too much, theoretically at least, when he affirms that as elsewhere every man could eat, lodge, and market where he chose, here every man could pray with whom he pleased without any notice being taken of it. He had seemingly heard little of the great conflict that shortly before his arrival in the republic had shaken the entire Reformed Church to its foundations, the fierce dispute between Cocceians and Voetians, which might have caused a revival of the old discord of Arminians and Gomarists.

After a quarrel over the Sabbath agitating men's minds during years, a new important difference came up about 1660 between the theologians of Leyden and Utrecht, that concerning the forgiveness of sin and the doctrine of grace, in which Voetius himself strongly opposed the "Leyden heretic," being soon helped by Maresius of Groningen, who forgot his former disputes with Voetius to join him in combating Coccejus and his friends, whose doctrine resembled the Arminian conception of predestination. Coccejus's moderate opinion found support in the government hostile to theological faction and composed to a large extent of elements half or wholly Arminian. On the other hand, the Voetians depended upon the partisans of Orange, in old times the protectors of the stricter orthodox tendency. Political and ecclesiastical dissensions thus threatened to bring the republic into trouble again, and in particular the strife over the "public prayer" gave occasion to violent commotion in church and state, when the Estates of Holland (1662) took up anew the subject of naming the prince of Orange in public and church prayers and formulated a prayer making no mention of the house of Orange. But resolutions and the clever avoidance of dangerous points of dispute succeeded still in conjuring the peril of a renewal of former factions, although the internal contentions in the church could not be ended.

Outside of the Reformed Church the *odium theologicum* was no less powerfully active as is manifest from the dissensions among the Mennonites. Among the Catholics also the serious difference of opinion regarding the validity of the ordained clergy as opposed to the secular priests had increased greatly of late years, and the adroitness of the apostolic vicar, De la Torre, and the caution of his successor, Johannes van Neercassel, could only with difficulty preserve a certain measure of the outward harmony so necessary here in the ever dangerous situation of the Catholic Church. Although the bepraised mutual toleration left much to be desired, it is positive that the government's policy in ecclesiastical affairs, aiming so far as possible to bestow freedom upon all, providing public order was not disturbed, succeeded in preventing the dissensions from becoming too evident, and in compelling the varying opinions, however sharply opposed to one another, to keep an actual but sometimes only superficial peace. Thus the country could remain what it had been since the revolt against Spain, a refuge for all opinions notwithstanding religious quarrels, an asylum for the foreigner exiled from elsewhere on account of his faith.

De la Court speaks of science still less than of religion, and in his book on Leyden our manufacturer seems but little convinced of its importance to the commonwealth. He considers it mainly from the point of view of the material advantages procured by it for his native city and perceives, therefore, the interest of enticing there as many students as possible. "Excepting holy theology, mathematics, history, and languages" he judges it quite useless, "nowhere serving but to obtain among the ignorant a step to practice." He has a particular dislike for philosophy which he thinks "ridiculous" and adapted "to extinguish all human wisdom." But, he says, although the students should wish to hear the Koran

explained, they must be given what they want, because only in that way are they attracted. Fortunately the men in power thought otherwise. Strongly under the influence of the Cartesian ideas penetrating more and more among the developed class, they had more than formerly an eye and ear for the progress of natural science.

The universities, Leyden first of all, which early in the century were especially noted for the flourishing state of the classical and theological studies, had not lost their renown, although the number of students no longer assumed such proportions as had been the case about 1640. This was a result both of the restoration of peace in Germany and of the disappearance of the matchless philological geniuses, who constituted Leyden's glory in the first half of the century, possibly also of the extensive exploitation of the foreign students mentioned by some authorities and of a certain love of ease that had arisen with the university's success.¹

Coccejus still lived at Leyden, the acute and compassionate author of the *Summa doctrinæ de fœdere et testamento Dei*. In Utrecht Voetius still swayed his heavy sceptre with unabated adherence to the principles of Dort. The vehement Maresius of Groningen continued to stand in the breach, since 1641 as the successor of Gomarus on the watch for all heretical doctrines, whether Arminianism or Cartesianism or whatever else must be to the strictly orthodox mind from the devil. They upheld the fame of dogmatic studies in the Netherlands, against which the philosophy of the Cartesians, proclaimed by Regius and Franciscus Burman at Utrecht, by Heydanus and his protégé Arnold Geulinx at Leyden, managed to defend itself successfully, being sure of the support of the friendly, ruling party in the States and in spite of the mild prohibition of 1656 that

¹ Wttewaall, *Proeve van De la Court's Welvaren van Leiden*, p. 148.

was not strictly enforced. The death of Salmasius after his return from Sweden to Leyden had been a great loss to classical literature, but the old tradition was brilliantly maintained by Gronovius moving from Deventer to Leyden, while Golius as a student of oriental languages followed in the steps of his noted predecessor Erpenius. Nicolas Heinsius was indisputably the greatest and most many-sided of the Dutch philologists of this period, although he spent a long time in Sweden and devoted himself there more to diplomacy than to philology. The Deventer, later Utrecht professor, Graevius, came after him and Gronovius not without distinction. With all these special mention may be made of such famous jurists as Antonius Matthaeus and Paulus Voetius of Utrecht, Ulric Huber of Franeker, Dirk Graswinckel, secretary of the *Chambre Mi-partie* and heir of De Groot's renown as a student of international law, in which he was far from equalling his celebrated predecessor.

But not one of them attained such a European fame as that of the ingenious Christiaan Huygens, the great mathematician and physicist, brilliant among the first students of natural science of all times. A pupil of Frans van Schooten, the noted Leyden professor of mathematics, from whose school came also John de Witt, Jan Hudde a member of the Amsterdam government, and the little known but skilful physician Hendrik van Heuraet,¹ he far surpassed those excellent men of the second flourishing period of mathematical studies in the Netherlands following that of Stevin. De Witt's admirable studies on curves and the calculation of probabilities, Hudde's application of pure mathematics to "more useful" questions of daily life in his native city, Heuraet's promising first essays are not to be compared with what Huygens accomplished. He looms up over

¹ See Korteweg, *Het bloeitijdperk der wiskundige wetenschappen in Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1894).

them all like a giant, the victorious refuter of the theory of the quadrature of the circle, the successful solver of the most difficult problems in numbers, the founder of the calculation of chance, the inimitable, clear thinker, who in mathematics put "the firmness of the rhetorical connection and the plainness of the demonstration" far above the results, the discoverer of the law of the conservation of the *vis viva* of motion and of the conservation of motion of the centre of gravity, of the pendulum's laws of motion, of Saturn's ring and moon, the inventor of pendulum clockwork, of the gunpowder machine, precursor of the gas machine and consequently of the steam engine, the talented expounder of the phenomena of light, of gravitation, of magnetism, the greatest mathematician, physicist, mechanician of his time, "the new Archimedes."¹ In the spring of 1666 he settled in Paris and helped establish there the *Académie des Sciences*, of which he was one of the first and foremost members. In his fatherland he found but few among the many dilettanti to understand and appreciate his work, so he left it in order from a more central place to let the light of his genius shine over the world, surrounded by men with whom he had been for years in close scientific relation, until the strict Catholicism prevailing at the court of Louis XIV. made life there difficult for him also, the liberal thinker, and drove him back to the fatherland.

The Netherlands swarmed² with men who, under the influence of Cartesian ideas, devoted themselves to the natural sciences, mostly estimable dilettanti like old Constantijn Huygens himself, who in his letters and posthumous writings displays a remarkable insight into scientific problems and had long kept up a correspond-

¹ See on him in general: Bosscha, *Christiaan Huygens* (Haarlem, 1895).

² See Sorbière's account of his travels through Holland in 1660 (*Bijdr. en Meded. Hist. Gen.*, xxii., p. 57).

ence with learned men of other countries. The famous Anna Maria van Schuerman, versed in all branches of erudition and art, may be mentioned in this connection. No stranger staying in Utrecht neglected the opportunity of trying to meet this noteworthy lady, which was not always easy owing to her aversion to such visits. Almost every important city in Holland counted one or more celebrities who sometimes inclined to charlatanry like the Rotterdam anatomist and chemist Lodewijk de Bils. The notorious search for the philosopher's stone, one of the chief elements in the rise of scientific chemistry, had a great influence upon this tendency to quackery. An important place among the chemists of the time was taken by the foreigners—Glauber, a physician at Amsterdam, and the singular Frenchman Borri. Inventors of all sorts found interested hearers in the republic and could easily obtain there a patent for their inventions. Thus the French mechanician, Du Son, became the object of universal attention at Rotterdam in 1653 on account of the wonderful ship devised by him, which seemed destined to take the place of sailing vessels but soon proved useless, although great expectations had been at first excited.

The great interest in scientific study, which showed itself more and more in the Dutch provinces, had also a favourable influence upon bookselling and the publisher's business. In the sixteenth century Frankfort had been the great market for books, the centre of the book trade, but the Thirty Years' War, which converted Germany far and wide into a desert and made its ravages felt on the Rhine no less than elsewhere, had robbed this city of the largest part of its business. Leyden, the seat of learning, where hundreds of students gathered every year and famous representatives of science met, appeared for a time destined to enter upon the rich inheritance. Its booksellers and publishers travelled over Europe to

buy old books and to sell new ones; its book auctions obtained great renown like those of Frankfort formerly. The peace of Münster, the waning splendour of philological studies at Leyden, above all the decreasing number of foreign students there injured this flourishing trade, but the Elzeviers succeeded in maintaining their old fame. Leyden and Amsterdam were long known over the whole world as the foremost seats of printing, where under the protection of Dutch liberty many works were printed and published that were elsewhere prohibited by the arbitrary decision of governments or the influence of the clergy. With Paris they possessed the largest share in the book business of those days.

If the republic might be called the promised land of inventors, dilettanti, publishers, booklovers, no less was it the land of painters and engravers. The aristocrat and the common man, the dweller in cities and the peasant, were accustomed to decorate their houses with art works of more or less importance. A portion of capital was invested in paintings, and they formed a considerable item of inventories and inheritances. There was almost no board of government or guild which did not own several portraits of its members past or present, in full consciousness of their dignity seated in their meeting room amid the emblems of their business or office. There was no officer of militia but he wanted to be immortalised upon canvas. Every family of consequence had its portrait gallery. At every fair of any note pictures and prints by well-known masters were offered for sale. Every notable event in the life of the family or in the state was commemorated by a painting, a print, or a medal. Every city of any extent could show its art amateurs and collectors of paintings. From no period of Dutch history are so many masters of art to be named, have so many art works of importance come down to us as from these days, when an abundance of money

allowed people to indulge in the luxury of art collecting. It requires no demonstration that, wherever art becomes to such an extent the fashion of the time, much that is mediocre is furnished as well as much that is excellent. Even for the best artists of those days this result of over-production has been verified by competent connoisseurs, while the equally proved fact, that some studios became factories of art works, where the master with rapid hand touched up the productions of his promising pupils and disposed of them afterwards as his own works, testifies to the same striving to satisfy an unusually heavy demand by a proportionate supply.

Of many of those pupils the masters of the preceding period might be proud, while they themselves continued to work with undiminished skill. Rembrandt was still in his prime and at this time he created perhaps his most beautiful works: the unsurpassed "Syndics of the Cloth Guild" (1662), the profound "Homer" (1663), the series of family portraits of Amsterdam patricians, the oft-repeated portraits of his Saskia, the striking Jewish and popular types of the Bible pictures on canvas and copper, which continually reveal new beauties to the beholder. Among his pupils he could point to a Govert Flinck who decorated the city hall of Amsterdam with masterpieces, to the excellent portrait painter Ferdinand Bol, to the landscape artist Philips de Koninck, to Samuel van Hoogstraten portraitist and writer of the remarkable book *Inleydingh tot de Hoogeschoole der Schilderkonst*, to Nicolaes Maes fertile in admirable portraits, and to many others. Scarcely any of his artistic contemporaries escaped the great master's powerful influence, but his last years, until his death in 1669, were darkened by financial and domestic troubles. Nobody approached him, unless it might be Johannes Vermeer of Delft, the exquisite colourist, who knew how to conjure up the most splendid lights in landscape and interior. At

Leyden Dou had excellent pupils and imitators of his fine style of painting in Frans van Mieris, Gabriel Metsu, Godfried Schalcken, Quiringh Brekelenkam. The "candlelights," the cabinet genre pictures, and the interiors of the Leyden school belong to the most attractive specimens of painting of this period. Jacob van Ruysdael excelled his uncle and teacher Salomon in the reproduction of the poetry of the water and the dunes in the vicinity of Haarlem and is esteemed the first landscape artist of the century, the best expert in the beautiful atmospheric and light effects of Holland. The reveller Jan Steen, Van Goyen's son-in-law, passing his life in poverty and miserable circumstances, created at Haarlem and Leyden those humouristic pictures of tavern and kirmess jollity, of household disorder and delights which made his name proverbial. The sons of Frans Hals and his able pupils Jan Miense Molenaer and Philip Wouwerman, the latter himself the founder of a numerous school of landscape painters and world-famous for his handsome horses, recalled the great portrait painter of Haarlem. Gerard Ter Borch of Overijssel established his great name as a portrait and genre painter. Johannes Lingelbach happily imitated Wouwerman, Claes Berchem more Van Goyen; Ostade had excellent pupils in Dusart and Brakenburg. Meindert Hobbema, little known in his time, is now celebrated as the equal of Ruysdael. Aert van der Neer, as little considered in his days as Hobbema was, is now highly praised for his exquisite moonlights and night conflagrations. The court and fashionable painter Gerard van Honthorst, whose portraits have survived in large numbers and testify to his fertile but too industrious talent; the Delft painter of churches, Gerard Houckgeest; the many-sided Karel du Jardin—they all can only be named here. Ludolf Backhuysen of Emden and especially Willem van de Velde the younger immortalised the great sea fights of the English wars and

the fame of the Dutch navy. Many, very many more names might be mentioned here, of animal painters like Melchior d'Hondecoeter, of painters of flowers and still life like the De Heems and Willem van Aelst, of the productive painter of landscapes with animals and figures, Adriaen van de Velde, who was regarded as the best in his line, of the versatile painter and draughtsman of landscapes, portraits, and small pictures, Adriaen van der Venne. No side of Holland's rich life of those days remains unrepresented in the works of its artists, no expression of Dutch nature but finds its reflection in the immortal productions of Dutch art.

But other branches of the fine arts may look back too upon this time as a flourishing epoch. The engravers and etchers of the second half of the seventeenth century, a Rembrandt, a Willem Jacobszoon Delff, can measure themselves with those of the first half. A number of painters, particularly portrait painters, are also world-renowned as engravers and prove themselves experts at drawing, but the superabundance of ornament around the engravings shows already, though the technic is still undiminished, the beginning of the end of the great time. The fine Suyderhoef reproduces upon copper the tints of the painters in an inimitable manner; the etcher-engraver Bloteling, the poet-etcher Luyken, are ranked but little lower. Among the sculptors stands in the foreground Rombout Verhulst, the greatest of Dutch sculptors, the creator of the monuments to Tromp, De Ruyter, the Evertsens, and Van Ghent in the churches of Holland, to Clant and Knyphausen in Groningen, to Polyander van Kerchoven and burgomaster Van der Werff at Leyden. Arthur Quellinus of Antwerp, his equal, adorned the new Amsterdam city hall with forceful statuary.

In the department of architecture the men coming up at the close of the preceding period continued for a long

time to set the fashion. The many architectural works necessary in extending and beautifying the cities: gates, public buildings, houses of private individuals in old and new quarters of the towns, an increasing number of the last excelling in architectural style and adornment, gave the city architects as well as the carpenters working for their own account an opportunity to display their taste and talent. The Hollander's love for his dwelling, the desire to let some of the prevailing prosperity appear on the outside, the fashion of renovating the gables brought into existence those numerous more or less beautiful gables of the seventeenth century, whose abundance helps to form the peculiar type of the Dutch cities. Artists like Salomon de Bray of Haarlem, painter, draughtsman, architect, author, all at once, could at this time give expression to the inspiration of their genius to their hearts' content. The genuine Dutch Renaissance style still flourishing about 1640 is, however, more and more lost in the tendency to the classical style followed after the example of France. The old peaked gable is given up for the horizontal cornice; instead of the sharp gable running up to a point comes the heavy monumental horizontal line; luxurious decoration with pilasters and leafy ornament, with baskets of fruit on the cornice, with wreaths and garlands upon the gable above and near the windows, takes the place of the former charming simplicity and prepares for the reign of the rococo which is soon to dawn.

If we thus see traces of an approaching decline in some arts notwithstanding their brilliancy, this is very distinctly perceptible in literature. The somewhat rugged national strength, that spoke from Roemer Visscher, Bredero, and the young Vondel, that animated Huygens and Cats to their best works, has ceased to inspire the literature of this time. Vondel, Huygens, and Cats still live — the last died in 1660, the other two

survived him a score of years,—but Cats amuses himself in his last years with tedious reflections on his old age and his tranquil life in the country. Huygens's *Zeestraet* (1667) is far from being equal in wit and form to his *Voorhout*, and his *Cluyswerck* (1680) does not reach the height of his *Hofwijck*. Vondel's imperishable poetical power alone, not visibly reduced after his conversion to the Romish Church and the domestic troubles of his later years, rose after the *Lucifer* (1654) and the *Jephtha* (1659) once more in 1667 to the height of the famed swan song in the *Noach*, noble fruit of his genius, which may be placed with the best poems of his earlier days, just as the *Scheepskroon voor Van Galen*, the proud *Uitvaart voor Tromp*, the *Zettriomf der Vrije Nederlanden* (1666), and many a passionate song of triumph of this glorious time may be compared with the songs in honour of Frederick Henry's victories. But those who followed: Anslo, Brandt, Oudaen, Vollenhove, Antonides van der Goes even, who unquestionably occupies the first place as poet among the younger ones with his *IJstroom*, did not fulfil the promise of their youth; the last died too early to allow of the development of his fine poetical gifts, excelling in strong imagination and pure diction. The unbridled romanticism of a Jan Vos, whose *Aran en Titus* seemed for a time to open a new epoch for the drama, soon degenerated into a display of "art and machinery," which fascinated the multitude more than it cultivated their taste or awakened fine thoughts in them, feasting their eyes upon murderous spectacles in desolate mountain regions, upon dragons, infernal spirits and monsters, upon bolts of lightning, pillars changing into bears, tigers springing out of trees, celestial chariots drawn by peacocks and swans. The days were coming when the toiling poets would place "unwearied work," which "conquers everything," above inspiration often far to be sought, when dramas and poems fashioned after

the French pattern would drive out both the classicism of Vondel and Hooft and the romanticism of Vos. With the foundation of the society *Nil volentibus arduum* at Amsterdam in 1669 under the management of Dr. Lodewijk Meijer began a new period of Dutch literature, that of a formal art bound down to fixed rules and models, soon overpowering all true art wherever it appeared, as did the rhetoricians of the sixteenth century. In the department of prose the affected style of Hooft's *Historien* had a great influence on the historical writings of Brandt and others. The grave stiffness of the ordinary written language was little adapted to lead to a rapid development, the less so because men soon imitated the French novel of those days and deviated further from the free forms, of which Marnix had given the example in his *Byencorff* and which are only to be found again in some well-written pamphlets of the seventeenth century. In those pamphlets, whose language has hitherto attracted too little attention from Dutch philologists, are often found the best productions of the easy prose of those days, much more natural than the prolix language of the learned men, than the complimentary forms of the epistolary style of the cultivated classes larded with French words and turns of expression, than the more or less conventional tone of the popular books of the time. There is to be heard the proud Dutch burgher of the most flourishing period in his real shape, coarse and rough sometimes but round and open, proud of his freedom, jealous of his rights.





CHAPTER XI

YEARS OF PEACE

AT last the happy time seemed to have dawned, for which men had thirsted so long. The peace of Münster had been followed by temporary domestic dissensions, then the English war had brought the republic into great danger, the northern war had again menaced its most important interests, the Portuguese difficulties had constantly attracted attention, the Münster troubles had threatened war on the east, and the war between Spain and France, so closely related to the long war of independence, had continued to disturb the quiet of Europe. Now all appeared to be over: the peace of the Pyrenees was concluded; Münster, for the time being, was made to see reason; Portugal was satisfied; the north was pacified; in England the revolutionary epoch was ended; little was to be feared from the young prince and his party. De Witt and his friends could now enjoy their victory. So it seemed. But much still impelled the Dutch statesmen to vigilance, and not for a moment could the council pensionary give his active mind rest, because new troubles were threatening. Spain and Portugal did not have to be guarded against: the former was crippled permanently, and the latter was scarcely able to protect the scanty remnants of its greatness. The northern affairs, too, were out of the way: Sweden, Denmark, Poland, were exhausted, and the smaller powers, Muscovy and

Brandenburg, counted for little. The emperor, assailed by the Turks, was obliged to turn all his attention to that side. The mighty States-General believed they could without danger neglect the claims of Münster, Cologne, and Neuburg.

Feeling with regard to France and England could not be so secure. The way the young Louis XIV. took full possession of the royal power after Mazarin's death, his marriage to the oldest daughter of the king of Spain, who was nearing the grave, and whose only son was a weak child, warned such a statesman as De Witt of what was to be expected from Henry IV.'s grandson, the heir of the French pretensions to the southern Netherlands. To obtain these provinces would have satisfied one of the great monarch's dearest wishes. Like many of his predecessors and successors he regarded the possession of the Walloon portion at least of the Netherlands as indispensable to the safety of his own northern frontiers. Louis's attempts to make himself master of the principality of Orange could not be disagreeable to the party now ruling in the republic. The occupation of the city and castle by French troops in March, 1660, with the secret and well-paid coöperation of the governor Dohna, was viewed by the States with apparent indifference.

The ambassadors sent to France under the lead of Van Beuningen to prepare a close alliance between England, France, and the republic soon saw that this was impossible but that a separate alliance with France might be obtained. After Mazarin's death an offensive and defensive league with France was concluded April 27, 1662, for twenty-five years with promise of a mutual guarantee of treaties made, of possessions and rights in Europe, with reciprocal commercial advantages, and with limitation of the number of troops each should furnish for the other's aid to 12,000 men on the French side and 6000 men on the Dutch side. The replacement

of de Thou, Sommelsdijk's friend, as French ambassador at The Hague by d'Estrades was sure to strengthen the alliance. The new ambassador, who had first brought about in England the cession of Dunkirk to France, seemed the proper person to renew the old friendly relations with the republic. The mission of d'Estrades, who reached The Hague at the end of 1662, was further to tranquillise the States-General with regard to the French plans about the southern Netherlands, of which he, the French government's former emissary to Frederick Henry and William II., was fully informed. Those plans were far from innocent. The French queen at her marriage had renounced her rights to the Spanish throne, but the renunciation had been closely connected with Spain's promise to pay a considerable dowry. The renunciation, as stipulated in the treaty of the Pyrenees, was not to be valid, if the dowry were not paid.¹ Now exhausted Spain was not in a condition to pay this dowry, or at least it failed to do so, and France had thus a good excuse for declaring the renunciation null, which it would have done in any case, as it had never seriously intended to keep the young queen's promise. Before the treaty with the States Louis XIV. had repeatedly sought to obtain from Spain the voluntary cession of a part of the Netherlands under promise of support against England and Portugal.² But Spain perceived that with the loss of the Netherlands its influence in central Europe would entirely disappear, and it refused just as it had declined to pronounce the renunciation of the French queen void. So Louis XIV. did not hesitate to ally himself with the republic in order with its help to attain his purpose.

The French king comprehended the necessity for caution and for respecting the fear of the proximity of

¹ Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, p. 193.

² Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, i., p. 49.

France felt by the States' party as far back as the days of the partition treaty. De Witt, the pupil of Adriaan Pauw, shared this fear and believed that the annexation of the southern Netherlands to France "would be a very dangerous and frightful matter for this state." He considered what was to be done for the States. Two plans came to the front: the raising of the southern provinces "to a free and independent republic, allied with this state as a Catholic canton" and supported by an alliance with France; or a partition of the southern Netherlands. If France would not consent to the "cantonment" or the partition, the provinces might be put in the hands of the less formidable German emperor, soon married also to an infanta, or with the help of Spain, England, and the emperor they might be defended against France and finally be converted into a separate state. He regarded the "cantonment" as the most desirable solution. Should Spain be unwilling, now its king was still living, to set up the new republic, then the attempt must be made to obtain it through a secret agreement with France for the contingency of the Spanish throne becoming vacant or to compel France to accept it at that event with the help of the allies by force of arms. De Witt thought best to present some of these plans to the French ambassador.

De Witt opened negotiations by an unexpected visit to d'Estrades, on March 30th, and informed him that he had received two secret emissaries from six prominent cities of the southern Netherlands offering to drive out the Spaniards and to establish a republic after the model of the Swiss cantons. The ambassador let fall some hints of his sovereign's secret plans, though he was soon directed to keep them concealed as much as possible, lest Spain and the republic from fear of France might agree to a closer connection between the seventeen provinces. It was known in Paris that Spain had long had such a

connection in view and that the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Don Estevan de Gamarra, was making every effort to come to a good understanding with the States.¹ Spain saw that, if it were not to lose all chance of ever regaining its old place in Europe, the southern Netherlands must be secured even with the assistance of the mercantile government at The Hague. But De Witt went further and proposed on April 12th to d'Estrades the formal annexation of several fortresses with what was left of Artois to France and of Bruges, Ostend, and the northwest coast as far as Sluis to the republic, while the rest of the southern Netherlands was to be "cantonised." The Paris government saw in this proposal a manœuvre to learn the French plans and maintained a cool attitude, though d'Estrades praised De Witt's sincerity and advised against an immediate rejection of the Dutch propositions. De Witt did not give up notwithstanding this first opening proceeded no farther. In May he made a formal proposal to d'Estrades for the establishment of a Catholic republic in the south or, should this appear impracticable, for the complete division of the southern Netherlands between the States and France. When the French government declared itself ready to negotiate on these bases, he began to discuss matters with the influential De Graeff and other statesmen, meeting privately at De Graeff's castle of Ilpendam. The partition plan was here objected to, especially by Amsterdam, which feared to see the competition of Antwerp spring up again and brought up the old motto: *amicus Gallus, non vicinus*. De Witt on account of this opposition went back to the more limited plan of April 12th, which might be carried out during the life of Philip IV. or at his death, or at the speedily expected demise of his weak successor. But Louis XIV. would not consent to any

¹ Legrelle, i., p. 77; Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne*, I., p. 183.

such plan for robbing his father-in-law and brother-in-law during their life and declared he would not settle the affair until their death.

D'Estrades in these discussions incautiously mentioned the law of succession or devolution, of which the French government had already secretly determined to avail itself, if it should seem necessary to prove the queen's rights to the southern Netherlands. The so-called devolution law, in the provinces of Brabant, Mechlin, and Namur a fundamental principle of the law of inheritance, decreed that only children of the first marriage had a right to the father's estate with complete exclusion of the children by the second marriage. Louis XIV. believed he might appeal to this law on behalf of his wife, who was the daughter of Philip IV.'s first marriage, even against the young successor to the Spanish throne, who was the offspring of his father's second marriage. It remained to be seen whether this law of private inheritance in some provinces was applicable also to the succession of the sovereign of all the provinces. The rights of the queen, based upon the non-payment of the dowry and upon the law of devolution, were now named, and De Witt and Spain might consider themselves warned. De Witt denied very strongly the validity of the devolution law, although he did not cease to negotiate over the partial annexation. If France were ever to obtain the southern Netherlands, it must owe them not merely to its own rights but to an agreement with the States.

Thus "the great affair" remained on the tapis, and De Witt did his best to convince the States of the necessity of an early agreement with France. But the French government, resting its claims to the entire inheritance of the Spanish king on the non-payment of the dowry and the devolution law unreservedly brought forward, was no longer inclined to enter into such an agreement as might conflict with these asserted rights. "His Majesty's real

purpose is to remain free," wrote Lionne, the clever leader of the French policy from the school of Mazarin, in April, 1664, to d'Estrades, though he too was ready, if necessary, to respect the republic's dread of French proximity that it might not unite with Spain or the emperor. This necessity would be felt less urgently, if the republic were threatened from another side, and this was already the case. Furthermore, what could be opposed in war to the immense power of France? De Witt knew only too well that Spain was nothing more than "a broken reed" and the German empire "a skeleton, the parts of which are held together not by sinews but by iron wires without natural movement." What was to be expected from such allies? An immediate agreement with France was the only thing left, but France itself would not hear to this now that the republic was getting into serious difficulties and finally into a new war with England, its only other possible ally. Thus the affair of the southern Netherlands remained unsettled, and the sword of Damocles was suspended over the threads of Dutch policy to fall whenever France should see a favourable opportunity—an extremely dangerous state of things, whose threatening development De Witt watched with anxiety.

Relations with England after the restoration of the Stuarts were not so good as the statesmen at The Hague had at first imagined. The honours, with which it was hoped to make Charles II. forget the humiliations of his exile, the complimentary speeches greeting him, the friendly conversations with De Witt and other statesmen, accomplished really but little. Never was a royal personage received in the republic with such distinction as Charles II. at that time. The States-General and the Estates of Holland vied with one another in courtesies. In a brilliant procession the English retinue was con-

ducted from Delft to The Hague on May 25, 1660.¹ The king was lodged in the palace of Maurice of Nassau, where the States, the governmental boards, and the republic's chief statesmen were received in audience by him. The feasts in his honour during a week surpassed anything ever before seen in the country. On June 2d the monarch departed from Scheveningen for England, after he had made on the preceding day a visit of ceremony to the States-General and the Estates of Holland to thank them for the attentions and presents bestowed upon him and his. He had used the opportunity to recommend warmly to the States the "interests" of his nephew, the young prince, and of his sister, the widowed princess,² and De Witt had answered with words of gratitude to the young prince's ancestors, whose merits were still so fresh in the memory. In his private conferences with De Witt the king had also spoken about his nephew, but De Witt would make no positive promise, though he seems to have expressed himself to the effect that the young prince must undoubtedly at some time obtain the dignities of his forefathers. Amid the roar of the cannon of the English fleet and the shouts of the multitude assembled on the dunes the king took his departure, accompanied to the last moment by deputies from the States and by the most eminent men of the country. All these compliments and honours, however, could not remove the political and commercial opposition between England and the republic, however great pains were taken on the Dutch side to maintain a good understanding with England, a question of life or death for Dutch commerce. Many people already

¹ Wicquefort, *Verhael in forme van Journael van de reys ende 't vertoeven van den seer doorluchtige ende machtige Prins Carel de II., Koning*, etc. (Den Haag, 1660). See Japikse, *De verwickelingen tusschen de Republiek en Engeland van 1660 tot 1665* (Leiden, 1900), p. 4 *et seq.*

² Aitzema, iv., p. 601.

doubted the possibility of this. Stellingma of Enkhuizen is reported to have said at the reception that the hundreds of thousands expended would better have been spent for powder, lead, and ships.

An extraordinary embassy to England headed by Beverweert, the prince's cousin, was to endeavour to bring about the good understanding. Before the embassy was formed, Beverweert started immediately after the king's departure to promote a friendly feeling at the English court. But the renewal of Cromwell's Navigation Act and the revival of the old complaints of the English and Dutch merchants showed that enough points of difference still existed after all the compliments exchanged to cause fear for the future. The failure of the king's efforts to borrow money in the Netherlands displeased further the English court. Complaints from both sides began to grow sharper, although the official tone remained in general cordial. Difficulties attended the drawing up of the embassy's instructions, because it was feared the desired alliance with France might be endangered by too close a connection with England, and an alliance with both powers seemed also not easy. The provinces finally agreed that it would be best to strive for a triple alliance with both the powers, as Holland had wished, while from England should be obtained restoration of the advantageous *Magnus Intercursus* of 1497 as a basis of commercial relations. The Navigation Act and other restrictive laws would then disappear. The work must be crowned by a defensive alliance like that hoped for with France. With all these discussions it was November, 1660, before Beverweert in England was joined by the other ambassadors: Van Hoorn of Holland, Van Gogh of Zealand, Ripperda of Groningen.

During nearly two years they negotiated in England and had ample opportunity to see the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interests of England and the

republic. Neither Beverweert's pliability, nor Van Hoorn's knowledge of commerce, nor De Witt's incomparable art of discovering expedients could remove the serious difficulties in the way of an alliance. The old differences were constantly coming up again: the English *Dominium Maris* with regard to fishery and commerce, England's unwillingness to recognise the principle of the "free sea," troubles in the Indies, the relations between the English and Dutch companies, commercial grievances in Africa and America had to be considered at length. After Charles II's marriage to the Portuguese princess, Catherine of Braganza, the strained attitude of the republic towards Portugal became of consequence. And soon the difficulties were to be increased by the appointment of Downing, the champion of Cromwell's commercial policy so hostile to the republic, as mediator for Portuguese affairs at The Hague (June, 1661). The faithless, brutal, varicious diplomatist, who cleared his way with the new ruler just in time, was little suited to prepare for friendly relations, although on his arrival he poured out over the States such fine words as "particular confidence," "very singular affection," "very hearty thanks," "very good and clear understanding," and "interest of religion and neighbourhood." His presence impeded negotiations with Portugal, as he sought to promote English commerce at the expense of Dutch interests and exercised pressure upon Portugal, so that all De Witt's talent was necessary to conclude the Portuguese affair in a manner not too injurious for the States.

During the negotiations with England the question of the prince of Orange soon came into the foreground. Adroit management of the Orange party might have accomplished much for the prince. But this was still lacking, and dissension between the two princesses prevented use of the favourable circumstances. The Act of Exclusion was of course repealed immediately, and in

June Nimwegen resolved to designate the prince for the office of captain- and admiral-general and to urge the States-General to take charge of his education. Amsterdam in the summer received the prince and his mother in the most festive fashion. Through the secretary of the prince's council, Buysero, and with the help of De Graeff van Zuid-Polsbroek, De Witt influenced the princess royal and persuaded her to drop the affair of the designation and to ask the Estates of Holland to undertake her son's education with a view to the dignities later to be given him. Holland showed itself willing, but in August the designation of the prince for the military posts was taken up by Zealand, whose Estates resolved to name him also for stadtholder and to induce Holland to do likewise. Gelderland, Friesland, and Groningen, perhaps also Utrecht and Overijssel, would be disposed to join Zealand, and then Holland would find it hard to persist in its opposition. But De Witt anticipated his adversaries and procured from Holland in September the resolution to take up the prince's education in order to prepare him "as an instrument of great hope for the service of the high commissions and employments" of his forefathers. The princess gave up Zeeland's plan, expressed her thanks to Holland, and named Zuid-Polsbroek and De Witt himself among the gentlemen to look after the education. Princess Amalia, on the contrary, proposed a purely Orange commission. After great disputes the princess royal obtained her way. Then she departed for England to concert further measures with her brother for securing the designation, now that Holland had taken the first step towards it.

The commission of education set to work at once, although it encountered opposition from Princess Amalia and the elector of Brandenburg. De Witt and his friends, instead of letting the prince study longer in Leyden so devoted to the Orange party, wished to have

him live at The Hague "in the house and under the eyes" of the States and to appoint one of their partisans as his tutor in place of his bastard uncle, Zuylesteyn. Thus William II.'s son was to be brought up in the ideas of the States. The princess offered objections. The matter remained undecided, when the sudden death of the princess in England from the smallpox changed the whole state of the question in January, 1661. In accordance with her desire Charles II. took her place as guardian, and the spring of 1661 saw a drawing together of the three authorised guardians, who desired a change in the commission and its enlargement with Orange members under the supervision of Princess Amalia. At the same time a new movement for the designation began in the republic. The States showed unwillingness to take any further trouble about the prince and revoked the resolutions concerning his education. Zuylesteyn and the preacher, Trigland, continued to have charge of the education, and the youthful object of all these intrigues pursued his studies quietly in the shadow of academic learning at Leyden.

English efforts to secure the prince's designation in one way or another persisted. Even the support of France and Brandenburg was sought for them, but the former saw more advantage in an alliance with the party now ruling, and the latter was too desirous of the friendship of the States to help. The relations between Charles II. and Princess Amalia grew more strained, and the princess soon showed herself as ready as her daughter-in-law had previously been to agree with Holland regarding the treatment of the young prince. In March, 1663, she requested Holland again to undertake her grandson's education, and Charles II. joined in this request, being prepared then to retire from the guardianship. But Holland refused once more. The dissensions between the guardians made it plain to the leading statesmen that

Charles II. after the death of his beloved sister would be much less disposed to take to heart the young prince's cause.

How strongly Holland felt in opposition to the Orange party is apparent from the affair of the "public prayer," the prayer for the magistrates, among whom the prince of Orange was still named in some provinces.¹ In 1657 a commission was appointed to investigate the subject. Its findings were reported in December, 1662, and after a long discussion it was resolved in the following March to settle the matter so that the preachers thenceforth should pray first for the Estates of the province, "as being the indisputable sovereign," then for the Estates of the other provinces, "their allies," further for all their representatives in the general assembly of the States and in the council of state, in The Hague only for the commissions, courts, and chamber of accounts, and finally everywhere for the municipal government. This resolution produced much excitement. De Witt and the preacher Lydius of Dordrecht drew up a historical-political deduction concerning the affair. General uneasiness was felt at the asserted attack upon the sovereign rights of the States-General, but Holland compelled its preachers to adhere to the new rule. De Witt's deduction and the larger work of his cousin of the same name, John de Witt, on the subject take a prominent place among the pamphlets of these years.

Although the interest of the prince dropped out of the differences with England, the others assumed a more acute character, and as early as 1661 there was fear of a rupture of the negotiations for the treaty of friendship desired by the Dutch. Indignation was aroused by the fitting out of ships in England under Admiral Holmes to take possession of the African coast at the Gambia and Cape Verde, where the West India Company had settle-

¹ See over the whole question : Veegens in *Hist. Studiën*, ii., p. 68.

ments, for the Royal Company of Adventurers, of which the king's brother, the duke of York, was the head. Holmes's rough way of accomplishing his task did not improve the feeling. A long list of English claims was offered the Dutch ambassadors in London, calling for an indemnity of eight million guilders from Netherlanders, especially from the East and West India Companies. The States did their best to keep the peace thus menaced. They even allowed the capture of three regicides of Cromwell's time, who had taken refuge in Holland, an act of weakness shocking Dutch ideas of liberty and feeding popular discontent with De Witt. In September, 1662, the treaty of friendship was signed, and the ambassadors and Downing returned to their respective countries. Questions regarding the seizure of vessels, etc., were to be submitted to a court of arbitration, but there was no commercial advantage for Netherlanders in England and no final settlement of the old points of dispute now raked up again.

This conclusion of the long negotiations was critical, because it had appeared that a strong party in England, including the duke of York, the heir to the throne, desired nothing more ardently than a new war with the republic in order permanently to cripple its commerce and sea power. The peace party, led by the duke's father-in-law, Lord Clarendon, still had the upper hand, but Clarendon's powerful influence was decreasing, particularly after the sale of Dunkirk to France, like the loss of Calais felt as a blow by the English people. New complaints and difficulties soon arose when Downing, who secretly belonged to the war party and considered the condition of the republic as extremely favourable for a war with England, had returned to The Hague (September, 1663). Differences about old privateering affairs, about the violation of English commercial regulations, about the lack of promptness in striking the flag,

etc., were to be found, and satisfaction was always demanded in an arrogant tone by the man who was well known as "the most quarrelsome of the diplomatists of his time." The dread of France's growing might, personally shared by Clarendon, led at first to sympathy between the two maritime nations. Downing and De Witt seemed for a time to work in perfect harmony. England and the republic stepped together into the breach for the oppressed Waldenses in Savoy. But the constant bringing up of old questions by Downing showed that England attached more importance to jealousy of the republic than to the interest of general European policy. New disputes between the Royal African Company and the West India Company added fuel to the fire. The English government complained further of the sojourn of English exiles in the Netherlands, of the lack of a Dutch envoy in London with the rank of ambassador, of insults to the duke of York in the press, of the slow progress of negotiations, of the want of coöperation with England. The feeling of the English government and people continually grew more unfavourable, and in the autumn of 1664 a war seemed to many only a question of time. England's internal condition and the government's need of money opposed an explosion, but the tone among the people and in Parliament, the complaints of the oppressions of the Dutch, became ever more vehement. In April Parliament demanded immediate redress of the dishonours, indignities, and grievances suffered, and offered the government the lives and fortunes of the people.

The presence at The Hague of such an ambassador as Downing was a great danger. Charles II. and Clarendon, however, were not the men to calm the warlike sentiment in England, for they deemed it a means of turning attention from unpleasant domestic conditions. Downing confirmed them in the opinion that the States on

account of commerce, internal disturbances, and the heavy burden of debt were afraid of a war and would consent to anything to avoid it. This opinion was not entirely unfounded, but there were bounds to the patience of the States, and England was fast approaching those bounds. This appeared from the resolution of the States-General in the spring of 1664 to keep De Ruyter at home instead of sending him to the Mediterranean to combat privateering, a resolution that was not carried out owing to more favourable news from England. De Witt hoped to remove the differences and considered with Downing a speedy investigation of England's pretensions. Reports of English preparations continued, and in May, 1664, the Dutch at last resolved to fit out thirty ships, ostensibly against the Spanish pirates, and to make ready for a large loan. Rumours of war were rife; uneasiness in commercial circles was shown by fluctuations in the shares of the East India Company, and they fell from 500 to 440 per cent. Some of the English claims were found to have not the slightest foundation, others were to be satisfied as quickly as possible. Van Gogh, a weak and inefficient man, was appointed ambassador to London. The equipment of the fleet went on in order to be prepared for any emergency. Intelligence came that England was enlisting sailors, building ships, and displaying great activity, so that it was feared she would assail the unsuspecting merchantmen returning from India without first declaring war.

Then arrived indisputable proof that Holmes in February had attacked the possessions of the West India Company on the coast of Guinea and had taken the island of Goree and some ships. It appeared that the Royal African Company was busily engaged in executing its plans in Africa with the support of its numerous stockholders among the royal family and the high aristocracy, who hoped to improve the company's bad

condition by a war with the republic. The complaints of the States-General were answered by the English government with counter complaints respecting the usurpations of the West India Company in Africa and its efforts to destroy English commerce there. It was plain that England wished to do a larger business, and that the republic was expected to furnish the means. The Navigation Act had not been sufficient to raise England's commerce to the desired height. The long wished and now expected humiliation of the hated republic was to accomplish this. But the States would not submit to such treatment and resolved to support their company vigorously with twelve war ships to be newly equipped. As these vessels could not be ready to sail for some time, the speedy dispatch of De Ruyter to Africa was prepared in deep secrecy. In the States-General on the 11th of August De Witt cleverly tacked this resolution to the equipment of the twelve ships, so that nobody but the initiated paid attention to it. Even the president of the week, who signed the resolution, did not notice it, and Downing's temporary absence in England helped to keep the affair secret.

The possibility of such secrecy may be attributed to an important change in the method of government made by De Witt after the example of what had occurred now and then under Frederick Henry, to the introduction of the "Secret Works." These committees, originally established to make reports and to prepare resolutions, were clothed from June, 1663, with full power in certain matters. Thus they were a delegation of the authority of the States-General, and through them it became possible to carry out important resolutions with great rapidity and in deep secrecy. The council pensionary repeatedly made use of them. They consisted of one member for each province except Holland, which had two, one being usually the council pensionary himself. Soon they secured the right to act in special affairs as if they were

the States-General themselves. The council pensionary's influence was uncommonly great in these committees owing to his experience. Thus he became more and more the minister of the States-General and guided them according to his views. De Witt in this way satisfied the necessity for a central power in the state.

Meanwhile negotiations were continued at London. While the African question was considered, while the Dutch demands were formulated in a long list, containing seventy-three points to thirty-three on the English list, while Van Gogh in London and Downing at The Hague offered draughts and held conferences with representatives of the companies and the respective governments, minds on both sides grew more heated, and the States and the English government went on clandestinely with their preparations. A new proposal to submit the differences to arbitrators was made by the States and coolly received by England. The justifiable quarantine in England of Dutch vessels on account of the plague raging in Amsterdam and elsewhere excited anger in the republic at the obstructions to commerce, and complaint was made of these "unneighbourly and unusual proceedings." The determination to have the twelve ships for Guinea escorted through the Channel by the fleet under Wasenaer-Obdam showed that the States had no intention of playing a passive part, however much England warned that contingencies might arise similar to those in 1652 leading to war. News came in October that Holmes had also taken the important Cabo Corso and had threatened St. George d'Elmina, then that another fleet had crossed from England to America and on September 6th had seized all New Netherland and incorporated it with the English possessions. The West India Company uttered a passionate cry of distress at the loss of nearly all its territory for the West Indian islands also were seriously menaced.

The conquest of New Netherland had cost little trouble. The director-general Stuyvesant in spite of all the English claims had hitherto preserved his province undiminished and maintained order in the colony with a strong hand, but it was certain that the weak garrison must yield to a vigorous attack. And such an attack was to be expected. Charles II. had never officially recognised the colony's existence, and Downing had even said that he could not find anything of that name upon the map. On March 22, 1663, the king gave to his brother, the duke of York, an extensive English territory in America as a present. The country on the Hudson River with Manhattan, *i. e.*, all New Netherland, was mentioned, and in May Colonel Nicolls departed with three war ships lent by the king to his brother and 500 men to take possession in the interest of English commerce. The colonel first settled affairs in Connecticut and appeared before New Amsterdam at the end of August. The undismayed Stuyvesant wanted to resist to the utmost with his weak force, but the colonists refused to engage in the unequal struggle and without opposition surrendered town and province to the enemy.¹

The States-General protested against all this but not with much energy, awaiting the result of De Ruyter's expedition still kept secret. In the late autumn something leaked out slowly of De Ruyter's mission. De Witt answered Downing's question about it evasively, but could not remove suspicion. When it became known that De Ruyter had been on the coast of Morocco, people in England realised they had been hoodwinked and manifested great indignation. Soon a fleet appeared in the Channel under York, afterwards a second one under Prince Rupert of the Palatinate designed to combat the proposed Dutch expedition to Guinea. With this

¹ Fiske, *The Dutch and Quaker Colonies*, i., p. 284.

attitude of England the Dutch set about making their fleet ready. They still hoped for peace, however. Perhaps it might be secured by the intervention of France. But Louis XIV. showed slight inclination to intervene, because his own plans could never suffer in a war between the two maritime powers. Despite the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, he sought to remain neutral in order to take advantage of any opportunity that might be offered in the southern Netherlands.

De Ruyter succeeded without much difficulty in reconquering the West India Company's African possessions. The English government replied to the first reports of this success by laying an embargo upon all vessels, especially the Dutch ones, in English ports in order to provide sailors for its fleet. Downing began now to ask indemnification for England's expenses in making preparations. The attitude of France caused Charles II. some uneasiness, until he was certain that this country would not go to war with England for the sake of the republic. English war ships commenced to bring in Dutch merchantmen. The States on their side now seized English vessels in Dutch ports, though but few of them remained after a warning from Downing. The Dutch fleet, being dismantled for the winter, could not capture English merchantmen. The war party in England was unquestionably supreme, and Parliament readily granted all the money asked, even to the unprecedented sum of two and one-half million pounds. The London Exchange exulted, the people railed at the Dutch, Parliament was praised for its "brave vote" against the "insulting and injurious neighbours" who committed the crime of surpassing England's commerce.

A slight chance for peace lay in England's hesitation on account of the attitude of France. Memorials by Downing and deductions by the States, designed to prove their authors in the right, were addressed to foreign

powers, particularly to France. The tendency was to war, and every day an explosion was expected. In January finally the English captain, Allen, attacked the fleet returning from Smyrna in the latitude of Cadiz, but the brave resistance of the commander, Van Brakel, at the head of the convoy, saved nearly all the vessels. This was the signal for giving out letters of marque in the Netherlands, while the naval vessels gathered in the harbours. England now also issued the letters of marque long lying ready. France made one more feeble attempt to mediate by proposing that England should receive Van Beuningen in London with new conditions from the States, but Charles II. answered evasively. The States looked forward to a war with quite different feelings from those of a few years earlier. Courage began to rise as danger approached, and confidence in themselves augmented, now the fleet was collected and the sailors were streaming to it. There was not a trace of the discord, upon which Downing had calculated. Relying with common accord on the fleet, thoroughly prepared by De Witt's care and commanded by excellent officers, men were determined to resist the hated enemy. England's declaration of war on March 4, 1665, put an end to all hesitation, and the States boldly took up the gauntlet.

While war disturbed anew the tranquillity of the republic, the fire of dissension began once more on its eastern side. The bishop of Münster had a grievance in the rejection of his claims to the lordship of Borculoo.¹ In 1406 this lordship was granted in fief to Münster by the house of Bronkhorst. After the death of the last Bronkhorst's widow in 1579 Münster took possession of the territory, but the Limburg-Styrum family, related by marriage to the extinct Bronkhorsts, pretended to the lordship. The court of Gelderland in 1615 decided in

¹ Der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster, 1650-1666*, p. 1.

favour of this pretension, and in the following year the States recognised the count of Limburg-Styrum as the owner of the lordship. Bishop Christopher Bernard von Galen vigorously urged the claims of Münster, but neither his representations, nor the support of France and the emperor could move the States to accede to his demands, so that he was greatly angered. There were the old difficulties between the bishop and his capital. The attitude of the States in 1658 had saved the city from complete domination by its lord, but von Galen did not give up, so that Münster repeatedly asked a garrison from the States, as Emden was protected in that way against its count. Friesland and the eastern provinces sometimes took much trouble to comply with the city's wishes, but Holland feared complications with the empire and let the favourable moment pass for raising on this side a strong bulwark, though earnestly importuned by the resident Aitzema, who was intrusted with the care of the city's interests. The States confined themselves to a weak mediation, and the respectable delegation sent to Münster in the summer of 1660 to effect an agreement met with little success. Before the sending of the deputies the bishop with an army of 14,000 men had laid siege to the city, and he encompassed it more closely and prevented all attempts at relief, so that in despair of help from the States it finally surrendered in March, 1661, vexed at their unwillingness. The half-hearted action of the States also excited the ire of the bishop, and he was ready to cool it at the first opportunity. Further dissensions with the States arose concerning the transportation of letters between Amsterdam and Hamburg, which took place partly across the bishop's territory and was there dependent upon the privilege of the count of Thurn and Taxis for the general imperial postal service dating from Maximilian's time. Another serious matter was that of the debt due, on account of an inheritance, from the

prince¹ of East Friesland to the count of Liechtenstein, which claim amounting to 300,000 rix-dollars was transferred in 1663 by the imperial council of Vienna to the bishop of Münster. The bishop offered the prince of East Friesland, now George Christian, to assume the debt in return for the cession of Reiderland, which territory was mortgaged to the States-General. The prince refused this offer, but saw no chance to pay the Liechtenstein debt unless the States-General helped him by a new loan. They were not unwilling, but demanded a mortgage on all the princely lands, Harlingerland in particular, besides the right to occupy Dyterschans and Jemmingen, conditions not acceptable to the prince. Von Galen prepared to collect the debt by force and had his troops take Dyterschans (December, 1663). This act of hostility aroused the States as well as East Friesland. The prince hastily consented to cede the fortress to the States which loaned him on it 135,000 rix-dollars for the payment of the debt and gave orders to the Frisian stadtholder to assemble a small army to defend Dutch interests. A deputation under Van Beverningh was to attempt the settlement of affairs in East Friesland. But the bishop apparently wanted Dyterschans more than the money. The emperor coöperated with him and had his ambassador Friquet at The Hague admonish the States not to interfere in these imperial matters.

The equipment of the Dutch troops consumed much time, but in May, 1664, a corps of 5500 men was gathered near Deventer. Prince William Frederick moved on Dyterschans, which was defended by only 300 Münster troops, and after a few days of siege it surrendered on June 4th under protest from the bishop. The Liechtenstein debt, the cause of the trouble, was not fully settled until after the death of the East Frisian prince

¹ Count Enno Louis had in 1654 changed the title of count for that of prince.

who expired in 1665 and left a son under age. It was no wonder that the bishop watched anxiously the course of the complications with England, and that the latter was disposed to take advantage of his feelings. He hoped furthermore for help from Brandenburg, Cologne, and Neuburg, which all had grievances against the States. France, however, served the republic by restraining these princes and by influencing von Galen to leave the States in peace. The bishop saw in the English war just beginning a fine opportunity to attain his purpose, sent representatives to London, and concluded on June 13, 1665, with England a secret treaty, by which he was to receive until August 500,000 rix-dollars and later 50,000 rix-dollars a month in return for the promise to attack the Netherlands from the side of the land with 10,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry.

In all these doings the warlike bishop was inspired by an exile from Groningen, Johan Schulenborgh. During the peace negotiations with Portugal his conduct as deputy to the States-General had been as equivocal as formerly in the disturbances at Groningen. As president of that body he had approved the treaty of peace, at De Witt's instigation and being bribed, as was asserted, by Portuguese gold, to the great exasperation of his province. He was removed from all his political offices and condemned to refund 4000 guilders on account of frauds imputed to him but not fully proved. The energetic Schulenborgh endeavoured in conjunction with Rengers to regain his influence by means of the guilds of the city of Groningen, with whose leaders, the architects Warendorp and Van Emmen, the advocate Harkens, and the alderman of the tailors, a certain Udinck, he had been connected in previous commotions. A movement of the guilds at Groningen resulted from his secret intrigues in the summer of 1662. The municipal government saw itself compelled to abolish some unpopular taxes and to

withdraw the sentences against Schulenborgh. Then the guilds sought more influence through a reform in the election of the council, which was granted. It was a turbulent summer in Groningen, but the victors soon disagreed, and Schulenborgh was suspected by his colleagues. The council took advantage of this. At a favourable moment it summoned the garrison to arms, met with support from the militia, and was presently strong enough to arrest Schulenborgh. At the council's request the stadtholder William Frederick appeared in November with a large force of troops in the city and garrisoned it. The council had now won its cause, and next year, on March 14, 1663, the guilds of Groningen were regulated and made entirely subject to the city government, the aristocracy of magistrates becoming the master. New rules were drawn up by the stadtholder to distribute the government fairly between City and Land, but the end was far from being attained. The leaders of the unsuccessful revolt were severely punished. Warendorp was put to death, and Schulenborgh only escaped the same fate by fleeing to Münster, where he entered the bishop's service as counsellor for the affairs of East Friesland. The deserter hoped at the head of Münster troops to be restored to honour and to be revenged upon his enemies.

The new rules of government and the suppression of the agitation of the guilds were principally due to the intervention of William Frederick. In Friesland too, where complaints waxed loud of the hunting after office and of bribery, he did much to improve matters. New regulations brought some reform temporarily in the shameful abuses of the local oligarchs at elections. The oligarchy was not broken, but more tolerable conditions were created. The Frisian prince did not long enjoy all this. An accident while repairing a pistol, that went off unexpectedly and sent a bullet through his jaw, deprived

him of life on October 31, 1664, and his young son, Henry Casimir II., succeeded to the stadtholderships with his mother as guardian. Another misfortune threatened the sorely tried house of Nassau, when, after the burial of the Frisian stadtholder, Prince John Maurice, riding over a bridge in Franeker, fell into the water and was only rescued with difficulty. The Orange and Nassau houses seemed never to have been further from dominion in the Dutch provinces than in these years, when two weak children and an old bachelor were the sole masculine representatives of the two princely families which had now for a century lived through the joy and moan of the young Netherlandish state. Of these three John Maurice had partly turned away from the republic by becoming stadtholder at Cleves for the elector of Brandenburg, although he might still be considered as the probable head of the Dutch army in case of war.

How sadly situated Prince William III. was, appears from the proceedings of the Estates of Zeeland, known as partisans of Orange, with regard to the government of Flushing and Veere, where they thwarted the princess-dowager in her rights as guardian of her grandson. All the prudence of the able but imperious lady was necessary, with the help of her daughter Albertina Agnes as guardian in Friesland of her other grandson, to preserve intact the family's possessions for better times. She succeeded actually, though it sometimes seemed as if the young prince of Orange would be quite ruined before he became of age. His principality was in the hands of France, and when after four years of negotiations Louis XIV. in the autumn of 1664 consented to give back the unjustly seized property, when Constantijn Huygens in the ensuing spring received at Orange the homage of the population for their young prince and the French garrison departed, no one had any illusions concerning the real independence of the little state surrounded by

French territory. And in the Netherlands the slight hope of the Orange partisans was fixed upon the future, when perhaps the heir of the Oranges, of age and sustained by the sympathy of the people, would attempt for himself and his family to obtain his elevation from the now supreme party of the States, which sat firmer than ever in the saddle and under the lead of the energetic council pensionary would certainly not be persuaded easily to that elevation. The old "Orange above" sounded to many like mockery, but it still sounded, and the new song testifying to fervent love for the "small prince" promised better days: "stadtholder must he be for all."





CHAPTER XII

SECOND ENGLISH WAR

THE two maritime powers had prepared themselves as well as possible for the impending conflict. The English navy, much neglected immediately after Cromwell's death, was notably improved after the Restoration. Under direction of the king's brother, the duke of York, lord high-admiral of the fleet, great reforms were introduced, and the intelligent administration of such men as Samuel Pepys had a good influence. There was still, however, a lack of money and consequently of all sorts of things. Workmen in the yards and sailors had to complain of poor payment, materials and provisions alike left much to be desired, serious injury resulted from the custom of having the posts of naval officers filled by wholly inexperienced persons or by army officers. At the outbreak of war England had a navy of about 160 ships with 5000 guns and more than 25,000 men under such commanders as Monk, Prince Rupert, Montague, Ayscue, Lawson, and Penn, who were a match for the Dutch admirals.¹

In the Netherlands, since the imperfection of the fleet had so plainly appeared in the first English war, work had been zealously pushed in augmenting the number of the regular naval ships so as no longer to be dependent upon armed merchant vessels or upon the aid of private

¹Tanner, *The administration of the Navy from the Restoration to the Revolution* (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, Jan., 1897, p. 17). See De Jonge, i., p. 616 *et seq.*

companies. With the council pensionary it was above all his brother Cornelius who looked after the navy, and from the latter part of 1664 many new war ships were built, this activity being continued during the war itself by the construction of large vessels, with forty to eighty guns, like those of the English fleet.¹ The admiralties were spurred to renewed exertions not only in building but also for the manning and equipment of the ships. The vigorous management of the council pensionary, with the coöperation of the admirals, Wassenaer-Obdam, De Ruyter, Cornelis Tromp, the Evertsens, and Tjerk Hiddes de Vries, overcame in part the difficulty of making five admiralties work together. At the breaking out of the war the condition of the Dutch navy was very satisfactory, and it could stand comparison with the English both in size and number of vessels and in their crews, the superiority of the Dutch mariners making up for any deficiency. Immediately every effort was made to send out the fleet. The new ships were finished hastily and others were put on the stocks. The East India Company furnished a score of large vessels; many merchantmen were armed; a partial suspension of the fishery, the raising of the pay, and other measures gradually provided an abundance of sailors; privateers were fitted out especially in Zeeland.

Soon came news that the English fleet, of more than 100 ships with 4200 cannon and 22,000 men, was at sea and off the coast. But a severe storm dispersed it. The Dutch squadrons were able to unite, and at the end of May a Dutch fleet of about equal strength under Wassenaer-Obdam as lieutenant admiral-general put to sea after being inspected by the council pensionary and other representatives of the States. On this occasion De Witt showed uncommon knowledge of maritime affairs, in opposition to experienced seamen demonstrat-

¹ De Jonge, i., p. 633.

ing the possibility of sailing out. Great expectations were entertained of this "armada," the most considerable that had ever left Dutch harbours, under command of such men as the lieutenant admirals, Jan Evertsen, Kortenaer, and Stellingwerff. The caution of the chief commander in remaining upon the coast on account of contrary winds excited vexation. Urgent letters from De Witt, who thought of going with the fleet as deputy, and a sharp order from the States constrained him to seek the British coast in order to risk a battle. The English fleet, sailing out again, met the Dutch at the mouth of the Thames. After a few days of drifting Wassenaer, though missing the advantage of the wind, resolved to attack. Off Lowestoft a bloody battle was fought on the 13th of June. This engagement resulted very unfavourably for the Dutch, owing to the bad coöperation of the seven squadrons forming their fleet, to the mutual jealousy of the subordinate commanders and the lack of confidence in their chief, so that each of the captains fought on his own account. In the beginning Kortenaer was killed, and several captains, in contrast to the great bravery of others, manifested slight eagerness for the fray. The English finally broke through the Dutch order of battle, and the confusion now became terrible. The ships of York and Wassenaer engaged one another; York was wounded and his vessel was almost boarded, when suddenly Wassenaer's riddled ship was blown up. This event settled the issue of the combat, and many vessels now took to flight, following the example of Kortenaer's cowardly pilot who sailed away with the admiral's flag at the mast. Some captains still held out, but at last all gave way, being pursued by the English who captured several ships and destroyed others. Stellingwerff and the vice admiral Schram also lost their lives. Jan Evertsen, succeeding to the command, attempted with Tromp and others to restore order, but he too had to give up, and

a disorderly flight ensued. Tromp sailed with some sixty vessels to Texel, Evertsen himself with about ten to the Meuse, others reached the Vlie. It was "a total defeat," neither more nor less. Sixteen ships were lost, nine captured by the enemy, 2000 men killed. There was great disappointment. Jan Evertsen on arriving at Briel was abused by a mob and even thrown into the water; later he was imprisoned at The Hague and brought before a court-martial in Texel, laying down his office, though at last honourably acquitted.

Led by the undaunted council pensionary, who hastened to Texel, the States used all means to repair damages, so that ten days later the rear admiral Banckers could run out to sea again with twenty vessels. The guilty captains were severely punished, three of them shot, others banished and disgraced. Tromp, refusing at first to approve of these punishments, rendered great service in restoring the fleet and was intrusted with the chief command, while the States-General associated with him a board of three deputies to act with three army colonels and two experienced seamen as naval councillors. The deputies were: John de Witt himself, Rutger Huygens, and Johan Boreel. The fleet was on the point of going out, when early in August De Ruyter unexpectedly arrived at Delfzijl from the Antilles and offered his services. De Ruyter, the senior vice admiral, was universally desired for the chief, and Tromp, to his vexation and at the instance of De Witt, was relieved from the command, while his place was taken by De Ruyter, appointed lieutenant admiral to succeed Was-senaer. Tromp was with difficulty induced by De Witt to continue to serve under the new chief in the fleet, with which he had hoped to wipe out the defeat by a brilliant victory and to preserve from the enemy's attack the richly laden merchantmen expected home from India. But events brought new disappointment. Notwithstand-

ing the objections of the most experienced mariners, De Witt succeeded in getting the fleet from Texel to sea through an outlet regarded as impracticable, which has since, as John de Witt's Channel, conserved the memory of his energy. The fleet, again over 100 vessels strong with 20,000 men, sailed out on August 14th to look for the enemy, "in a splendid condition and full of courage." The council pensionary himself was on board to share its perils or glory.

The enemy had attempted in the harbour of Bergen to capture the returning fleet, which had sailed around Scotland to that place, but was repulsed with the help of the Danish forts. His main force still lay off the Dutch coast, but De Ruyter, escorting the returning fleet, did not encounter the English, and a severe storm destroyed several ships and injured the others so that they had to seek port. A second storm at the end of September inflicted further damage. De Witt with De Ruyter, however, managed to repair the fleet every time, and early in October they again sailed out to search for the enemy on the English coast off Yarmouth and the mouth of the Thames. But the enemy remained inside, and new autumnal storms and sickness compelled De Ruyter in the first days of November to return without having accomplished his purpose.¹ The council pensionary now resumed his post which had been occupied during a few months by his cousin Vivien.

The first year of the war on the sea had thus brought nothing but misfortune and disappointment. The war waged on land at the same time with Münster had also not been fortunate. Army and fortifications had been terribly neglected. Since the death of Prince William II. the once excellent Dutch army had become more and more disorganised. No field marshal was appointed after

¹ Most important letters concerning the doings of the fleet are to be found in De Witt's correspondence from the fleet itself (Royal Archives).

Bröderode's death, and thus to please Holland the general army was really dissolved into the seven small armies of the separate provinces. Princes William Frederick and Maurice of Nassau represented the old traditions of the Spanish war. The former had now disappeared from the scene, and the latter withdrew in discontent to Cleves. And the prince of Orange was too young to fill a high military office, even under the guidance of an experienced commander. Good officers were scarce or incapacitated by age, while most of the posts were occupied by young sons of magistrates, who profited by shameful frauds in the muster and payment of the soldiers. The land provinces reduced their war budget as much as possible; Holland, Zealand, and Friesland had enough to do for the fleet to prevent their devoting much attention to the army. The best part of the army was used as marines in the navy. The council of state and the prince of Nassau had year after year warned against this condition of affairs. But their voice had been like that of one crying in the wilderness.

Early in the spring of 1665 rumours were rife of the bishop of Münster's plans for war, and it was feared that the archbishop of Cologne, the duke of Jülich, and even the elector of Brandenburg might join him on account of their grievances against the States. The land provinces, especially Gelderland and Overijssel, became uneasy and called for help. The troops were reënforced by over 11,000 men, munitions of war were collected, and measures were taken to improve the fortresses, a credit of 2,400,000 guilders being opened. The bishop of Münster continued his preparations after the treaty with England, secretly supported by the attitude of the Spanish governor at Brussels, Castel-Rodrigo, who permitted his enlistments in the Spanish Netherlands. In September the States concluded an alliance with Brunswick-Lüneburg, which placed 12,000 men under George Friedrich

von Waldeck at the disposition of the republic. Waldeck was an experienced general and had refused the command of Münster's troops. France promised to do its best to prevent the war and succeeded in breaking the dreaded coöperation of the princes on the lower Rhine, so that Münster finally stood alone.¹ War with Münster was plainly inevitable, and late in July Prince Maurice was appointed chief commander with the Rhinegrave von Solms and the Scotchman Kirkpatrick as generals and with eight deputies of the States, including Cornelius de Witt, "to assist with word and deed." After an unsuccessful treacherous attack upon Arnhem and Doesburg the bishop sent to the States-General at the end of September a declaration of war, while he moved towards the Dutch frontiers with his army under command of the count of Hesse-Homburg. Prince Maurice complaining of the small army left him after garrisoning thirty forts, the States took 9000 new troops into service besides 6000 militia for the frontier fortresses. At the end of the year the army had increased from 20,000 to 70,000 men, and the expenditures upon it amounted to over five and one-half million guilders.

But this was all in preparation when the bishop began his attack. The forts of Twente and a large part of the Achterhoek were occupied by him in September; Salland and Twente purchased a safeguard from him; the Dutch army on the Yssel was not strong enough to drive him away, but prevented his crossing the river. In October the enemy forced his way from Staphorst and Rouveen into Drenthe and farther into the Oldambt, where he plundered and burned and was with difficulty kept by Prince Maurice from attacking Groningen. Fortunately French help now appeared, 6000 troops under General Pradel, governor of Bapaume, sent in accordance with

¹ See Der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster, 1650-1666*, p. 277 *et seq.*

the treaties concluded with France. Pradel's small army arrived at Maestricht on November 10th, twelve days later on the Yssel, pillaging on its way along the Meuse to its heart's content. There were many complaints of the scandalous disorder of these auxiliary bands, to be ascribed in part to their poor provisionment.¹ Though it was already winter, a joint expedition into Münster was decided upon, urged by Maurice but opposed by Pradel, in order to force the bishop to quit the republic's territory. Lochem was taken on December 13th after a brief siege, and the whole army then moved to the Münster frontier, supported on the other side by Waldeck. But Pradel soon refused to go farther, and winter quarters were occupied before the end of the month. Thus ended the first campaign. Little was accomplished during the winter by the small detachments sent out by either side, the most important events being the occupation of Wedde by Dutch troops and the plundering of Vriezenveen and Emmen by Münster.

Meanwhile peace was sought from various sides, and especially since Beverningh with French help in February had persuaded the elector of Brandenburg to a treaty of subsidy and alliance with "the merchants of Holland," Münster began to incline to peace, menaced everywhere and feebly sustained by England's slow payments. Brandenburg was to aid the Dutch with 12,000 men, if von Galen declined to conclude peace. A second campaign was prepared, Prince Maurice again receiving the command, but before any important result was achieved, negotiations were opened through the mediation of Brandenburg at Cleves, Beverningh conducting them for the Dutch. Other Rhenish princes took part, as well as

¹ Der Kinderen, pp. 344, 352. Cf. Aitzema, v., p. 517, where is the report of the deputies concerning the entire campaign. Further, pp. 660, 665. Also, the *Mémoires du prince de Guiche* (London, Changuion, 1764), p. 83; Wicquefort, iii., p. 219.

the emperor's ambassador to The Hague, Friquet, who promoted a good understanding between the States and the princes of the empire, and the French diplomatist Colbert-Croissy, who acted equivocally. These negotiations led to peace on April 18th, by which both parties were to evacuate the territory occupied, and Münster gave up its claims to Borculoo and promised not to increase its army over 3000 men. This result was more favourable to the republic than could have been expected. A last attempt of the English diplomatist Temple to induce von Galen to continue the war failed. An eye had to be kept upon the sail in this quarter for fear of another attack. The bishop had made peace, because he was about to be assailed from all sides, and it was hard for him to swallow his defeat, while the course of the war had shown that the army and fortifications of the States were insufficient of themselves to oppose him, whenever he should again venture upon war.

The death of Philip IV. of Spain in September, 1665, brought new dangers into European politics, because his son, young Charles II., declared by will his sole heir, was so weak that he could not be expected to live long, and then the same will indicated as successor not the French queen, on account of the stipulations of the peace of the Pyrenees, but Philip's second daughter, the empress, and, in her default, the emperor and his children. It was no secret that Louis XIV. did not intend to accept this settlement and reckoned upon the aid of the States. Early in 1666 he declared war on England to satisfy the States, which had long been urging France's engagements by virtue of the treaty concluded. A joint naval expedition was planned with the coöperation of a French squadron under the admiral of France, the duke of Beaufort. The French squadron was not assembled until late in the spring and then made little haste to unite with the Dutch fleet. This latter was

after the trials of the preceding year again in order. De Witt had incited the admiralties to energy, and a more powerful fleet than Obdam's was ready in spring, consisting of seventy-two large men-of-war, twelve fast frigates, and a sufficient number of dispatch boats, galiots, and supply ships, while the East India Company offered 1,200,000 guilders in place of twenty ships. Three lieutenant admirals, De Ruyter for Holland, Cornelis Evertsen for Zealand, Tjerk Hiddes de Vries for Friesland, had charge of the preparations. England's sea power might be curbed by the help of France, whose large fleet¹ was to be escorted north by a Dutch squadron, and with that of Denmark which consented to an alliance after the English attack on Bergen and was willing to fit out forty vessels. But the French fleet remained on the Portuguese coast, and the Danish one did not leave its own shores, so that the Dutch fleet put to sea alone in June.

It was somewhat smaller but, on account of the size of the vessels and the more numerous crews, stronger than that of the year before. De Ruyter, on the new ship *The Seven Provinces*, commanded this fine fleet, "at least a third more considerable in power than it has been in the past," says De Witt himself, while the men, "experienced, brave, and healthy," could stand comparison with any previous force. It numbered sixteen high officers, among whom were Aert van Nes and the other lieutenant admirals, to which rank Cornelis Tromp and Johan Meppel had also risen, the vice admirals De Liefde, Van der Hulst, Banckers, Schram, and Coenders, the rear admirals Jan van Nes, Cornelis Evertsen the younger, Stachouwer, and Bruynsvelt, and the best captains to be found, many of them obtaining great renown then and later. In joyful expectation of victory

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 417, puts the French fleet in 1667 at 110 ships with 3700 guns and 22,000 men.

the fleet sailed out, divided into three squadrons and each of these again into three sections: De Ruyter with Van Nes in the front, Evertsen and De Vries in the middle, Tromp and Meppel in the rear. Off North Foreland on the 11th of June the English fleet under Monk was encountered, also divided into three squadrons but, by reason of the detachment of twenty vessels under Prince Rupert to hold de Beaufort in check, considerably weaker than the Dutch, though provided with heavier ships.

Then began the fierce four days' naval battle, the most murderous of all time. On the very first day there was a bloody fight between the English and the Flemish coast, with great bravery and great losses on both sides. On the second day De Ruyter broke through the hostile line and destroyed several of the enemy's ships, so that Monk at last had only twenty-eight vessels. In a masterly manner he conducted the retreat to the British coast, during which Ayscue, the vice admiral in command of his second squadron, fell with his ship into Tromp's hands. Prince Rupert's return from the Channel reënforced Monk again to about sixty ships, and once more he was able, close by the English coast, to attack the Dutch fleet reduced to about the same strength. This time also the British gave way, but on the fourth day they renewed the savage combat with even greater violence than before, so that the sea looked red with blood and the clouds of smoke from burning vessels obscured the light of day. The Dutch force was in peril for a brief space, but at the decisive moment De Ruyter hoisted the blood-red flag in sign of a general attack, broke the British line in different places, and was soon chasing the enemy's fleet in a wild flight. The entire English fleet would have been annihilated, if a dense fog had not stopped the pursuit. Thus ended this battle in a complete victory, and the Dutch fleet decked with flags

and streamers, though severely damaged, sailed to Wielingen, carrying in triumph six ships and 3000 prisoners with Ayscue and the corpse of his colleague Berkeley—a proof of success that should have silenced all the English assertions and exultations over a British “victory.” The day of thanksgiving in the Netherlands had certainly more reason for its existence than the bonfires in England on Monk’s return, which speedily gave place to general dejection.¹

Under De Witt’s energetic management the damaged ships were quickly repaired, and early in July ninety of them were again ready for sea. De Ruyter was once more in command. But England, whose national pride was hard hit by the defeat, had vigorously exerted itself, and its fleet was also at sea under Monk and Prince Rupert. The fleets met in the same seas on August 4th. Tromp succeeded in putting to flight the English squadron commanded by Smith, but in the eager pursuit he lost sight of the dangerous situation of the two other divisions of the Dutch fleet. The vanguard, consisting of Zealanders and Frisians, was dispersed by the British after the death of Johan Evertsen and De Vries. De Ruyter with the middle division engaged the enemy alone and was nearly overwhelmed by superior force. With his disabled ship and some others he escaped among the banks on the coast of Zeeland, exasperated at Tromp’s conduct, which he attributed not merely to recklessness but to design, and for which boiling with wrath he reproached Tromp on his own ship. The result was a quarrel between the two heroes, Tromp complaining to the States-General. Nothing remained to be done but to dismiss one of the two, and this fate naturally befell Tromp distrusted by the ruling party on account of his Orange partisanship. He was replaced by the colonel of marines Van Ghent. During six years Tromp remained

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 85.

out of the service, bewailing the injustice done him and with his Orange friends considering means for overthrowing the existing government and elevating the prince.

This time the victory of the English was not for a moment in doubt. They ruled the sea and even threatened its inlets. The rear admiral Holmes pushed, on August 19th, within the Vlie to destroy merchantmen lying there, and burned the two convoy ships destined to protect them and more than 140 of the mercantile vessels. A landing on Terschelling next day was a complete success, and a large part of the island was pillaged and laid waste. The destruction of some English merchantmen on the Elbe at Hamburg afforded but slight consolation. Early in September the Dutch fleet, eighty ships of war strong, again put to sea under command of De Ruyter and with Cornelius de Witt as deputy. The British were met in the Channel off Boulogne, but they avoided battle to the disappointment of De Witt. Sickness on the fleet and the indisposition of the commander, burning tow from a match having flown into his throat, decided the States to recall the fleet.

The terrible fire of London, which made a deep impression in England like the plague prevailing there, seemed to the States to give a fitting opportunity to prove that the republic was not thoroughly beaten. As De Ruyter's illness prevented his commanding the fleet, John de Witt in the absence of his faithful friend was designated to lead it with the support of the lieutenant admiral Van Nes. So the council pensionary went with the fleet to the English coast again. Some ridiculed the gowned admiral, but De Witt, hoping this time to unite with the French under de Beaufort, boldly entered the Channel and offered battle to the enemy early in October. Neither a battle, nor a junction with de Beaufort followed; storms and sickness forced the fleet to return, and only a few ships remained at sea to protect com-

merce. In the Netherlands as well as in England the disasters of this year strengthened the peace party. There were heavy losses on both sides, the plague had raged violently in England, discontent was increasing at the court's extravagance in the midst of war. The continuance of the Dutch ambassador Van Gogh in London and that of Downing at The Hague had encouraged at first the lovers of peace. Until the autumn of 1665 Downing was the soul of intrigues in the republic with the help of the Orange party to cast suspicion upon the States. These intrigues were discovered, and he had to leave the country. Van Gogh followed his example towards the end of the year. The reverses of the next year occasioned new efforts of the Orange party which had even wished to send the young prince to England to obtain peace from his uncle. In these new intrigues was mixed up the captain of horse Henri Fleury de Coulant, lord of Buat, son-in-law of the late clerk Musch, one of the many French officers finding here a military career. Buat was a brave but insignificant man, a drunkard, little suited to act as a secret negotiator. A partisan of Orange by conviction, he had proffered his services to De Witt to enter into secret relations with the English statesmen, particularly with the influential minister Arlington.

De Witt was not averse to approaching England. In the spring of 1666 the Dutch negotiator at Cleves, Beverningh, had been in confidential conversation with Temple, the English ambassador there, and France had immediately suspected negotiations without its participation. In preparing the campaign against Münster in 1666 the council pensionary had thought seriously of winning over the active Orange party by making the prince general of the cavalry, provided Turenne himself undertook to lead the campaign. But France protested against any secret negotiation and was disinclined to do

anything for the prince. It desired to support the stadtholderless government and to weaken the two maritime powers by their conflict in order at the right moment to strike for itself in the Spanish Netherlands.¹ De Witt gave up his idea, while Zealand continued to insist upon some military office for the prince. To oppose this urgency De Witt determined to bring the young prince under the supervision of Holland by having him adopted as "child of the state." Some people there were who believed that the state in so doing would become "child of the prince." The princess dowager made the request and with her aid the prince in April was adopted by Holland as "child of the state." His courtiers and tutor Zuylesteyn were replaced by the lord of Gent as tutor and other attendants more to the mind of the States, while a commission, including John de Witt himself, was appointed to instruct the young prince "well and thoroughly" both in the "Reformed religion" and "in the good and salutary rights, privileges, and maxims of the state." Thus it was hoped to thwart the efforts of the Orange party and to direct aright the prince's education. But in the affair itself lay the recognition of the prince's exceptional position and the promise of his later elevation to those dignities which De Witt had long seen could not be permanently withheld from him. The agreement was a compromise that the princess could look back upon with satisfaction, and she might expect the future to bring more. And De Witt, however cleverly the danger of the moment was averted, could not hide from himself that under these finely sounding words the first step was taken on a way that he would gladly have avoided.

In consequence of these events De Witt did not refuse the services of so confirmed a partisan of Orange as Buat. Like the whole Orange party, Buat expected advantage

¹ See Fruin, *Het proces van Buat* (*Nijhoff's Bijdr.*, 3^{de} R., i., p. 4.)

for the prince from peace with England, and, even before France's declaration of war against England, he was, through Silvius, a former servant of the princess royal and one of his friends at the English court, in correspondence with Lord Arlington, who was married to Beverweert's daughter. In this correspondence terms of peace were discussed, and Buat communicated them to Van Beverningh in De Witt's absence and to the council pensionary himself on his return from the fleet in November, 1665. These terms were so "unreasonable," that the council pensionary made but little answer to them, but he allowed Buat to continue the correspondence. Buat kept De Witt informed of unimportant matters, but at the same time he was carrying on a second secret negotiation with Silvius and Arlington in the name of Tromp's friends, the violent partisans of Orange, who desired peace at any price and were reputed to be led by Johan Kievit, Tromp's brother-in-law. Through a mistake in August, 1666, a letter of this last correspondence with the superscription *pour vous mesme* fell into De Witt's hands, and thus he learned the secrets of the hated faction which wanted to overthrow him. Of course Buat was lost. He neglected the opportunity to escape and was arrested some hours later. A search of his house furnished proof of a very extensive correspondence, but only a little of it seemed to have been kept. Commissioners of Holland gave him a preliminary hearing, but did not discover much of consequence except that he was in communication with Kievit and another member of Rotterdam's government, Van der Horst. The case was then referred somewhat irregularly to their own court of justice with a request "to proceed with all possible promptitude and with vigour." Enough was found to show the traitorous attitude of the friends of Kievit and Tromp. The court's slowness gave Kievit and Van der Horst a chance to flee, and so poor Buat was left alone. One of the councilors

favouring him, Van der Graaf, excused himself from further participation in the case on account of remarks made concerning his incautious visit to the prisoner. The court was repeatedly urged to hasten matters by the States in De Witt's absence,¹ on October 4th by a deputation in which Vivien, pensionary of Dordrecht and De Witt's cousin, made a vehement speech. Acquittal was constantly advocated by the Orange party. After long delay and pressure also from the French ambassador the court pronounced sentence of death with confiscation of property by five to three votes, a severe punishment but one that cannot be called unmerited or unjust. In default Kievit had the same sentence and Van der Horst that of banishment. On October 11th the imprudent cavalry captain was executed amid the general compassion of the people who soon began to regard him as an innocent victim of his devotion to Orange—an unjust opinion which was fostered by the Orange party and which later greatly injured De Witt and his friends.

In the autumn of 1666 the States planned new naval expeditions for the following spring, hoping for energetic coöperation of the French fleet. A quadruple alliance with Denmark, Brandenburg, and the Lüneburgers absolved them from all fear of Münster and Sweden. In England as well as in the Netherlands a new struggle was viewed with apprehension by reason of its financial burdens. The Dutch found it very difficult to pay the costs of war and were forced to issue loan after loan both for the provinces and for the admiralties. De Witt says that Holland was paying half of its income and more for the interest on its debt. In the war this province borrowed over twelve and one fourth million florins.² Sweden

¹ That he was the great instigator of the trial, and that he must thus be reproached with Buat's death is contested by Fruin upon convincing grounds. Fruin, p. 38.

² Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 400.

manifested its readiness to mediate between the belligerents and found England, the republic, and France willing. England was prepared to negotiate at some town in the republic's territory, *e. g.*, in the generality lands, which seemed better also to the States and to the king of France than The Hague, where the intrigues of the Orange party might have to be fought against. Evidently England hoped for this at Breda, the prince's barony. In April Breda was finally designated as the place of the negotiations, and the envoys of the powers concerned gradually gathered there. Van Beverningh was the chief of the eight Dutch negotiators; only three of them were to go to Breda, the deputies of the three maritime provinces; by this limitation De Witt hoped to thwart the English intrigues.

Thus began the negotiations for peace.¹ Van Beverningh, De Huybert, the council pensionary of Zealand, and the Frisian Jongestal were the envoys. At once the uncommon friendliness of the French ambassadors towards those of England attracted notice, but the English government showed less good-will, mistrusting more and more the designs of France upon the southern Netherlands. During the negotiations France actually threw off the mask and moved its troops into South Flanders. The old questions of Pularoon and the captured English vessels, the repeal of the Navigation Act and similar laws, the treatment of rebels on both sides, etc., were discussed at length, but the equivocal attitude of the French and Swedes and the unwillingness of the States to concede much retarded the negotiation, and by the middle of June little progress was made, while France's conduct excited uneasiness and the English envoys encouraged by it commenced to display arrogance.

Under these circumstances it seemed desirable by some brilliant naval exploit to show England and the world

¹ See Wicquefort, iii., p. 298, and the documents in Aitzema.

once more that the complete exhaustion attributed to the republic was far from having been reached. Even before the defeat of Lowestoft De Witt had formed the plan of entering the mouth of the Thames and of attacking the arsenals of the English fleet. This bold plan, considered also after the four days' battle but rejected by De Ruyter on account of insufficient acquaintance with the shoals of the Thames, was now at the instance of De Witt to be carried out by the fleet made ready in spring and again surpassing the former one in strength.¹ A small division of the fleet under the lieutenant admiral Van Ghent, which had escorted some merchantmen around the north of Scotland, attempted early in June to sail up the river of Edinburgh, but was quickly obliged to turn back. The rumour of a more dangerous plan against the Thames began to spread in England, and measures were taken to defend the river. These measures, however, were soon suspended, and De Witt saw a chance to execute his plan. Everything was prepared in deep secrecy. Cornelius de Witt, as the representative of the States, was sent to the fleet only a few days before its leaving Texel in order with De Ruyter to lead the expedition according to a commission put into their hands by the council pensionary on the departure of the fleet. The governor of Putten was not a little proud of the honourable mission given him. He and De Ruyter might indeed be "the best plenipotentiaries" for Breda. At the Meuse a considerable detachment of troops was taken on board. On June 14th the fleet sailed, over eighty vessels of all kinds and exclusively fitted out by Holland, to the British coast, where it arrived off the mouth of the Thames in the evening of the 17th. A squadron of seventeen smaller war vessels with advice boats, fire ships, and galiots under command of Van Ghent was intrusted with the real attack and sailed up

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 155.

the river in the early morning of the 19th, followed at a distance by the main part of the fleet. Some half-equipped ships on the Thames escaped to London, but De Witt and Van Ghent determined to go up the Medway on the 20th, and the troops having been landed under Colonel Dolman captured the fort of Sheerness and hoisted the flag of the States there, the fort and its stores being afterwards mostly destroyed. Measures were hastily taken on the English side to ward off the attack: batteries were thrown up and manned; some large ships were stationed in the river behind a heavy chain to protect them; other vessels were sunk to block the passage; troops were hurried from all directions. Monk and York endeavoured to avoid the consequences of carelessness as much as possible. Thus the Dutch ships could only advance with great difficulty and not until the 22d did they sail farther up the Medway, aided by a spring tide with a northeast wind that drove the water into the river. The brave Rotterdam captain, Van Brakel, captured a heavy frigate placed before the chain; a fire ship broke the chain to pieces, and fire ships and armed sloops now continued the work of destruction, the English batteries being quickly silenced and seized upon by the troops landed. De Witt and Van Ghent captured the *Royal Charles*, which bore the admiral's flag, and other ships were destroyed or seriously damaged. On the following day the squadron sailed up to the castle of Upnor, where three large vessels were destroyed by the Dutch fire ships in spite of the valiant defence made by the vice admiral Spragge. It even seemed possible with the help of Cromwell's old followers to overthrow the royal government and to restore the republic in England; the council pensionary at least aims at such plans in his letters of these days. But these great designs were not carried out. The river became so dangerous and narrow that it was resolved to go back, also because the shipyard of

Chatham was strongly fortified and fire ships were wanting. Six large English vessels were destroyed, several scuttled by the English themselves to block the river, two—the *Royal Charles* and the *Unity*—were taken away in triumph as memorials of the victory which was celebrated with solemn days of thanksgiving and bonfires. So ended the famous expedition which had cost the Dutch side only fifty sailors and some fire ships and in England had produced a great sensation, particularly in London, where people began to take to flight in panic. The brave victors received brilliant rewards and honours.

But the council pensionary considered the task as not yet finished. He urged new attacks on the Thames and elsewhere. The larger part of the fleet continued to blockade the Thames, and small squadrons cruised along the English coast to prevent the running out of merchant vessels. One of them made in July an attack on Harwich, which failed as did similar attacks upon other ports and a new attempt to go up the Thames, followed by a third in August under Van Nes, in which the English navy suffered heavy losses at Gravesend. The lack of fire ships and the vigorous defence of the English forced the Dutch this time to turn back after four days of fighting at Sheerness and on the Medway.

These last hostilities took place after peace was really concluded. On the 31st of July this occurred, being undoubtedly promoted by the glorious expedition, but operations did not cease before a month later, while the Dutch continued their mastery over the sea. The plans of France and complications with Sweden and Portugal made it desirable to hold a naval force in readiness. With the return of the fleet in October the war could be considered as ended.

In the peace the affairs of Pularoon and the captured ships were finally set aside, and the commercial regulations enacted in the last war to the detriment of the

Dutch were abolished by England. The Navigation Act remained but was modified by the stipulation that goods from Germany and the southern Netherlands might thenceforth be imported in Dutch vessels; salutes with the flag were settled; the rebels of each were no longer to be protected. With regard to the colonies it was arranged that both sides should possess what they held on May 10, 1667. This caused the republic to lose New Netherland afterwards so important, as it had remained in British hands. But the possession was assured of Surinam, which with its chief town Paramaribo was conquered by the brave Zelander Abraham Crynssen and a small squadron on February 28, 1667, while Essequibo also was taken from the enemy and his power in the West Indies was harmed by a battle near the island of Nives, by the capture of the island of Tobago, and by a successful attack upon some ships off the coast of Virginia. Surinam became an important possession and by the fertility of its soil made up during a time for the loss suffered in North America. De Witt might well speak of the "glorious" treaty securing terms from England such as had never before been obtained and perhaps never would be again.





CHAPTER XIII

SUMMIT OF THE REPUBLIC'S POWER

WITH the peace of Breda begins the most brilliant period of the republic. In a letter De Witt speaks with justifiable pride of the realisation of his prediction that the state "within the time of two years would be in a better condition, in greater reputation, and in higher credit than ever before."¹ "New Carthage," exclaimed the aged Vondel, is humiliated by the "maritime triumph of the Free Netherlands," now that "the sea lion on the Thames" caused the English standard to be struck. Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal dare not oppose the republic; France seeks its coöperation in the plans long formed against the Spanish Netherlands; Spain looks imploringly to its former rebels for protection; Germany's princes turn for help to the United Netherlands; even the emperor desires their friendship. Within the country Holland's will is law, while victory confirms the power of the magistrates, and prosperity and wealth everywhere awaken satisfaction with the rule of the council pensionary and his colleagues. But in the distance appears a cloud, much larger already than a man's hand, upon the southern horizon, where the armies of France are crossing the Spanish-Netherlandish frontier. And nearer at hand, in Holland's bosom, another danger threatens the ruling party. The young prince is growing up, sickly and weak of body indeed,

¹ See Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 409.

but strong in mind and strong in the love of the people for this heir of great traditions. De Witt watches anxiously the coming perils, and his cry of triumph is mingled with a word of apprehension for the immediate future.

At the beginning of the English war Lionne, the manager of French foreign relations, had demanded Cambrai for his help to the republic, but De Witt had refused and had warned Spain. Louis XIV. knew well that the republic would prefer to throw up a barrier against his designs on this side, but he hoped by his coöperation against England and Münster to have made it more favourably disposed. An understanding between Spain and England was the direct result, although Madrid and Brussels feared to break entirely with the republic.¹ But France succeeded in ending this understanding, just as it thwarted Spain's efforts to secure assistance in Germany, and managed to bring over to its side the German princes on the Rhine by money and promises. So Spain stood quite alone in the spring of 1667, and on the 8th of May² Louis wrote to the Spanish regent, the queen-mother, that his patience was exhausted and at the end of the month he would march at the head of his troops to take what belonged to him by virtue of the hereditary right of his wife, whose pretensions he caused to be expounded in a *Traité des droits de la reine*. What he demanded was no less than: Brabant with Antwerp and Limburg, Mechlin, Upper Gelderland, Namur, Artois, Cambrai, Hainaut, one fourth of Luxemburg, and one third of Franche Comté. The *Traité* was contested upon good grounds in the *Bouclier d'Estat et de justice* of the baron of Lisola, imperial ambassador at London and a native of Franche Comté. This celebrated pamphlet of the talented opponent of French plans in Europe³ was

¹ Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, p. 213.

² Mignet, *Négociations*, ii., p. 58.

³ See concerning him Pribram's book, *Freiherr von Lisola*.

directed especially against the devolution law, the foundation of Louis's claims, and warned against French rapacity. The freedom or slavery of Europe was in question and was to be decided by this first attack. How was feeble Spain to withstand the assault?

After the protest of the regent and her governor in Brussels, Louis marched on May 21st, and the French army of more than 50,000 men under Turenne, inspired by the king's presence, easily made itself master of a series of fortresses, from Lille, Charleroi, and Armentières to Aalst and Dendermonde, while the Spanish force, small and hastily collected, was dispersed at Bruges. In September nearly all Brabant, Flanders, and Hainaut were in French hands; Brussels, the capital, with Ghent and Mechlin alone remained under Spanish rule. Great was the terror in the republic at the rapid progress of the French arms. De Witt himself was surprised and complained of the sudden change in the French policy. Van Beuningen, Dutch ambassador in Paris, endeavoured to satisfy Louis XIV. by the offer of Franche Comté with Cambrai, Aire, and St. Omer, but France asked for more with Spain's recognition of Louis's rights on the death of the young king. De Witt was in great difficulty. The peace of Breda was not then signed and Sweden was unreliable. A new war with France for the sake of Spain would be madness. When peace was concluded, the council pensionary declared his inclination to help Spain, provided Bruges, Ostend, Damme, Plesschendaale, and the forts Isabella and St. Donat were granted to the republic. The Spanish government would not hear to this, because it might then become entirely dependent on its old enemies. When England made a similar offer, the government at Madrid considered the price too high, now that winter was approaching and the French conquests were ending with the king's triumphal return to Versailles. But Spain fell constantly lower. The emperor was persuaded into an

agreement with France to divide the Spanish heritage at the young king's death, while France was now to keep much of what was conquered; the most powerful German princes were entirely for France; Sweden was pacified. The game seemed won against Spain as well as against the States which had always dreaded becoming the neighbour of France. On the ground of common interests Louis XIV. requested the help of the States in getting possession of his lawful property.

Dutch diplomacy sought a way out of the dilemma. In his letter of May 8th Louis had demanded the surrender of the territory coming to him or of its equivalent. Spain might give this equivalent in Franche Comté or Luxemburg with some fortresses so situated that the republic would suffer no harm. France had declared its readiness to conclude a truce of six months for the purpose of negotiating. In the autumn negotiations began, but it soon appeared that Louis would never renounce his wife's claims to the inheritance of the Spanish king, and that he could not be induced willingly to give up the territory already conquered. Van Beuningen's protests in Paris, De Witt's talks with d'Estrades at The Hague advanced matters little further. Spain was as unwilling to submit to the loss of its chief fortresses as France was to content itself with a small part of the conquered territory. The sole hope of the States lay in help from Sweden and England to compel France to moderate its demands. The party in Sweden favouring French interests, led by the chancellor De la Gardie, was in this autumn overcome by its opponents, and consequently the Swedish government ordered the ambassador at The Hague, Dohna, to join England and the republic in resisting French encroachments. The English government was not so easily moved. The new ambassador of the States in London, Johan Meerman, was instructed to bring about an understanding with England, and for this end he was even to threaten a

treaty of the States with France concerning the Spanish Netherlands. England hesitated under the influence of French offers, and Charles II. was ready to join France in an attack on the republic.

The danger for the republic became great, and De Witt had to keep his eyes open. Fortunately popular opinion in England impelled the government in the direction of De Witt's policy. It was unwilling to see the Spanish Netherlands in French hands and remembered the loss of Dunkirk. Lisola's activity had much influence upon this disposition of the English people, and Parliament showed itself averse to any participation in French plans. The fall of the minister Clarendon and the elevation of Arlington, Beverweert's son-in-law, promoted the understanding with the republic, and Charles II. saw himself obliged to yield to this tendency. He had Sir William Temple, the English resident in Brussels and a well-known opponent of France, come to London at the end of December from his station by way of The Hague in order to prepare for coöperation with De Witt. Long an admirer of the council pensionary, Temple had little difficulty in agreeing with him, and when early in January he arrived in London from The Hague, he was able to say that the States, though disinclined for the moment to begin a joint war against France, were quite prepared to unite with England in a mediation. On the 13th of January, 1668, Temple left London to propose a joint mediation four days later in The Hague. De Witt hesitated a bit to enter into so close an alliance with the unreliable English government, but Temple overcame his scruples and even persuaded him to have the States-General conclude the treaty directly with England. Thus long discussions in the provincial Estates and the opposition of France would be avoided. In an audience of the States-General Temple easily secured the appointment of seven deputies in order, supported by the council

pensionary, to negotiate with him. After some wavering they consented to a defensive alliance with England as the basis of the mediation to be offered. Temple's urgency accelerated the formalities and on the 23d the treaty was signed by the deputies and the English diplomat and approved by the States-General. The ratification by the provincial Estates occupied a month. Temple and De Witt together quickly induced Dohna for Sweden to join them and so on the 26th the Triple Alliance was completed. The treaty provided that each should help the other in case of attack with 40 ships and 6400 troops, while the chief purpose was to compel France to limit itself to its somewhat moderated demands and to persuade Spain to submit to them. If France violated the conditions imposed, it was to be constrained by a joint war to be content with the territory ceded by the peace of the Pyrenees.

Thus was concluded the famous treaty that was to maintain the equilibrium of Europe by united action of the two maritime powers. Temple may be considered the first vigorous champion of this coöperation which during more than a century, with a short interruption in the beginning, was to play such a part in European politics. Great was the joy among the partisans of the States and the Orange party, and the universal satisfaction was shown in the council pensionary's ball, where the young prince and Prince John Maurice led the dance. Louis XIV., almost sure of his affair, was surprised by the treaty and did not allow himself to be deceived as to its results by the consoling reports of the outwitted d'Estrades. Van Beuningen did his best to appease the French government, but there was much to do to accomplish this and to make Spain listen to reason. At first Spain refused, but when it saw that the three powers had no intention of guaranteeing it against all loss, it played them the trick of sacrificing not Franche Comté but the

fortified places in the Netherlands already lost, which was least of all agreeable to the States. There was more difficulty with France and, while Sweden was only induced at the eleventh hour to keep its word by increasing the promised subsidies, it was found necessary to assemble troops to show Louis XIV. that matters were serious. Under John Maurice and the field marshal Wurtz the army of the States was collected on the Scheldt and the Yssel in order to move either upon the Spanish Netherlands or upon the bishop of Münster again gathering his troops. Lüneburg and Lorraine promised respectively 6000 and 8000 men, 48 ships were fitted out, and new levies were to add 12,000 men to the Dutch army, so that by spring 25 regiments and nearly 4000 cavalry were ready. Louis XIV., who had already seized Franche Comté, was not prepared to enter upon a great war and decided to comply with the demand of the three powers to the end that he might later break their resistance. The terms of peace were settled at St. Germain en Laye on the 15th of April between Lionne, Van Beuningen, and the English envoy Trevor. A congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, comprising representatives from the states interested and presided over by the papal nuncio, was to draw up the definitive treaty. Beverningh and Temple had little difficulty in persuading the French envoy, Colbert-Croissy, and the one from Brussels, Bergeyck, to sign the stipulations discussed at St. Germain. On May 2, 1668, peace was finally concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle. Louis kept Mons, Veurne, Armentières, Courtrai, Lille, Douay, Tournay, Oudenaarde, Ath, and Charleroi, and gave back Franche Comté; he had gained a firm footing in Brabant and Flanders, but his further progress was for the time blocked.¹ A guaranty treaty between the three powers and Spain, securing to the latter the inviolability of its remaining possessions, placed

¹ Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, i., p. 148.

the treaty of peace under the protection of the allies.

A great victory for the Dutch policy was obtained in this manner. But De Witt had few illusions concerning its permanence. England's "usual insolence" was manifested in the renewal of humiliating demands for the striking of the flag, and commercial jealousy was far from having disappeared, while English pride had been sorely wounded by the defeat on the Thames, and the king's vacillating policy inspired no confidence. Unless money was constantly advanced for secret subsidies to prominent officers, slight reliance could be placed on the corrupt Swedish government, now influenced by the able French diplomatist Pomponne in a way that alarmed Pieter de Groot, the new Dutch ambassador to Sweden. Louis XIV. quickly set about devising means to break the Triple Alliance and to punish the republic for its opposition to his plans in the Spanish Netherlands. It remained De Witt's endeavour to induce France, whose friendship he considered of the highest importance, to form a buffer state by making the Spanish Netherlands into cantons according to the old plans. But the policy of France during recent years showed plainly that it would not now be content with this. Such a policy as De Witt's was therefore doomed to failure.

Danger was averted for the time being by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and De Witt could go on with his domestic task of strengthening the principles of government prevailing since the death of William II. First it was necessary to arrange matters so that the young prince might never unite in his hands the great civil and military power possessed by his forefathers. Reasons enough for anxiety were the weakening of the influence of the States' party by the elevation of the Orange partisan Pieter de Huybert in 1664 to the council pensionaryship of Zeeland after the death of Adriaan Veth, the resignation of Bever-

ningh as treasurer-general in the following year, popular movements in different cities after the defeats of 1665, the activity of preachers and officers in the young prince's interest, the incessant vigilance of the princess dowager in advancing her grandson. There were traces also of a diminution in the personal influence of De Witt. His friend De Groot had to lay down the pensionaryship of Amsterdam, and was replaced by an antagonist in the town council, which more and more opposed De Witt. By securing for him the embassy to Sweden De Witt recompensed his friend, but the blow was felt by the council pensionary's internal policy. The death of Andries de Graeff removed his best support in the great city, where Gillis Valckenier, too independent to submit to De Witt's guidance, had now become the chief personage. A disagreement between the influential Van Beuningen, who imagined himself slighted by De Witt and was made burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1669, and the council pensionary estranged the latter still more from the city. Under these circumstances a speedy settlement of the attitude of the prince of Orange appeared necessary.

De Witt hoped to prevent the worst by taking into the council of state the young prince, with whose education in the "good maxims" he now earnestly busied himself, and, as soon as he should be eighteen years old, by investing him with a high military office under condition that no captain-general to be appointed should ever obtain or keep the stadtholdership in any province. Some members of his party desired to go further, and Caspar Fagel, pensionary of Haarlem, and Valckenier, burgomaster of Amsterdam, took the initiative¹ for the proclamation by the Estates of Holland of a Perpetual Edict for the "mortification" of the stadtholdership. De Witt hesitated, fearing that this extreme could not be

¹ Bontemantel, *De Regeeringe van Amsterdam, uitg. Kernkamp*, ii., pp. 17, 19.

maintained, but finally yielded to the urgency of the two men and brought Holland to the resolution. On August 5, 1667, came in this province an edict, by which nobility and towns took to themselves the election of all magistrates according to the old laws and privileges and the Estates were to retain the gift of all offices now enjoyed by them; the other provinces were to be requested to decree that no captain- or admiral-general should become or remain stadtholder, while Holland abolished the stadtholdership "in all manners." In December the resolution was irrevocably confirmed without further debate, and oaths to observe it were taken by the persons and bodies concerned, the Estates doing so first.¹ The resolution excited vexation among the Orange party as well as in Zealand and Friesland, but Holland hoped by deputations and discussions in the other provinces to secure at least a separation of the stadtholdership from the captain- and admiral-generalship. In Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overysse this was accomplished quickly, and Utrecht later followed Holland's example by doing away with the stadtholdership. The majority in the States-General now favoured De Witt's "Plan of Harmony" and sought, in the spring of 1668, to win over the other three provinces by official deputations, but Zealand, Friesland, and Groningen refused, and in consequence the prince for a time was not admitted to the council of state. De Witt, however, did not give up his scheme, but talked and corresponded with influential statesmen and negotiated for the purpose of having all the provinces adopt it at the right moment. The sudden recognition of the prince, who without the knowledge of his tutors betook himself in September to Zealand, as first noble of this province, was a clever move of the Orange party, advancing him an important step on the road to the civil offices. This recognition, giving him entrance into the Estates of Zealand, was a warning to the

¹ Wicquefort, ii., p. 373; Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 505.

party of the States, that it could not long maintain severe restrictions. Vivien, the pensionary of Dordrecht, interpreted undoubtedly the secret thought of his cousin, the council pensionary, when during the discussion of the Perpetual Edict he stuck his penknife into the resolution lying before him and replied to the question of what he was doing: "I am trying what steel can do against parchment."¹ The young prince had listened to De Witt's communication of the proceedings in the Estates of Holland without any external marks of displeasure according to his custom, cautiously hiding his real feelings in the depths of his mind.

The course of these affairs seemed to have strengthened the existing government. At the end of July, 1668, the five-year period of the council pensionaryship expired again, and the high appreciation of De Witt was shown by his reëlection with the doubling of his salary, 6000 guilders, over and above his compensation as governor of the fiefs and keeper of the great seal of Holland, which dignities had been his since 1660, and besides a gratuity of 45,000 guilders for his services, to which the nobles added 15,000 guilders more. The renewal of his act of indemnity and the promise of a place in one of the courts of justice on his retirement assured his future. Thus he found in the gratitude of his fellow-citizens a reward for his hard work, in the midst of which his faithful wife died on July 1st of this year, leaving him the care of a large family. The beautiful letter of his friend Temple, expressing sympathy with him in this loss, gives evidence of the great diplomatist's fine feeling, just as De Witt's own letters of this time testify to the sovereign calmness, with which the council pensionary received the favours as well as the blows of fortune. Thenceforth he espoused alone the good of his country, and though he might be struck deep in his soul, he remained outwardly what he was, the

¹ Scheltema, *Staatk, Nederland*, ii., p. 418.

watchful leader of the state, to the government of which he had devoted his life.¹

His first aim was patiently and cautiously to smooth the way in the three refractory provinces for the acceptance of the Harmony. He had to contend with the domestic difficulties disturbing some provinces, especially Overijssel, Friesland, and City and Land, in which more and more came to light the antagonism between the partisans and opponents of the stadtholder government. The most violent dissensions raged again in Overijssel.² The decision of De Witt and De Graeff in 1657 had restored order here for a time. Before long, however, the division of the provincial offices caused the old discord, and the parties assailed one another, the stadtholderless faction relying upon Holland and De Witt, the stadtholder partisans having friends in the other provinces. The attempt was made to reconcile adversaries by a fair distribution. Thus Haersolte in 1660 received the office of bailiff of Salland, and his rival Raesfelt became bailiff of Twente. This method gave bitter enemies a chance to cross each other. The question of the control of ecclesiastical property, which occasioned troubles also in Utrecht and was connected with the treatment of the numerous Catholics in these two provinces, kindled strife anew between nobles and cities. At Utrecht the aged Voetius about 1660 opposed the States in his customary vehement fashion. In Overijssel it was less the preachers than the interested nobles and magistrates who quarrelled over this property. The management of property in the cities by the municipal magistrates was not at all pleasing to the noblemen. Then came the Münster invasion with its plundering and destruction by the foe and by the French allies to disturb order in this province. The plan of October, 1665, to send the young prince to England to make peace and to raise him to the supreme

¹ See Lefèvre Pontalis, i., p. 521, where passages from letters are quoted.

² Bussemaker, *Geschiedenis van Overijssel*, ii. ('s Gravenhage, 1889.)

command over the land and sea forces was put forth by two deputies from Overijssel to the States-General, Pallandt and Van Langen, and was a consequence of the wretched condition of the province. Though given up, the plan showed how strong the Orange party in the province felt itself. After the peace of Breda the finances of Overijssel were in hopeless confusion. The party of Haersolte and Pallandt began a contest with that of Raesfelt. Violent pamphlets, accusations of bribery and intriguing were the order of the day. Both parties applied as of old to the States-General, each calling its Estates legitimate and declaring the resolutions of the other null. "It was like a man, suffering from a raging fever and with senses confounded by the severity of the pain, who brings forth in delirium now this now that."¹ Both parties—Kampen and Deventer with Raesfelt, Zwolle with Haersolte—held their assemblies, and all attempts to settle the differences failed. In July, 1669, Holland recognised the Raesfelt party as the true Estates, but the party of Haersolte did not give up the struggle. There was even the beginning of a civil war in August, 1671, soldiers from Kampen occupying Blokzijl and Zwartsluis, while those of Zwolle seized Genemuiden and Kuinder. An extraordinary deputation from the States-General at last came to restore order; it suspended Haersolte in September from his office of bailiff and his presidency of the Estates, and pronounced an amnesty, but this decision did not quiet the province despite the threatening approach of war. Induced by De Witt, the province had quickly assented to his Harmony, and the dissensions had little influence upon that, though they lessened the force of the assertion that four provinces, or a majority, already favoured it, because it was well known that the Haersolte party, if it came to power, would withdraw the approval.

¹ Aitzema, vi., p. 584.

The situation was different in the two northern provinces. There assent was not yet obtained, and it depended upon the victory of the "Holland maxims" which had encountered stubborn resistance. In Friesland this resulted from the old disputes concerning the way of making up the Estates. The intrigues of the great nobles, who were generally lords of the manor, in electing the representatives of the manors and the deals between members of prominent families became very troublesome in 1668 during the minority of the young stadtholder who had succeeded his father under the guardianship of his mother. It was worse when deputies of the Estates belonging to the prince's party removed by force from their assembly some members chosen contrary to the will of the lords in Oostergoo and Westergoo. The opposition of the partisans of Holland led by Ernst Sicco van Aylva, Karel Roorda, and others was weak, because their leaders also participated in disgraceful bargains and divisions of offices. The harmful fire of dissension was caused chiefly by jealousy among the magistrates, and these illegal contracts were considered the only means of opposing the abuses of intrigue. The shameful spectacles at elections, the sale of votes, the bringing in of votes by giving food and drink to whole villages, made it absolutely impossible for a poor man to obtain any office. The result was that the rule of the great nobles, the lords of the manors, became ever more oppressive, and they put members of their families, even young children, in possession of offices in country and city. After "reform was talked in boats and waggons," the supervision of the legality of elections was taken from the deputies in March, 1672, and given to a special commission appointed for a year. But the cities declined to consent to this and held Estates at Sneek, separate from those of the three districts at Leeuwarden. The result of change was simply—"other men, the same manners." More roughly than in Friesland the great lords exercised

their tyrannical power in City and Land, even in the city of Groningen. Here occurred all sorts of abuses at the "muster," the examination into the competence of the representatives elected from the country. At the request of Egbert Clant and Johan de Mepsche the States-General in 1667 sent delegates to reform the abuses. The city opposed the new regulations; dissensions between city and country sprang up again; but the anti-Holland party kept the upper hand in spite of the efforts of De Witt from The Hague to defeat it with the help of Jan Osebrand Rengers and his friends. To end the discord and secure the assent of City and Land to the Harmony De Witt late in May, 1670, went to the province with four other "arbiters" and remained several weeks settling matters without entire success, as the city continued to resist. The selfish interests of the great lords appeared stronger than the desire to improve, and the "reformation" of the provincial government could not be accomplished. These abuses are not astonishing in the remote northern provinces, where the States-General seldom interfered and the stadtholder's authority was not powerful enough to hold in check the landowners of noble birth. In Holland, in Amsterdam also according to Bontemantel's disclosures, terrible abuses prevailed in the government; family interests, personal ambition, and love of power often had free play; the purchase of votes by promises and favours, the distribution of fat offices to friends and relatives, the misuse of public money, were common occurrences. And De Witt himself was not entirely averse to them. His correspondence shows that he looked after the interests of his relatives and friends, that his power in Holland rested largely upon their occupation of the offices, that he and his friends upon occasion profited by speculations dubious in our eyes. But in Holland the abuses were confined to limits that did not have to be observed in the north.

More than two years passed before De Witt succeeded in

winning over the three refractory provinces to his Harmony. The prince was now in his twentieth year, and it became time to release him from the guardianship, in which Holland still held him, and to admit him to the council of state. The former took place with thanks to Van Ghent and the others charged with his education, but the latter depended upon the question of the Harmony. On March 20, 1670, the deputies of the three provinces declared their assent to the Harmony, being influenced by De Witt and urged by the princess dowager to secure in this way admission to the council of state at least. The question was how the prince should enter the council, with a "decisive" or "advisory" vote, or whether he was to have a sitting without any vote. After much wrangling Holland in May allowed the prince under conditions to obtain a decisive vote until he should become captain-general for one campaign, which could only happen by unanimous vote. De Witt arranged the affair cleverly, had the Harmony solemnly accepted by the States-General and the prince led into the council. An attempt to pilot him into the States-General during De Witt's absence failed owing to the opposition of Holland.¹

In all these transactions it was plain that Amsterdam under the lead of Valckenier and Van Beuningen and with the aid of Fagel no longer supported De Witt's policy but sought to oppose him. The council pensionary's great power was a thorn in the eyes of these gentlemen; they complained of his arbitrary conduct, of his domineering over his masters,² of his preference of his friends, and aimed at depriving him of office.³ But the council pensionary, who could still rely on the Bickers and De Graeffs and their following, offered no contest. In 1669

¹ Wicquefort, iv., p. 124, is very full concerning these matters.

² "That the country and this city are ruled by a minister, denoting the council pensionary De Witt" (Bontemantel, ii., p. 156).

³ Fruin, *Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het burgemeesterschap van Amsterdam tijdens de Republiek*, in *Nijh. Bijdr.* 3^{de} Reeks, v., p. 221.

he wanted an understanding with the opposing party, and when Valckenier refused "for reasons" and Van Beuningen was elected burgomaster, the council pensionary hoped to end their hostility by ostentatiously asking their advice. Next year also the burgomaster's election went against him, and his recommendations for offices began to fail of their effect. This enmity to De Witt naturally brought a leaning to the prince's party. In the election of 1671, after all sorts of intrigues, Valckenier's party was unsuccessful, and none of its candidates became burgomaster. De Witt triumphed over the proud relative of the Pauws and Trips, who never forgave him this defeat. The choice of Fagel as secretary of the States-General (November, 1670) in place of the dead Ruysch relieved De Witt of the Haarlem pensionary so influential in the Estates of Holland. A new victory for him seemed the promotion of the ambassador De Groot after his return from Sweden to be pensionary of Rotterdam, the second commercial city of Holland. But the council pensionary still had powerful enemies among the magistrates who desired with the aid of the Orange partisans to overthrow the "minister." What they secretly prepared was forwarded by the course of foreign affairs in these years.

The excellent French diplomatists of the school of Richelieu and Mazarin had taken for the first object of their activity the annihilation of the Triple Alliance and of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.¹ They tried to accomplish this by working upon weak Spain and the two allies of the republic. Spain, ruled by a passionate and avaricious woman and her unworthy favourites and ministers, was in no condition to thwart the French intrigues. Many of its statesmen, like the aged Peñaranda, regarded

¹ See concerning the diplomatic intrigues of these years especially—Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., Chapters ix. and x., where De Witt's manuscript correspondence and that of the French diplomats are very well employed.

the Spanish Netherlands as an encumbrance to be gotten rid of, the sooner the better. The governors following one another at Brussels—Castel-Rodrigo, Velasco, from 1670 the young count de Monterey—were better fitted for their task, but found so little support in Madrid that they were unable to achieve much. Evidently Spain must seek the help of the republic against France, if it wished to keep the Spanish Netherlands. Castel-Rodrigo had therefore preferred to give up some fortified places of the Netherlands instead of Franche Comté, because he hoped thus to increase the Dutch fear of France, and Monterey adhered to the republic as closely as possible.¹ France offered to exchange the Netherlands for Roussillon, ceded by Spain at the peace of the Pyrenees, but neither the emperor, as presumptive heir, nor Spain consented. De Witt opposed these plans to the best of his ability, but he soon had a more redoubtable adversary at The Hague than d'Estrades. This ambassador, so friendly to the council pensionary, was succeeded by one of the ablest leaders of the new French diplomacy, Simon Arnould de Pomponne, who appeared late in February, 1669. He was to diminish the distrust of France in the republic, to keep De Witt busy with negotiations, and to treat with the Orange party in order to oust him if necessary; above all, his effort must be to remove the mistrust of France's aims inspired by Van Beuningen. Pomponne soon saw that the last was no longer possible and confined himself to negotiating with De Witt for the purpose of learning his plans and of giving France an opportunity to break the Triple Alliance by working secretly on England and Sweden; while De Witt's attention was engaged in negotiations.

The cunning scheme succeeded. Misled by Pomponne, De Witt in the course of 1669 proposed two plans con-

¹ Lonchay, p. 239 *et seq.*; Van Dijk, *Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der Nederlandsche diplomatie* (Utrecht, 1851), p. 281.

cerning the southern Netherlands: one assigning Cambrai, Aire, and St. Omer to France, the other giving back the places ceded by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in exchange for these three lying on the French frontiers; the remainder of Belgium was then to become a separate republic. Neither these plans nor that of a division of the Spanish Netherlands between France and the emperor encountered approval at the French court. All De Witt's endeavours to come to an understanding with France failed. In June, 1671, Pomponne left The Hague to go again as ambassador to Sweden; shortly afterwards he replaced the deceased Lionne as minister of foreign affairs at Paris. Only a chargé d'affaires was left at The Hague. This attitude of France opened De Witt's eyes at last to the necessity of putting the republic into a condition to defend itself against all contingencies. Louis XIV.'s sudden attack upon the duchy of Lorraine in August, 1670, showed him that France had not given up its old plans, but his representations had as little success as those of the emperor. Lorraine, conquered within a month, remained in French hands. The real intentions of Louis XIV. continued to be hidden from the council pensionary, in consequence partly of the unsatisfactory arrangement of Dutch diplomacy, a fault that brought the most terrible evils over the country.

The principal ambassadorial positions remained in these years for a long time either unfilled or occupied by incompetent persons. After the death of the Dutch ambassador Van Reede at Madrid in September, 1669, it was more than a year before his place was taken by Van Beverningh, the first diplomatist of the States, who was there from January to July, 1671, and then returned home after preparing the way for a league between Spain and the republic in case of an attack by France upon either one. The arming of France was then generally known, and it was certain that with an attack from that side the

republic would also have to sustain a war with Münster, unless Münster were held in check by Brunswick-Lüneburg and Brandenburg. The prince of Tarento, once considered by De Witt as the future captain-general, and other Frenchmen resigned from the Dutch service in the autumn of 1670—another indication of France's hostile sentiments. But danger threatened, too, from the side of England, and De Witt had not calculated upon that. The ambassador in London, Johan Boreel, was not equal to that important post, and it was planned to send Van Beuningen there as extraordinary ambassador, which was not done until June, 1670. He remained half a year, and discussed the difficulties arising from a British predatory foray into Surinam, England's demands for the surrender of a man suspected of plotting the king's assassination, the expulsion of Scotch preachers from the republic, the groundless complaints of England about tapestries, medals, and pictures representing the Chatham expedition, etc. The cool attitude of Charles II.'s government towards the Dutch ambassadors and requests proved conclusively that vigorous aid from England could not be hoped for in case of an attack by France upon the republic. Rumours were already circulating of a secret alliance between France and England, but De Witt refused to believe them. England's disposition was meanwhile manifested plainly by the opposition of the English government to the plans for taking the emperor and some German princes into the Triple Alliance, which was much desired by the imperial ambassador Lisola, and would have frustrated the French designs.

De Witt was no better informed of what was going on in Paris. The place of ambassador there was vacant from September, 1668, when Willem Boreel died, to the end of August, 1670. Then Pieter de Groot, though just made pensionary of Rotterdam, went there as ambassador in the hope of doing some good through his old relations to

the French court from his father's days. But De Groot accomplished little and speedily urged the States to prepare for war. What he saw in France aroused his fears. He had reason for them, because at this time the secret league between England and France was actually effected. Set on by York and the war party in his court, who ardently longed to wipe out the disgrace of Chatham, won over by offers of money and wiles of women, finally influenced by his sister Henrietta, duchess of Orleans, Charles II. assented to the secret treaty of Dover (December 31, 1670), which detached him from the Triple Alliance and allied him with Louis XIV. against the republic under promise of three million francs of subsidy a year, and of the cession of Walcheren and the mouths of the Scheldt to England. Repeated warnings from Madrid, Berlin, and from Van Beverningh had been given De Witt, but, relying upon Temple and the alliance, he had disregarded them. He even hoped that France would return to the old friendship with the States, and from Charles II. he feared at the most a breaking away from the Triple Alliance, but not a new war. Van Beuningen, ridiculed by Lionne in January, 1671, as a "poor dupe," allowed himself to be misled regarding the real purpose of the equipment of the English fleet; "the end of the comedy" was to be a bitter disappointment to him and De Witt.

When Louis XIV. was ready with England, and in Sweden also the French money lavishly spent appeared more powerful than the anti-French policy, so that Sweden would not hold to its alliance with the republic, he turned to the emperor and the German princes to induce them to leave the republic to its fate. The Rhine princes and Münster, long under French influence and now gained further by French money and diplomacy, were quickly persuaded. Cologne and Münster, the former led by the Fürstenbergs in favour of France, displayed a readiness to declare war on the republic in the interests of Catholicism.

The downfall of the strong Protestant power, the hope and the support of the German Protestants, would be of great importance to the Catholic Church, and Louis XIV. did not fail to emphasise this side of the affair to the Catholic princes of the Rhine and to the emperor. Efforts were made also to draw Spain away from the republic and thus to expose the latter entirely alone to an attack from all sides. The emperor, threatened by Turks and Hungarians, consented at the end of 1671 to an agreement with France on the basis of the plan of 1668 for dividing the Spanish inheritance. Bavaria promised support to the French policy, even in securing the imperial dignity for Louis XIV. after the emperor's death. Spain remained refractory, and Brandenburg, however much inclined to help Louis in his designs on the Spanish Netherlands, refused to turn against the republic.

While French diplomacy thus prepared the way and the resourceful Colbert filled the treasury by protectionist measures, the excellent minister of war, Louvois, with an iron hand, organised the army for the approaching campaign. It was intended to strike in the spring of 1671, but the whole year passed in diplomatic negotiation and military preparation. In April, 1672, after Sweden was won over to an alliance with France, all was ready. An army of 120,000 men,¹ one-sixth cavalry, Frenchmen, Italians, Swiss, Irishmen, Englishmen, mingled together after the fashion of the time, but all under rigid discipline, with 100 cannons, 300 pontoons for crossing the rivers, an abundance of ammunition purchased in Holland,² with officers formerly in the Dutch service, and commanded by Turenne, Condé, Luxembourg, Vauban, and other famous generals, was at the first sign to march upon the republic

¹ Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, i., p. 346.

² The agent in this was the Jewish banker Zadok of Amsterdam, who bought up the ammunition secretly, ostensibly for the Spaniards and for German cities, and transported it by way of Cologne (Rousset, i., p. 338). This Zadok played later also a treacherous part.

through the Liege territory. At the same time Münster and Cologne with 30,000 men¹ were to attack its eastern frontiers, and the united Anglo-French fleet was to assail Holland and Zealand. Thus the republic would be speedily destroyed. De Witt late in the autumn did not perceive the extent of the danger. De Groot had frequently mentioned rumours regarding an alliance between France and England, but not until November, 1671, did he write about it with certainty. England's refusal to enlarge the Triple Alliance, Charles II's indifference to the French attack on Lorraine, Arlington's conduct towards Van Beuningen troubled De Witt, but he relied upon the aversion of the English nation to France's plans of conquest and upon the anti-French attitude of Parliament. Temple had left The Hague, however, in August, 1670, and news came in the summer of the following year that he would not return. Then his wife, who had remained behind, also quitted The Hague. An English yacht, the *Merlin*, came for her in August, and Charles II. made use of the opportunity to create new difficulties. The yacht was to sail through the Dutch fleet cruising in the Channel and fire upon it immediately, if the flags were not struck. On the voyage out nothing was done, as a strong wind drove the yacht away from the fleet. During the return voyage, with the royal flag flying, it sailed among the Dutch fleet anchored off the coast of Zealand, fired a salute in the direction of De Ruyter's ship but received no reply, because his vessel careened very much to one side. The lieutenant admiral, Van Ghent, answered and finally De Ruyter himself, but the captain of the yacht fired back with shot, complaining that Van Ghent had not struck his flag "according to custom." Van Ghent paid a visit to Madame Temple and declared he was not obliged to salute in this way, whereupon the yacht sailed away unmolested. This affair occasioned very unpleasant negotiations concerning

¹ Knoop, *Willem de Derde*, i., p. 79.

the flag question, in which the old dissensions were raked up again and the States refused to comply with the English demands. The sending of the quarrelsome Downing in December as ambassador to the States opened at last De Witt's eyes to the danger from the English side, though he hoped to avert it through Parliament, which, however, was dissolved in August, 1671, and not assembled again during eighteen months, and through the feeling of the nation itself against France.

The danger from the French side appeared more and more unavoidable. In 1671, Louis XIV. complained bitterly of the attitude of the States, of their allowing the publication of libels against him and his government, of the hostile tone of the newspapers in the republic, of the duties imposed on French goods in opposition to Colbert's protectionist measures in France. De Groot, though personally well received, had no further illusions and urged at The Hague vigorous preparation. After the French attack on Lorraine, De Witt had recommended equipments, but the States-General, relying upon the Anglo-Swedish alliance, were with difficulty persuaded to strengthen their naval force, while nothing was done for the land force. Not until the spring of 1671 was it resolved to fit out a fleet of thirty-six large vessels and a number of smaller ones, preparations likewise being made to increase the army by new levies in consequence of the gathering of the French troops on the northern frontier and the appearance of the king himself with an army in Flanders. De Witt seems to have contemplated the possibility of spoiling the French plans by an attack from the Dutch side. He did not yet despair of a reconciliation with France and thought of using his friendship with d' Estrades who was just then in Dunkirk and might come to The Hague. But it quickly appeared that this could not be and that the States must arm, especially when Louis had no other representative at The Hague

than an agent. De Groot now asked for his recall but remained in Paris at the request of the States which still expected something from his embassy.¹ He had the arduous task of defending in Paris the Dutch policy of commercial war and peaceful assurances at the same time, of listening to the French complaints and of answering with counter-complaints. On the 1st of December the States addressed a solemn missive to the king to defend their conduct towards him and to justify their equipments on land and sea. De Groot was to deliver this in an audience and to accompany it with oral explanations. He did not get an opportunity to do so until January 4, 1672, but the king received the letter "with a look of indignation" and replied in threatening terms both orally and in writing, declaring he would go on with his preparations for war and had to give account of them to nobody.² All that remained possible was the adoption of "timely and vigorous resolutions" for war, but De Groot was left in Paris until the end of March, when he took leave of the French court in appropriate words and with an assertion of the good will of the States. He had no sooner departed than Louis XIV. declared war upon the republic (April 6, 1672), making his reasons known to the world in a violent manifesto. The device *cvexi sed discutiam*, which he had placed on a medal struck for this occasion, testified to his purpose to destroy the ungrateful republic, once rescued by France in the great Spanish war from the dominion of mighty Spain.

Charles II. had preceded him by several days. Notwithstanding the opinion of his people strongly prejudiced against France, he had long been drifting towards war. Downing demanded, in lofty tone, satisfaction for

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 121. See Combes in *Mélanges historiques*, i., p. 365, where is a letter from De Witt to Pomponne, dated September 25, 1671, with hope of a restoration of "the same confidence that the two nations formerly judged to be necessary to them."

² The two letters are in Mignet, iii., pp. 657 and 660.

the insults to England, laid claim to the *Dominium Maris* in the widest sense and to the recognition of it by the States in the striking of the flag on every sea, even though it might be to but a single English ship of war. Everything possible was done to content him, and the demand regarding the flag was complied with as a "sign of deference" to the ally, not as a proof of giving up the free navigation. But nothing availed. Downing declared haughtily that the offer came too late, gave up his passport, and went to England. The ambassador in London, Boreel, supported in March by Meerman as ambassador extraordinary, endeavoured still to avert the storm, misled as he was concerning Charles II.'s real policy, but March 28th war was declared on the republic in a manifesto similar to that of Louis. Some days earlier, after a communication to Meerman, that England would attack Dutch ships, Sir Robert Holmes had assailed the Smyrna fleet sailing unsuspectingly by the Isle of Wight but had been able to capture only a few vessels in consequence of the valiant resistance of the small convoy.

England and France had preceded, Münster and Cologne followed, with like manifestoes. Münster's was actually based on the old grievances, now however replaced by smaller ones of recent date and by general complaints of the bribery of its officials, of plots against the bishop's life, and of the sending of spies. Cologne was offended because Rijnberk was not given back and because the city of Cologne was supported against its authority, old wrongs brought forward again during the difficulties between the city and the elector about 1670. The destruction of the republic, so these neighbours proclaimed, would end all this injustice. The lavish promises of French help and money, the desire to promote the Catholic faith by the ruin of the heretical republic, the secret intrigues, at the Cologne court, of the Fürstenberg brothers entirely won over to France—all urged these

princes to energetic coöperation. The alliance of Cologne, whose elector, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, was also bishop of Liege, had great value to France, because the French army secured across his Liege territory a road to the republic outside of Spanish lands, the neutrality of which did not have to be violated.¹ It was thought that the weakness of the eastern frontier of the States would speedily put the eastern provinces in the hands of Münster and Cologne.

¹ Huisman, *Maximilien Henri de Bavière* (Bruxelles, 1899), p. 84.





CHAPTER XIV

DE WITT'S FALL

WHAT had the republic, menaced on all sides, to oppose to its enemies? Relying upon the Triple Alliance and upon the aid of the Swedish army in case the Spanish Netherlands were again attacked, and eager to economise, the States-General immediately after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle¹ had reduced their army considerably and had sent over 40,000 men home, so that only 33,000 men were left, Holland paying for about half of them. What remained was certainly not the best part. The officers were mostly inexperienced young men from the governing class, and regarded their posts chiefly as a means of making money easily; supreme guidance was lacking; and financial abuses abounded. The picture of the Dutch army unrolled by the *Mémoires* of the count de Guiche is far from brilliant: the avarice and incompetence of the officers were equalled by the greediness and ignorance of the soldiers; little discipline was to be seen; the magazines were empty, the fortifications neglected, the ramparts planted with trees, the moats dried up; the militia had run down, and the drills of the citizens in their armouries had degenerated into banquets, where the officers outdid one another in fine apparel. "It seems that we no longer understand war," wrote Colonel Bampfield in April, 1672, to De Witt, and another time he said

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 185.

that the Dutch officers ought to camp out for three months to learn what was required in time of war.

De Witt quickly comprehended the danger. At the first rumours of the French preparations, in October, 1669, he urged a reënforcement of army and navy, the former by 50,000 men, and the appointment of expert foreign officers, but not until a year later was the increase adopted with a tenth of what De Witt desired. He ceased not to call for vigorous measures, by which he hoped to have finally 100,000 men in readiness. To simplify the payment he wished the maritime provinces to care for the fleet and the land provinces for the army. But the unwillingness to spend much money and domestic dissension, the difficulty of inducing most of the provinces to pay their arrears to Holland and the admiralties, and the opposition of Zealand long worked against any organisation, so that it was the spring of 1671 before the necessary money was granted. The fleet, which had been at sea in 1671, was dismantled for the winter, and the army remained in the garrisons. De Witt, now alarmed by the attitude of France and England both, proposed the fitting out of 120 vessels and a new enlistment of 20,000 men, but the Estates, slow as always and, so far as Zealand was concerned at least, little inclined to coöperate with the leaders of the ruling party, did not consent immediately, and when they at last took the matter in hand the proposal was cut down considerably. Great troubles arose over the payment of all these extraordinary armaments, which much exceeded the ordinary war budget of less than $4\frac{1}{2}$ million guilders. The bad financial condition of several provinces brought everything down upon overburdened Holland, which groaned under a debt of 125 millions, and was unable to meet its obligations in spite of De Witt's admirable financial management. De Witt's attempts to impose new taxes failed owing to the opposition of commerce. Loans were thus the only means

of raising money, and availing himself of his studies of probabilities and of his calculations of the average duration of life De Witt, with the aid of the Amsterdam regent Jan Hudde, explained in a detailed report the advantages of the issue of life annuities by the state over ordinary loans. But the Estates of Holland were not convinced by the council pensionary's representations, and several ordinary loans were concluded in 1671 and 1672, so that the province's debt bore 11 millions of interest a year, representing a capital of about 240 million guilders. This increase was met in part by taxes on carriages and beer, in part by a reduction of interest. De Witt proposed a reduction from 4 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but it was resolved to limit it to $3\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., while the deficiency was made up from the reserve fund which he had formed in 1655. But the necessary money was not thus accumulated, and Holland in the spring of 1672 at the approach of war was obliged to raise a 200th penny of all property, a few weeks later doubled and tripled and accompanied by a land and poll tax, finally by a forced loan with interest of from 2 to 4 per cent.

So money was at last obtained for the war. The navy in May, 1672, was brought up to more than 130 ships, the army, on paper at least, to about 52,000 men. De Witt was by no means satisfied with the latter figure and, with great difficulty, secured new reënforcements which would increase the army to 80,000 men, and 20,000 militia were to be called out besides bands of armed peasants to throw up earthworks. The 100,000 men and more, deemed necessary by the council pensionary, would thus be assembled. In reality, however, not over 50,000 to 60,000 men were under arms at the outbreak of the war.¹ He urged rapidity in collecting the troops authorised, which were to come largely from Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, and the German countries. But all did not go as it

¹ Knoop, *Willem de Derde*, i., p. 85.

should. It was too late to put the army, neglected for years and according to De Witt's system cut up between seven provinces, at one stroke into a condition to meet a formidable enemy. Furthermore, magistrates and people lacked enthusiasm, the conviction that the fight was for the fatherland and not for the preservation of a certain government; there was a want of the courage and desire to defend themselves and to exchange tranquil enjoyment and prosperity for privation and sacrifice. Men came from the cities in quite large numbers, but the peasants refused to take up arms; the States showed irresolution and slowness; and De Groot in February exclaimed indignantly—"is it possible that the descendants of a nation, which laid the foundations of our freedom, so feebly defend what their forefathers obtained with so much glory?"¹ Much had to occur to revive the heroic spirit.

The question of the command of the army was connected with that of the prince of Orange and occasioned great difficulties. The prince was now a member of the council of state, and the youth of barely twenty took his seat in it. He was already becoming a political personage of importance, and De Witt had cherished some hope of a good understanding with England at the time of the prince's journey there in the autumn of 1670; it was even contemplated to intrust a sort of mission to him with Van Beuningen, but the project was given up at De Witt's suggestion. The swiftly approaching danger of war directed attention to the heir of the military traditions of the famous family, however young and inexperienced he might be. But the Harmony provided that he was not to be proposed as captain-general before his twenty-second year, and he would not attain that age until November, 1672. A year earlier, however, Gelderland desired to designate him for that office, and one province after another expressed the same wish in spite of the stipulations of the

¹Wicquefort, iv., p. 354. See Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 232.

Harmony. Even Holland wavered. In the Estates of Holland Enkhuizen made the proposition in December, 1671, and it was supported by the nobility, so that it cost De Witt the most strenuous exertion to resist the appointment with the small majority following him. He was obliged to allow the drawing up of instructions for the captain-general to be elected. The first step was thus taken, though Perpetual Edict and Harmony continued in name to exist and the proposed captain-general was bound to them, while his authority was restricted so that it would be entirely under control of the States and of their representatives. After these precautions De Witt, yielding to the popular wish, consented finally to the prince's appointment for one campaign. The desired appointment for life could then be considered in November. But this concession was regarded in the States-General as insufficient by the other provinces, and the young prince of Orange, instigated by Fagel, declared his unwillingness to accept the office on such conditions, while the two field marshals, John Maurice and Wurtz, ranged themselves on his side. De Witt saw the necessity of giving way still further, and on consultation with Fagel and Beverningh an agreement was reached at the end of February, first in the Estates of Holland, then in the States-General, conferring the office of captain-general upon the prince for one campaign under limitations but with more liberal instructions, which were to become definitive in November. On the 25th the prince was invested with the office amid the exultation of the people after a speech in the States-General, and a banquet offered by the new captain-general closed the long negotiations. Deputies for the field were named, among whom were Cornelius de Witt and Beverningh for Holland, the latter showing himself more and more a partisan of Orange. The chief officers were appointed—the two aged field marshals, the rhinegrave of Salm as commander of the

cavalry, the lord of Zuylesteyn as commander of the infantry, other moderately able officers as generals under them: Van Welderen and Nassau-Saarbrück with Montbas, De Groot's brother-in-law, as commissary general for the cavalry, the Swede Königsmark and the fiery Hans Willem van Aylva for the infantry, with the Scotchman Kirkpatrick and Van Styrum as sergeant-majors and the Frenchman Pain-et-Vin as quartermaster general, the count of Hoorn for the artillery. The army thus organised was collected on the Yssel after the detachment of a large number of garrisons to fortresses and forts, so that hardly 20,000 men remained under the command of an inexperienced youth, supported by old or incompetent subordinate commanders. Garrisons and forts were in poor condition. Trees on the ramparts were hastily cut down, gardens destroyed, houses in the firing zone demolished, rusted cannon brought out from the magazines, powder and ball scraped together, inundations prepared. What had been neglected for twenty-five years could not be restored in a moment. The results of De Witt's system, springing from fear of the military power of the Oranges, made themselves felt in the shape of general military helplessness.

In a much better condition was the fleet which had been at sea in the summer of 1671 and was kept in good order by De Ruyter with Banckers, Van Nes, and Van Ghent. But its equipment had suffered under De Witt's idea that the war would be against France only. When it appeared that England must again be fought, it was resolved in March to bring the fleet up to 120 ships with nearly 30,000 men. The closing of navigation to the Baltic, to the English and French coasts, and through the Channel, the prohibition of the exportation of munitions of war enabled the admiralties to fit out vessels speedily. A commission,¹ of which John de Witt was once more the soul,

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 261.

took from the States-General the care of the navy and urged the admiralties to haste, but only Amsterdam and the Meuse did their full duty. It was the middle of May before the fleet was ready to sail out, which delay, to the disappointment of De Witt, prevented an attack upon the English fleet before its junction with the French. As in the second English war the fleet was quite equal to its task, and De Ruyter, commanding it as lieutenant admiral, had no need of the young prince, whom the Orange party had at first destined also for the dignity of admiral-general. As in 1667 Cornelius de Witt embarked as the plenipotentiary of the States-General.

Thus stood the means of defence on land and sea in the spring of 1672. The enemy hoped that other circumstances would weaken the efforts to repulse him. First and foremost of these circumstances was the discord among the people. The threatening danger had turned the eyes of the people with more love than ever upon the prince of Orange. Though he was now captain-general for one campaign, the manner in which his elevation to this post had been wrested as it were from the party of the States had augmented the feeling against the party and its leaders. If defeats ensued, internal commotions would not be absent and the existing government would almost certainly be overturned, while the young prince, inexperienced as he was, would not be able to combine the reorganisation of the government with the command of the army in a war with a victorious foe. Then the republic, torn within itself and assailed by a superior force, would fall an easy prey into the conqueror's hands—a calculation which failed at last, although for a time it seemed likely to be realised. The enemy attacking on the east side counted upon another cause of dissension, upon the dissatisfaction of the Catholics there so numerous with their condition under the government of the States. He was deceived in his expectations, but there are traces of the

action of this cause in the defeats suffered. After the peace of Münster the condition of the Catholics in the republic was little changed, although there was no longer any fear of secret relations with Spain and the Brussels government. Public worship continued to be prohibited for the Catholics, but, as before, worship in private was secured by money paid to the officials. And this privacy was public, while the Catholics themselves did not complain much of the state of affairs, knowing well that they were quite otherwise persecuted elsewhere in Protestant countries and that the Protestants in Catholic countries were in an infinitely worse condition, so that they had only to rejoice at the fact that the States gave no attention to the repeated exhortations of preachers and church councils to wreak vengeance on them for the violence done elsewhere to the Protestants. The apostolic vicar Jacobus de la Torre (1651-1661) complained in his *Relatio* of 1656 to the papal see about his diocese, but his second successor, Johannes van Neercassel (1663-1686), was more ready to submit to actual conditions.¹ Under the government of De Witt, who regarded it to the interest of the republic to allow different religious beliefs to live in peace, provided they respected the laws of the state, there was much less reason to complain, and Neercassel's relation of 1668 praises the freedom enjoyed in Holland, where the building of churches, divine worship, religious instruction were connived at. Foreign Catholics of the time testify to the same effect.

In the other provinces, except in Friesland where oppression was reported, the situation was about the same as in Holland, even in Utrecht, whose capital was inhabited by the violent Voetius, while in Groningen, Drenthe, and Zealand the small number of Catholics constantly diminished under the now and then sharp persecution. Most

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Katholieken onder de Republiek*, i., pp. 227, 287.

of the Catholics lived in the cities of Holland, in Amsterdam alone 30,000, and in the country of Utrecht and Overysse. In the generality lands, with the majority of the population Catholic, placards were issued and annoying measures adopted, but they failed to attain their object. Under Neercassel's moderate rule the Catholic church flourished, so that his clergy showed slight inclination to take part in movements hostile to the States. Besides about 300 priests and chaplains there were over a hundred members of religious orders active here, mostly Jesuits. The old jealousy between them and the secular clergy still existed, and the Jesuits sought to throw off the supervision of the vicars. Neercassel went to Rome in 1670 to complain of the attitude of the Jesuits and of the brothers of the orders in general, and his authority was confirmed. Outside of the ardent champions of the Catholic faith there were naturally many people who, without wishing for the victory of the Catholic enemy, would in case of such a victory be speedily ready to make friends with their fellow-believers and to submit to their sway. But it was to be an exception for them to take up arms against the government of the country, to serve its enemies, or to commit treason by supporting them. It is clear, however, that under these circumstances the Protestants watched their Catholic fellow-citizens with suspicion and in the eastern provinces especially an uncomfortable feeling prevented their vigorous defence.

Thus the war began.² The enemy's plan was to avoid the fortresses of the generality lands, because they could only be attacked after crossing a wide Spanish territory and taking Spanish forts in Brabant and Flanders, while

¹ The total number of Catholics is estimated by Neercassel at 400,000, outside of the generality lands, so that the number of Catholics may safely be placed at half a million, about one-third of the population of that time.

² See Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, i.; Sypesteijn and De Bordes, *De verdediging van Nederland in 1672 en 1673*; Knoop, *Willem de Derde*.

then the large rivers would still be in the front. It seemed better to follow Alva's route of a hundred years earlier, to make Charleroi the base of operations, to go through Liege and a small section of Spanish territory into Cologne, masking Maestricht with a sufficient number of troops, then to cross the Yssel or the Rhine and to penetrate quickly to the heart of Holland, while the German allies were conquering the east and north and the united fleets were blockading the coasts, possibly landing troops here and there in Holland. The eight or nine thousand men in Maestricht would then be isolated, the army on the Yssel be compelled to retreat on penalty of being cut off, and the small garrisons be either overwhelmed or held in check.

Late in April Louis XIV. left his palace, and before the middle of May his troops moved northwards from Charleroi and Sedan. Turenne and Chamilly went with the main army along the Meuse to Visé, where the former crossed the river on the 24th and directed his course towards Burik; Chamilly surrounded Maestricht with a number of strong posts; Condé marched from Liege through Cologne territory to Kaiserswerth, where he crossed the Rhine in the direction of the Lippe. At the beginning of June, Turenne lay before Burik, Louis himself before Rijnberk and Orsoy, Condé before Wesel, all ready to commence the attack upon those "bulwarks of the state." De Witt had hoped to anticipate the enemy by securing possession of Cologne or Neuss before the French auxiliary troops arrived there. Towards the end of April, John Maurice, with cavalry and infantry, marched rapidly in that direction, but he came too late and had to return to the fortresses of Cleves. Those bulwarks appeared now quite unworthy of the name: they fell like card houses, badly garrisoned, miserably armed, and weakly defended as they were. Thus fell Rees and Emmerich, afterwards Doetinchem and Grol, and the country

lay open to the Yssel. The line of the Yssel from Arnhem to Deventer offered few chances of better success, as it could be easily flanked on the north and south. The enemy moved up from Wesel with his whole force, in order to attack the line in front, according to Condé's plan, or, adopting that of the more prudent Turenne, to force the Rhine at Nimwegen, and thus to turn Prince William's right flank. The latter was resolved upon, and on June 10th the French main army came to the Rhine at Elten, opposite the Tolhuis (Toll-house), where some troops under Montbas were stationed. Montbas, commanding only a few thousand men, asked for reinforcements, but received them not at all or too late, left his position, and fell back to the main line. An attempt was made to repair this fault—Montbas was accused of treason, probably quite unjustly—and infantry and cavalry were sent again to the Tolhuis, where perhaps a few thousand men under Wurtz were posted. This small force was insufficient to dispute the enemy's passage, and the crossing was effected on the 12th under the guidance of De Guiche and Condé himself. Wurtz was driven back by the superior force and fled with the cavalry, while his infantry, on the point of surrendering, through a misunderstanding took up arms again, and after a bloody fight, in which many French officers fell and Condé himself was wounded, was destroyed or captured, as was also Aylva's regiment, hastening to the scene from Nimwegen. This was the affair that is exaggerated by Louis's courtiers and later historians to a deed of high renown, but in reality is of slight significance from a military point of view.

The French main army now marched towards Doesburg, while Condé planned with all the cavalry to move through the Betuwe and Utrecht directly upon Amsterdam and Turenne appeared at Arnhem. The Dutch army on the Yssel was in danger of being cut off and retreated to

Utrecht, where it arrived about the 15th. Condé's plan was given up on account of his wound and would have been difficult to execute. The prince's army, diminished to about 8000 men after the detachment of garrisons to the Yssel and Rhine cities, stood before Utrecht, which immediately shut its gates from fear of being exposed to a siege and of seeing its suburbs burned. It demanded, nevertheless, a vigorous defence from the prince, but after negotiation and the positive refusal of Utrecht to allow its suburbs to be burned the army left this position on the 18th by order of the States-General and fell back to the frontier of Holland, the famous old water line of Holland. Gelderland and Utrecht were thus given up within a month after the enemy had appeared on the border. In those provinces, outside of the great fortresses on the Rhine and Yssel, there was nothing to resist the enemy, who with 4000 cavalry occupied the chief places, on the 21st Utrecht, and even penetrated to Naarden, Leerdam, and Asperen. Muiden also was almost taken, important on account of its nearness to the sluices in the Vecht, but Count John Maurice put a garrison there in time.

Meanwhile Overijssel had fallen into the hands of the Münster and Cologne forces, which, with the help of a French corps under Luxembourg, captured the smaller fortified places and then attacked Deventer and Zwolle. The former, heavily bombarded, capitulated after a few days, and Zwolle and Kampen surrendered in a like cowardly manner. It quickly appeared that bribery and treason had here played a great part; the secretary of the Estates, many noblemen of Overijssel, many regents seem to have formed a plot for delivering the province up to the enemy. Early in July it was shamefully given over by treaty to Münster, which through an agreement with Louis XIV. and Cologne was assured of the undisturbed possession of the conquered province with Grol, Bredevoort, Borculoo, and whatever should be taken in Fries-

land and Groningen. Deventer alone went to Cologne, Kampen to Louis who reserved for himself all Gelderland and Utrecht. Across Drenthe, guarded by Steenwijk and Coevorden, the garrisons rescued by such faithful officers as the colonels Bampfield and Ripperda retreated to Friesland and Groningen.¹ Three provinces lost and the enemy on the frontiers of Holland, Friesland, and Groningen—such were the results of the war on land in the first month.

It went better on the sea. Here too the republic encountered a superior force. The English and French fleets numbered together 172 ships with 5000 guns and 33,000 men, while the republic possessed 133 ships with 4500 guns and 26,000 men. York and Montague commanded the English fleet, d'Estrées and Duquesne the French; the Dutch fleet was again under De Ruyter with Van Ghent and Banckers as subordinate commanders. On the sea De Witt had wished to anticipate the enemy by an attack upon Brest and La Rochelle, and by landing on the French coast, but the English declaration of war had spoiled this plan. A new expedition to the Thames was now considered for the purpose of destroying the vessels there fitting out. But these plans failed in consequence of the delay of Zealand's squadron and contrary winds. The two hostile fleets were able to unite at Portsmouth. De Witt urged such an enterprise upon De Ruyter and his brother, the plenipotentiary of the States on the fleet, and Van Ghent with a squadron of light vessels actually sailed into the Thames again, but he met with such resistance at Sheerness that he had to turn back. Nothing now remained but a battle on the open sea, and full of hope the intrepid leaders resolved to venture this. They sought and found the enemy on June 7th at Solebay, on the eastern coast of England. Deeply convinced of the great importance of a victory, De Ruyter before the engagement summoned

¹ Der Kinderen, *De Nederlandsche Republiek en Munster 1666-1679* (Leiden, 1874), p. 175; Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 327.

his captains on board his ship, the *Seven Provinces*, and earnestly addressed them. The battle was chiefly between the Dutch and English fleets, as the French took little part in the fight. York, attacked by De Ruyter himself, was repeatedly compelled to change his ship; Montague, hard pushed by Van Brakel with a much smaller vessel, found death in the waves; the French were made to retreat by Banckers. The English fleet suffered severely and lost several ships. But there were heavy losses also on the Dutch side; Van Ghent perished, and the dead and wounded were numerous. The Hollanders fought like lions. De Ruyter was everywhere and everything: admiral, captain, steersman, sailor, soldier, all at once. De Witt stood with calm courage among his bodyguard of twelve halberdiers in the most dangerous place; Van Nes, Banckers, De Liefde, Sweers, Den Haen, surpassed one another in valour. Although greater advantages were won by the Dutch side, the victory remained doubtful, but on the following day the enemy declined battle and the Dutch fleet alone kept the sea, returning afterwards to the ports in order to repair damages. The danger of a landing from the combined fleets was averted. Of what help was this naval success in the hard trials of the war on land? The States-General resolved to reduce the fleet considerably, no less than one-third of the ships being unrigged, and to use some of the sailors and marines in the land war. Cornelius de Witt returned home sick with rheumatism and gout. De Ruyter continued in command of the sixty large ships, which were retained in service, but from now on had to be content with a more modest task than that of meeting the enemy on the open sea.

The French were meanwhile masters in Utrecht and Gelderland. Arnhem surrendered without a blow, the fort Knodsenburg after a short defence, Schenkenschans without any resistance, Doesburg after a weak opposition,

Zutphen after defending itself four days. More than twenty-five towns and forts were taken in that month by the French army. The king himself received at Doesburg the deputation from the Estates of Utrecht, which came to deliver the entire province to him, and established himself in the castle of the lord of Odyk at Zeist, while he made a brilliant entry into Utrecht surrounded by his nobles and the best divisions of his army. Luxembourg was given the chief command in Utrecht. The king remained at Zeist to examine the offers expected from the States-General. Those offers were not long absent. A great panic prevailed in Holland after the disastrous defeats. Confidence was slight in the defence of Holland's water line which extended from Muiden to Gorkum. The army occupying this line contained scarcely 10,000 men, and the 1600 Spanish cavalry, sent at the eleventh hour by the count de Monterey without an actual declaration of war on France, were of great help. Muiden under John Maurice, Schoonhoven under Louvignies with the Spaniards, Gouda under Hoorne, Gorkum under Wurtz were the main points of defence with the prince's headquarters at Nieuwerbrug, where he had 3600 men under Zuylesteyn. Want of stores and discipline, antiquated cannon, indefensible walls and retrenchments, distrust of the leaders' capacity—all combined to justify the fear that this last line also would give way at the first attack. With all that, the position behind the water line seemed so strong that Louis XIV. hesitated to assail it.

This water line, put at the last moment by the Estates of Holland, at De Witt's entreaty, between that province and the enemy, appeared for a time to give safety. In the middle of June Amsterdam consented to let the water overflow the land in order to repel the invasion, and soon the fertile country and fine villas lay buried under the brackish water of river and sea. In some districts, particularly around Woerden and Gouda, the peasants were

with difficulty brought to this sacrifice ; here and there force had to be used and the sluices were strongly guarded to prevent them from being secretly closed. By vigorous measures the prince overcame all opposition, and the enemy was checked. But the panic within the line was none the less. "Everybody stood stunned and dumb; everybody found his house too small and fearsome and betook himself to the street, where he encountered for his consolation nothing but lamentation and misery; everybody hung his head like a reed; everybody seemed to have received his sentence of death; the trades were at a stand; the shops were shut; the courts were closed; colleges and schools took a vacation; the churches, on the other hand, were too small for the troubled hearts that groaned with anguish more than they could pray."¹ People hid their valuables and shipped wife and child to neighbouring countries. The confusion grew worse as time went on. Disorder and defection were feared among the Romanists, who sometimes assisted the enemy in the provinces already conquered. Treason and cowardice were dreaded on all sides. "The government was without counsel, the people without reason, the country without rescue." The government securities suddenly dropped far below their value. A forced loan of uncoined gold and silver furnished money temporarily, but coin became ever scarcer. Holland's securities fell quickly from above par to 30 per cent., those of the East India Company from 572 to 250. There was a run upon the Amsterdam bank to withdraw deposits. In July the state's obligations were quite unsalable.

Under such conditions negotiation with the enemy was the only salvation, though it might occur merely to win time and perhaps to find alliances: with Sweden, Denmark, Brandenburg, Spain, the emperor, or even England. The chances for such connections were not entirely

¹ Valckenier, *'t Verwerde Europa*, iii., p. 636.

lost. From Sweden and Denmark little appeared to be expected, but weak Spain was ready to help, although it did not venture upon open war with France. More important was it that the mortal enemy of French policy in Europe, Lisola, now imperial ambassador at The Hague, convinced the Vienna court of the dangers threatening the house of Hapsburg from the side of France and induced the elector of Brandenburg also to maintain his alliance with the States. Before the end of the month the certainty was acquired that the emperor and Brandenburg would soon appear with an army to uphold the peace of Münster and to guard the German empire against losses. On the 13th of June, after the passage at the Tolhuis, De Witt with an eye to Lisola's diplomatic activity had proposed to Fagel negotiation with France and England. First Holland, then the poorly attended assembly of the States-General, was persuaded to send two embassies, to Charles II. and to Louis XIV. Van Weede van Dijkveld and Cornelis Teresteyn van Halewijn, both excellent diplomatists, betook themselves to England, but the ambassador Boreel still there had to report that Charles II. would not negotiate without France. To the house at Keppel near Doesburg, where Louis remained, went a deputation, headed by Jan van Ghent and Pieter de Groot and consisting besides of Eck for Groningen and the prince's cousin Odijk. They were haughtily repulsed on the 22nd by Pomponne and Louvois, and De Groot returned immediately to The Hague for further instructions or for the full powers which the king had demanded for the negotiators.

At The Hague he found the States under the impression of an important event, the attempt on the life of De Witt, against whom the most violent reproaches were heard after the first defeats. Late in the evening of the 21st he was returning from his work, doubly arduous in these days, with his servant and his clerk along the

Vijverberg to his home on the Kneuterdijk, when he was attacked by the brothers Van der Graeff, sons of the councillor, and two accomplices and was dangerously stabbed. One of the assassins, Jacob van der Graeff, was caught and beheaded on the 29th; the others escaped . . . to the prince's camp.¹ An assault on Cornelius de Witt at Dordrecht a few days later testified again to the popular hatred of the two brothers, who were regarded not only as the personal enemies of the beloved prince but as the artificers of the country's misfortune, and whose fall seemed the first condition of rescue. That fall was rapidly approaching, at least the overthrow of the government, of which they and their friends were the soul, but which had been unable to save the country from the disasters now ravaging it.

De Witt in these circumstances was not in a condition to rise from his bed, and his cousin Vivien had to lead the Estates of Holland, when De Groot appeared on the 25th with his message. Opinion favoured the continuation of the negotiation, but Amsterdam declared its opposition, unless the representatives made a tour to the towns to learn their feelings in this important matter. De Groot advised peace with an offer of Maestricht and the generality lands, besides payment of the costs of war. Amsterdam's deputies resisted firmly, and it was resolved, after asking instructions, to meet again in the evening of the 26th. Amsterdam and four other towns remained absent, while Enkhuizen alone objected to the resolution to sue for peace, urged by the pensionaries of Leyden and Gouda, Burgersdyck and Van der Tocht, and adopted by the members present, which resolution was at once referred to the States-General. Here also it was weighed in great haste and with waxing excitement. Zealand and Friesland wanted first to hear from their Estates; Utrecht could not do so and abstained; Overijssel desired peace

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 395.

on any terms; Groningen was absent; Gelderland and Holland favoured giving the full powers. But the end was not yet reached. The president Kann of Friesland and the presidents of the two preceding weeks refused to take the resolution; finally Wassenaer van Duivenvoorde in the name of Holland put himself in the president's chair and accepted the resolution, which after Fagel had declined was signed by his first clerk. Thus by two votes and in a very informal way the full powers were conferred, being limited only by the condition proposed by De Groot himself that they should be valid with maintenance and restoration of the sovereignty of the States as they had existed before the war.¹ So great was the anxiety that De Groot was begged to hasten. Even in the prince of Orange's camp the return of De Groot was awaited with suspense, and both the princess dowager and the prince himself sought to obtain from the king a safeguard for their property. De Groot had been unwilling to use the safeguard offered him for his country house. Amsterdam's attitude in these days was worthy of the great city's traditions in contrast with all these evidences of cowardice and discouragement. The municipal council voted unanimously on the 28th to protest against the resolutions adopted by the States and to arouse the other provinces to defence to the last drop of blood. Valckenier and De Graeff, Hooft, Hasselaer, the pensionary Hop, manfully opposed all efforts to save life and property by humiliation, and the last named in the meeting of the States reproached vehemently the other cities for their pusillanimity and neglect of duty. But De Groot was on the way.

During all this fermentation the revolution in Holland and Zealand had progressed. On the day of the attack upon John de Witt the first blow was given to his system of government. The citizens of Veere acclaimed the

¹ *Lettres de De Groot à Wicquefort*, ed. Krämer, p. 307.

prince as stadtholder of Zealand, and the movement in this province spread speedily from one town to another ; the magistrates yielded to the popular wish which saw no other salvation from the impending ruin but Orange. News of negotiations with the enemy kindled a flame also in Holland's towns. At Dordrecht, the bulwark of the De Witts, a movement of the people arose on the 28th against them and in favour of Orange. "Up with Orange!" accompanied by "Down with the De Witts!" resounded upon all the streets. The old council, menaced by the populace, assembled and invited the prince to come over. He arrived in the city on the following day, was received in princely fashion, and after brief opposition by the magistrates he was, at the demand of the people, declared stadtholder by the government. But the Perpetual Edict which he had sworn to ! Cornelius de Witt refused at first to sign the document, even after the prince had been solemnly absolved by two preachers from his oath to the Edict, but he finally gave way to the supplications of his wife, alarmed at the raging multitude without. Vivien signed only "as pensionary," as the servant of the city's regents. What happened in Dordrecht was repeated elsewhere. The movement extended from one city to another, and in a few days the case was decided. The actual appointment by the States still remained, but what could they do, especially while De Witt was prevented by his wounds from appearing in the assembly ?

Just then De Groot returned with the intelligence that Louis demanded part of Gelderland south of the Lek, for Cologne Rijnberk with some territory, for Münster the greater portion of Overijssel, for England Delfzijl with the environs ; for himself he would be satisfied with the cession of a part of the generality lands, Crèvecœur, Bois-le-Duc, and Maestricht ; finally he asked for complete freedom and equality for the Catholics, repeal of all commercial regulations against France, an advantageous

treaty of commerce, 24 million francs for war expenses, and the annual presentation by a deputation of a gold medal in token of gratitude "for having preserved to the United Provinces the independence which the kings his predecessors had caused them to acquire." All the efforts of the ambassadors to reduce these humiliating terms secured nothing but a limitation of the frontier to the Waal and a diminution of the war expenses to twenty million francs. But these demands were much too high, and on July 1st the ambassadors, not daring to use their full powers, departed for The Hague, promising to come back within five days. Those were trying days for the Estates which still lacked De Witt's trained leadership. From all sides came reports of tumults and declarations in favour of Orange; amid turbulence and war, while the enemy lay on the border and nobody felt sure of the defence, there must be deliberation concerning a change in the system of government and concerning the hard conditions of peace at the same time. A Rotterdam burgo-master ventured to bring up the subject of the stadtholdership; the delegates from Dordrecht alone declined to discuss it, but the others were ready, and Burgersdyck of Leyden proposed that the town councils should be consulted. A postponement of two days was accepted, and all seemed to depend upon Amsterdam, which under the influence of Valckenier and Van Beuningen inclined to the abrogation of the Edict. When the Estates met again on the 3d of July, the affair was settled: repeal of the oath to the Edict was granted and Amsterdam proposed the introduction once more of the stadtholdership immediately and without restriction. *Hodie constat, hodie agatur.* Early in the morning of the 4th of July the resolution went through for offering to the prince the stadtholdership of Holland as his forefathers had possessed it with the exception only of the appointment to municipal offices. A stately deputation went to his camp to offer

him the dignity, and after being relieved from his oath the prince accepted it. Zealand had come to the same resolution two days earlier. On the 8th the States-General also appointed him captain- and admiral-general of the Union. What a sudden change for the young prince! He received it with calm self-control and was installed on the 9th without much ceremony, returning then to the camp of Nieuwerbrug. His grandmother saw the aim of her life accomplished and wished him the patience and steadfastness of his renowned grandfather in the troublous days awaiting him.

Amidst these events the demands of Louis were received with vexation and exasperation. On motion of Amsterdam, which declared for breaking off the negotiation, Holland resolved to refer to the newly elected stadtholder, but he pronounced the terms unacceptable and himself ready to defend Holland's frontiers, provided reinforcements were sent him. The French conditions were then rejected unanimously, though it was desired to have De Groot continue the negotiation. He asked for new instructions, calling attention to the expiration of the time fixed by him at Zeist. Van Beuningen, proposed as his associate, refused to go and urged the continuation of the war, as after the prince's elevation a favourable disposition of the English court and help from Brandenburg and the emperor might be counted upon. Holland and afterwards the States-General resolved not to stop the negotiation, notwithstanding the terms offered were rejected, but De Groot declined to resume his task, and Van Ghent now obtained alone the mission. This was equivalent to breaking off the negotiation with France. That with England had little more success. Halewijn and Dijkveld on arriving there were treated almost like prisoners. But meanwhile the prince himself,¹ after discussing matters privately with Sylvius who was passing through, had sent

¹ See Fruin in *Nijh. Bijdr. N. R.*, iii., p. 287.

his trusted servant Van Reede van Schonauwen to Charles II. to sound him as to the possibilities of peace. The manner of the reception accorded to the English ministers, Buckingham and Arlington, travelling through Holland on their way to the French headquarters indicated that much hope was beginning to be felt of England's mediation. The two English lords visited the prince also at Bodegraven and consented in his name to offer to Louis Maestricht and the Rhine fortresses. But the English government was not at all of a mind to help draw the republic out of the fire so cheaply. On coming to Louis XIV., now at Heeswijk, the English ambassadors (July 16th) concluded a new treaty with him, which bound the two monarchs closely to one another, and by which England stipulated for itself Sluis, Walcheren, Cadzand, Goeree, and Voorne, besides 25 million francs for war expenses, an annual payment for the herring fishery, and recognition of its pretensions respecting the flag. William III. was then to become sovereign of the remaining portion of the republic, after the subtraction of what France, Münster, and Cologne were to obtain.

The prince had been really disposed to concede peculiarly favourable conditions to England, and Sylvius, having again returned there, had received promises from him, by which on his own authority he offered to the king, provided he would separate from France: recognition of the demands concerning the flag, 100,000 francs a year for the herring fishery, cession of Surinam, payment of four million francs for war expenses, Sluis in pledge, sovereignty over the seven provinces for the prince. Charles II., however, rejected these terms, and therewith ended for the time—and fortunately—this negotiation.¹ Arms were to decide, now under the undaunted lead of the young

¹ The letters exchanged in Costerus, *Historisch verhael ofte deductie van zaaken raekende het formeren van de republieque in 1572 en van het gebeurde in 1672 en 1673* (Leiden, 1736). See Schotel, in *Nijh. Bijdr. N. R.*, iv. p. 7.

prince himself, who after this brief hesitation was determined to die in the last ditch rather than to purchase peace with dishonour.

The course of affairs in Holland and Zealand had removed the foundations of De Witt's system, but he was still council pensionary and his friends were everywhere in the government. During those July days in Holland the agitation manifested itself in popular risings against the adherents of the fallen system, and the prince took no vigorous measures to repress the turbulence. By request of the States he exhorted to peace, but he refused to punish the culprits, asserting that the leaders were in too high places, and that he needed his soldiers on the border. Evidently he wished the resignation of the chief statesmen and considered popular agitation as the best means of obtaining it. The publication of a letter to the prince from Charles II., in which the latter threw the whole blame of the war on the enemies of Orange, poured oil into the fire of popular passion.¹ Some facts already indicated the fate awaiting the partisans of the States. The severe punishment inflicted on Montbas, degradation and ineligibility for any command, was changed at the instance of the prince to imprisonment for fifteen years, but even this penalty appeared insufficient and Montbas's affair was again examined for the purpose of condemning him to death. He only escaped the scaffold by flight and sought safety with the enemy. His fate and the disturbances of every day alarmed De Witt's followers, and many of them prepared to fly. De Groot fearing arrest withdrew to the Spanish Netherlands. A report of De Witt's secret flight was spread, but the council pensionary was too proud to save himself in that way and remained quietly at home waiting for his complete recovery, surrounded by his family and ready to face the gathering storms, refraining from all opposition to the

¹ Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 465.

prince's growing authority, of which some of his friends were really guilty. His opponents did not leave him unmolested. Scandalous pamphlets accused him of improper use of the secret funds, and he deemed it necessary from his sick-bed to defend himself by disclosing his private affairs, whereupon he was on July 23d exonerated from all suspicion by a resolution of the Estates adopted unanimously. But the prince himself answered with cool evasion to the great statesman's request for help against this accusation. It was a bad omen.

His brother Cornelius was the first victim of hatred. The most shameful accusations were uttered against him also, and calumny spoke of cowardice and incompetence, treason and misuse of public money. In a riot at Dordrecht, his portrait in the city hall was torn to pieces, and the head was hung on the gallows. He was arrested suddenly on the 24th and taken to The Hague, where he was imprisoned in the Kasteleinij.¹ The proceedings were in deep secrecy, and the council pensionary could only with difficulty learn that upon the denunciation of a certain barber, Tichelaer of Piershil, his brother was suspected of complicity in a plot to assassinate the prince. The barber was a man of ill-repute, and three years earlier he had been prosecuted in the governor's name for an attempt at rape, later for perjury and insults to his judges. The governor was heard on the testimony of this rogue who related that early in July the governor had wanted to persuade him to assassinate the prince in his camp. In the very first examination he protested earnestly and asserted that Tichelaer, on the contrary, had desired to speak to him about an "important affair," which might save the country, and that he had been unwilling to hear anything about it. Neither he nor his brother felt uneasy over the result. The doubtful feature of the matter was that the governor without further

¹ See Wijnne, *Het proces van Cornelis de Witt*, in *Geschiedenis*, p. 230.

investigation had taken the precaution to warn his wife, and through her the secretary of the town, Muys van Holy, through him one of the burgomasters and the under-sheriff, while it would have been better to inform the competent authority immediately of Tichelaer's dangerous offer. This was, at the most, a blamable postponement. The Dordt deputies, knowing the hostile disposition of the court towards the governor, who had many enemies on account of his undeniable pride and passion, found it necessary to ask the Estates to bring the matter before a judge of Dordrecht and at least to have Tichelaer arrested, which had been demanded also by Jacob de Witt, the aged father of the accused. The Estates did not venture to displease the prince by releasing immediately the accused and appointed commissioners to investigate. That the prince was ill-affected towards the governor appeared from his wishing to let the law take its course. The court imprisoned Tichelaer in the Gevangenpoort, where the governor was also transferred, while all efforts to secure his release failed. The council pensionary did his best to win advocates and to collect legal opinions in his brother's favour. De Ruyter declared there was not a word of truth in the accusations concerning the governor's conduct on the fleet. On the 1st of August, after appearing in church the preceding day to thank God for his recovery, the council pensionary visited the prince. The interview was cool, and to De Witt's offer of his resignation William III. replied with indifference that De Witt must take it to the Estates.

On the 4th the council pensionary made his last appearance in the Estates, understanding that he could no longer find a place in the government under the new system, and preferring to resign voluntarily rather than to play an insignificant part or to be dismissed. He announced his purpose in an appropriate speech, in which he alluded to his activity of nineteen years, his warnings,

his exhortations to prepare for defence, the fateful course of the war, which naturally had cast the blame for everything on the government and especially on him, the first servant of the state, who therefore now asked for his release, expecting that the Estates, in accordance with their thrice repeated promise, would grant him the post of councillor in the High Council. The Estates were willing to relieve him with a warm expression of thanks in the name of the majority, while Amsterdam and four other cities wished to give him simply the release asked for; they requested from him further a report on the finances. But next day Haarlem moved an investigation of his administration particularly with regard to the prince's army and the secret funds. The prince did not deny the desirability of this, but advised he should be discharged merely without the beautiful formulas of thanks. So it was done, and the excellent man complained of being misunderstood by his people who now hated him fiercely. Although the prince approved of his admission to the High Council, Zealand managed to postpone it. But with all the complaints De Witt was satisfied by the conclusion of the affair. He rejoiced too soon. Five days later Fagel was elected to his place with instructions corresponding in the main to those of De Witt, while the latter's offices of keeper of the great seal and governor of the fiefs went to a member of the nobility. The prince had approved of the instructions and chosen Fagel from the list recommended to him, including Van Beverningh, Van Beuningen, Burgersdyck, and Van Niedeck.

Cornelius de Witt's case was meanwhile undecided, and the accused awaited his fate calmly during several days, reading and writing to his wife, whose anxiety about the result of the trial was quieted by his brother. As no change came, the governor began to grow uneasy and at last to dispute the jurisdiction of his judges over him.

The unfavourable disposition of some of them was not improved by this. Some obscure and conflicting answers of the governor, careless remarks of a political nature, notwithstanding his further explanations and his convincing attitude toward the accuser, gave the judges occasion to sentence De Witt to the rack in order by a "sharper examination" to bring the truth to light, as they said. On the 17th of August, by four votes to two, he was handed over to the executioner to be tortured. Horrible misdeed of these conscienceless judges!¹ He was tortured fearfully on the 19th, but no screwing and beating, no stretching and bruising could break the steadfastness of the innocent victim, and amid the most excruciating pains he proclaimed his innocence to the judges according to some with the words of Horace about the just and persevering man, whose proud spirit the rage of his fellow-citizens and the tyrant's menacing visage cannot stir, according to others with expressions of faith in the righteousness of God. But early on the following day the judges, without using the word "guilty," pronounced upon the innocent man the sentence of deposition from all his offices and of banishment from the province—a sentence justifying Burnet's observation that the purpose was to remove him rather than to uphold the laws.²

And upon the same day the terrible tragedy was ended.³ The governor had asked his brother to come to him, and the former council pensionary hesitated not an instant to accept the invitation, although his family begged him to stay at home, because frightful reports had been circulating of new plans for murder, and mobs had repeatedly assembled before the prison, as the blinded populace firmly believed in the governor's guilt and in the com-

¹ De Bosch Kemper, *Staatkundige geschiedenis van Nederland*, p. 167.

² *History*, ii., p. 491; Wijnne, p. 256.

³ See Lefèvre Pontalis, ii., p. 515 *et seq.*; Fruin, *De schuld van Willem III. en zijn vrienden aan den moord der gebroeders De Witt*, in *Gids*, 1867, i., p. 201; Wijnne, *Geschiedenis*, p. 258; Wagenaar, xiv., p. 157.

plicity of his brother, and hated both as enemies of the prince, traitors, sellers of the country, as the causes of the republic's great misfortune. He rode in his carriage, with his clerks following, to the prison which was guarded by two militiamen. The two brothers conversed, calm and self-possessed as usual; the governor wanted to appeal to the High Council, but John advised against it as illegal and useless. While they were talking, a turbulent multitude was gathering before the prison. Tichelaer had been liberated by the court on the same morning and, perhaps at the instigation of one of the judges, Van Nierop, had trumpeted around that the governor was only banished and would thus escape the punishment he deserved. Agitation displayed itself immediately in The Hague, and people flocked to the Gevangenpoort, incited by the wretch and his friends, by screaming women, soon also by some sedate citizens. John's oldest clerk, sent out to bring the sentence, had a narrow escape from the furious crowd outside. The second clerk came to warn them that the carriage was sent away, and the governor urged his brother to go, but the guard held him back by force amid threatening shouts of the populace. Returning to his brother, John de Witt resigned himself to remaining.

The brothers might still have been rescued, if the deputy councillors had done their duty. On their report of the prevailing agitation the Estates called to their help the three companies of cavalry in garrison at The Hague to keep the peace under the supervision of the deputy councillors, and to disperse the people, had the "most reliable" companies of militia assemble, and warned the prince at Nieuwerbrug in order to avert a tumult. The three companies under Count Tilly took a station near the prison, but nothing was done towards scattering the vicious rabble. The deputy councillors went no farther; their president, Van Boetzelaer van Asperen, was an ardent partisan of the prince and thought enough had

been done ; the brothers seemed saved, but the crowd remained and waited. Meanwhile the entire militia to the number of about 1000 men gathered in the neighbourhood of the prison according to orders. They showed a disposition very unfavourable to the brothers and mixed with the multitude ; some militiamen pushed into the prison to be sure that both were still there ; others climbed with muskets upon the nearest roofs to prevent their escape. Tilly, though separated from the prison by the militia, held the crowd in check merely by his presence, until a generally believed report of a troop of plundering peasants marching on The Hague from the Westland caused the deputy councillors to resolve to send the cavalry to the entrances of the city to repel this attack. Tilly refused at first, but then obeyed a written order from Van Asperen and went away with two of the companies. It was the death sentence of the brothers.

The field was now clear for the leaders of the turbulent throng, the goldsmith Verhoeff, the alderman Van Bankhem, the physician Van Baelen, and other citizens, in general persons unfavourably known. The frightened government of The Hague attempted to bring to reason Verhoeff, who played the chief part, but he declined to listen to requests to preserve order and declared that he wished for the death of the brothers. His company of militia pressed up to the prison, and the door was shot through with bullets. Verhoeff threatened to open it with hammers, when the jailer yielded. It was just four o'clock. The desperate band poured in and found the brothers calmly together, Cornelius in bed, John sitting at the foot of the bed and reading aloud from the Bible. The militia officers, who had joined them some hours before and now desired to defend them, were thrust aside, and amid great clamour John was led off by Verhoeff, Cornelius roughly thrown down the stairs, beaten on the way and wounded with blows of clubs and stabs of pikes. The

two brothers took each other's hands but were speedily separated and knocked down upon the street in the midst of the loud cries of the furious mob. Cornelius died first from heavy blows with clubs, and wounds inflicted with daggers and hatchets, then John who with his mantle about his head ran into the ranks of Verhoeff's company and was first hit by a pistol shot fired close to him and finished by clubs and musket shots. At half-past four all was over and the madmen, drunk with bloodshed, danced on the bodies which were finally hung up by the feet to the lamp-post on the Groene Zoodje, horribly mutilated, even cut to pieces by desperadoes desirous of a bloody relic. Until late in the evening the rabble shrieked about the abused remains, and it is whispered that even Cornelis Tromp came with pleasure to look upon the scene of terror; it is certain that the magistracy of The Hague, overcome with fright, gazed at the horrible work from the windows of a neighbouring wine shop, and it is not improbable that a preacher of The Hague on the following day, a Sunday, praised the murderers from his pulpit. Late in the evening Verhoeff cut the hearts out of the corpses which were taken down towards midnight by the faithful servant of the former council pensionary and carried off to be buried in the New Church before morning in the presence of a small company.

Thus died the two brothers who had loved their country and cared for its interests, *hic armis maximus, ille toga*, as a medal says with the portrait of both, though different both of them being *integer vitæ, scelerisque purus*, in truth *nobile par fratrum*. The prince was absent and therefore not responsible, but he did not punish the crime on account of the number and position of the guilty men! What is worse, he rewarded the most shameless offenders and consequently did not hesitate to assume the appearance of approving their actions, even of complicity in their crime. Tichelaer obtained a pension from the

prince's purse and an under-sheriff's post. Van Bankhem became sheriff of The Hague and, in spite of all his later misdeeds, he was protected for years by the prince until finally, on account of the most disgraceful facts, he was prosecuted and condemned to death, which sentence remained unexecuted by reason of his death in prison. Verhoeff, afterwards a suspected innkeeper and highwayman, was recommended by Tromp for the enlistment of volunteers under John Maurice.¹ The stadtholder's hard mind could never forget the humiliation of his youth; never would he deny those who had wished to serve him in this way, although there can be no thought of any actual complicity upon his part or that of his friends. The "execrable deed," so characterised by Fagel, was assuredly no less disapproved of by William III., but political considerations induced him to let the matter rest, to guard the doers from punishment, even to reward them.

John de Witt thus fell with his system of government, his fine career, which embraces a splendid period of the Dutch people's existence, ended by one of the most horrible murders mentioned in history. With indignation the gentle philosopher Spinoza alluded to the *ultimi barbarorum* in the letter sent to Leibnitz and announcing the death of the great statesman and scholar who had also been his benefactor. Christiaan Huygens, hearing of the event, asked himself if the Epicureans had not been right in their bitter saying: *versari in republica non est sapientis*. In the memory of the nation the 20th of August, 1672, is joined as a second "black day" to the 13th of May, 1619, when another statesman fell a victim of his system. With sadness the nation remembers the fate of these two great statesmen, who came out from its midst. But not sadness alone, gratitude also—fervent gratitude—inspires it when thinking of what John of Old-

¹ Wagenaar, xiv., p. 180.

enbarnevelt and John de Witt were for it. Their names it puts as those of "heroic and resolute" patriots with the names of the great princes of Orange who led it in the days of glory and humiliation. In its recollection it embraces the representatives of antagonistic forms of government with equal veneration for great gifts and self-sacrificing love of country employed in the service of the same fatherland.

CHAPTER XV

THE GREAT WAR

THE generation inhabiting the republic of the United Netherlands after the peace of Münster was in many respects of an extraordinary nature. The sons of three generations, who had passed their days in war, learned to look at life from the hard side. Little heed was given to ordinary Christian morality by the inborn commercial spirit, developed by the fine situation of the country as a centre of traffic and furthered by the profits of trade with remote regions. The natural roughness of a seafaring people was little softened during the long and bitter war, and not until its last stages, when the enemy was driven from the country, did the arts and sciences exercise upon the highest circles their refining influence which penetrated very slowly to the lower classes. The predominant faith, strict dogmatic Calvinism, was not calculated to smooth the rough sides and to lead souls to gentleness. Energy, vigilance, marked selfishness, cunning, ingenuity, tenacity, roughness, inflexibility, hardness, were some of the most prominent characteristics of the people at this glorious period, joined to a certain good-nature that seems not incompatible with suspicion. These qualities had fortunate results in De Witt's time, and under the guidance of a series of remarkable men, such as usually appear in a nation after a hard struggle for existence, they raised that nation to a high rank in the world. In the thirty years of William III.'s rule their action remains plainly visible.

William III. himself is one of those men of the great epoch, who may be considered as the best representatives of the Dutch national type, with individual modification of some qualities under the influence of personal experiences. Energetic, alert, ambitious, crafty, resourceful, persistent, rough, inflexible, hard, mistrustful, he was all that and furthermore taciturn and reserved owing to the pitiful circumstances of his life during the decisive years of his youth, owing also to the delicate health which had impeded his development,—his bodily development at least, for the coughing youth, to whom the entire nation now looked up as to its rescuer from dire distress, was intellectually a giant. His acuteness, his clear judgment, his healthy understanding, his excellent memory, were developed in an admirable manner notwithstanding the varying systems of education to which he was subjected. He was not ideally gifted. His mind was positive, averse to speculation, a mind of cool deliberation, not fervent but rational, passionate sometimes, but generally calm, persevering even to obstinacy. Thus the stadtholder went through life, uncommunicative as he had learned to be in his sombre youth, with a strong will pursuing the aims he had set before himself—a grand but solitary figure, more imposing than attractive. Thus his tall form appears before us with the oblong face framed by long locks, with the piercing glance, the long Stuart nose, the imperious attitude, weakly stooping, simply dressed, upon his strong horse. Thus he was portrayed by Netscher, by Blooteling, and by the pen of his secretary, the younger Constantyn Huygens. Thus history knows him, the great statesman and general of the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Such was the young man, to whose rule the state of the United Netherlands was now intrusted.

The condition of this state was perilous in the summer of 1672, but signs of improvement began to appear. The enemy's main force under Luxembourg still lay on the bor-

ders of Holland, restrained only by the water line. Zealand was not unmolested. A small French army under de Nancre attacked Aardenburg on June 26th, but the little town was so successfully defended by a handful of soldiers and a few hundred citizens commanded by the valiant ensign Beeckman that the enemy had to withdraw. Nimwegen, Grave, and Crèvecoeur were captured by the enemy; also Bommel fell, after which Turenne threw himself into the territory of Bois-le-Duc, while some of the French troops went to complete the surrounding of Maestricht. Steenwijk and other places in Overijssel were taken without much difficulty by the forces of Münster and Cologne, but they did not yet venture to push into Friesland, defended by Aylva with a few troops and his Frisian militia. The enemy first turned towards Groningen, where the frontier forts were captured without a blow besides the important Bourtagne. Coevorden detained the enemy less than a fortnight, and on July 9th, guided by the traitor Schuylenburgh, he appeared before the gates of Groningen, which under command of the brave Rabenhaupt was prepared for a stubborn defence by inundations and excellent organisation of the troops, numbering with the inclusion of militia and students between four and five thousand men. The besieged held out over five weeks, and despite the incessant bombardment and reiterated assaults upon the outworks they so weakened the enemy that he was compelled to raise the siege on August 28th. The attacks of the Münster forces on the Frisian intrenchments at Heerenveen were repulsed and soon the enemy had to evacuate both provinces, being followed by the Dutch troops who made themselves masters once more of northwestern Overijssel and of a large part of Drenthe. The defender had here become an attacker.

The fleet on the Scheldt and Zuyder Zee prevented every attempt to disturb the security of these waters. The privateers, especially those of Zealand where 200 of

them are said to have been fitted out, inflicted serious damage on the enemy. In July an Anglo-French fleet of about 100 ships appeared on the coast, where the Dutch fleet, only half so strong, was stationed at Goeree. The enemy wanted to land in the neighbourhood of Texel, but a violent storm, destroying some of his ships and injuring others, spoiled these plans.¹ The enemy's great mistake was in not making every exertion during June to conquer Holland instead of waiting to besiege and occupy the fortified places of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel, where garrisons had to be put, so that Luxembourg before the water line was left with only 16,000 men and Turenne on the Meuse and Rhine with 12,000, while Chamilly surrounded Maestricht with some thousands. Thus William III. secured an opportunity to strengthen his positions behind the water line amid the important events and agitation in Holland. Powerfully aided by Amsterdam, whose environs were quickly placed in an excellent state of defence, he made his left flank safe. At threatened points intrenchments were thrown up and the country was flooded; sailors, marines, fugitives from the eastern garrisons, released prisoners of war, made up for the want of troops, so that the army was soon increased to 57,000 men; militia and armed peasants were employed for real service, especially for the batteries on the coast. The young prince showed himself an able and prudent commander, supported by Van Beverningh as deputy in the field and by skilful generals, among whom now appeared George Friedrich, count of Waldeck, as a field marshal and as the prince's chief adviser.² In September Holland was metamorphosed into an impregnable fortress so that the French dared not attack it vigorously and courage began to revive in the province.

¹ The story of the wonderful double ebb tide is erroneously placed in this time. See Fruin, in *Bijdr. N. R.*, x., p. 125.

² Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck*, i., p. 33.

The prince took advantage of this to attack. A first attempt on Naarden failed, but he made a second on October 10th for the conquest of Woerden. This failed also, Zuylesteyn was killed in Luxembourg's unexpected attack on his rear, and the force retreated with heavy losses, but the enterprise proved that the new troops were not so easily vanquished by the enemy as formerly. Some days later in a council of war at Alfen the prince proposed a bold plan—to leave a force sufficient for the defence of the water line and to move rapidly southwards through Brabant to Maestricht with 10,000 infantry and almost all the cavalry, together about 23,000 men, in order with German and Spanish help to threaten the enemy's communications and to constrain him to retreat from these provinces. Early in November the troops gathered at Rozendaal, and on the 8th the army moved from there to the Meuse near Maestricht, which was relieved some days later, while the surprised French force under Duras, succeeding the deceased Chamilly, retreated to the Rhine at Andernach, where Turenne was awaiting the Brandenburg and imperial armies. The prince now moved northwards to the Roer, captured Valkenburg, and menaced Tongres. But the united German armies remained on the right bank of the Rhine, being constantly watched by Turenne. Thus left to himself and again threatened by Duras, the prince in the middle of December undertook an arduous expedition along the Meuse to the distant Charleroi, the repository of the French army stores. Including Spanish auxiliary troops he had about 30,000 men, but the enterprise was a failure. The commander of the city, Montal, who was in Tongres, threw himself with a small troop of cavalry into his important fortress and greatly increased its power of resistance, so that the siege lasted longer than the prince had expected. A sudden frost prevented the continuation of the siege works. The prince took Binche, but then moved away and appeared again on December

30th with his reduced army at Alfen in Holland. This undertaking was also a failure, but it showed what a formidable foe Louis XIV. had in the young Orange.

Luxembourg was desirous of taking advantage of the frost to cross over Holland's water line. Hitherto he had confined himself to expeditions with small results due to the watchfulness of the Dutch commanders, though many frontier villages were burned and plundered. On December 27th he assembled 10,000 men at Woerden and marched into Holland over the frozen flooded fields along the Rhine. Count Königsmarck left the camp at Bodegraven and fell back to Leyden, whereupon the enemy took possession of Bodegraven and Zwammerdam and devastated them in a horrible manner. Suddenly it began to thaw and the only practicable road back was by way of Nieuwerbrug to Woerden, while the defenders of the water line, aided by thousands of armed peasants, blocked the road to Leyden or Gouda. That to Woerden was also blocked by the intrenchments of Nieuwerbrug, but the commander, Colonel Pain-et-Vin, seized with a sudden panic, evacuated them and thus rescued the French army from certain destruction. He was in consequence severely treated at the prince's instigation and condemned to death. The sentence was executed in the camp at Alfen late in January. But Luxembourg reached Woerden safely on December 30th, laden with plunder from the burned villages and farms which never forgot the "French fury."¹ On the day before, Coevorden was surprised by a column from Groningen under Colonel Eybergen, guided by the patriotic sexton, Meindert van Thynen, a great advantage for the country of Drenthe and Groningen, which was hastily quitted by the enemy.

At the beginning of 1673 the situation was quite changed from that of a half-year earlier, although three provinces were still in the enemy's hands. The army had regained

¹ Knoop, p. 207.

confidence under the lead of the young Orange prince and Waldeck, and it was numerous enough to assume the offensive. Besides weak Spain there were allies, who indeed did not yet accomplish much but kept a part of the hostile troops busy far away on the Rhine. And the people plucked up courage, though complaining bitterly of the heavy taxes, the flooding of their lands, the stoppage of commerce and industry. That half-year was a time of storm and stress for Holland. The murder of the De Witts had given the signal for tumults elsewhere, directed against the adherents of the fallen government and under the watchword "Up with Orange," which was often shamefully abused. Rotterdam, Delft, Leyden, Gouda, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Amsterdam were not free from them. The council pensionary Fagel called for measures against such disturbances, and deputy councillors proposed authority for the prince to investigate the relations between people and regents and to maintain or change the municipal governments "without violation of the privileges." A resolution to this effect was taken on August 28th. The prince acted and replaced various regents by others of his party. There were great difficulties in Amsterdam. Some of the magistrates had desired to make the prince sovereign. Excitement among the people seemed about to lead to a riot on September 6th, when the house of the popular De Ruyter, now suspected as a friend of the De Witts, ran great danger of being plundered. A meeting of citizens next day demanded the removal of the suspected regents, restoration of the "ancient rights" of the citizens in the election of magistrates, maintenance of the privileges of the guilds, reform in the government of the city and militia, all comprised in twelve articles, which were spread through the city in the form of a petition. This attempt to introduce a more democratic style of government was a dismal failure. The city government finally requested help from the prince and offered its res-

ignation, when he answered evasively. Some of the regents here now lost their seats, while Van Beuningen and Hudde were restored to the burgomastership and in the following year Valckenier also, who was again considered as the leader of the Amsterdam government.¹ The majority in the Estates of Holland was transposed, and this speedily brought quiet. In the towns of Zeeland changes were likewise made in the government. A general amnesty proclaimed in November put an end to dangerous agitation, though here and there some persons roused popular discontent. Even De Ruyter on coming home in October was assailed and had to be taken under the prince's particular protection.²

With the beginning of 1673 more vigorous action was hoped for from the allies.³ The indefatigable Lisola had convinced the imperial court of Vienna that only a close alliance of the emperor with the States-General could prevent the latter from concluding peace with France. It was not inconceivable that France might give back all its conquests. The elector of Brandenburg and the count of Monterey at Brussels promised help and urged the States to continue the war. In December the Vienna government determined to approve definitively of a subsidy treaty. At last the foundation seemed to be laid for the great alliance, which, according to Lisola's long cherished wishes, with the emperor and the States as the centre, was to oppose the threatened supremacy of France in Europe. But it soon appeared that much must happen before these wishes were realised. The imperial government, influenced by the Jesuits, was far from having resolved to follow the path indicated by Lisola and to declare war

¹ Bontemantel, ed. Kernkamp, ii., p. 180. See Kroon, *Amsterdam in 1672*, and Gebhard, *Amsterd. anteeeningen*, in *Nijh. Bijdr. N. R.*, x., p. 139.

² Wagenaar, xiv., p. 188.

³ Pribram, *Lisola*, p. 587; P. L. Muller, *Nederlands eerste betrekkingen met Oostenrijk*, p. 38.

upon France for the preservation of the strongest Protestant power. The elector of Brandenburg, disappointed at the course of the previous campaign, withdrew from the alliance and concluded peace with France in June. The prince had consequently the greatest difficulty in holding the peace party of Holland in check, now that the allies were showing themselves so little reliable.¹

The chances of a peaceful solution later, however, became greater. Holland's peace party was supported by the entreaties of the three provinces still groaning under the enemy's occupation. Sweden endeavoured to bring about a peace congress and was listened to by both parties, so that Cologne was chosen as the place of meeting. In England also the party of peace urged negotiation with the States. France saw that the German princes had not been entirely won over and mistrust of its real purposes must be removed. The war party, as whose chiefs the prince and Fagel in the republic, Monterey at Brussels, and Lisola might be considered, was compelled to yield something to the universal desire for peace. Though nothing came of a proposed truce, negotiations were opened in Cologne at the end of June under the mediation of Sweden. Van Beuningen for Holland, De Mauregnault for Zealand, Van Haren for Friesland, Ysbrands for City and Land, Odijk in the name of the prince himself, soon appeared there as ambassadors of the States-General. The three provinces occupied by the enemy could not be admitted to the negotiation, as they were not free. The prince naturally had the chief management of the affair, together with the council pensionary, and nearly all the envoys were their trusted friends. At Cologne appeared also Pieter de Groot, who had been at Antwerp in the winter with De la Court and other exiled partisans of De Witt, and in the negotiations he played a certain part in

¹ Pribram, p. 606; Muller, p. 47; Wagenaar, xiv., p. 247.

the interest of peace.¹ The negotiations went on languidly. France's demand for the cession of the generality lands, that of England concerning the fishery and the surrender of some towns on the sea were too high to be seriously considered, and the offer of the States was too low for the enemy. Sweden continued its action as mediator, but the demands of the four allied enemies seemed rather to increase than to diminish, until the war finally began to turn in favour of the republic and its allies gave more effectual assistance.

While there was negotiation at Cologne, both parties had resumed war. England was now to act more energetically than in the preceding year, with a landing force of 20,000 men on the rapidly equipped fleet, the king's bastard, the duke of Monmouth, accompanying with 8000 men the French army. This last was to move on Holland again, while some antiquated Dutch fortresses were to be demolished and the rest were to be strongly garrisoned. The French army against Holland was to be under Condé and to number 25,000 men, Turenne was to act on the Rhine once more, and Louis himself in Flanders and Brabant.² It was hoped to draw much of the necessary money from the conquered provinces themselves, which were pillaged in a frightful manner by Luxembourg and the intendant Robert. Heavy taxes, confiscations on a large scale, systematic plundering, destruction, and burning of districts already ravaged by water and disease exhausted the population. When Condé replaced Luxembourg in the spring of 1673 and repeatedly called the attention of Louvois to the country's miserable condition, the latter answered cynically that this was just the way to subjugate the land and to force the Hollanders to peace.

The prince added some regiments to the Dutch army so that, with Waldeck as chief of staff, he obtained an

¹ See his letters to Wicquefort in Krämer's edition, p. 143.

² Rousset, i., p. 427.

army of 28,000 men, while in the north John Maurice had the general management of affairs. The militia of the cities and bands of armed peasants helped to occupy the principal points of Holland's water line, while similar lines were formed on the borders of Friesland and Groningen. From fear of a landing of the Anglo-French fleet the coast was provided with troops. A small force under Wurtz was stationed in Zeeland to defend this province from attack by sea or land. After the improvements of the water lines not only Holland and Zeeland but Friesland and Groningen also were converted into almost impregnable strongholds. Outside of the lines Coevorden in the summer had to sustain a vigorous assault of the Münster forces, which were obliged to break off the siege. A cavalry combat at Staphorst in July ended in a complete defeat of the Münster troops, and they also surrendered the intrenchments east of Groningen to Rabenhaupt and accomplished little after the relief of Coevorden which fell in October.

Against the water line of Holland Condé could do no more than Luxembourg before him. He tried in vain to drain off the floods and to capture Muiden, but the water let in from the sea increased the inundation and the heavy Dutch artillery compelled him to give up the attack on Muiden. Better success attended the siege of Maestricht, which was undertaken by Louis XIV. himself with his main force of 45,000 men, supported by a part of Turenne's army, and lasted over three weeks (June 6th–July 1st). This siege of the city, defended by 6000 men, was unquestionably one of the most remarkable events of the whole war, and in it the talented engineer Vauban distinguished himself by an excellent use of trenches. After the loss of the chief outworks the gallant defender Fariaux was compelled to capitulate to superior force by the citizens, who expected restoration of the Catholic religion from the French rule. It now seemed the turn of Bois-le-Duc,

and Condé left Utrecht to prepare for this siege, while Luxembourg resumed command of the army before the water line. Thus Holland continued to be besieged, and the enemy was still prevented by the water line from conquering Holland's cities and from plundering Holland's country, the richest district of Europe, as he had done to Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel. Amsterdam and other cities still held their proud heads above the water, determined under the prince's lead to resist until the last redoubt fell or until the allies could be persuaded to wage war vigorously.

While the war on land remained in the same state until late in the summer, longer than a year, the war on the sea was energetically prosecuted. After the battle of Solebay and the partial dismantling of the fleet, De Ruyter was not in a condition to venture out. Privateering, at first prohibited so that the naval crews would not melt away, was allowed again in July, 1672, and many English and French merchant vessels were brought as prizes into the ports of Zealand and Spain. Two shipowners of Middelburg declared in September that their captains had over thirty prizes in the harbours of Biscay, which they would like to have escorted home by naval vessels.¹ But the fleet was too weak for such an undertaking, and the only attempt was to send Van Nes in November with a squadron to Brest to attack the French fleet wintering there. This enterprise failed on account of contrary winds, and Van Nes returned quickly. New perils by sea appeared with the beginning of 1673. England seemed bent upon putting an end to the commerce and navigation of its hated competitor. *Delenda est Carthago*, exclaimed the English chancellor Shaftesbury in asking Parliament for money on February 14th,² and Parliament granted one and a quarter million pounds to attain the

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 337.

² Ranke, *Englische Geschichte*, v., p. 114.

ardently desired end, after the king had recalled his measures of toleration of the Catholics, though secretly converted to their faith, and after he had assented to the Test Act which excluded all Catholics and nearly all dissenters from public offices. Now these guarantees were given against the dreaded predominance of Catholicism, Parliament saw no harm in the alliance with France, although popular opinion was opposed to war with the republic, the bulwark of Protestantism in Europe. The duke of York, openly professing Catholicism, could not command the fleet, so Prince Rupert replaced him, but, lacking his experience, the English naval force was not so well equipped as in the preceding year. The Dutch fleet was brought up by great exertion to about 120 ships, and crews for all of them were found by prohibiting privateering again and navigation to the Baltic and the north, so that in May twenty sail could go out under command of De Ruyter, raised to the rank of lieutenant admiral general of Holland, and of lieutenant admiral Banckerts. Cornelis Tromp, restored by the prince to his dignity of lieutenant admiral and reconciled with De Ruyter, was soon to join the fleet with some large vessels. The purpose was neither more nor less than a new expedition to the Thames, before the English fleet could run out to unite with the French. A squadron under Van Nes and Vlugh was already sailing for the Thames to close the mouth of the river by sinking ships, when it was observed that the English fleet was on its guard and had detached vessels to defend the approaches of the river. The squadron returned and the fleet was ready to receive the enemy, when Tromp arrived at the end of May. It was near the banks of Schooneveld, on the coast of Zealand, when the Anglo-French fleet of nearly 150 sail came to attack the small force of 100 sail. On the anniversary of the battle of Solebay, June 7th, there was a battle, in which De Ruyter himself dispersed the French squadron

of d'Estrées, broke through the middle division, and went to the relief of Tromp who was running great danger in a fight with the vanguard under Prince Rupert. It was on this occasion that Tromp cried out to his men: "There is grandfather coming to our help. I too will never desert him so long as I can draw breath." After a hard struggle darkness fell, but the enemy retreated with great losses, while those of the Dutch were much less. Seven days later the same fleet offered battle to the same enemy not far from the place where victory had been won before. The Dutch fleet now also repulsed the allied fleets under Prince Rupert to the English coast, where darkness again ended the combat, so that De Ruyter returned to his station at Schooneveld without being followed by the enemy, who repaired damages in the Thames and left the sea to the Dutch for a considerable time. A small Dutch squadron under rear admiral Den Haen even undertook an expedition along the English coast near the mouth of the Thames.

Early in July the Dutch fleet ran out again in search of the enemy, who was preparing for a third voyage to the Dutch coasts, but no enemy was to be seen, and the fleet cruised off the mouth of the Thames until a pestilence compelled its return. Towards the end of the month the hostile fleets appeared with the intention of landing and forcing the republic to peace. An unusually long ebb tide on the 2d of August in conjunction with a dense fog prevented the execution of this plan and gave rise to the story everywhere believed of the "double ebb" which saved the endangered republic.¹ De Ruyter, desirous first of protecting Zealand, followed the enemy's strong fleet only a short time. The latter sailed northwards and spread terror along the Dutch coast, but no landing was attempted. The prince now ordered the fleet to leave Schooneveld and to oppose the enemy. De Ruyter ar

¹ Fruin, *De dubbele ebbe*, in *Nijh. Bijdr.*, N. R., x., p. 129.

rived off Scheveningen, where the prince excited indescribable enthusiasm by visiting the fleet and considering with the council of war whether the enemy should be attacked notwithstanding the inferiority in strength of the Dutch force. It was resolved to make the venture, and the visitor departed from the fleet amid shouts of — “Long live the prince!” So De Ruyter followed the enemy north and encountered him early in the morning of August 21st at Kijkduin, where with 90 large and small vessels and 22 fire ships he valiantly assailed the allied fleets of over 140 sail, commanded again by Prince Rupert, Spragge, and d’Estrées.¹ The French van gave way speedily before the violent attack of Banckerts; De Ruyter threw himself on Prince Rupert, who, fighting stoutly, was forced back and sought to join the rear division under Spragge. Attacked by Tromp and severely damaged by his admirably served guns, Spragge also resisted bravely but lost his life in a boat on leaving his sinking ship, while Prince Rupert himself was in great danger of being destroyed by the united Dutch squadrons. A general attack seemed to offer some chance of dispersing the Dutch fleet by superior force, but the attack failed, as the French squadron paid no attention to the repeated signals of the English commander and did not venture again into the fight. After sunset the enemy retreated, being pursued by the Dutch, who returned to the coast a few hours later, while Prince Rupert went back to the English ports with great losses in killed and wounded and complaining loudly of the treacherous behaviour of d’Estrées. The losses were severe also on the Dutch side, including the vice admirals De Liefde and Sweers among the dead. There was no more talk of a landing, and the harbours were opened for the returning merchantmen, so that the battle of Kijkduin may be regarded as a victory. It was celebrated as such, though this did not prevent Prince Rupert from claiming

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 412.

the victory as on the two previous occasions. De Ruyter and Tromp were honoured as the saviours of the fatherland from destruction which was threatened by the landing of the army of 12,000 men under the French general Schomberg. In this rescue from danger was seen the hand of God, who had given victory to the weaker Dutch fleet and had averted a landing by a rare natural phenomenon at the right moment.

De Ruyter in September sailed again into the North Sea for the purpose of threatening the English coast, but violent storms obliged him to return. The naval war during the winter was of slight importance. But the victories of the summer began to have the desired effect. There arose in England dissatisfaction with the conduct of the French squadrons, and d'Estrées really appealed to his sovereign's command not to risk his ships, while he manifestly suspected the English of desiring to endanger his fleet. Prince Rupert put himself at the head of the movement against the French alliance, long disagreeable to him as a Protestant. The proposed second marriage of the Catholic successor to the throne, the duke of York, with the very Catholic princess of Modena aroused antagonism among the English people,¹ and the Parliament meeting in October, to which the king applied for money, showed itself no longer inclined to act with France. It denied the supremacy of Dutch commerce over that of England, opposed York's marriage, demanded the upholding of the Anglican church against Catholicism, pronounced against a standing army, and called for the dismissal of the most hated ministers. A new conflict between crown and Parliament seemed impending, and only the sudden prorogation of the latter by advice of the French ambassador put an apparent end to the dissension. England had gone so far that the French ambassador interfered in its

¹ Fruin, *Prins Willem III. in zijn verhouding tot Engeland*, p. 34 of the article reprinted from the *Gids*, 1889.

domestic affairs. Charles II. was playing a desperate game. He hoped with the booty obtained from Dutch merchantmen and with Louis XIV.'s aid to find the money necessary for the war outside of Parliament. The government's adversaries were assailed in their positions and incomes. Even the chancellor Shaftesbury, to whom York ascribed the movement against his marriage, was forced to give up his office. The violent opposition of all classes of the population brought the king to reflection. He determined to yield somewhat and to appease the nation by making public the treaties with France and renewing the edicts against the Catholics. Then he called Parliament together in January. But it did not favour the governmental policy and, vigorously incited by Shaftesbury, it demanded stronger guarantees against Catholicism, complained of the king's ministers, and desired maintenance of English liberties and the disbanding of the army standing since 1664. Many eyes were already directed to the prince of Orange, after York the nearest male blood relative of the king, as the proper successor to the throne in case the childless king died and the duke of York as a Catholic had to be excluded from the succession. Everywhere in England the conviction gained ground that peace with the republic must be restored, and the sooner the better.

These events in England made the prince and the States believe that the dangerous alliance of England and France was drawing to an end. The prince was in secret communication with Shaftesbury and other influential members of the opposition and watched English complications. The States supported the peace party by a letter to the king in October affirming that they were ready for a fair peace and by similar declarations. Under these circumstances negotiations for peace at Cologne naturally advanced but little, so long as the republic's allied enemies persisted in their high demands. But the republic had more reason to

look with confidence at the future. Under the influence of Lisola the fear of French designs on the empire had increased among Germany's princes and peoples, and pamphlets and writings on the subject appeared in great number. The Vienna court regained spirit, and the elector of Cologne and the bishop of Münster began to be alarmed at the French lust for conquest, particularly after the fall of Maestricht. Spain also became more ready to act vigorously against France. Spain promised the emperor a subsidy of 50,000 rix-dollars a month, the States about as much, and on August 30th, shortly after the battle of Kijkduin, treaties were concluded at The Hague both with the emperor and with Spain and Lorraine in opposition to France. The great alliance desired by Lisola was accomplished, and the States soon declared they would only negotiate in conjunction with their allies. The war of the republic thus became a European war against France.

In expectation of the imperial army collected in Bohemia under Montecuculi, which was to move to the Rhine, William III. in September made a new attack on Naarden that yielded before Luxembourg could relieve it. This loss was felt by the French, and they prepared to destroy the numerous small forts in the conquered provinces so as to strengthen the larger fortresses and to have more soldiers for the army in the field.¹ Before it went so far, there was a masterly move by the prince, owing to which Luxembourg's position had at last to be given up. He left Waldeck in command of a sufficient force behind the water line. With 10,000 men he went late in September to Rozendaal, united in October with a Spanish army of 15,000 men at Lier, and towards the end of the month was near Cologne. The imperial army came there also, and together siege was laid to Bonn which fell on November 13th, followed by other fortresses in Cologne and Jülich territory. Then the prince returned with his army to the Meuse at

¹ Rousset, i., p. 484.

Roermond and Venloo.¹ This November campaign had great results. It discouraged wavering Cologne; the influence of the Fürstenbergs on the elector diminished, now that the latter lost his residence Brühl and had to seek refuge in his capital Cologne, which had resisted him so often. The last stroke was Prince William's arrest of Count Fürstenberg, the elector's first minister, though he was taking part in the congress of Cologne. The elector and his Münster ally soon showed themselves ready for peace. The French commanders saw that they must face this sudden attack. Condé's army moved largely from Brabant into Jülich; Luxembourg left garrisons in the Utrecht fortresses and stationed himself with 8,000 men at Mook to defend Gelderland; Turenne was on the Moselle to oppose Montecuculi. In November and December, for fear of being cut off from the distant French frontier, by command of Louvois, though against the opinion of Condé and to the disappointment of all France, one fortress after another in Utrecht and on the Lek and Yssel was evacuated and immediately occupied by Waldeck. By the middle of December only the places on the Meuse and Rhine were in French hands, while Luxembourg with 16,000 men was hoping to reach the French border. The prince, whose army now was nearly twice as strong as that of the French general, endeavoured to oppose him and succeeded twice in making him return to the protection of Maestricht's cannon. On the approach of winter, however, the prince broke up his army, and early in January, 1674, Luxembourg moved for the third time, and this time unmolested, southwards to the vicinity of Charleroi. The last French garrisons left Gelderland in the spring and fell back upon Grave and Maestricht. Thus after a year and a half the siege of the "fortress Holland" was given up, and before the end of the year the enemy had evacuated the greater part of the republic's territory.

¹ Knoop, i., p. 290.

These great advantages, secured by the republic and its allies, had a decisive influence on opinion in England. Peace with the republic was urged by Parliament, desirous in opposition to the crown of breaking the league with France and strengthened by the attitude of Spain, which on one side threatened England with war, on the other influenced members of Parliament with money. Spain undertook mediation and brought over the offers of the republic, which intimated cleverly that France had made offers for a separate peace in the summer of 1673. After some negotiation and pressure by Parliament and such statesmen as Temple, who had deplored the war from the beginning, Charles II. declared his wish for peace, and it was concluded February 19, 1674, at Westminster. The terms were in general those of the peace of Breda, although the flag question was so settled that all Dutch ships and fleets must thenceforth salute even a single English royal vessel, bearing the flag, anywhere between Cape Finisterre and Norway. For war expenses two millions were promised within three years. Concerning commerce in India, commissioners were to meet in three months. Surinam remained Dutch, but New Netherland, which in August, 1673, was captured without much difficulty by a small squadron sent to the West Indies under Cornelis Evertsen the younger and Captain Binckes, was given back to England again. Before long the congress at Cologne ended in nothing. The French government declared international law so violated by Fürstenberg's arrest that it could not continue negotiations. Lisola managed to persuade first Münster and then Cologne to accept peace on conditions resembling little those offered previously by the two spiritual princes. Münster, menaced by the imperials and on the other side defeated at Noordhoorn and Nienhuis by Rabenhaupt, who had succeeded the aged John Maurice in the conduct of the war in the north, consented on April 22d to a renewal of the peace of Cleves with a

return of all the conquered territory and under guarantee of Spain and the emperor, and on May 11th Cologne followed. Thus the east of the republic was entirely delivered from the enemy in May, 1674, and France alone had to be dealt with, possessing still only a few fortresses in Dutch territory. After a struggle of two years people breathed again and hoped that those fortresses also might be recaptured. What a result after the dangers which in the summer of 1672 had brought the republic to the verge of destruction, and what sacrifices had been necessary! With gratitude men thought of the fortunate course of affairs, freeing them without noteworthy loss of territory from the enemies who had assailed the republic on all sides.

This success was due largely to the young general and statesman, who now had the management of the republic in his hands. In reorganising the disordered state the definitive regulation of his attitude to the state would naturally be considered anew. Was the prince now finally to receive the sovereignty desired by him and the republic to be changed, wholly or partially, into a monarchy? The subject came up in connection with the settlement of affairs in the three provinces which for a year and a half had been in the enemy's possession and had ceased to take part in the common government. The danger of the entire country in 1672 had lessened the love for the republican form of government and had raised the question whether it was not better to bestow upon the real ruler the title as such.¹ It was no secret that many of the chief statesmen were not averse to such a reform, among others the council pensionary Fagel, the influential Valckenier, and Van Beverningh. The districts occupied by the enemy were terribly treated. The support of the hostile army and garrisons had ruined cities and country, cattle were killed, agriculture suffered, requisitions were carried to the extreme under threat of plundering and burning. The inten-

¹ Basnage, *Annales des Provinces Unies*, ii., p. 564.

dant Robert made himself notorious in Gelderland and Utrecht, and we know from his correspondence and that of Luxembourg and Condé with Louvois ¹ that his threats were more than mere form. The border regions of Holland, Utrecht, Friesland, and Groningen were spoiled for years by the water let in from sea, river, and marsh; the heavy taxes in the parts remaining free were unbearable; and commerce and industry had for a year and a half stood still. How much had to be restored and improved before the traces of war could be said to have disappeared!

The first question after the departure of the French was—should the three provinces be taken into the union again? A commission from the States-General discharged the De Witt government still sitting in Utrecht and substituted for it a provisional government. The prince, asked for his opinion by Holland, thought that the three provinces must be admitted into the union with their old boundaries, Holland giving back the parts of Utrecht taken possession of during its defence and reserving the right of flooding the frontier districts and the ownership of the fortifications built by it on Utrecht territory in the course of the war. So it was resolved by Holland on February 2, 1674. The plan of keeping Utrecht and the two other provinces out of the union until they were able to pay their share of the quotas was rejected by advice of the prince. On April 20th a resolution was adopted by the generality providing that the three provinces should be received into the union again on the old footing; taxes were to be made uniform; a statement of revenues in all the provinces was to be drawn up to regulate by it a new distribution of the quotas; the debt in arrears of the three provinces must be paid to the administration; Gelderland must relinquish one of its two places in the council of state to Groningen; finally the prince was empowered to change the govern-

¹ Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, *passim*. See also *Nijh. Bijdr. Eerste Reeks*, v., p. 204.

ment in the three provinces. A few days later the prince, upon whom Utrecht had conferred the stadtholdership in November, made his stately entrance into the city, where he was welcomed with great enthusiasm, and on the 25th he filled the government of city and province with persons agreeable to himself. A new settlement of the government was sworn to on the following day by the new administration. Arranged by the prince with the chief men of Utrecht, it put all power into the stadtholder's hands. His representative there was Van Reede van Renswoude, whom he selected for the presidency of the Estates. A similar fate was appointed for the two other provinces, but the prince confined himself at first to setting up a "provisicnal" government in expectation of the opportunity to make here also radical changes.

In Holland itself Haarlem on January 23d brought up the matter of having the stadtholdership hereditary, incited, as is supposed, by the council pensionary.¹ It pointed out the desirability of being sure of the presence of an "eminent chief" in the state, which could not otherwise be properly governed. *Vox populi, vox Dei*: without opposition the resolution was on February 2d adopted to make the prince hereditary stadtholder, captain and admiral general; the right of inheritance was confined to the "male descendants" of the prince.² It was a Perpetual Edict, so Delft and Rotterdam affirmed, but of perpetual "inclusion" of the stadtholdership. Zealand adopted the same resolution on the same day. The States-General also made the office of captain and admiral general of the union hereditary. The prince furthermore was urged to marry. His income was increased. Amsterdam proposed to take over for Holland Prince William II.'s debt to Amsterdam, amounting to two millions, and it

¹ *Lettres de De Groot*, ed. Krämer, p. 289.

² See Simon van Leeuwen, *Bedenkingen over de stadhouderlijke magt*, ed. Fruin, in *Bijdr. en Meded. Hist. Gen.*, xviii., p. 442.

was immediately approved. Zealand gave him 30,000 guilders in obligations. The East India Company presented him $\frac{1}{33}$ of all its dividends to the stockholders. Tokens of gratitude and good feeling flowed in upon the prince from all sides, and it seemed only to depend upon his will whether or not he should rise higher. For the time being nothing was done about it, though all eyes were directed to the rising sun, and there appeared to be a rivalry as to who should first come out with a proposition of this nature.

But before everything else the great war with France demanded the prince's utmost care, and he had to think of preparing for the new campaign south of the great rivers and in conjunction with the Spanish and imperial generals. In April and May of 1674 there was progress in freeing Gelderland and Overijssel from the enemy. The French left the fortresses on the Rhine and Waal. Grave and Maestricht continued to be occupied as advanced posts of the army which was collected on the French frontier and was under Condé to invade the Spanish Netherlands.¹ In the middle of May Condé began the campaign and eleven days later he reached the environs of Maestricht, where he soon had 50,000 men. At the same time Prince William moved from the north and the imperialists under De Souches from the Rhine to the Meuse to unite with the Spanish force stationed at Brussels and Louvain. The slight coöperation between the armies of the allies and on the French side Condé's bad health prevented vigorous action. A small Dutch corps under Rabenhaupt besieged Grave, and on August 11th a bloody battle took place at Seneffe in Hainaut, in which the stronger armies of the allies under Prince William, owing to the weak attitude of the imperial force under De Souches,² did not succeed in defeating Condé, and the Dutch had to fight the

¹ Knoop, ii., p. 27.

² Temple, *Memoirs of his Life*, London, 1714, p. 216.

hardest. Both parties claimed the victory. Among the allies the stadtholder of twenty-four years of age received the highest praise for his spirited conduct and undisturbed composure, and with him the faithful Waldeck, who was here severely wounded, Prince Henry Casimir of Nassau, aged seventeen, Nassau-Ouwerkerk, Beverweert's son, and a number of other officers distinguished themselves greatly. The heavy losses of the Dutch showed how bravely the soldiers formed by the prince fought against the best army of Europe. The battle of Seneffe established the young stadtholder's fame as a general, and it also restored the good name of the Dutch army. Although the prince's enterprise against Oudenarde failed in September in consequence again of the attitude of the imperial troops, Condé had found in him a worthy adversary.

The navy was energetically managed. De Ruyter endeavoured in vain to capture Martinique in the Antilles. More important was another expedition connected with plans for a Huguenot uprising in France, especially on the western coast and in Languedoc and Provence. Tromp was to support these plans with a fleet carrying a small landing army. The conspiracy formed by the adventurer de Sardan and some young Huguenots was less extensive than was pretended. It was betrayed and resulted in nothing but a weak naval demonstration on the French coasts. Tromp landed troops on Belle Isle and Normoutiers and alarmed the entire west coast of France and later also the Mediterranean coast. That France regarded the prince as the soul of the alliance was proved by the peace proposals it made to him after Seneffe for ending the war on the basis of the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Münster and with recognition of his supreme place in the republic. These proposals caused a negotiation at Maestricht, where d'Estrades, the old friend of the republic, appeared, and where the prince sent the secretary of Utrecht, De Pesters, to listen to the enemy's offers. From

the English side efforts were made by Temple, who had again come to The Hague as ambassador, and afterwards by Arlington and Sylvius to persuade the prince to a separate or a general peace. But an understanding could not be reached, and the Dutch refused to desert Spain and the other allies. The prince now continued the siege of Grave begun by Rabenhaupt, until on the 27th of October this fortress surrendered after a valiant defence of three months.

The capture of Grave freed Gelderland from the dreaded neighbourhood of the enemy, and in the winter of 1674-1675 the reorganisation of this province and Overijssel could be taken up. The way the work was begun shows that William III. hoped for the opportunity to have the sovereign power conferred upon himself, first in Gelderland, then in the whole republic. Perhaps a more comprehensive idea was considered, having been discussed since the war's commencement by Fagel and Van Beuningen in a general way with the imperial ambassador, the idea of receiving once more the republic into the German empire as the Burgundian or Batavian circle. This project, again spoken of in January, 1675, was quickly given up.¹ Nimwegen was the place, from which the prince started his Gelderland plans. After everything was carefully prepared at the end of 1674 and the prince's friends, including the Bentincks, had worked upon the influential magistrates and noblemen,² the provisional government of Nimwegen requested the prince to allow a discussion of provincial interests in the provisional governments of the three quarters of the province. The prince consented naturally and the quarters met and resolved unanimously on January 29, 1675, to offer him the government of the province under the ancient title of the duke of Guelders and count

¹ Muller, *Nederlands betrekkingen met Oostenrijk*, p. 100.

² See *Nijh. Bijdr.*, *Eerste Reeks*, iii., p. 197; viii., p. 158; Wagenaar, xiv., p. 345; Sylvius, *Historiën*, ii., pp. 164, 179, 205.

of Zutphen. The manner of the prince's reception of the offer showed that he was not averse to it, but he declared he could not accept without hearing from the other provinces. He expected to be received as sovereign by them also, or otherwise to have the offer withdrawn. His court was already talking of the "count of Holland." Utrecht strongly favoured the plan, but Holland and Zealand did not answer his expectations. Some towns of Holland were for it, but others, notably Haarlem and Leyden, opposed it, though not very vigorously. In Zealand attachment was manifested to the republican form of government, and the example of Gideon was cited to point out the right way to the prince. Now, however, the prince decided finally to give up the plan, and on February 20th he declared in the provisional assembly of Gelderland that, thankful for the confidence reposed in him, he declined the offer. His vehement letter to Zealand showed his resentment at the way the proposal was received there, and the distrust displayed had insulted him. Without a sovereign title his influence was great enough for him in the different provinces, and he feared to displease some of his own partisans, in particular to anger the Zealanders jealous of the old freedom by pushing through the affair, which would have cost him little trouble. Even among the greatest champions of the house of Orange there were many who saw no salvation in the prince's elevation to sovereignty and were devoted to the old form of the state, under which their fathers had lived. The allies had watched the affair uneasily, fearing internal dissensions in the republic and a consequent relaxation of military operations. Later generations have regretted that at this favourable moment William III. did not make an end of the indisputably ambiguous condition of the form of government of the United Provinces, causing the greatest difficulties even during the rule of the prince himself.

Reforms were now to be made in Gelderland and

Overijssel as they had been in Utrecht. The prince immediately accepted the hereditary stadtholdership in the first province, to whose chief place, Arnhem, he had betaken himself, restored the court of Gelderland, and introduced government regulations, by which was yielded to him the appointment of councillors, burgomasters, sheriffs, bailiffs, officers, justices, magistrates, etc., without nomination or recommendation of any kind; he was to have unlimited command of the provincial militia, and the settlement of differences was left to him. Then the prince went to Overijssel, where on March 2d the government in cities, villages, and quarters was rendered scarcely less dependent upon him, while here also he was invested with the hereditary stadtholdership, and the command of the military force and the settlement of differences were conferred on him.

The recovery of the three provinces had a great influence on church affairs in those provinces, where the Catholic faith had lifted up its head, as soon as the foreign Catholic ruler had taken possession of the country. Then it was high tide for the Catholic church, and in many places it was restored to honour after long years of oppression and prohibition of its public worship. But the moderation of the vicar Johannes van Neercassel avoided excesses. Churches held by the Reformed nearly a century were as a rule not disturbed, though the Utrecht cathedral and the great church of Zutphen were of course used by the Catholics. Their worship was everywhere allowed in the conquered territory, and processions moved through city and village as of old. Some zealous Catholics voiced the sentiment—"Frenchman rather than prince," and occasionally a feeling of relief from the heavy yoke appeared in them. Naturally the Catholic clergy used their influence with the enemy in favour of their fellow-believers. This was all changed with the recovery of the three provinces. The principal churches occupied were stripped of their Catholic

adornment, Voetius mounted the pulpit of Utrecht again, and the Catholics were everywhere reminded of the laws against them. But the alliance with Austria and Spain prevented vengeance being taken for the "popish boldness" of the time of the occupation, as these two Catholic powers were known to be interested in the lot of their co-religionists. In 1675 Neercassel could truthfully testify that freedom for his church was then greater than before.¹ But in the Reformed church itself, both in Holland and elsewhere, the changes of 1672 to 1675 had important results. The moderate, Cocceian or Cartesian, even libertine regents of De Witt's time were replaced by the more Voetian partisans of Orange, who, like the prince, adhered more closely to the principles of Dort. Here and there in Holland and Zeeland there soon arose between the two tendencies violent dissension which had also some political influence.

Thus three provinces had become entirely dependent upon the prince, and two, Holland and Zeeland, were now more than ever subject to the stadtholder's authority. In City and Land and Drenthe the young prince of Nassau was in February raised to the dignity of hereditary stadtholder, but Friesland hesitated to take this step. The northern provinces remained apart as before, and the arbitrary, passionate character of the young Henry Casimir, who could not easily submit to the strong will of his cousin of Orange, was later to occasion great difficulties. At the siege of Grave the Frisian prince complained of the way in which William III. treated his quarrel with Rabenhaupt about the chief command of the Groningen and Drenthe troops,² and soon various matters increased the personal estrangement between the two young princes.

The English government meanwhile did not give up the hope of persuading the warring powers to peace.

¹ *Arch. aartsb. Utrecht*, xviii., p. 278.

² See Van Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige Bijdragen*, iii., p. 13.

Temple continued to negotiate with the prince and the council pensionary, and the evident exhaustion of France made this power also not unwilling to consider peace seriously, now that a strong party in England wanted to stop being only half neutral—for English troops under Churchill still fought in the French army—and to join the allies in order to thwart the dreaded plans of Louis XIV. for Catholicism and the extension of France. On the other hand the Catholic party at the English court made efforts to remain on a friendly footing with France. The question was which of the two parties would win the unprincipled Charles II., and both the prince and Louis XIV. endeavoured secretly to support their friends, the former by working upon the Protestant feelings of the English nation, the latter by lavishing money and promises among the English ministers, courtiers, and members of Parliament. Connected with these intrigues was the arrest of Wicquefort in March, 1675, on account of the discovery of his secret relations with English agents during and after the war, of which he had now made use to set the prince and his royal uncle against one another. Wicquefort, under suspicion as an old friend of John de Witt, was put into the Voorpoort notwithstanding his office of resident for Poland and Lüneburg, and after half a year of confinement he was condemned to imprisonment for life.¹

Towards spring preparations for war began on both sides, after Waldeck had departed for Vienna in December to consult with the court council of war there about the coöperation of the allies in the Netherlands. Louis XIV. himself was to lead an army of 60,000 men against them in the Spanish Netherlands and set out in May for the Meuse, where he captured Dinant and Limburg but could accomplish little more, as the prince of Orange, still suffering from the effects of the smallpox so danger-

¹ He escaped in February, 1679, and died three years later. See Everwijn, *Abraham de Wicquefort*.

ous for his family, succeeded with the aid of the Spanish troops in saving Brabant. A deep impression was made in France by Turenne's death at the battle of Sasbach against the imperialists, who were now opposed by Condé on the Rhine, while popular tumults in Brittany and Guyenne showed the disposition of the country. At the same time war was kindled in the Baltic lands. Brandenburg fell out with Sweden and renewed its alliance with the States which now also declared war on Sweden. Then Denmark joined them and attacked the duke of Holstein, who was in league with Sweden, while Münster, now on the side of the allies, invaded the Swedish territory of Bremen. A general war on land and sea began to be developed, which stirred up all Europe but did not seem in the north to be advantageous to France and its allies.

The French government, even before the campaign, showed a readiness to open negotiations; the English government offered its services again, and it was soon agreed that a general peace congress of greater importance than that of Cologne should be held. Nimwegen was chosen as the place of the congress, and, after some difficulties owing to the refusal of the States to allow there the free exercise of the Catholic religion, the first ambassadors of the different powers assembled in the spring of 1676. The Dutch negotiators were the same as at Cologne; Temple and Berkeley represented the English; the chief personages on the French side were the aged d'Estrades, Colbert-Croissy, and the able Jean Antoine de Mesmes, count d'Avaux; the place of imperial ambassador, Lisola having died in December, 1674, was taken by a less skilful diplomat. But it was some time before all the ambassadors, after questions concerning etiquette, titles, and passports, reached Nimwegen, and it was still longer before the bases of a general peace could be agreed upon. The city of the negotiation with its environs was declared neutral territory.

Meanwhile the war dragged along in the southern Netherlands, on the Rhine, and in the Baltic regions, on the water especially in the Baltic and the Mediterranean, to the great injury of the republic's commercial interests, its competitor in the world's market, England, making use of the opportunity to extend trade and boasting already of not being behind the republic, thanks to the Navigation Act, which had forced English commerce to a vigorous development. The army of the republic under William III. could only with difficulty hold out against the strong French armies under Condé and d'Humières, as it was supported but feebly by the Spaniards, while the imperial troops on the Rhine had their hands full in protecting the territory of the empire. So the campaign of 1676 became a war of sieges, in which the French made themselves masters of some small fortresses of Hainaut and the prince did not see the siege of Maestricht crowned with success. When the French army under Schomberg approached at the end of August to relieve the besieged fortress, Prince William's army had to give up the siege on account of its heavy losses. More discouraging than the failure of the siege of Maestricht was the severe blow inflicted upon the republic by the death of De Ruyter. The Spanish fleet had been unable to defend Naples and Sicily against the French attacks, and the Spanish government therefore requested the republic to send to its aid a fleet under De Ruyter himself. With difficulty were the States persuaded to send the famous admiral so far away. The year before a similar fleet under Binckes had been dispatched to the Baltic to help Denmark against Sweden, and in the following year the rear admiral Philips van Almonde went there with a squadron, while Tromp, becoming temporarily a Danish admiral, fought the Swedes at the head of the Danish-Dutch fleet. His brilliant victory at Oeland, June 11, 1676, showed the value of his assistance to the

allies. De Ruyter's expedition was much less successful. Owing to want of money and to the promise of the Spaniards to furnish over twenty war ships, his fleet consisted of only eighteen ships and some smaller vessels. De Ruyter protested against this weak equipment, pointing out the large French fleet that was to oppose him under command of the excellent admiral Du Quesne, and having little confidence in the Spanish ships. His warning was disregarded and he yielded, saying he would risk his life where the States trusted their flag,¹ though his health left much to be desired in consequence of a severe attack of his malady, the gravel. He felt this would be his last expedition and departed in sadness. In August, 1675, he sailed to Cadiz, and neither there nor at Barcelona, Cagliari, Naples, and Milazzo did he find the expected Spanish fleet. Finally it appeared that this fleet—"the sea power of the ocean," as the Spaniards boastingly called it—lay quite unready at Palermo. But the French fleet was already on the way to relieve besieged Messina, and De Ruyter, reënforced by some Spanish galleys, determined to seek it. On January 8th, a battle took place near the island of Stromboli, in which De Ruyter repulsed Du Quesne's stronger fleet and forced it to sail around all Sicily to Messina. De Ruyter now received orders to remain six months longer in these waters. At Naples his intervention secured the release of 26 Hungarian preachers from the Spanish galleys.²

He complained again of the weakness of his fleet, after reënforcement by the small Spanish ships still unequal to the French force. The States protested to Spain about one thing and another and offered to build new vessels for Spanish account, threatening to recall their fleet. Before it came to this, De Ruyter had returned to Sicily, and he sailed out from Palermo on March 14th, strengthened by

¹ De Jonge, ii., p. 561.

² Brandt, *Leven van De Ruyter*, p. 911.

ten Spanish ships of war. The fleet went through the strait of Messina, then southwards, and failed in an attack upon Agosta. The French fleet now appeared, thirty war ships with other vessels, to which De Ruyter could only oppose nineteen smaller ships with some inferior craft. In sight of Etna the battle began on the afternoon of April 22d, in which De Ruyter won the victory after an obstinate fight and put the enemy to flight. But the success was dearly bought. Besides the many killed and wounded and the severe damage to the ships, De Ruyter himself was wounded. His left foot was carried away, while his right leg was badly hurt. The fleet went to Syracuse, where his wounds at first gave hope of recovery, until a traumatic fever on the 29th of April ended his life. Thus died the "great soldier and good patriot" far from his fatherland. His body was embalmed and brought home on the fleet in the following year, being interred at Amsterdam March 16, 1677, and Rombout Verhulst finishing his beautiful tomb four years later. With De Ruyter disappeared the second of the great Dutch admirals who have left an immortal name in history. He stands higher than Marten Tromp in the memory of posterity, which honours in him the most brilliant period of the Dutch navy, the great seaman, the brave, honest, simple lover of his country, the idol of his men, the "grandfather," whom all recognised as their superior and loved as their fatherly friend.

His fleet remained for months after his death in Sicilian waters under command of vice admiral Den Haen. With the weak Spanish armada he soon went to meet the enemy. Luck had deserted the fleet. On the 2d of June he also was killed in a fatal battle at Palermo. His successor Callenburgh, who was captain of De Ruyter's ship and still had the famous admiral's body on board, rescued what was possible and then sailed for Naples at the risk of being intercepted by the French fleet of quadruple his strength. Philips van Almonde, coming by land

from the republic, now assumed command and, the promised great Spanish fleet not appearing, he left these waters in October to return first to Spain and then to the fatherland, arriving there in February, 1677.

More fortunate was Almonde in command of the fleet aiding Denmark against the Swedes in the Baltic, later also the lieutenant admiral Bastiaense Schepers, while Tromp repeatedly led to victory the Danish fleet which he had reformed and manned largely with Dutch crews under Dutch captains, until the Danish king, weary of the war, dismissed the valiant admiral from his service. With the small Brandenburg fleet Tromp now endeavoured to injure the Swedes and served the elector at the conquest of Rügen, after which he returned to the republic in August, 1678. A sharp contest was waged also in the North Sea, where the French privateer Jean Bart, who had long been in the Dutch service, from the old pirates' nest Dunkirk inflicted great losses on the mercantile marine and the fishery. Squadrons under Schepers, Van Nes, Cornelis Evertsen, Vlugh, were often fitted out to hold him and other privateers in check, but they did not always succeed. Other squadrons helped protect Dutch and Spanish commerce on the ocean and the Mediterranean, one of them being commanded by the rear admiral Engel de Ruyter, son of the admiral. Brave deeds were done by many a captain in this guerrilla warfare against the rising naval power of France in all parts of the world. After the battle of Kijkduin the Dutch fleet engaged in no great battles owing to the increasing difficulty of manœuvring with so many heavy ships and because the enemy would not risk its young navy in one great battle. Small mobile squadrons were used, and it was easier to find commanders for them. Notable was the expedition of commander Jacob Binckes with a squadron to the West Indies, where he took Cayenne and some of the French Antilles, and directed his course to Tobago, the Dutch colony planted

there in 1654 having been since often devastated by English and French. D'Estrées with a strong French fleet soon recaptured Cayenne and went to Tobago, where Binckes repelled his furious attacks at the cost of nearly the whole Dutch squadron burned in a battle of March, 1677. A second attempt of d'Estrées met with better success in December. Binckes himself perished, the island was lost, the garrison suffered death or capture or fled. The last years were not fortunate on the sea, and Evertsen's expedition to Spain in the spring of 1678 furnished little but disappointment on account of the weak support of the Spaniards. It was hoped that an English expedition would follow it, but this did not take place.

This hope was not baseless in 1678, because England was inclined at last to join the alliance against France. The continuation of the great war showed more and more that the republic, with the feeble help of Spain and the emperor and so long as strife lasted in the Baltic countries, was not in a condition to curb the power of France so grandly developed under Louis XIV. It had to contend with difficulties on land as on the sea. Louvois had again provided a large army for his king who laid siege to Valenciennes in March, 1677. That city fell and then the French besieged Cambrai and St. Omer. William III. and Waldeck attempted to relieve the latter city, but at Mont-Cassel on April 11th the Dutch army was beaten by the stronger French force under Orleans, and only the prince's masterly management of the retreat averted disaster, although he lost all his artillery and a third of his men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The young general's imperturbable courage did not desert him. He urged on the allies and in August ventured to lay siege to Charleroi, but it had speedily to be stopped, and the prince with much talent extricated himself from the danger of being surrounded by a superior French force. Opinion was not improved by these unsuccessful enter-

prises. Weary of endless war, people longed eagerly for peace even without the allies. Heavy war expenses, defeats in the Spanish Netherlands, losses at sea, the impossibility of raising up commerce and industry excited a universal desire for peace, and Amsterdam especially demanded it. Fearing a general European coalition under the lead of the republic, Louis XIV. showed a readiness to offer favourable conditions, if it would leave the allies to their fate. In 1676 he consented to send his ambassadors to Nimwegen and seemed inclined to renounce any extension of territory at the republic's expense, provided the stipulations of the peace of the Pyrenees regarding Spain were not insisted upon, but those of Aix-la-Chapelle were accepted.¹ The French ambassadors at Nimwegen did their best to convince the Dutch representatives of their peaceful disposition, declared a willingness to recognise the prince in all his dignities, affirming the bad policy of De Witt alone had brought on the war, and promised to give back to the prince his principality, again seized upon by Louis XIV., and the property of his family in Franche Comté. The prince, however, would not hear to all this. He would only work for peace in coöperation with the allies and on the basis of the peace of the Pyrenees, while he thought a middle course had been found in the proposal to marry the young king of Spain to the daughter of the duke of Orleans, the conquered fortresses of the southern Netherlands becoming her dowry. The French declined this and the wrangling continued.

In the republic people began to be dissatisfied with the prince and his thirst for military glory. In Amsterdam Van den Bosch, formerly secretary of De Witt, became pensionary in 1677. Some pamphlets already appeared against William III., especially those of the half-crazy visionary Rothé, who had long assailed him, had sought refuge

¹ See concerning these negotiations Temple's reports and those of d'Estrades in vol. viii. of his *Négociations*.

abroad, and now had secretly returned.¹ Rothé was arrested and imprisoned for years, and the prince considered himself strong enough to follow his own line of conduct. Through Temple and Shaftesbury he hoped to draw England into the coalition. Leading English statesmen were at first averse to such a connection, but Charles II. himself, afraid of the secret relations between the prince and prominent members of the opposition, had formed the plan of uniting his nephew more closely to his family by a marriage between William III. and his oldest niece Mary, the daughter of the Catholic York.² This matrimonial plan must have appeared desirable to the prince, for it opened to him a certain road to the English throne in case York's second marriage produced no sons. The king's confidants, Arlington and Ossory, came to offer him the princess at the end of 1674, but the prince, fearing he would be implicated in court politics and thus brought into disfavour with his English friends, evaded the offer and declared he could not think of marriage in time of war. Thus matters remained until 1676. Charles II. took good care not to summon Parliament; he could count upon secret subsidies from Louis XIV. as long as he left his troops in the French service and persisted in his so-called neutrality; at the same time he continued to urge upon the prince and the States through Temple a separate treaty with France. There came a change in the spring of 1676. The prince, disappointed in his expectations of the war, now sought the king's friendship and asked permission to visit him. But Charles II. and York were then less amicably disposed. At last Parliament assembled again in February, 1677, and insisted upon measures for the rescue of the Netherlands from France, upon an alliance with the coalition, upon war with France. After the defeat of Mont-Cassel the prince also showed

¹ De Boer, in *Tijdschrift voor Gesch.*, xv., 4.

² Fruin, *Willem III.*, p. 43.

himself less stiff on the subject of the war. Charles II. and York now assented to his coming, and on October 19th the prince appeared in London, where he speedily asked for the hand of his cousin. The application was favourably received by Charles and his brother, and some days later the marriage was concluded—an important affair for the future of the English and Dutch people.

But the prince came not merely for this political marriage. He hoped also to bring about a rupture between the English court and France. Soon he convinced Charles II. of the necessity of acting against France and of compelling it to revert to the peace of the Pyrenees, though some fortresses might have to be given it on account of its victories. The prince returned to the republic in December, and on January 26th Charles II. made a treaty with it, after the terms of peace agreed upon with William III. had been rejected by France. A fleet and an army were to coöperate with those of the republic as speedily as possible. In England the king's plans were mistrusted, and it was feared that the prince had been won over to his policy. In the republic peace was wanted and not a continuation of the war. Distrust of the prince's plans arose there also, and the consequences of the previous English marriage in the house of Orange were remembered with terror, the complications of 1650 being attributed to it. The mutual lack of confidence hindered the desired coöperation, and it was late in the summer before the chance of it improved. Meanwhile the French armies were again approaching the Dutch frontiers, and Maestricht was still occupied by French troops.¹ Must the territory of the state endure another attack? Faith in the prince's prudence began to waver. The best statesmen, even the prince's friends, had moments of discouragement. Fagel spoke for a separate peace; Van Beverningh and Van Beuningen wished

¹ Knoop and Fruin, *De slag van St. Denis* ('s Gravenhage, 1881), p. 58.

for peace; Gilles Valckenier and Hooft, leaders of the two Amsterdam factions, were united in the desire for peace, and began together to oppose the prince's growing power¹; the new Amsterdam pensionary, Van den Bosch, carried on a secret correspondence with d'Estrades at Nimwegen known to him from De Witt's time. It was no secret that the young stadtholder of Friesland, Henry Casimir II., was jealous of his cousin of Orange. The former dissensions of Frederick Henry's days between the Frisian branch and that of Orange seemed about to be renewed. Henry Casimir feared the plans now discussed in the north for placing the entire republic under the prince of Orange and pushing aside in fact the Frisian branch.

French diplomacy made a masterly use of all this both in England and in the republic, strengthened the distrust of the government at London and half won over Charles II. to the French side again, augmented the division in the republic and thus disturbed the prince's plans, while it was always holding out favourable terms to the Dutch envoys at Nimwegen to persuade them to the ardently desired separate peace. At the same time Louis XIV. prosecuted energetically the war in the Spanish Netherlands from the early spring of 1678. First he moved towards Lorraine, but suddenly turned to Flanders, took in March within a few days Ghent and Ypres, laid the country districts of Flanders and Brabant under contribution in merciless fashion, and threatened to besiege Brussels, after which Luxembourg began slowly to surround Mons with no less than 50,000 men. This rapid advance of the French troops started England up at last, and English troops, now on the side of the allies, occupied Ostend and Bruges, while an English corps under the king's bastard Monmouth was soon to come to the

¹ Fruin in *Nijh. Bijdr. 3^{de} R.*, v., p. 227, chiefly from Bontemantel, see ed. Kernkamp, ii., p. 245.

support of William III., who on his side moved to the relief of Mons. Mutual distrust between Parliament and the crown opposed the accomplishment of these promises. Ghent's capture produced a deep impression in the Netherlands, and the repeated faithlessness of the English government caused little reliance to be placed on English help. The old party of the States coming up again determined to avail itself of this feeling; some of its leaders met privately in March and opened communication with d'Estrades, who advised they should refuse to the prince to raise any more taxes for war and should emphatically inform him that France was quite ready for an advantageous separate peace.¹ The prince yielded somewhat to the storm and offered to consult with England. But the French negotiators at Nimwegen declined the English mediation and applied directly to the States with the offer to give back Maestricht, to conclude a commercial treaty, and to leave Spain a fortified line on the borders of the Spanish Netherlands. Favourable terms were put in prospect for the allies also, though France thought of holding conquered Franche Comté and bringing Lorraine entirely under its sovereignty. These advantageous conditions for the republic excited lively satisfaction there, and the strong peace party called for their immediate acceptance, but the slow course of such affairs and the prince's evident unwillingness made matters drag through the whole spring. Finally the States asked Louis XIV. for a truce of six weeks, and it was granted.

The Dutch ambassadors at Nimwegen now endeavoured to persuade the allies, succeeding readily with Spain which was dependent upon the republic's aid. The emperor, however, and the German princes, Brandenburg foremost, and Denmark, which latter would have to give up their conquests to Sweden at the peace, refused and complained bitterly of the faithlessness of the States. Sure of Spain,

¹ Fruin, *De slag van St. Denis*, p. 65.

the States reported to the king that they accepted his proposals, and they commissioned their representatives to sign the peace together with Spain. Peace was concluded in fact, and the prince reluctantly agreed to it. Luxembourg began to evacuate Brabant; only the ratification of the treaty was still necessary. The French troops remained around Mons, close to the Dutch-Spanish army of the prince, which was to prevent the surrounding of this important city. At the last moment a difference arose at Nimwegen over the time set for the evacuation of the fortresses occupied by the French, including Maestricht, which Louis XIV. would not wholly evacuate before Sweden had recovered its lost possessions — an unreasonable condition made only because dissension had broken out again in England between king and Parliament and Louis felt safe on that side. Peace was not yet signed, much less ratified, while Mons already suffering from hunger might yet fall into the hands of Luxembourg, who objected to the bringing of provisions into the city. Neither the States nor the Spaniards wanted to leave Mons for a moment in French hands, because the French ambassadors at Nimwegen had intimated that they would give back the city, if it fell after peace was signed and ratified, not disclosing what they would do, if it fell before that time. This attitude of France awakened alarm in the Netherlands and in England. Charles II. sent Temple to The Hague again to propose to the States that France should be forced to accept peace, and Holland and Amsterdam considered themselves threatened by Louis. The prince returned to the army at the end of July, and both powers demanded of Louis a withdrawal of his condition concerning the evacuation before August 11th, or, in case of refusal, England would join the coalition. Every day bad news from Mons was feared, every day an attempt to relieve it was expected, the prince having everything ready. French diplomacy endeavoured to sow distrust between

England and the States that peace might be postponed and Mons be played into Luxembourg's possession. The States realised that this must be prevented at any price, and the prince, with Waldeck as chief of his staff, moved up on the 10th in order to attack the enemy on the following day, the end of the time allowed to France.

At the last moment French diplomacy made a masterly move at Nimwegen. It yielded to the demand for evacuation and persuaded the Dutch ambassadors on the 10th to sign the peace just before midnight, while that with Spain could not be made ready, some points requiring to be formulated. Thus the republic had peace, but next day the French began making all sorts of difficulties for Spain in the hope that Mons might fall and be exchanged for something else. Meanwhile the prince moved closer to Luxembourg's position. The report of the conclusion of peace was already noised about the camp. No official letters came to confirm the rumour, but on the 13th news was shown in print around the prince giving Van Beverningh's report of the 10th to the States that he was to sign the peace that same evening. Luxembourg had heard similar rumours, and on the morning of the 14th d'Estrades appeared in his camp with the official intelligence. The French general was on the point of informing the prince of Orange, who had still no report from his government, and thus of avoiding the battle already offered him, but he hesitated and believed that the honour of war obliged him to fight the battle. At St. Denis, an hour's distance from Mons, the prince attacked him, and the battle, in which the prince gave proofs of uncommon personal courage and of a reckless contempt for death, ended indecisively, but was not renewed on the following day. Towards noon of the 15th the prince received the report from the council pensionary and from the Spanish side and gave up further strife as useless. The enemy moved away from the neighbourhood of Mons a few days later and

the prince returned home. The war was over. After a month peace between France and Spain was concluded through Dutch mediation, France keeping Franche Comté and a series of important fortresses, including Valenciennes, Cambrai, St. Omer, Ypres, and Maubeuge.¹ In the course of the next year the other allies, one after another, made separate treaties of peace, loudly complaining of the faithlessness of the States which had left them in the lurch. The battle of St. Denis has occasioned a remarkable contention between Messrs. Knoop and Fruin as to William III.'s attitude with regard to this battle. The discussion has shown that the prince had received no official report of the conclusion of peace and Luxembourg had received such a report. The accusation may well be denied that William III. risked the bloody battle, knowing peace was made, in order to undo that peace.

Thus ended after six years the war that was to destroy the republic. Under the lead of the great soldier of the house of Orange and with the help of the allies coming at the eleventh hour it preserved its independence and territory. Its way of rewarding those allies must be disapproved of, but no one can take from it the glory of having stood firmly during years for the defence not only of itself but also of Europe against the conquering lust of the insatiable French king, whose sturdiest opponent was constantly shown to be Prince William III.

¹ See *Actes et négociations de la paix de Nimègue*, ii., p. 729, the collection where all the official documents relating to this peace are to be found.

CHAPTER XVI

PREPARATION OF THE GREAT COALITION

PEACE was now concluded, but from the first moment the prince understood that this peace was really nothing more than a truce. There was no sign of an appearance that France had given up its plans in the Spanish Netherlands and the German empire or its desire to extend its frontiers to the Rhine. Plainly it had wished for peace merely to avert the threatened European coalition and to be able to wait for a more favourable time. The prince was resolved to seek the task of his life in the frustration of those plans, in the maintenance of what was beginning to be called the "European balance of power." William III. considered himself called by God to this task for religious as well as political reasons, because Louis XIV's course in religious matters showed that the victory of France would be likewise that of Catholicism. William regarded himself as appointed by God to defend the political and religious liberty of Europe and of the civilised world.¹ And he was determined in this struggle for freedom and faith to prove himself the worthy scion of the great founder of his house, whose device—*je maintiendrai*—was also his cherished motto, his aspirations being best represented by the—*pro religione et libertate*. This high ideal has given to his person and government a peculiar character, by which his time is distinguished in Dutch history from the period immediately preceding. The

¹ Fruin, *Prins Willem III. in zijn verhouding tot Engeland*, p. 115. See P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und G. F. von Waldeck*, ii., p. 17.

Cartesian De Witt, the Catholic Lisola, had merely contemplated a political contest with France, the former guided by the particular interest of the republic, the latter by that of the emperor and empire. What they had begun from their limited point of view William III. took up with a wider and deeper vision. To his high ideal he subordinated and sacrificed his own interest, his own person, the interests of his dynasty and of the countries and peoples intrusted to his rule. He risked his life times innumerable; he ventured his domestic happiness in the service of his policy, when he united himself with the woman who, not until much later, won his heart by her self-sacrificing love; he overcame his personal inclinations by submitting to the limitation of his royal power in England, the necessary condition of his elevation, which assured to him England's help against France. This immolation of self, this energetic pursuit of his grand purpose, has given to the outwardly cool, stubborn, weak man the sympathy of posterity, which honours him higher than did most of his contemporaries, because it sees in him the unselfish, tireless champion of the high ideals of political and religious liberty dear to the present.

His government was not fortunate for the republic in all respects, not even during the ten and later the five years of peace, the half of his reign, when it could recover from the difficulties brought upon it by war. He regarded the republic more as the implement put by God into his hand for the attainment of the desired end than as the state whose interests were committed to his care. He knew the need of improvement in its faulty form of government, but did not take the trouble to strive for its reform. He was content with the great power given him between 1672 and 1675 and paid slight attention to the way his creatures used the authority conferred by him on them, provided they remained the obedient servants of the policy which he prescribed for them. Not unknown to

him were the actions of his second cousin and favourite Odijk,¹ the rapacious prodigal, whom he appointed in 1668 to the influential dignity of first noble in Zeeland. William knew that his cousin trafficked in the offices of Zeeland in shameless fashion, but he did not end this business, because he recognised Odijk's personal attachment to himself and Odijk by his brilliant life at The Hague enhanced the splendour of the court. Under the patronage of this adventurer, considered by his guests as a rogue and cheat, official corruption flourished,² and the governing cabals in the towns of Zeeland, suppressed after the fall of the De Witt party, were restored in favour of the other party. Affairs went elsewhere as in Zeeland. At Amsterdam the government of before 1672 was replaced by Valckenier's clique, which had great influence³ on the appointments and regarded in the beginning as a law the recommendation of those who the most "are in favour with His Highness." The "resolution for harmony" of May, 1676, offered by Valckenier to the other burgomasters, was nothing but a combination aiming to win over the opposite party in order together to resist the prince. It was not fully accepted, but, when Hooft became burgomaster again in 1677, he and Valckenier ruled over the city until the latter's death three years later. In smaller cities also men entered the government by influence, intrigue, or gifts, through the favour of His Highness, just as earlier through De Witt or his friends. At Rotterdam a candidate for the town council had to promise to obey the prince "blindly." In the East India Company, in church consistories, in all governing boards, similar abuses were very common at this time, all the profitable offices being played into the hands of friends and relatives, and under the prince's protection such

¹ See Fruin, *Aanteekeningen op Droste*, ii., p. 470.

² De Witte van Citters, *Contracten van Correspondentie*, p. xviii.

³ See Bontemantel, ii., p. 208.

wrongs were punished less than before. What happened in Holland and Zealand took place in the other provinces also on a large scale, so that in this regard William III.'s period was a time of retrogression rather than of progress. In Henry Casimir's stadtholderships the evil was little less extensive.

These affairs were made critical by the circumstance that the prince could hardly be called particular in the choice of his instruments. Odijk is not the only one who had a bad name. The prince's treatment of the chief personages in the drama of the De Witts does not move to admiration of his ruling principles, and what the younger Constantijn Huygens in his journals communicates concerning the chief members of the prince's circle, though much calumny may be given out for truth, shows that the mischief was not confined to the municipal government boards or to the anonymous press. The prince's favourites in general bore a bad reputation, and while their influence lasted, they used it in every way for their own profit. "Injustice and desire for higher estate" were no less general in William III.'s days than in those of De Witt and were more strikingly displayed, while the regents of the later time were inferior in ability to those of the preceding period. This was because the prince required docility in his creatures rather than ability, which often brings independence of judgment, his rule being much injured by this preference.¹ The fame of the Dutch diplomatists in this period, however, did not remain far below the height it attained in De Witt's time. Van Beverningh retired from public affairs at the age of 65 after the peace of Nimwegen and devoted himself, until his death in 1690, to the cultivation of rare and exotic plants at his villa near Leyden, where he was curator of the university. De Groot a year after his return from exile was brought before the court of Holland on

¹ Fruin, *Willem III. in zijne verhouding tot Engeland*, p. 115.

account of the discovery of his correspondence with the condemned De Wicquefort during the negotiations at Cologne but was acquitted in December, 1676, to the vexation of the prince; he died two years later at his country house near Haarlem. Van Beuningen, the brilliant diplomatist, and man of the world, for some years after the peace of Westminster occupied the important post of ambassador in London, where he was until 1682 the faithful servant of the new ruler's policy. Then he began to oppose the prince, resigned his ambassadorship, was unable to maintain himself as burgomaster in Amsterdam, and in a fit of dejection withdrew from politics to become absorbed in the mystical ideas that had attracted him of old. Soon he showed signs of mental derangement, especially after his singular marriage in his old age; a few years later he became quite insane and died so in 1693 almost forgotten. Their place was taken by eminent noblemen like Godard van Rheede, lord of Amerongen, who won reputation by negotiating with Brandenburg, like Everhard van Weede, lord of Dijkveld, one of the trustiest servants of the prince's policy. Like them the council pensionary Fagel adhered unconditionally to the prince's views. With Waldeck, who besides his military talent possessed that also of the diplomatist, these men were the excellent instruments disposed of by the prince in conducting foreign affairs, and they could stand comparison with the diplomatists of De Witt's time. But they were the tools of the prince's policy much more than De Witt's statesmen had been his tools, and this was even more true of such men as the prince's gentleman of the bedchamber and confidential friend, Hans Willem baron Bentinck, now and then used in delicate negotiations to reach the great end of a European coalition against France.

If this end was to be attained, the prince must first of all have to fear no opposition in the republic itself. Since

Amsterdam had antagonised him in 1677 and the Frisian stadtholder had begun to thwart him, this opposition gave the prince no rest. It had to be overcome, as was plainly shown by events after the peace of Nimwegen. The way peace was secured had roused the prince's exasperation against Amsterdam, and its secret coöperation with the enemy was not unknown to him. With Valckenier at its head the great commercial city defied the powerful stadtholder and worked against his anti-French policy. After Valckenier's death the lead at Amsterdam fell into the hands of Johan Hudde and Nicolaas Witsen, learned and excellent men but less able as statesmen. Neither they nor Van Beuningen, who was burgomaster at Amsterdam a few years longer, followed the prince's wishes entirely, but their opposition was less strong than that of the energetic Valckenier. French diplomacy availed itself cleverly of Amsterdam's disposition. The French ambassador d'Avaux, who represented his government here after the peace, always emphasised the fact that he was ambassador to the States and not to the prince. He flattered the States as much as possible, and Louvois at Paris offered the ambassador of the republic an alliance with great advantages for commerce and navigation and the promise to let the Spanish Netherlands alone in case of war. Thus France hoped to vanquish the republic's resistance. The prince's plans were impeded, though nothing came of the proposed alliance. Those plans were directed at Germany and England. Just then England, where the fear of Catholicism was leading to persecution, seemed on the right road, and the prince's influence on the king had never been greater, but there was slight reliance placed in the permanence of the English policy. Things were not much better in Germany, although Waldeck on behalf of the prince succeeded in forming a "union" of various small German princes on the Rhine with Nassau as its centre. Brandenburg com-

plained still of the peace of Nimwegen and demanded its unpaid subsidies of the States as did the emperor himself, and it was even persuaded into a secret league and subsidy treaty with France. The rising Hanover showed the same disposition. Notwithstanding Waldeck's efforts the Rhenish union was very slow in extending over north Germany and becoming a union of the upper imperial circles against France.

This was all in process, when France threw off the mask by establishing the *chambres de réunion*, destined to ascertain what parts of the German empire had formerly belonged to the fortresses and lands now become French possessions, while it immediately occupied the duchy of Luxemburg and moved its troops far into Brabant and Flanders ostensibly to maintain its rights obtained at Nimwegen. Great was the indignation on all sides at these sudden demands. Poor Spain, paralysed by court cabals and intrigues, looked up anxiously to the republic. The chief princes of northern and central Germany, including some of those "armed" princes who always had troops ready to sell for subsidies, joined the union owing to Waldeck's exertions and thus formed the alliance of the upper imperial circles. But Brandenburg opposed this movement and tried to keep the emperor out of the league. The alarm became greater, when France seized upon Strasburg August 30, 1681, and began to force Luxemburg to surrender by a blockade. In October Sweden concluded an alliance with the republic for the maintenance of the peace of Münster and Nimwegen, and it was hoped that England, the emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, and the minor German potentates would join, so that France must finally come to it. William III. and Waldeck endeavoured to obtain a union of all the interested princes in the German empire under the emperor's lead. This resulted in the treaty of Laxenburg in June, 1682, and then there was a beginning of armed resistance

on the Rhine. Prince William supported his faithful Waldeck, his "minister for German affairs," and the question was now whether the republic would take up arms again in case of war and whether England would coöperate. But England remained powerless on account of the division between king and Parliament concerning the exclusion, desired by the latter, of the Catholic York from the succession or the limitation of his authority in case he should succeed. The weak Charles II. began again to hold out his hand to France, while the prince saw his influence decline and, by a journey to London, convinced himself of his uncle's unreliability. Soon he deemed all hope from that side lost.¹ England's attitude, coupled with French intrigues in Amsterdam and elsewhere, determined that of the States. The burgomasters of Amsterdam adhered to their resolution to do nothing serious without England. Help was promised to Spain, but negotiations were to come first, and immediately Louis relinquished Luxemburg and thus showed his friendliness to the republic in order to paralyse the prince's war policy.

Spain, weary of French violence in its Netherlands, called once more for the help of the republic which, in accordance with treaties, ought to have sent 8000 troops. The prince favoured this and proposed to the council of state an increase of the army by 16,000 men. Amsterdam refused to take this road to war and inspired elsewhere opposition to the prince's plans among the regents fearful of a new French war. The discovery of secret relations between the French ambassador and the Amsterdam magistrates seemed about to break this resistance. The prince reproached them with treason, spoke like his father of "those Amsterdam rascals," threatened them with the vengeance of the people, with throwing "the club into the street" as in 1672, and popular agitation began to arise destined, it was expected, to make it

¹ Fruin, *Willem III.*, p. 100.

soon appear "whose head was firmest on his shoulders." Neither remonstrances nor deputations could induce Amsterdam to yield. It declined after Spain had declared war on France and affirmed that it was justified in negotiating with a foreign ambassador like d'Avaux. Civil war seemed to be threatened as in 1650. There was talk of possible military measures against the great commercial city and of its plan to transfer the supreme command within its walls to the Frisian stadtholder, who was opposed to his cousin in the affair of raising more troops. It was thought that Amsterdam would be supported by France and Brandenburg, whose ambassador was on good terms with d'Avaux and was soon aided in his diplomacy by a special envoy, Paul von Fuchs. But the prince went to work in another way. On January 31, 1684, he had the increase of the army adopted in the Estates of Holland by a majority of votes despite the protests of Amsterdam and Schiedam. The resolution was offered to the States-General as coming from Holland. Then arrived the report that the Spanish government of Brussels had intercepted a packet from d'Avaux, in which a cipher letter from him to his king mentioned several members of De Witt's old party as "well-disposed" and seemed especially to compromise the Amsterdam regents. The letter was sent from Brussels to the prince, who communicated it (February 16) to the Estates of Holland in secret session with closed doors. A violent scene ensued; Amsterdam's attitude was sharply disapproved of, while the papers in its office at the Hague were sealed and a copy of the intercepted letter was sent to the other municipal governments. A translation of the letter appeared a few days later in print. The affair excited great alarm now that the chance of a war with France seemed so near. But d'Avaux and Amsterdam protested against these things. It rained little blue books again, some for, others against the prince and his policy. One of them,

the *Missive from a regent in the Estates of Holland by Philalethes*, was attributed to Fagel himself and brought forth an official *Vindication of the conduct of the lords of Amsterdam*. While the affair went off thus in Amsterdam, the prince attacked his opponents in other cities as well.¹ He managed everywhere to establish his authority and to subject the regents to that authority with a vigorous hand. He would not have feared to take measures against Amsterdam conflicting with its privileges and customs. The old antagonism between the "monarchic" and the "aristocratic" government with its consequences for civil liberty and unity once more appeared.² The levy of soldiers encountered opposition in other provinces in the spring after the deep impression produced by Louis XIV.'s brutality towards weak Genoa, which he bombarded into submission in May, 1684, on account of its building of ships for Spaniards. The fate of the "Hollanders of the Mediterranean Sea" was lamented, but the power of France seemed too great. So the affair had to be postponed, and Spain continued alone in its war with France.

That war of course resulted to the advantage of France. It conquered nearly all Flanders, burned Oudenarde, regularly laid siege to Luxemburg, and took the city after a brave defence. And the republic sat still, to the vexation of the prince. The German empire also did nothing, now that the emperor had to devote all his attention to the Turks, who had even besieged Vienna in 1683 but were repulsed with German and Polish help. Brandenburg still worked into France's hand, and Hanover hesitated what to do. England's attitude afforded no hope of coöperation. The discovery of the "Protestant treason," a conspiracy against the duke of York, in which the king's illegitimate son

¹ Wagenaar, xv., p. 259.

² See the very numerous pamphlets, speeches, and essays concerning this in the catalogues of pamphlets for this year.

James, duke of Monmouth, and many English noblemen were implicated, caused a persecution of the enemies of York and the Romish church. Monmouth fled to Holland and sought refuge at the prince's court in The Hague, where he was readily received in spite of the suspicion of a secret understanding with the conspirators thus incurred by the prince and princess, already in disfavour with York and his party. Both prince and States did their best to please Charles II., and his anger was soon appeased; but he continued to act secretly with France. The willingness, with which the sheriff of Leyden, Cornelis Paets, delivered up Thomas Armstrong, one of Monmouth's fugitive friends, to be soon afterwards beheaded in London, excited resentment at this deviation from the custom of receiving political exiles here. There seemed to be no possibility of a good understanding between England and the States and of joint action against France. The only thing left to do was to make some arrangement with France, which did not seem disinclined now it had what it wanted. William III. was beaten and endeavoured to save whatever was possible. A truce of twenty years on the basis of the *status quo* was concluded in Ratisbon on August 15, 1684, and it put temporarily into France's hands everything conquered but opened an opportunity, before the definitive cession of these lands and cities, of organising opposition to the "general monarchy" desired by France.¹ Time won was well won. But France wanted more than the "general monarchy," the "supreme power" in Europe, everywhere spoken of: it wanted also a "general religion," Catholicism. The Edict of Nantes "perpetual and irrevocable," which from 1598 assured a large measure of freedom to the Huguenots in France, was a thorn in the eye of the strict Catholics under Louis XIV. Rude hands were

¹ On the significance of this treaty see P. L. Muller, in *Versl. en Meded. Kon. Akademie*, 4^{de} R., iv., p. 78, in opposition to the opinion of Fester in his book: *Die armirten Stände und die Reichskriegsverfassung*.

now laid upon what Louis XIII. had maintained, what Richelieu and Mazarin had been unwilling to touch, what the young Louis XIV. himself had recognised as law in 1652. About 1660 France numbered more than one million Protestants, one twelfth of the entire population,¹ from Dauphiny to Brittany and Normandy living along the edge of the kingdom and particularly numerous among the manufacturers, merchants, and farmers, with over 600 churches and 700 preachers. But the French clergy, ruled by the Jesuits, looked askant upon the blooming plant of heresy and gradually found the king's ear open to their remonstrances, his Spanish ancestry on the mother's side manifesting itself in increasing devoutness. It opposed the building of Protestant churches in places where the Edict of Nantes did not really apply, and in 1666 the king declared the Edict should be exactly enforced. This was the beginning of the official persecution, which had in fact commenced some years earlier by all sorts of molestations and insults, so that no worship of the Protestants took place at Charenton near Paris without disturbance and no dying man was safe from attacks upon his faith.² Notwithstanding the bitter complaints of the Protestants one royal declaration after another restricted their liberties; finally, family life was reached by the permission to convert children seven years old to the Catholic religion and to take them away from their families. No persecution, however, could do away with Protestantism; only a few gave up the struggle and changed their faith or left the land of their fathers, while active preachers like Du Bosc, Jurieu, Benoît, Basnage, Bayle kept their flocks together. Then the system of compulsion began in 1682. "Compel them to come in" was recommended to the government as a duty by the Gallican church. A warning in this spirit was proclaimed, and the king ap-

¹ *Histoire générale*, ed. Lavissee and Rambaud, vi., p. 281.

² *Journal d'un voyage à Paris, passim.*

pointed commissioners to apply these ideas, to remove Protestant officials, close shops and inns owned by Protestants, demolish churches, and prevent religious worship. The commissioners obtained soldiers to complete their task. Hundreds of families were reduced to beggary, hundreds fled to Switzerland, to the republic, to the Protestant sections of northern Germany, to England to escape imprisonment and corporal punishment. It became even worse with the beginning of 1685. A last protest of the persecuted was answered by a demand from the clergy for the abrogation of the Edict, because it could no longer serve as a general law on account of the modifications gradually made in it. The king, now under the influence of Madame de Maintenon and the Jesuits, desired nothing better. The terrible dragonnades of Béarn were imitated in all the provinces; dragoons invaded the houses, plundered, abused, tortured the poor Protestants to convert them on the spot. Hundreds fled, other hundreds submitted, others gave up their lives for their faith or atoned for their constancy as galley slaves. Every day reports reached the court of "conversion" by the sword, and the clergy dared to speak of this "road strewn with flowers," of its aversion to the executions necessary "to destroy this hydra."

The revocation of the Edict on October 17, 1685, was the crown of the work. Not a single right remained to the "pretended reformed religion"; its adherents might still dwell in France, but their children must be brought up as Catholics, and the property of emigrants was confiscated and they themselves were condemned to the galleys for life. Thus Louis earned the praises of his clergy, the approval of Pope Innocent XI., though the pope had scruples against the mingling of political and religious motives and against the conversions by violence in France and later disapproved often of the persecutions there.¹

¹ See Fruin, *Willem III.*, p. 145. Also the brief of December 13, 1685,

Thus the king earned the curses of the tens of thousands who emigrated before the revocation, of the hundreds of thousands who now left home and hearth to seek elsewhere for the freedom which could no longer be theirs in France. The day of the 17th of October, 1685, cost France half a million of inhabitants, and they took with them, according to an eminent French historian of our time, "treasures of heroism, constancy, self-sacrifice," that could never be replaced. The free Protestant republic provided a new fatherland for thousands of these refugees. The Protestant court of the stadtholder and his wife supported a number of men and women of all ranks among them; the cities of Holland and the other provinces opened wide their gates to thousands of industrious and educated people: preachers, officers, merchants, workmen, farmers, who came streaming in. In 1686 their number was estimated at not less than 75,000, and they continued flocking to the land of personal freedom, where they could worship in their own language in the Walloon communities existing longer than a century.¹ The cities endeavoured to attract the French manufacturers and workmen by privileges, loans, temporary exemption from taxes. Industry, especially in the cities of Holland, derived the greatest advantages from them.² Old branches of industry received new life from this sudden influx of fresh strength; new industries were established, like those of hats, silken stuffs, gauze, velvet, taffeta, lace. A dark side was the increasing influence of French education in polite circles, the action of the French language on the Dutch tongue. This great immigration was entirely merged into the more numerous population of the country. In the second or third genera-

cited in *Histoire générale*, p. 301, as compared with the papal declarations of 1688 to De Cock and of 1689 (Ranke, *Päpste*, iii., p. 115). Concerning the pope's attitude see especially: Immich, *Papst Innocenz XI.* (Berlin, 1900), p. 64.

¹ See d'Avaux, *Négociations*, vols. v. and vi.

² Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsgeschichte*, p. 33.

tion the mingling with the original Dutch people was so thorough that the influence of the French element seems to vanish from the investigator's eye. The descendants of the French immigrants are now only to be distinguished from the Netherlanders of older ancestry by their names and family traditions.

The treatment of the Protestants in Catholic France had an irritating effect upon the feeling in the Netherlands against the Catholics.¹ The eagerly read stories of the dragonnades and other abuses; the poverty of many refugees; alarming reports of renewed persecutions of the Waldenses in Savoy, of the Catholic government in England, now that Charles II. had been succeeded in 1685 by the Catholic York as James II., of the appearance of a Catholic branch of the princely house in the Palatinate; sensational conversions of German Protestants, the emperor's victories over the Turks, and the restoration of Catholicism in Hungary—all this made people believe in a general Catholic activity in Europe, in a "Great council of Rome," of which the Jesuits were the soul and Louis XIV., James II., and Fürstenberg were the most powerful tools. Violent pamphlets stirred up the agitation, and it was not quieted by the circumstance that the Catholics under the guidance of Neercassel refrained from giving offence and even contributed money for the poor refugees. The States-General discussed a revival of strict regulations against the Catholics, but Holland managed to postpone the matter, as the merchants were opposed to any such severity and the imperial ambassador at The Hague, Cramprich, who interested himself in the faith of his co-religionists, had to be favoured on account of the prince's plans for the great coalition, into which even the pope was gradually drawn from fear of the predominance of France. Late in 1687 the expulsion of Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc., was proposed in Holland, but the proposal

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Katholieken*, i., p. 290.

did not become a law and soon the awakened religious passions subsided. In Zealand commercial and political considerations opposed the urgency of the preachers, who were warned to be calm and to observe "moderation in the affairs of the papists." In Friesland and Groningen only were serious measures taken against the Catholics, and there were persecutions and plunderings of churches.

The persecutions and the revocation of the Edict had a decided influence on the Great Elector's attitude.¹ The political consequences of his secret league with France, from which he had expected support against Sweden in his designs upon Pomerania, had been a failure. When Louis XIV. showed himself as the champion of Catholicism, the thought of Brandenburg's position in Germany as the most powerful Protestant state came to the fore, and the elector's Protestant sympathies made him offer his country also as a refuge for the persecuted. His good relations with France suffered from this, although he did not yet give up the alliance, on account of the subsidies, and tried to smooth over the reception of the French emigrants settling especially in Berlin and the taking into his service of exiled officers, including the famous marshal Schomberg. In May, 1685, he sent his trusted counsellor, Paul von Fuchs, to the republic to restore a good understanding with it and his nephew, the prince of Orange. Fuchs succeeded in his mission: the alliance, concluded in 1678, before the peace, was prolonged until 1700, and the dissension between the prince and Amsterdam was settled by the mediation of Fuchs. The latter cost no less trouble than the former, because obstinacy on both sides had long prevented harmony. The chances for it had risen somewhat in the spring of 1685. Through the mediation of the princess of Anhalt, daughter of Frederick

¹ P. L. Mullen, *Een Brandenburgsche zending in Nederland in 1685*, in *Nijh. Bijdr. N. R.*, vi., p. 77, and *Nederland en de Groote keurvorst*, in *Nijh. Bijdr. N. R.*, vi., p. 169.

Henry and mother-in-law of Henry Casimir from 1683, peace was brought about in March between the two cousins, and Henry Casimir pledged himself in writing no longer to oppose but to support the policy of William III. "in relation to other kingdoms and commonwealths."¹ This reconciliation weakened the Amsterdam party, and the efforts of d'Avaux to bind Amsterdam to France became less effectual. Just at this time Fuchs appeared as mediator and in the course of the summer succeeded in bringing the prince and the burgomasters of Amsterdam together. Amsterdam agreed that the army should not be reduced during the current year, assented to the alliance with Brandenburg and the accompanying financial sacrifice in favour of the elector, and only secured a regulation of the tariff of convoys and licenses to suit itself. D'Avaux did his best to break this understanding, but his "artifices" could no longer disturb the "good harmony." The retirement of Van Beuningen from the burgomastership established peace more solidly, for Witsen, Hudde, and the other rulers of Amsterdam were more tractable, especially since the pensionary Hop had been gained to the prince's views. The prince triumphed here also, and the point was found, about which the great coalition could be formed. No city in Holland would now venture to resist his will, and nothing was to be feared from the other provinces.

There was for a time some hope that England would play an important part in the coalition. The new king, James II., was an ardent Catholic, but also a defender of the balance of power in Europe. He manifested an inclination to coöperate with his son-in-law, the prince of Orange, who was likewise the presumptive successor to the throne of England. James II. had a much stronger character than his deceased brother, and England could be depended upon, if he were once won over to William

¹ Sypesteyn, *Geschiedk. Bijdr.* iii., p. 27.

III.'s policy. Negotiations between the king and the prince aimed to promote an agreement between England and the republic. Commercial differences were intrusted to a mixed commission. The king desired that Charles II.'s bastard son, the young duke of Monmouth, regarded as the head of the opposition in England, should be expelled from the republic, that the English emigrants in general should leave it, that suspected officers in the English and Scotch regiments of the States should be discharged, that the republic with England should draw a line against France. The prince consented to all this. Harmony did not long endure, because James, influenced by Monmouth's armed invasion of England, by insurrections in Scotland, by Protestant agitation in the whole realm, soon began, like his brother before him, to seek financial aid from Louis XIV. A year later the king had entered upon a Catholic reaction, which estranged him further from his people and made that people look to the prince of Orange as the saviour of its faith and freedom from the secret plans of a Catholic king. Apparently no help for the great coalition was to be expected from England under James II., who was secretly in league with Louis XIV. and at the critical moment would stand with France, unless a revolution should change the course of English affairs. Then would come the time for the prince to exert a decisive influence on England's fortunes. Not until then might England finally be won for his religio-political ideal.

While he watched matters in England, he and Waldeck with Brandenburg's aid were busily organising the party of opposition to France in the German empire and preparing the coalition upon a broader basis. It was very slow work to break up the relations between France and the small German courts, to unravel the net of finely spun intrigues. The Laxenburg treaty of 1682 remained without much result owing to the war with the Turks and the

attitude of the republic. Waldeck went to Vienna in July, 1685, to take part in the campaign against the Turks on the Danube and to induce the German princes to persist in their union with the emperor for the empire's defence. He succeeded in the latter and supported the endeavours of the imperial court in place of the expiring Laxenburg treaty to bring about the Augsburg alliance (1686), a treaty of less general importance than is attributed to it and only serving to keep together what had been brought together. Spain and Sweden as members of the empire joined the nucleus of the Franco-nian-Rhenish princes, and Waldeck, under the elector of Bavaria and the margrave of Baireuth, was to be field marshal of the army which might be used against France. This was far from a coalition centred around the maritime powers, such as William III. and Waldeck had imagined. The French understood this, as was shown by their conduct on the Rhine in occupying several important fortresses without any impediment from the side of the allies. It was often a hard task for the aged Waldeck, now approaching seventy, but he continued working with the prince to strengthen the bond between the German princes and to oppose the French influence in the empire.

In 1688 the crisis suddenly came which was to transform long preparation into vigorous action. It was brought about by the course of affairs in England, and Prince William took advantage of them at the right moment. Strife there between sovereign and people became ever more violent both in religious and political matters, while James II.'s attitude towards France indicated secret coöperation between the two courts, more dangerous now than under Charles II. on account of the more obstinate character of the new monarch, of whom his sceptical brother had prophesied that he would not sit four years

¹ See Fester, *Die Augsburger Allianz von 1686*, and P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. und Waldeck*, ii., p. 11.

upon the throne. The situation was so serious early in 1687 that the prince found it necessary to send his confidential servant Dijkveld as an extraordinary envoy to the English court, and he prevailed upon the States-General and the Estates of Holland to consent secretly to this. The purpose naturally was to investigate the reliability and the plans of those who were making ready to set up the prince of Orange against his uncle and father-in-law. The mission was a complete success, and Dijkveld returned in summer with many letters from eminent Englishmen who desired to enter into relations with the prince. Thenceforth the prince carried on secret negotiations with them. The king did not perceive what was going on about him, and his envoy at the prince's court, the Catholic Ier D'Albyville, did not see through the designs there. Even d'Avaux in his letters confessed that he was perplexed, although he knew what it must all come to in the end. James cast the warnings of d'Avaux to the winds and asked the prince and the States for their coöperation in his measures of toleration for the Catholics. But the prince did not wish to lose favour with his English friends and the English people, and refused absolutely to do anything against the interest of his religion, though he was averse to any religious persecution. The princess agreed entirely with her husband and would have nothing to do with the proposals of her father. Living at first coolly and without mutual love, the husband and wife after ten years of marriage were brought closer together and learned to understand and appreciate one another. The gentle and amiable princess, whose diaries and letters have in large part come down to us, was able to win the confidence and love of her husband, hitherto cold and somewhat mistrustful towards her.¹ If James II. should die childless, his successors would assuredly not continue in his course. This had to be made plain in England to counteract the

¹ See concerning her: Krämer, *Maria II. Stuart*, Utrecht, 1890.

efforts of James and his partisans to show that the prince and princess approved of his measures. Fagel's noted letter to the Scottish dissenter Stewart served this purpose, the council pensionary announcing that prince and princess favoured abolishing penalties for deviation from the Anglican church, but by no means the admission of Roman Catholics to all offices. The letter was immediately printed and thousand of copies¹ were distributed over England, so that it acquired the character of a manifesto to the English people against the king's policy.

Meanwhile James persisted in his measures to assist the Catholics and confirm his sovereign authority. He was treading the path that had led his father to the scaffold and that was to bring him also to ruin. In May, 1688, he had seven refractory bishops of the Anglican church imprisoned in the Tower and proclaimed anew his "declaration of indulgence." Amid the consequent exasperation a son was born to him on June 10th, an event which seemed to assure the future of his dynasty. In the preceding fall the expected birth had been announced here and there, and the report was received with great joy by the Catholics, with dismay and suspicion by the Protestants. When the birth took place a month before the designated time and was managed at court in a very mysterious fashion, the presumption gained ground that the young "prince of Wales" was a supposititious child procured by the Jesuits, but modern researches have shown this hypothesis to be baseless. The prince and princess, who had at first found no reason to doubt and had sent over Zuylesteyn with their congratulations, were soon of another opinion, especially when Anne, the only sister of the princess, wrote to them that she did not consider the so-called prince of Wales as genuine.² An end was speedily made in the

¹ Extracts in Wagenaar, xv., p. 361, printed among other places in *Holl. Mercurius* 1687, p. 92.

² See relating to the genuineness :Fruin, pp. 171, 177 ; Krämer, p. 159.

English chapel of the princess of Orange of the prayers for her young brother. There was great commotion in England itself, and the acquittal of the seven bishops increased it. On June 30th some prominent Englishmen signed an invitation to the prince to come over and rescue England's religion and liberties from the hands of the existing government. Admiral Herbert with the document appeared a few days later at the villa of Honselaarsdijk, where William III. usually sojourned at this period. The prince hesitated, consulted with his wife, but soon accepted the not unexpected proposal that presaged for him a brilliant part, as it gave him an opportunity of saving the religion and freedom of a great nation and might provide him with means for attaining the coalition against France, the great purpose ever present to his mind.

The choice by the Cologne chapter of Cardinal Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, Louis XIV.'s old friend, as archbishop of Cologne showed to the princes of the empire their peril from this side. The dead archbishop had possessed the rights of bishop in Münster and Hildesheim, so that his territory including Liege stretched from the Meuse to the Weser. If Fürstenberg united all this under his sway, Louis XIV. would be a great step in advance, for he hoped with his adherent's aid to change the truce of 1684 into a definitive peace giving him permanent ownership of the lands and cities temporarily occupied. It was doubtful whether the pope would confirm this election, but the design of France was evident.

The prince had accepted the English invitation, and the die was cast. The republic must now decide if it would furnish him with the means for doing what England desired of him and what he ardently wished in the interest of religion and liberty. The answer was not long uncertain. The equipment of the fleet, begun in the preceding autumn, was prosecuted with energy. With the help of the government and admiralty of Amsterdam, of

Bastiaensze Schepers at Rotterdam, and of Odijk in Zealand it was resolved in December to fit out 21 ships of medium size ostensibly against the Algerine corsairs and on account of complications between Sweden and Denmark. From July work went on vigorously in the yards, while 4000 sailors were enlisted and transports sufficient for the troops were hired. In October a fleet of 43 war ships and some fire ships, besides smaller vessels and about 350 transports, was ready under command of the lieutenant admiral Cornelis Evertsen and the vice admiral Philips Almonde. Cornelis Tromp, succeeding De Ruyter as lieutenant admiral general, had dropped into the background for some years past in consequence of dissensions with the prince; besides he would not easily have consented to yield the chief command to the admiral Herbert as lieutenant admiral general of the common fleet, an arrangement made to satisfy English popular feeling. Naturally one thing and another could not be kept secret from d'Avaux, and he did not fail to warn Louis XIV. and James II. of the republic's great armaments, but always without finding a hearing, though he could now declare that England was aimed at. Measures concerning the army to go over were taken in deep secrecy and with great care. In July and August Bentinck on behalf of the prince hired several regiments from the princes of northern Germany; the English and Scotch regiments in the Dutch service and some of the best Dutch troops were brought into readiness; the command under the prince was given to the marshal Schomberg; the whole army of 14,000 men was collected at Mook, supposedly to defend the frontier against an attack from the side of Cologne. To avoid publicity the necessary money was scraped together privately from everywhere. Dijkveld and Fagel in July applied to the Amsterdam government, particularly to Witsen and Hudde, about it, but the latter hesitated at first to comply with the prince's

requests.¹ The enterprise was spoken of as an attempt "to play Monmouth," but people were not altogether averse to it.

Early in September the English and French ambassadors asked the States-General for enlightenment as to the preparations for war, while the former asserted the peaceful disposition of his sovereign and the latter threatened war, if England or Cologne were attacked. The French threats had the opposite effect from what d'Avaux expected. The prince managed to convince the States that the enterprise against England was the best means of bringing that kingdom on the side of France's opponents and that it certainly would succeed, as James could find no support in his own country. Through the council pensionary the prince then turned to the Estates of Holland to demonstrate to them the necessity of the undertaking upon England in the interest of the Protestant religion, of general policy, and of the republic in particular. He did not deny that he and his wife were specially interested, as successors to the throne of England, but he confidently asked the state's help in winning victory for his just cause. *Nunc aut numquam!* In deep secrecy everything was considered by the municipal governments, and "the inclination of the common people and of the preachers" against France moved those still hesitating to consent, afraid as they were of a repetition of the war of 1672 with its consequences. Fagel and the prince himself had long been working upon the preachers and showing them the peril of Protestantism, so that they would disseminate this idea from the pulpit and in families. On September 29th the affair was concluded in the Estates of Holland and on October 8th in a secret session of the States-General with a larger attendance than usual. The prince obtained a complete assent to his request, and the

¹ Fruin, *Willem III.*, p. 179; Wagenaar, xv., p. 427; Gebhard, *Nicolaas Witsen*, ii., *passim*; d'Avaux, *Négociations*, vi., *passim*.

English demand for explanation was answered by declaring that the armament was not directed against king and people, but that it was hoped to see the troubles in England end through the removal of just grievances. The States desired not to wage open war with the English government, but to assist the prince with the power of the state in his enterprise begun on account of those grievances. Some of the regents looked on with anxiety but did not venture to oppose.

The prince's diplomacy took all possible precautions with the European powers. The Great Elector had lately been working in harmony with the policy of the prince, but he had died in April and been replaced by his son Frederick III., who speedily manifested his disposition to support the United Netherlands.¹ Bentinck had a secret meeting with Fuchs, and the latter in the elector's name promised troops for the prince's expedition. Brunswick Lüneburg also joined in it secretly as well as Wolfenbüttel and Hesse. Waldeck directed Bentinck's cautious and well concealed steps. Everything was arranged in treaties by the beginning of August. Würtemberg furnished three regiments of cavalry, and Hanover declared its readiness to help repel any attack by France upon the German empire. In September Prince William went from Het Loo to Minder and Rinteln to meet the elector and the landgrave of Hesse. Waldeck sounded the court of Vienna and secured the assurance that the emperor would watch the English expedition with approval. The elector of Saxony and other German princes were ready to follow Hanover's example. In September the prince had an interview with Spain's representative in the southern Netherlands between Breda and Antwerp and learned of Spanish satisfaction with the plan. Even the papal government, though viewing with apprehension the defeat of

¹ Ranke, *Englische Geschichte*, vi., p. 134; Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Waldeck*, ii., p. 25.

Catholicism in England, interposed no serious obstacles, because the expedition might break the supremacy of France, felt oppressively at Rome, and serve to restore peace in Europe by the humiliation of the ambitious king.¹ The chances were still better on this side, when Louis XIV., instead of following the advice of Louvois and attacking the republic, declared war in September on emperor and pope, and the French troops invaded the empire, which caused the German princes at once to take up arms for the defence of the imperial frontiers. Thus the great war began. Its end depended upon the course of affairs in England, upon the success or failure of the prince's great expedition. If it succeeded, England and the republic would undoubtedly help to defend the German empire; if it failed, an irretrievable blow was inflicted on the enemies of France and France's supremacy in Europe was established.

It succeeded, the expedition of the new Armada that conquered England a hundred years after the first had so miserably failed. On October 10th appeared the prince's masterly "declaration," drawn up by Fagel's able hand and translated into English by the court preacher, Burnet, concerning the reasons that induced him with arms to restore the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of England. At the end of October all was ready, the fleet assembled at Hellevoetsluis, the army conveyed along the Meuse to that port. With emotion the prince took leave of the States-General on October 26th, declared he had always had the welfare of the country in view, appointed Waldeck to the command of the Dutch army, recommended the princess to their care "if anything mortal should befall him," and urged to harmony in the troublous days that might come. He addressed the Estates of Holland also more cordially than usual. Tears stood in the eyes of the stern men about him, and many accompanied

¹ Ranke, *Päpste*, iii., p. 117; Immich, *Innocenz XI.*, p. 106.

him on his journey to Briel. The same earnest feeling pervaded the whole country on the day of prayer after the prince's arrival at Hellevoetsluis. On the 25th he had a serious talk with his wife, the memory of which is preserved to us in the journal of the princess,¹ the most beautiful page written by the pious, loving woman, who saw her husband depart to war against her father. He intimated to her the possibility of his death during the expedition and the desirability of her marrying again in that case, but not with a Catholic. Trembling at the thought of his going away, she said that she hoped not to survive him, but, if this happened now that she had no child by him, she wished for none, though it was by an angel. The departure of the prince was postponed on account of slowness in the preparations for the fleet. When, on the 30th, he set sail for northern England or Scotland, a severe storm drove him back with great damage to Hellevoetsluis. There was general alarm, lest this delay of a few days might awaken James II. from his dream and cause him to take vigorous measures for defence. Summoned to Briel, the princess could once more see her hero, but only during a few hours and in deep anxiety, for which she sought and found consolation in solitude and prayer. On the next day, November 11th, the fleet put to sea again, Herbert commanding the van, Bastiaensze Schepers the middle division, and Evertsen the rear guard, followed by the loving glances of the princess, who stood gazing from the tower of Briel until the masts of the ships had disappeared, followed by the prayers of the whole republic, united now as seldom before in wishes for the success of the enterprise. The prince's flag bore the words *Pro religione et libertate* and under them the proud *Je maintiendray*, the motto of his fathers. The aim and spirit of the expedition were embodied in these watchwords. Anxiety regarding the issue lasted

¹ *Lettres et mémoires*, p. 80. From them Fruin, p. 192, and Krämer, p. 169.

a month, but all ended well.¹ The prince this time directed his course towards the Channel, without molestation from the English fleet lying idly in the Thames, more than 400 vessels passing through the strait of Calais with all sails set and flags fluttering, amid the thundering of cannon and blare of trumpets. After some trouble with a strong east wind, which carried the fleet past the harbour, he landed on the 14th at Torbay on the southern coast of England, disembarked the troops, and moved on the same day to Exeter, where he entered upon the actual campaign. England hesitated during a few weeks, but then the royal army, retreating before the slowly advancing prince, began to fall away, and the defection soon became general. James retired to London, tried at the last moment, when surrounded by treason, to rescue his crown by concessions, but fled from his palace in the night of December 10 to 11, after having sent the queen and their son away. He was arrested at Sheerness and brought back to London; then he was allowed to escape to France, where he arrived on Christmas.

With the king's flight from London the victory of the prince was complete, and not until then did he write to his wife. Now that all was won, discussions could begin regarding the manner of filling the deserted throne. The Convention, called together soon after the prince's arrival in London, declared the throne of England vacant (January 28, 1689). There was a period of uncertainty as to whether the throne should be occupied by the appointment of a regent, or by the elevation of Mary alone to be queen, or by making the prince and princess together king and queen. Finally, by the wish of both of them, the last was resolved upon, and William and Mary on February 13th accepted the crown offered to them. A week later she also came over from Holland. The "glori-

¹ See the fine account of the expedition in Macaulay, *History of England*.

ous revolution " was finished, and " Dutch William " had saved the religion and liberties of England.

Louis XIV. had contemplated all this with deep vexation at the conduct of James II., who, disregarding French warnings and offers of help, had gone on the road to destruction in his usual stubborn fashion and was now a fugitive on French soil. The consequences of events in England were immediately felt by France. Against Louis XIV. all the powers were now united that had any reason to complain of him. It was a period of great importance in the history of the world, when pope, emperor, and empire, in league with the two Protestant maritime powers, " opposed the concentrated might of the furious Cock " in order to rescue Europe's freedom.¹ That period of the world's history dawned when the prince, starting from the republic and relying upon its fleet and army, mounted the throne of the Stuarts. At Vienna under the influence of the Jesuits there had been some reluctance to unite with the maritime powers, but after the expedition to England Louis in November had finally declared war upon the States, professedly on account of the support given his enemies in the affairs of Cologne. The declaration of war was accepted by the States early in March, 1689, in a manifesto " for the defence of religion and liberty " against French violence. Spain followed this example in May, and somewhat later England also declared war on France, as d' Avaux had long before predicted would happen whenever the prince's expedition succeeded. All this at last turned the scale in Vienna to the side of the allies. Jacob Hop, pensionary of Amsterdam, sent to Vienna in April, was able on May 12th to sign there the treaty, by which the emperor pledged himself to the States to aid in restoring the peace of Münster and that of the Pyrenees and made an agreement with them respecting the future of the Spanish monarchy.

¹ Ranke, *Französische Geschichte*, iv., p. 30.

Spain, England, the German princes soon entered formally into that league which, as the "Grand Alliance of Vienna," signified the success of the efforts of William III. and his partisans in uniting all Europe against the power that threatened them all alike. The great coalition was in existence, and it was to appear whether it would really be equal to breaking for good and all the power of France, now that England had joined the former allies and had thrown the weight of its navy, army, money, and commerce into the balance against France. The ideal of William III. and his statesmen was to be subjected to proof, and the republic bravely plunged again into the struggle, which it had given up in discouragement ten years earlier, roused to enthusiasm for the general cause by the great warrior and statesman who guided it with a firm hand and, like his ancestors, made it advance in the contest for the Protestant religion and the political equilibrium of Europe, the great principles that ruled his life until his last breath.





CHAPTER XVII

THE COALITION WAR

IN the time of William III. the history of the Dutch people starts from a different point than in that of De Witt. The leaders of the state in De Witt's period aimed first at the preservation of peace. They hoped, through peace after the long war for independence, to keep the prosperity obtained and to open new paths to commerce and industry; in the wars forced upon them, and occupying a third of their administration, the idea of restoring peace was constantly active with them; their domestic policy was chiefly directed to the establishment of the system of government, from which they expected happiness for the nation; abroad they had in view the nearest material interests of their state and people. It was otherwise with William III. and his adherents. Although their end too was not war but peace, they were not ready to purchase this peace at the price of material profit offered them by France. They put the powers of the state in the service of a high ideal and subordinated to it the state's interests; at home they were content with holding the predominant influence of their master; outside of the country their exertions sought the abasement of the power striving for supremacy. This abasement could only be secured by a general European war. Consequently William III.'s period is one of war. The peace treaties, both that of Nimwegen and that of Rys-

wick, were nothing more than truces in his eyes, and only the peace of Utrecht in 1713 could bring to an end the series of wars against France, which in the last quarter of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth determined the destinies of the state and people of the United Netherlands.

In the years after William III. became king of England the state of war, in which the republic existed, was of great importance to its internal condition. There was no thought of reforms in the faulty government, now that the stadtholder's personal ambition seemed satisfied by his high dignity elsewhere and his dynastic interests were less strongly felt on account of the childlessness of his marriage. This lack of children imparted a tinge of sadness to the life of the reconciled pair, awakened in the minds of both a feeling of loneliness and desolation, was coupled in the queen with the mournful thought of her father wandering in exile, and it caused repeated talk of transferring the succession to one of the related families, to the Frisian branch of the house of Nassau, or to a prince of the house of Hohenzollern. But William III. had only slight sympathy with his Frisian cousin, who on his side was not very obliging, and after a short reconciliation withdrew from the army on being passed over in the choice of a first field marshal at Waldeck's death in 1692.¹ Prince Henry Casimir was even drawn into secret negotiation with his country's enemy, Louis XIV., and the serious dissension was not ended until 1694 through the mediation of the Frisian stadtholder's wife. When he died young in March, 1696, and left a son, the eight-year-old John William Friso, whose godfather was William III., the latter inclined to assign the succession to this young prince. After Queen Mary's death he named him as his sole heir by will of October 18, 1695. The death of the council pensionary, Fagel

¹ See Van Sypesteijn, *Geschiedk. Bijdragen*, iii., p. 24.

December, 1688, in the midst of the English complications, was a great loss to William III.¹ His place was taken by Van Hove, pensionary of Haarlem, and, after his speedy death in May, 1689, and a temporary occupation, by the pensionary of Delft, Antonie Heinsius, who had been pensionary since 1679 and had attracted attention by his sagacity, though he did not at first belong to the Orange party. The prince had employed him in 1683 on a mission to Paris to defend the interests of the principality of Orange against French attacks, and Heinsius had returned from there and later from a mission to London a pronounced adherent of the prince's policy against France.² He soon became the friend of Fagel, and when the latter's health began to fail, the prince looked to the Delft pensionary as his helper in treating foreign affairs. Fagel was not unwilling, and offered him in 1686 the office of pensionary of Dordrecht, whose pensionary usually replaced the council pensionary. But Heinsius, already forty-five years old, declined, believing that the employment suited "neither with his humour, nor with his knowledge, nor with his health." After reiterated entreaty, the modest man accepted and soon proved himself an excellent aid to William III., less independent and vigorous, much less enthusiastic and ardent than Fagel, but exact, zealous, honest, able, clear-sighted, docile, an invaluable tool in the prince's hand. With Dijkveld and Hop, he belonged to the best statesmen of the last period of William III.'s reign.

This period was characterised in domestic affairs by a strong maintenance of the Orange prince's supremacy in the republic, where his power was much greater than it could be in England with the limitations imposed upon the royal authority after the "glorious revolution." His elevation was heard of here with great joy; bonfires were

¹ Burnet, *History*, i., p. 559.

² *Archief Heinsius*, ed. Van der Heim, i., p. lxxiv.

kindled, salutes fired, triumphal arches erected on the day of the coronation; a day of thanksgiving was observed over the whole country late in March. Many feared that the republic's affairs would suffer from lack of attention or that the prince would find his double dignity too onerous and would lay down the stadtholdership. William III. never considered this seriously; on the contrary, when matters in England did not go as well as he had expected, when attacks were made on his conduct, his friends, even his person, he repeatedly meditated resigning his high dignity in England, especially after the queen's death in 1695. "Crucify him" followed the loud "Hosanna" in his case also according to his prediction, and his thoughts often went back to the old fatherland, to Het Loo, metamorphosed from a hunting castle into a princely palace, to the faithful love of his former countrymen, to the rural surroundings of The Hague. Nowhere was William III. more at home than in the Netherlands, and the brief periods of his sojourn here were times of rest in the brilliant exile of Hampton Court and London, where he lived in a society that did not please him, in a climate that did not agree with him, in a strife that vexed him more and more. "Dutch William" remained a foreigner to the English people, though he was a foreigner to whom that people owed much and whose name it still venerates. He announced to the States his elevation in England and his wish that both powers should go on in "inviolable friendship." Previous to this letter he had requested the States-General to send envoys to England to help in regulating the common action with the ordinary ambassador Van Citters.¹ Witsen, Odijk, and Dijkveld were intrusted with the mission in January, and soon De Wildt and other members of the boards of admiralty joined them to settle mutual maritime interests. The extraordinary embassy

¹ Gebhard, *Nicolaas Witsen*, i., p. 335. See also Wagenaar, xvi., p. 21.

was commissioned further to congratulate the king and queen of England and to discuss an offensive and defensive alliance. This last encountered opposition from the Dutch side. Men hesitated "to exhaust themselves for Great Britain's sake." Witsen and Van Citters were little inclined to use "the money and people of the States" on behalf of England. After long delay they gave way under strong pressure from the king and signed the treaty of September 3, 1689, for the prevention of commerce with France and for carrying on war together. For the time not even the repeal of the Navigation Act could be obtained, and everything showed that the commercial jealousy between the two nations had not disappeared. Witsen, returning home with the others in November, complained that all had been decided in accordance with the king's opinion and with the desire of England. Laughingly and insistently William III. had pushed his will through, regarding everything as subordinate to the great aim of the coöperation of England with the coalition, which, through the mediation of Hop going over to England, was really brought about before the end of the year by England's official accession to the Grand League of Vienna.

The residence of the stadtholder in England caused troubles in the government of the republic, which had as a consequence violent popular movements and no less violent pamphlets. In the usual election of sheriffs in Amsterdam at the end of January the nomination, on account of the absence of the stadtholder, who had to make the choice, was sent to the court of Holland for its selection. The court, fearing the prince, sent the nomination over to him, and he chose from those nominated, but expressed his displeasure at Amsterdam's action. Next year the city would not consent to this treatment of the affair and appealed to the Estates of Holland for authority to give the nomination to the court according to its privileges, as

otherwise the sheriffs could not be sworn in time. The king was consulted in writing, but Amsterdam refused to yield, though the war against France might suffer. The city said that its privileges were dearer to it than a victory over the whole world. Very disagreeable to the king was the strenuous opposition of Amsterdam to the further admission of Bentinck, who had been created earl of Portland in England, as a member of the nobility in the Estates of Holland. The city asserted that Bentinck had become an Englishman, had lost his rights as a member of the Holland nobility, and cited precedents. The nobility brought up precedents on the other side. In January, 1690, Amsterdam again handed its nomination to the court, which resolved to send it back unnoticed. Meanwhile the old sheriffs remained in service, and the opposing party asked by what right this was allowed. The justice administered by the old sheriffs might have been declared illegal, and the nobility already proposed a resolution to this effect. Holland resolved to pronounce the continuance in office of the old sheriffs as illegal and their actions as void notwithstanding the vehement protest of Amsterdam. The majority of the Amsterdam council now determined to give way and to adopt the proposed middle course. The nomination was delivered to the Estates of Holland, by them sent to England, and the king made his choice. After discussion between Witsen, Heinsius, and Bentinck the dissension was settled in March. Amsterdam thenceforth treated its nomination in this manner, and Bentinck-Portland remained in the nobility. The stadtholder was once more victorious, but apparently his absence had no favourable influence upon the vigour of the government.

The ecclesiastical movements of this time had little connection with politics; but the States watched them and the orthodox party hoped for the king's support. Voetians and Cocceians still opposed one another, even after the

death of Cocceius in 1669 and of Voetius in 1676. The former did not rest until they had removed from his professorship the venerable Heydanus, who had long taught his moderate Cartesian principles at Leyden, just as they had driven the moderate Van der Waeyen from Middelburg. But Van der Waeyen was taken under the protection of the Frisian stadtholder and in 1677 became professor in Franeker, from where he succeeded in defending the Cocceians against their enemies. William III. showed himself less and less inclined to side with the Voetians in all respects and endeavoured by a conciliatory attitude to bring the parties together, which was finally accomplished. The resolution of the Estates of Holland of 1694, exhorting to "brotherly harmony," to the choice of preachers "of a moderate and peaceful disposition," to the treatment of religious matters at the university not according to "the rules of philosophy" but according to the "usual doctrine of the Reformed Churches, contained in the Catechism, the Confessions, and the rules of the National Synod of Dordrecht,"¹ did much to appease the strife, which otherwise in the opinion of the violent Voetians must inevitably have led to the new national synod desired by them. Neither the States nor the prince wanted such a synod, dreading a repetition of the discords of the time of the truce. Although here and there traces might appear of a revival of the ideas of the old party of the States, William III.'s authority was in the long run energetically upheld, and there was no more opposition to his foreign policy, which he held firmly in hand with the aid of Heinsius and other trusted leaders of the state, much better than was possible in England.

The instruments of that policy, the army and navy, were carefully prepared for their difficult task. The army, trained with the help of Waldeck, Hoorne, Aylva, Ouwerkerk, Slangenburg, Van Rhee de Ghinckel, and other

¹ *Res. Holl.* 18 December, 1694.

officers, was not large, scarcely 60,000 men, but formed an excellent nucleus to be joined by the troops of the allies. Under command of Vauban's equal, Menno, baron van Coehoorn, the Dutch engineers were now developed into a corps fully capable of their work. Waldeck, the foreigner, had much to overcome in this preparation, especially during the absence of the prince in England, not only on account of the opposition of Prince Henry Casimir, who grudged him the chief command, but also on account of the difficulties with the council of state and the continual intrigues of the prince's influential favourites. As soon as the king placed himself at the head of the army, however, most of these troubles vanished. To the navy also William devoted his attention in conjunction with Cornelis Tromp, Schepers, Cornelis Evertsen, Job de Wildt, Witsen, and others. In 1687 by introducing a farming-out of half of the convoys and licenses the prince managed to improve the finances of the admiralties and put them in a condition to meet their engagements better. From 1690 a body of 9000 sailors was enlisted every year. De Wildt, from 1691 the king's commissioner to the admiralties,¹ was active, but many plans remained unexecuted from lack of funds and want of coöperation. Holland and Zealand worked zealously, and so between 1682 and 1700 about 170 new vessels were built, half of them by the Amsterdam admiralty, while in the same period over eighty millions were spent for equipment and building over and above the ordinary appropriation for the navy, which rose from nearly six to nearly eight millions a year. In the last years of the coalition war a fleet of 100 to 115 fine ships was obtained with 4000 to 5000 cannon and 20,000 to 24,000 men, a force that may well be compared with that of De Witt's time. The commanders, though no Tromps or De Ruyters, could likewise be compared with those of former days. Cornelis Tromp and Willem Bastiaensze Schepers were too old for

¹ De Jonge, iii., p. 109.

active service—the former died in 1691 and the latter in 1704—but Almonde, the two younger Evertsens and Callenburgh, formed in the school of De Ruyter, may be named among the best. Coöperation with the British fleets and squadrons, always under command of a British admiral in accordance with the treaty of 1689, did not increase the fame of the Dutch navy.

At first an attack of the French upon Maestricht was feared, even during the prince's expedition to England, but Louis XIV. turned to Germany and had the Palatinate devastated for the second time in a terrible manner, while the French army in the Spanish Netherlands under the marshal d'Humières acted only defensively against Waldeck. With the coalition army composed of Spanish, English, and Dutch troops the latter moved late in the summer to the vicinity of Charleroi, where the French were driven back in a bloody skirmish at Walcourt on August 25th. The advantage secured was not followed up, and both sides confined themselves to border raids, with which the far from brilliant campaign of this year ended. More profit was derived from the campaign in Cleves and the Rhine district, Dutch troops under Aylva acting with the Brandenburgers, and Neuss and Bonn were taken there besides a number of smaller places. Dutch troops under Van Rheede Ghinckel fought also in Ireland against King James together with English and Danes.

Of more importance was the campaign of the following year, when Luxembourg again took command of the French forces in the Spanish Netherlands and by superior strength inflicted a serious defeat upon the aged Waldeck at Fleurus on July 1st in spite of the exemplary conduct of the infantry of Holland and Friesland.¹ That defeat did not injure the good name of the Dutch troops, whose leaders, Aylva, Wibbenum, and others, won renown not-

¹ Knoop, *Willem III.*, iii., p. 35; Muller, *Wilhelm III. und Waldeck*, ii., p. 74.

withstanding the heavy losses, nearly half of the army lying dead or wounded on the field of battle. A few days later, on the 10th, the allies suffered a second "great disaster" off Beachy Head, where the French admiral Tourville defeated the Anglo-Dutch fleet under the English admiral Herbert, now Lord Torrington. The Dutch vanguard, commanded by the lieutenant admiral Cornelis Evertsen, was especially damaged, and the Dutch captains complained that the English had left them in the lurch. Among the numerous dead in this battle was Jan van Brakel, "the terror of the ocean." An investigation really proved Torrington's guilt, and, though acquitted, he lost his position as admiral. Great was the disappointment of the Dutch at the course of the war, and the deep impression made by the two defeats was not entirely removed by the famous victory of the Boyne, on the day after the battle of Beachy Head, in which the Dutch troops had an important part. Confidence did not return until the king himself came over from England in the spring of 1691 to direct the military operations. The beloved Orange prince was greeted with great joy: triumphal arches and bonfires, poems and speeches welcomed him to the capital after two years and a half of absence. His Majesty replied with expressions of cordiality and of a readiness to stand by the republic with all the power of England. Grand plans were at once formed. The allies held a general conference at The Hague, where the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, marquis de Gastanaga, appeared besides many German princes, and at the urgency of the king it was resolved to put no less than 220,000 men upon the different fields of war, of which the republic was to furnish 35,000, while with England it secured the payment of considerable subsidies. Suddenly in March a French army attacked Mons, which after a short defence fell into the enemy's hands in April. The army of the allies, hastily assembled by William III., came too late to prevent

the city's fall and was content with the protection of Brabant, where meanwhile the French troops had plundered terribly, especially at Hal, destroyed by Luxembourg in barbarous fashion at the command of Louvois, as Boufflers did some days later at Liege, where over 3000 houses were burned and pillaged to take vengeance for the support given to Spain. Even Brussels was threatened, when William III. left there with his army for Louvain. These were the last acts of the inhuman French minister of war, who died soon afterwards. The large armies arrayed against one another in the southern Netherlands, each about 60,000 men, accomplished finally but little, and they went into winter quarters in October.

The two following years furnished more important military results. On both sides great preparations were made for 1692. William III. crossed over to the Netherlands with numerous English troops to carry on the war energetically. Louis XIV. planned an attack upon England with army and fleet to restore James II. to the throne, while a large part of the English army was absent in the Netherlands and was to be kept busy there by a vigorous assault on Namur. The coasts of Normandy swarmed with troops, and 20,000 to 30,000 of them were to be conveyed over to England under escort of the fleet from Toulon and Brest commanded by Tourville and d'Estrées, while there must be a rising of the still numerous adherents of James II. The threatening danger made the English nation stand up as one man in defence of the fatherland. A conspiracy against the existing government was discovered and frustrated; a large force was brought together on the southern coast; the Anglo-Dutch fleet gathered in the Channel under Russell and Almonde; other English and Dutch forces were held ready in the Netherlands to cross over the North Sea at the first sign. But the French army did not go over the Channel. Tourville was detained in Brest by slowness in

the equipment and by a contrary wind ; d'Estrées was delayed by a storm on his voyage from Toulon and could not unite with the main force in time. Against the 120 ships of all kinds of the allies Tourville had only half as many, but the French government hoped that the discontent prevailing on the English fleet might keep it in the background as at Beachy Head, so that only the Dutch would have to be encountered. This calculation failed. Queen Mary, governing during William III.'s absence, managed with great tact to restore obedience on the fleet and to thwart the intrigues of the Jacobites. Late in May the powerful Anglo-Dutch fleet, with some 7000 cannon and 40,000 men, sailed for the French coast in search of the enemy. On May 29th it met Tourville off La Hogue. The valiant admiral did not avoid the unequal conflict, however rash such an undertaking might appear, and his king's command to wait for d'Estrées did not reach him. Early in the morning Tourville began the attack and continued it with desperate obstinacy during the entire day, until darkness gave him an opportunity to retreat to the French coast with the remnant of his fleet. This time the battle was principally between the English and French ships, while Almonde got into the fight with but a few of his vessels. That Tourville turned his attention mostly to the English seems due to his expectation that several English commanders would desert to his side at the first shot, but this did not occur. Next day fog and a calm hindered the enemy's flight as well as the pursuit. A few ships succeeded in reaching Cherbourg, others took refuge in the bay of La Hogue, followed by the small vessels of the allies, which chased the hostile ships among the rocks, assailed them with armed boats and fire ships, and on the 2d and 3d of June burned, destroyed, or forced ashore one after the other of them. Those in the harbour of Cherbourg were also set on fire. The Dutch took part in this work of

destruction. Almost half of the French fleet, including its best ships, was lost. For a long time after the battle of La Hogue France ceased to be a naval power of the first rank.

The war on the sea dropped into the background after this battle. Danger was threatened in June, 1693, by the disaster of Lagos in Portugal, where a large fleet of merchantmen, escorted by an Anglo-Dutch squadron of 23 war ships under Rooke and Van der Goes, sailed unexpectedly into the midst of a numerous French fleet commanded by Tourville and suffered heavy losses. An attack on Brest in 1694 failed; a bombardment of Dieppe and Havre de Grâce, later of St. Malo, did much damage. From Dunkirk the brave privateering captain Jean Bart, now in the royal service, inflicted serious injury upon Dutch and English commerce and became the terror of the North Sea. As late as 1697 the waters of Zealand were far from safe. The great fleets of the allies had for their chief task to guard the merchantmen against the French squadrons and privateers but found no opportunity to attack the enemy in naval battles of importance. The lieutenant admiral Almonde, the vice admiral Callenburgh, Cornelis and Geleyn Evertsen, and other intrepid leaders upheld the good name of the Dutch navy in these small fights and expeditions.

The result of the long contest depended upon the war on land. It was carried on with varying fortunes, and the large armies did not succeed in winning decisive advantages. In June, 1692, Louis XIV. captured the important Namur, and its citadel after a sturdy resistance was forced to yield to Vauban's brilliant siege, though it was cleverly defended by Coehoorn. The battle of Steenkerke (August 3d), where Luxembourg, fighting against William III., changed defeat into a victory, altered but little the situation. The death of Waldeck at the age of 72, after he had taken part in the battle and had later departed for

his own country, at Arolsen in November of that year, was a great loss to the prince.¹ With him disappeared from the scene an excellent general, a dexterous statesman, one of the best helpers of the great Orange prince, who honoured him as his old friend. France lost in him a persistent opponent, the republic a faithful servant. The great battle of Neerwinden, where William III. with a much smaller army suffered defeat at the hands of Luxembourg, lost nearly all his artillery, and by a hasty flight narrowly escaped capture (July 29, 1693), might have had fatal consequences, if the leader of the allied forces had not again shown himself a master in retreat. It appeared that France was still strong enough to make head against all the allies, unless England coöperated more energetically in bringing the war in the Spanish Netherlands to a successful end. Parliament continually thwarted the king-stadtholder and objected to furnishing the necessary funds, while the intrigues of the Jacobites in England and of the partisans of France and the States in the republic prevented vigorous prosecution of the war, particularly when the Frisian stadtholder, on account of the appointment of the duke of Holstein-Plön as field marshal in place of Waldeck, whose successor he had hoped to become, not merely quitted the army for good, but lowered himself to secret negotiations with the enemy. A brief negotiation for peace in the spring of 1694 amounted to nothing, the French apparently not being in earnest. So the war was continued. William III. appeared again at The Hague to deliberate with the representatives of the allies, and then to lead the campaign, but the French armies seemed too strong to be expelled from Brabant. Only Hoey was captured from them, while the talent of the king-stadtholder prevented Luxembourg from penetrating farther into Brabant or Flanders. The

¹ *Archief Heinsius*, ed. Van der Heim, ii., p. 60 ; P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. und Waldeck*, ii., p. 102.

death of Queen Mary (January 7, 1695), although it struck William III. personally and made him sit down for weeks in sad despair, brought no change to the state of affairs, but this loss threatened to diminish the king's influence in England. Luxembourg's death at this time was a serious harm to Louis XIV., as he was the last of the great commanders who had won victories. His successor, Villeroy, was more of a courtier than a general.

In 1695 also the French army in the Netherlands remained over 100,000 men strong, but that of William III. reached about the same figure and enabled him to operate offensively, with the aid of the excellent leaders formed in the long war, among whom may be named the cavalry general Nassau-Ouwerkerk, son of Beverweerd, the noted Van Rhee de Ghinckel, after his Irish victories earl of Athlone, the generals Fagel, Nassau-Weilburg, Von Dopff, Van Ittersum, Noyelles. Early in July he laid siege to Namur, "a hard nut to crack," as he said, now a fortress of the first rank, fortified by Vauban and defended by the brave Boufflers. Coehoorn, now general of infantry, was soon the leader of the famous siege, which ended a month later in the surrender of the city.¹ The citadel, where the garrison had taken refuge after the capitulation, had to be separately besieged, while Villeroy's army was kept at a distance by that of the allies under the prince of Vaudemont. The bombardment of Brussels, by which Villeroy had hoped to break off the siege of the citadel, could not save the important point, and on September 5th the citadel of Namur fell before William III. A large share of the glory of the exploit was due to Coehoorn and to his admirable use of artillery. From this time he was regarded as the equal of Vauban, and even superior to him as a besieger. The garrison stipulated for marching out with arms and the honours of war, yet Boufflers remained for some time a prisoner on

¹ *Leven van Coehoorn*, ed. Van Sypesteijn (Leeuwarden, 1860), p. 12.

account of the unjust imprisonment of the Dutch garri-sons of Dixmuiden and Deynse by the French. The fall of Namur and its citadel is the great event really ending the important military operations in the Netherlands. Both armies took the field in the following year and in the last of the war, but the bombardment of the French in Givet in 1696 and the capture of Ath by the French in 1697 had slight influence.

It appeared more and more that both sides were becoming completely exhausted. Neither in the Netherlands, nor in Germany, Italy, Spain, where the war had been raging eight years, nor on the sea were any decisive advantages secured. Furthermore there were alarming reports of the increasing feebleness of the childless king of Spain, whose heritage the allies were unwilling to see in the possession of the house of Hapsburg or of that of Bourbon, while Louis XIV. hoped to make with them some agreement about it. Why should war be waged any longer, people asked in Paris, now that all hope of the restoration of James II. in England was lost after the pacification of Ireland and Scotland by William III. and after the failure of so many Jacobite conspiracies, and now that French influence in Germany was every day diminishing? Why should the struggle be continued, men asked in England and the republic, now that the power of France appeared about equal to that of all the allies? The Dutch merchants desired peace in the interest of commerce. The Amsterdam government began as early as 1693 to make secret efforts in Paris through the Polish agent Mollo, who now lived in Amsterdam as an eminent merchant.¹ At Brussels French agents offered peace to Dijkveld, and d'Avaux, France's ambassador in Stockholm, had the mission to

¹ *Archief Heinsius*, iii., p. xvi. This entire preface is of much importance for the knowledge of the long secret discussions concerning peace. See also Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, i., p. 392.

announce there Louis XIV.'s willingness to negotiate and by bribery and persuasion to aim at mediation by Sweden. Evidently France needed peace and sought to enter into relations with the court of Vienna, hoping to break the harmony of the allies and win some of them over to peace, as had been secretly done with Savoy. France wished this peace on the basis of the truce of 1684 or of the Nimwegen peace, while William III. wanted to go back to that of Münster, Spain to that of the Pyrenees, and the German empire hoped at least to recover Strasburg. The recognition of William as king of England, the return of imperial lands seized by France, the fate of Luxemburg, the settlement in Italy were the chief points discussed. Sweden assumed the part of mediator and submitted proposals to the representatives of the allies meeting in congress for the common war at The Hague in the spring, while France remained privately in touch with each of the allies. All this did not tend to promote a vigorous prosecution of the war. A plot against the life of the Orange prince, betrayed in time to Portland, with more Jacobite disturbances and a new attempt of France to effect a landing in England, threatened in the spring of 1696 to break off negotiations between France and the two maritime nations. A severe financial crisis in England brought further complications; the defection of Savoy gave an unfavourable look to affairs in Italy for the allies. But France with Pomponne now in charge of foreign relations began to strive earnestly for a treaty, with an eye especially to the reports about the feeble health of Charles II. of Spain. In August, 1696, it gave way on different points, and there was talk of appointing envoys to a peace congress under the mediation of Sweden. The only opposition came from the imperial government, which in case of Charles II.'s death wished to use the war as a support against French claims to the Spanish inheritance.

William III. was convinced of the absolute necessity of

a prompt peace, and Amsterdam wanted, if necessary, to conclude a separate peace, as had been done at Nimwegen. In the beginning of 1697 under Swedish mediation the preliminaries of peace were settled at The Hague in accordance with agreements privately made with France, in which the recognition of William III. as king of England was verbally promised. The treaties of Münster and Nimwegen were taken as "basis and foundation." The imperial government objected to carrying on the decisive negotiations at The Hague, where French intrigues might influence the States-General, and proposed Aix-la-Chapelle, Mainz, or Frankfort. After some wrangling it was finally agreed to continue the peace congress in the palace of Nieuwburg at Ryswick, the property of William III., which by its architecture gave an opportunity of keeping the parties separate from one another. The right wing was assigned to the allies, the left wing to the French, the large central hall to the "mediator."¹ The etiquette was carefully regulated on account of the extraordinary importance then attributed to it. On the Dutch side Heinsius and Dijkveld, besides the Amsterdam burgomaster Jacob Boreel and the Frisian nobleman Willem van Haren, were chosen as negotiators; England sent Lord Pembroke, France Harlay and Caillières, the emperor Kaunitz and Straatman, Spain De Quiros as chief plenipotentiaries. On May 9th the Swedish ambassador Lilienskiöld opened the peace congress, during which the war continued. Negotiations went on slowly on account of the secret opposition of the emperor, who won over Spain to his views. William III. let his trusted Portland discuss matters privately with Boufflers in the Spanish Netherlands, and an agreement between France and the maritime powers was the result. In August Heinsius declared to the imperial envoys that England and the republic were unable to keep on with the war and desired to accept the French conditions.

¹ Wagenaar, xvi., p. 348, giving a picture and description of the building.

The imperialists still refused. The time set by France, September 1st, expired, and peace was uncertain to the deep anxiety of William III., who expected that France would again take advantage of the opportunity to separate the allies from one another. He endeavoured without success to intimidate Louis by threatening resumption of the war. Louis knew that the English Parliament and the States both longed ardently for peace. The inducement of commercial gains sufficed to strengthen this feeling and was held out liberally by France. Thus the maritime powers and Spain resolved on September 20th to sign the peace; the emperor, being allowed until November 1st to accede to it, consented at the last moment. The peace was based upon that of Münster. The treaty with the States stipulated that Pondicherry should be given back to the French by the East India Company, and an advantageous commercial treaty for 25 years was concluded, as it had existed before the war. In the treaty with England William III. was recognised as king; the principality of Orange was returned to him. In that with Spain Luxemburg was given back besides all the places and districts appropriated for France by the *chambres de réunion* with the exception of 82 cities and villages mentioned by name. The empire received back the *réunions* excepting Strasburg, which remained to France in exchange for the cession of some small places. Thus peace was concluded. But William III. after the end of the negotiations in September spoke the prophetic word: "I confess that the manner of it troubles me not a little for the future." Louis XIV. gave way to England and the republic and the empire largely on account of the existence of secret plans concerning the Spanish succession, which were soon to agitate Europe anew. In the treaty of peace, however, that succession was not even mentioned, and this assuredly did not tranquillise the diplomats on this point, because that both the French and imperial governments constantly

had their eyes upon it could not remain doubtful to anyone engaged in the discussions. The affair of the Spanish succession rose in the political heaven like a dark cloud, intercepting the quickening rays of the sun of peace and menacing Europe with a new war and new evils.





CHAPTER XVIII

WILLIAM III.'S LAST YEARS

THE history of the last years of the king-stadtholder is dominated by a great political affair, which had long busied the heads of the statesmen of the seventeenth century: the affair of the Spanish succession that, with the sharp antagonism between France and the other powers, might easily lead to a general European war. It was not conceivable that the republic could keep out of such a war. In its close connection with England, embodied, as it were, in the person of William III., lay the only chance of breaking the supremacy of France. It was not to be doubted that Louis XIV. would try to seize the Spanish Netherlands or in any case to make them dependent upon France, the aim of his policy during his entire reign, the political aim of France for more than two centuries. The unfortunate "battlefield of Europe," twice trodden during years by the armies of both sides, its cities in ruins, its villages in ashes, its roads unprotected, its fields uncultivated, its impoverished population in despair under Spanish misgovernment,¹ would then once more witness the atrocities of war. Happily Belgium had now in Maximilian Emanuel, elector of Bavaria, from 1692 a governor who revived the good times of Aytona and Castel-Rodrigo. He rebuilt the desolated Brussels, consulted the States and municipal governments

¹ See Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, p. 340.

about raising up commerce and industry, made plans for connecting Antwerp with the sea by a canal and for establishing an East India Company in Flanders. Like the archdukes of a hundred years earlier he with his young wife, the daughter of the Polish king John Sobieski, won the favour of the people by appearing at popular festivals. In the approaching catastrophe in Spain he hoped, on account of his first marriage with the daughter of the emperor Leopold, from which a son not ten years old was left to him, to become master of the country with the aid of France and, at first as his son's guardian, to unite it with the Bavarian hereditary dominions under his rule. The population attached to the Burgundian-Hapsburg family regarded the emperor or one of his sons as heir to the Spanish claims. France was not unwilling to favour the elector, provided he did not assert too loudly the Bavarian pretensions to the rest of the Spanish heritage. Evidently the elector would not object to this arrangement, while the formation of a more or less independent Belgium might not displease the maritime powers. A notable coolness arose between the governor and the Flemings and Walloons, who looked to the maritime powers for protection against French influence, dreaded and hated for centuries, though they did not forget that such protection carried with it a certain dependence distasteful to them, especially when it was on the Hollanders, since the closing of the Scheldt the worst enemies of commerce and industry in the southern provinces. England and the republic had more interests in the fate of the Spanish monarchy than concerned merely the Spanish Netherlands. Both carried on an extensive commerce with Spain; for the sake of their commerce with the Levant and Italy both were indisposed to have the strait of Gibraltar in the hands of a strong power; both were interested in the future of Spain's possessions in America. It mattered little to them whether a German or French

prince secured the succession, provided he did not depend upon the emperor or Louis XIV., one of whom might thus obtain such an increase of power as to enable him to lay down the law for them and their commerce.

The heirs to be considered at the speedily expected demise of Charles II. of Spain were: the Hapsburgs of Vienna, not only on account of their old relationship to the Spanish royal house, but also on account of the marriage of the emperor Leopold with Charles's youngest sister, from which two sons were born; then the elector of Bavaria, the son of this sister's only daughter, consequently the emperor's grandson; finally, the Bourbons, by reason of the marriage of Louis XIV. to the oldest sister of the Spanish king, from which marriage the dauphin and his three sons were descended.¹ Louis XIV., furthermore, the son of Philip III.'s oldest daughter, was undoubtedly the nearest heir in the blood, but both his mother and his wife had renounced their hereditary rights; he appealed to the fact, however, that the Spanish Cortes had never ratified this renunciation and that the dowry stipulated in the last renunciation was never paid. The mother of the electoral prince had also made a renunciation. The emperor's wife alone had not given any such promise, so that her two sons could without dispute enter legally into their rights. At the court of Madrid the French and Austrian parties were in sharp opposition, but the proud Spanish people and Charles II. wanted the unity of the kingdom to be preserved, and the king thought this assured by appointing in 1698 by will his grandnephew, the young electoral prince, as his heir. The maritime powers desired to break this unity, in order that the great power of Spain, over whose territory "the sun never set," might not rise again under an energetic

¹ See concerning all these matters Legrelle's work, which treats fully the diplomacy of the Spanish succession.

monarch. A division among the three pretenders seemed advisable also to Louis XIV. In 1698 there were negotiations between France and the maritime powers, prepared, as before the peace of Ryswick, by secret discussions, in which Dijkveld and Portland took part on behalf of William III. A French envoy, count de Tallard, came to Het Loo with a definite offer, which, on October 11th, led to the first secret partition treaty concluded at The Hague. The Italian possessions of Spain, excepting Milan, were to go to the dauphin, who was to have the part of the Spanish province of Guipuzcoa north of the Pyrenees; Milan was to belong to the emperor's second son, Archduke Charles, and all the rest to the crown prince. But the secret was not long kept. On its discovery by the Spanish diplomats Charles II., indignant at such negotiations without consultation of himself or Spain, gave the entire heritage to the crown prince. An unexpected event frustrated this plan. The crown prince died in March, 1699, of the smallpox, to the deep disappointment of Heinsius and William III. and naturally not without suspicion that the young man had been removed by poison, a suspicion from which his notoriously ambitious father did not wholly escape.

New discussions between the maritime powers and France followed. Some mistrust of France's real aims was aroused by intimations that the French faction in Madrid was working around Charles II. in the interest of the dauphin's second son, who, it was hoped, would now obtain the entire heritage. The negotiations produced the second secret Hague-London agreement of March, 1700, by which the dauphin, besides the Italian possessions, secured for France the long-desired Lorraine, whose prince was to be transferred to Milan; all the rest fell to Archduke Charles, the emperor's second son. There was dissatisfaction in Madrid and Vienna with this new treaty. The emperor, who could not endure the loss of the Italian

possessions and the increase of French influence in Italy, refused roundly to recognise the treaty and prepared for war. Both parties intrigued at Madrid, where the Austrians in particular were hated and the unity of the kingdom seemed best attained by the elevation of a French prince. Theologians and jurists and even the pope recommended this last to the king, and early in October, 1700, Charles II. signed a secret will, making Duke Philip of Anjou, the dauphin's second son, his only heir. Four weeks later (November 1st) he died, the last scion of the old Burgundian race, once raised high and proudly, but during a century shrinking to a fragile reed that was bent by every breath in the political atmosphere. Louis XIV. hesitated whether he should hold to the treaty of March or recognise the will. The fear of another great war stood opposite the hope of an extraordinary augmentation of power for the royal house, not for France itself, which would profit more by the partition treaty. Who could say that the new branch of royalty might not oppose France, as the Burgundians had done despite their descent from the French royal family? But the king's resolution was taken on November 16th, and he informed the Spanish ambassador at Paris that his grandson, now Philip V., accepted the crown. "There are no longer any Pyrenees," remarked the French *Mercur*e in announcing this important resolution.

French diplomacy had the task of appeasing the maritime powers. It was not what it had been under Richelieu, Mazarin, Lionne, Pomponne, and d'Avaux. Tallard and Torcy could not compare with those great diplomatists, just as Chamillart, the leader of war and finance, was not the equal of Louvois, and the new generals, Vendôme and Villars, were inferior to Turenne, Condé, and Luxembourg. William III. and Heinsius were not convinced of the good faith of France or that both crowns of France and Spain might not be united, especially when Louis XIV. recog-

nised his grandson's rights to the French crown and with the aid of the elector-governor placed French garrisons in some frontier towns of the Spanish Netherlands. The sea powers hesitated to begin the war. Under the influence of the Tories England was not disinclined to recognise Philip V. as king, but the republic, where William III. and Heinsius ruled everything, would not consent. The governments of England and the republic saw the seriousness of the situation and made ready for all contingencies. Preparations for war were heard of in both countries, in England ostensibly on account of France's new plans for landing there on behalf of the Stuarts. The latter hoped, by reason of William III.'s childlessness and bad health, to secure the support of the Tories for their restoration, particularly after the death of the only son and child of Princess Anne, James II.'s second daughter, who according to the stipulations of 1689 was to succeed William III. Elsewhere rumours of war had already developed into actual war. It seemed as if all Europe would soon be in fire and flame. Northern Europe in 1700 saw war between Sweden, closely allied with the maritime powers, and its old enemy Denmark with Saxony, Poland, and Russia. The sea powers vigorously supported Sweden and its young king Charles XII. A Dutch squadron under Almonde and a Dutch force under Von Dopff had with English ships and troops taken part in the hostilities. Almonde helped in the bombardment of Copenhagen and the Swedish invasion of Seeland, after which the peace of Travendahl followed through the mediation of the maritime powers between Denmark and Sweden. But Saxony, Poland, and Russia continued at war with Sweden, and Brandenburg appeared about to enter into the conflict.

The chief statesmen of the republic immediately after the decision at Paris deliberated under the guidance of Heinsius about the policy to be adopted. The predomi-

nant influence of France was dreaded, whenever Spanish America and the entrance to the Mediterranean should come into hands so closely connected with France, and commerce would thus be menaced. Was it not better to venture upon a war with weakened France, which must now defend also Spain, while the sea powers could count on the aid of emperor and empire, of the anti-French elements in Italy? Others asked if England could be brought to this, now that the Tories had so much to say there. It was determined to negotiate. The Dutch ambassador in Paris, Coenraad van Heemskerck, was instructed to declare that the States hoped the king would adhere to the last partition treaty and give the emperor an opportunity to join in it. England presented a similar declaration. But France seemed averse to upholding the treaty. Louis XIV. endeavoured to justify his actions, and Philip V. announced to the States officially his accession to the throne. A direct answer to both was avoided from the Dutch side. An agreement seemed not inconceivable, even after France had made itself master of Milan and with the Bavarian elector had secured the Spanish Netherlands by suddenly throwing French garrisons into the farther fortresses, some of them having had Dutch garrisons since the peace of Ryswick, so that two sorts of troops were now there together. The States, fearing their garrisons would be attacked, withdrew them. They even recognised Philip V., and this example was followed by England in April, 1701. In negotiations at The Hague, to which the aged d'Avaux came and from England the earl of Stanhope appeared, the States and England formulated their demands for an agreement: evacuation of the Spanish Netherlands by the French garrisons; placing of Dutch garrisons in a series of fortresses there; no cession of any part of the Spanish inheritance to France; Ostend and Nieuwpoort in English hands; territorial indemnity for the emperor; no reduction of commercial advan-

tages for the maritime powers in Spain, America, and India.¹

Louis XIV. would not listen to such terms. He answered shortly that he wished to see the peace of Ryswick maintained. This was understood to mean war, and even the most peaceful among the regents realised that nothing was to be done but to prepare for it. The fleet was brought into readiness, exportation of horses prohibited, troops were enlisted, an inundation was arranged at Lilloo, the fortresses on the southern border were provisioned. England also equipped itself for war. William III. came over in spring as usual, and d'Avaux at the end of July left The Hague with a solemn assertion of France's peaceful disposition. An ample counter representation of the States aimed to show that a renewal of the great war was not to be reproached to them but to France, which had violated the treaties concluded. The manifesto was printed and circulated everywhere. Thenceforth the conviction was established that war was inevitable, and the devotion of the people could be relied upon in the republic and England. This was now an imperative necessity in both countries. It was impossible to wage a war against the will of Parliament and the States, no matter upon what good grounds William III. and Heinsius might desire it. Now that since the elections of 1698 the Whigs in England again had a majority in Parliament and the support of commerce was secured in the republic, war was a certain fact, and it became advisable to array all Europe in arms against France, preferably by a renewal of the Grand Alliance with the addition of other powers. On September 7, 1701, a treaty was signed at The Hague with England and the emperor, one of the most influential Whigs, Lord Marlborough, now in high favour with William III., coming over from England, and Count Goes

¹ Lamberty, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du XVIII. siècle* (2^{de} éd.), i. p. 403; Legrelle, iv., p. 117.

appearing in the emperor's name. The conquest of Milan and the other Italian territories of Spain was to satisfy the emperor; Belgium was to become a "dike, rampart, and barrier" for the republic, while the Spanish colonies were indicated as spoils for the republic and England. Frederick of Brandenburg, now king of Prussia, joined with the emperor, as did also the dukes of Hanover and Lüneburg and the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, of whom the former, closely related to the English royal family and the future successor to the throne of the United Kingdom after Princess Anne, obtained the long-coveted electoral dignity. Frederick IV. of Denmark also consented to a subsidy treaty with the powers. Sweden was too busy with its northern plans to think seriously of acting against France. The maritime powers renewed their alliance with one another. On the other side Louis XIV. could count upon the coöperation of Spain, of avaricious Savoy, of Bavaria with a member of its ruling family as bishop of Cologne, besides upon the benevolent attitude of weak Portugal and of the neutral Italian states.

The war was already breaking out in Italy, and English and Dutch fleets were putting to sea to protect the merchantmen from French privateers and war ships. The French troops occupied Liege, Rijnberk, Neuss, Bonn, and other places, while the States sent theirs to Jülich and Cologne; Dutch forces moved to the generality lands to protect the frontiers. The actual war was not yet begun, not even when Louis XIV. saluted as king of England, as James III., the son of James II. who died in September at St. Germain. Indignation seized upon the English people; they demanded vengeance for this affront, and the Whigs in Parliament, the party of the Protestant succession in England, showed inclination to as close a league as possible with the republic. When William III. returned to England in November as usual, after settling the state of war for 1702 in the Netherlands,

he could continue preparations for war in England with the hearty coöperation of Parliament and people. Before the end of 1701 the enemy threatened Maestricht and Dutch Flanders. The archenemy was to be fought in Italy, where Prince Eugene of Savoy was to command the Austrians, in Germany, where Archduke Joseph and Prince Louis of Baden were to operate on the upper Rhine, and the Prussians on the lower Rhine, in the Netherlands, where William himself was to lead the Anglo-Dutch troops, and at sea, where the combined fleet was to attempt the capture of Cadiz. William III. discussed matters with the allies at Het Loo and The Hague. Marlborough and Heinsius were fully informed of these plans. William III. himself, the general recognised by all as their superior, was to be the great leader in the last conflict that was to prevent France from laying down the law to Europe. But he was not destined to take part in all this.

His weak constitution had been injured by the hardships of war and the troublesome cares of state, which in England particularly were coupled with great disappointments, so that he repeatedly spoke of abdication. In the Netherlands cares oppressed him less; his trusted helpers, with Heinsius at their head, conducted affairs quite to his liking, and in the last years not a voice was raised in opposition to the supreme influence of the king-stadtholder. His weak health had occasioned his plan for making his young cousin, the son of Henry Casimir II., Prince John William Friso of Nassau, whom he had appointed his sole heir, his successor also in his dignities, especially in the stadtholdership of Holland and the other provinces. In the summer of 1701 he sounded the Estates of Holland concerning this, but owing to their unwillingness to enter into plans that would bring all the provinces under one stadtholder and thus end in a monarchy, though the name of a republic might be re-

tained, he reluctantly let the matter drop, warning that it might some day be too late. He seems really to have felt very feeble, but this was kept secret by his desire, in order that political affairs might not suffer from fear of his death.¹ Those nearest him, his best friends, were very anxious about his condition, and he himself was accurately acquainted with it. There seemed to be some improvement in the spring. He took to his beloved pastime of hunting in the vicinity of his palace of Hampton Court and to horseback riding usually in the company of his favourite of these last years, the young baron of Keppel-Pallandt, now Lord Albemarle, who had more and more acquired the place of his old friend Bentinck-Portland, to the latter's vexation. The improvement was only in appearance. William III. knew from his physicians that his malady was incurable and that he had not long to live, a certainty that tormented him at the thought of the troublous times speedily approaching. He had never felt any fear of death, but now he expressed a wish to live a little longer for the sake of the high aim of his life which he hoped finally to reach by this last great war: the establishment of the European balance of power and of freedom of worship in Protestant countries.

Then an accident came suddenly to hasten the long-dreaded crisis and to strike him down, while he was still restlessly busy with preparation for the war and with regulation of the domestic conditions of England. Letters to Heinsius, arrangements with Marlborough, Ouwerkerk, and Athlone concerning military matters, a message to Parliament relative to a closer union of England and Scotland are the last documents bearing his signature, precious memorials of the activity of a great mind. On the morning of March 4, 1702, he was riding in the park of his castle, when his horse stumbled over a molehill. The king fell and broke his collar bone. The bone was immediately set,

¹ See on his last days the conclusion of Macaulay's masterly work.

and the sufferer was taken in a coach to the castle, but the jolting of the carriage broke the bone again, and in an exhausted state he came to the chamber which he was nevermore to leave in life. His enfeebled body could not stand the shock of the accident insignificant in itself. He sank during several days, uniting to the very last the transaction of affairs of state with pious meditation directed by Burnet. To the last his strong mind remained clear, his thoughts devoted to the great purpose of his life. His deathbed was surrounded by the most influential English statesmen, and he took leave of them one by one with friendly words, thanking them for their coöperation and recommending them to continue his work. Dutch friends were with him too in these moments, those who were bound to him by the most intimate ties of personal friendship. Keppel came back from The Hague just in time to hear his last instructions; Ouwerkerk received a last word of thanks from his lips; Bentinck, hastening at his request, felt the last pressure of his hand and heard the last whispers from the mouth of the old friend who had offered him the hand of reconciliation on his deathbed. Thus the great William of Orange died amid his friends on the morning of the 19th of March. On his breast was found a piece of silken ribbon containing a gold ring and a lock of hair, a tender memento of Queen Mary, the faithful wife, who had lived with him through his most arduous and successful years—a striking proof of what had really gone on in that apparently cool mind.

With the death of the last direct male descendant of the house of Orange ends a period in the history of the Dutch people, a period of glory and distinction which is surpassed by no other except by that immediately preceding it. Upon each page of the history of these two periods stands the name of one of the two great men, to whose guidance the Dutch state intrusted itself in those years: John de Witt and William III., both working in their way for the

good of their countrymen, both with firm hand steering the ship of state through the breakers of political life, along the rocks of domestic and foreign politics. John de Witt and William III., the man of the aristocratic form of government and the man of the monarchy in fact, the man of the narrower political interest of the republic and the man of world-embracing political and religious ideals, have both the highest claim to the gratitude of the Dutch people, which fought with one for the interests of commerce and prosperity, with the other for the higher interests of political and religious liberty, and in both recognises the representatives of genuine Dutch principles and ideas, the great statesmen of the most brilliant days it has ever known. Politics set them against one another as personal enemies, making one after a fine career fall in the vigour of his years as the victim of a furious mob, raising the other to the highest dignities his childhood could have dreamed of. More than two centuries have passed away, the parties led by them have disappeared, and the people of the Netherlands places in its memory the great council pensionary and the great Orange prince as the representatives of the most glorious portion of its history. What Prince William, his two excellent sons, and Oldenbarnevelt prepared was brought to maturity under De Witt and William III., and the whole world has shown unfeigned admiration for both. Among the great men of history a place is allotted to them without hesitation, because they are notable representatives of a grand period in the history of their people.





CHAPTER XIX

THE NETHERLANDS AT THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

THE period of William III. is generally regarded as one of decline for the republic, of internal decline at least, though outwardly the splendour of De Witt's time seemed preserved or even surpassed, now that William III., king of England and stadtholder of most of the provinces of the republic, guided its destiny and made it act a brilliant part among Europe's powers. In some respects an unmistakable falling off was to be noted, and it was due apparently to the disappearance of the generation steeled by danger, which had fought in the war of independence or had witnessed it in youth. The thought of danger to independence had now vanished. For a long time there was nothing to be feared from the closely allied England, unless it was the sharp but peaceful rivalry of commerce; France was exhausted by Louis XIV.'s continuous wars and could be held in check by united Europe, when England no longer supported it directly or secretly; Sweden was powerless in consequence of domestic conditions like Denmark; the emperor had more need of the republic than it had of him; the rest of Europe could not equal it. When it thenceforth had to wage war, it no longer struggled for its existence, not even to keep what it had, but only against relatively remote perils of a political or economic nature. The citizen of the republic could usually be at ease and peacefully

enjoy his own without troubling himself much about increasing or retaining it. What people does not yield to such a temptation? What people does not involuntarily see its energy, its strength, formerly tempered by daily conflict, decline in days of victory and enjoyment?

Some decadence may be remarked in art, literature, science, morals. Every period of course cannot be expected to furnish men like Rembrandt and Hals, Vondel and Hooft, Huygens and Heinsius. But how far below the pupils of Rembrandt and Hals stand De Baen, the protégé of Prince John Maurice and the Great Elector, and Arnold Boonen, that of various German princes, the much patronised and admired portrait painters of the fine people of the century's last years? How far is Dusart from his master Ostade and the academic Gerard de Lairesse, the head of a numerous school of painters, the once esteemed painter of chimney-pieces and ceilings, from the talented representatives of the previous generation? Yet there are some great names to be mentioned. Ludolf Backhuysen recalls in his pictures of the sea the Van de Veldes, the youngest of whom was his famous contemporary and perhaps the greatest of this family of marine painters; Huchtenburgh imitates Wouwerman in delineating happily the battle scenes of the French wars; Rachel Ruysch excels as a painter of flowers and reproduces admirably the soft tints of native fruits. But Willem van Mieris, refining the fine art of his father Frans, attains an affected style, from which all soul has disappeared, just as Godfried Schalcken seeks to surpass Dou's artful lights by still more exaggerated effects, and Gaspar Netscher's sons also fail to equal their father. In engraving as in painting it is a time of epigones. Jan Luyken, as engraver and etcher, is quite the equal of the preceding period's great artists with the burin and etching needle; his numerous drawings and etchings, his exquisite illustrations for books give evidence of his charming talent.

Romein de Hooghe, inaccurate draughtsman, confused in the presentation of his subject, pornographer and illustrator of lampoons, with which he put his pencil in the service of a political party, is one of the most esteemed engravers of the period together with Arnold Houbraken, the many-sided, exact, learned, but not really very artistic painter, engraver, etcher, literary man. The latter survives in his *Groote Schouburg der Nederlandsche kunstschilders en schilderessen*, which with Lairesse's *Groot Schilderboek*, "wherein the art of painting is thoroughly taught in all its parts and explained by reasoning and the illustration of prints," testifies to the more erudite than artistic spirit of the time. So it is in every department that still had great names before the middle of the century. There are no architects, no sculptors of importance, except the aged Xavery, whose works are possessed by all sorts of houses and villas of the epoch, especially at Leyden and Utrecht and on the Vecht. Not that much frequented art schools could not be shown in nearly all the cities, or that art in general found no appreciation among the population. No Holland city of note but it had its active and popular St. Luke's guild; no aristocratic dwelling but its owner wanted to beautify it with art works of all sorts; no country house but it had garden statues, artistically constructed grottoes and arbours, handsome water basins to show; no habitation in city or country but it could display, as formerly, if not original at least copied works of art; no gable of a well-to-do city abode but its considerable number of ornaments in wood or stone attracted the attention of the passer. This was only an afterglow of the great time, and art works within and without the house were characterised by imitation and overloading, signs of artistic decay.

Thus it was also in literature. The "excellent society for promoting art" of Amsterdam, *Nil Volentibus Arduum*, here swayed the sceptre more and more under

the lead of Pels and Meijer, "building up the language" according to "rules found after long deliberation" and striving after "sweetly flowing" verses, "polishing" what seemed to suffer from roughness. "Every word may be many times improved and scraped, forged, changed, and the superfluous scratched out," became the rule in prose and poetry. The drama must exclusively "lead up" to the virtue of common life and be arranged after the French model, "edifying, artificial, according to rule"; the "path found" by the French must show the way. No "original invention," no "Bible subjects" or modern situations were to be presented, so that the province of the church would not be encroached upon, and the old enemy was reconciled to what took place on the boards.¹ Vondel and Hooft are out of date, Bredero and Jan Vos are considered "too wild," Oudaen and Antonides van der Goes find as little favour in the eyes of the conceited critics and presumptuous pedants. The French drama was victorious also over the spectacular pieces of recent times; the stage in the capital and elsewhere lived upon translations and imitations of the much admired plays of Corneille, Racine, and their followers. It was little better with comedy, although this, of course, preserved more of the national colour.² Asselijn's depictions of manners, among which his *Jan Klaaszen* still attracts audiences, rise above the ordinary standard of the "ingenious" imitations of Molière and other French authors approved by the "academy." It was all over with lyric and epic poetry after the artificial extinction of independent talent, though rhymesters shot up like mushrooms from the ground in the shadow of the poetical societies, which—successors of the ancient chambers of rhetoric and infected with all their faults—were formed

¹ Jonckbloet, *Gesch. der nederl. letterk.*, XVII^{de} eeuw, ii., p. 416.

² Kalff, *Litteratuur en toneel te Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*, p. 268.

in nearly every city ; under these circumstances didactics alone celebrated its dry triumphs. Almost no poet, no verse of this latter time has any claim to be mentioned, when real art is in question. The classically formed captain Broekhuizen at the end of the century—in Dutch as well as in Latin verses—gave expression to his uncommon talent in a language that recalls Hooft, but he ended in pious and not very poetical meditation. Jan Luyken, also a poet of fine feeling, published in 1671 a charming collection of love poems in his *Duytse lier*, but he, too, in later years retired from the world and devoted himself entirely to edifying reflection and poetry, in which he was far from reaching the artistic height shown by the collection mentioned. These are the last poets of the great period, the last who in the circle of Oudaen and Vollenhove and Antonides van der Goes had looked admiringly up to the old age of Vondel. The learned David van Hoogstraten, who as prorector of the Latin school at Amsterdam had known the older poets and the youngest poetasters of the last quarter of the century, had associated with them all and himself made mediocre verses, has rendered to many of his older and younger contemporaries the service of collecting their remains and writing down his recollections of them. As sexton of the Dutch literature of the flourishing time he has no slight merits, but he is likewise the pioneer of the scientific study of the Dutch language which now actually begins—a phenomenon that is perhaps related to the decline of literary talent and may be observed in other nations and periods, as we have noticed it for this time also in painting and engraving. He stands on the same line with Lairesse and Houbraken.

It was somewhat better in science. From the gifted Heinsius and Vossius it was a little descent to Graevius, Gronovius, and Burmannus, from Voetius and Cocceius to the younger Jacobus Trigland and Frederik Spanheim,

from De Groot to Graswinckel. In theology A Marck, the author of the comprehensive handbook *Merck der Godgeleerdheid*, and the gentle middlemen, Vitringa at Franeker and Witsius, were prominent. The noted jurist, Gerard Noodt, received the praise of being the only literary man among the jurists of the fatherland. The famous commentator on the Pandects, Johannes Voet, was little more than an excellent collector of "what was thought and said before him." Above them both stood indisputably the distinguished Franeker professor, Ulric Huber, dying in 1694, after De Groot the man best informed in political and international law, which he treated admirably in his work, *De jure civitatis*. Antonius Matthæus, the third of the name from an erudite legal family, was mainly a collector and editor of documents and chronicles, a compiler. Jacobus Perizonius, the great authority on ancient history, to which he adapted an intelligent criticism, had given up acute textual criticism. Leeuwenhoeck, the simple usher of the Delft justices, prosecuted late in life his studies of the "mysteries of nature" and excited the astonishment of Europe by his surprising discoveries about the "invisible created truths" of the minute animal, vegetable, and mineral world, which his microscope, the successor of spectacle glasses, enabled him to make. Christiaan Huygens, *summus Hugenius*, saw the last years before his death in 1695 clouded by melancholy. In general, however, the time of original geniuses was past, and that of collectors,¹ compilers and, handbook writers had dawned. This was true also of history, where Gerard Brandt found his successors in the restlessly collecting antiquarians Cornelis van Alkemade and Pieter van der Schelling, and the story of the great deeds of earlier generations gave place to topographical, genealogical, and archæological treatises. The learned Huguenot

¹ See concerning the Dutch collectors of this time the numerous data in the *Merkwürdige Reisen* of the German traveller Uffenbach, Bd. ii. and iii.

emigrant Basnage, preacher successively at Rotterdam, Leyden, and The Hague, alone upheld the honour of historical study in a literary form. In medicine Charles Drelincourt and Goverd Bidloo were known no less as learned men than as practising physicians. Groningen succeeded in connecting the famous Basel mathematician, Johannes Bernouilli, the inventor of the integral and differential calculus, from Halle with its university. Dutch universities still possessed some good teachers, professors excelling in general knowledge and the scientific spirit, so that in this period also many foreigners came hither to enjoy the admirable instruction, but the brilliancy of Dutch science had perceptibly paled.

These foreigners were still impressed by the peculiar traits of the Dutch people, but the slow decline of the national virtues and customs did not escape them, chiefly in the higher classes, but also among the prosperous citizens. Unquestionably French fashions, French dress, French manners, the French language, were invading the country more victoriously than ever, partly in consequence of the settlement of the many refugees. A foreign traveller says that the nobility especially "strive to imitate the French in their mien, their clothes, their way of talk, of eating, of gallantry, or debauchery,"¹ and a similar tendency was plainly evident in the army. Simplicity in dress and dwelling, which had formerly symbolised the nation's strength in the eyes of foreign travellers, was slowly lost; men demanded more of life and sought to satisfy these demands; the younger generation showed this inclination more than before. Luxurious France was everywhere the model to be patterned after.

With the augmentation of the national fortune and the increase in the number of rich men in the country, who lived on the capital accumulated by themselves or their ancestors, this tendency must gradually impair the na-

¹*A voyage to Holland*, in *Harleian Miscellany*, ix., p. 543.

tional strength, although prosperity still remained at a considerable height. That it so remained was due largely to the flourishing commerce and industry, in which no falling off was to be observed. A very unfavourable symptom was the growing traffic in stocks, especially in the shares of the East and West India Companies, which were more subject to fluctuations than others by reason of the varying cargoes brought to Europe. Since the first quarter of the century speculation had been common in Amsterdam, and the sharp differences in the prices of government bonds in 1672 and the following years had much promoted this. The "Portuguese Jewish nation" at Amsterdam engaged extensively in this bond and stock business, but other residents and many foreigners also took part in it. The stocks went from hand to hand, often for delivery months afterwards, and every day was to be seen the evil of speculation in the rapid vicissitudes of fortune, which in great measure had the same pernicious consequences as in later times. This stock speculation in Amsterdam was far from having driven away mercantile trade. A French writer¹ of the last years of the century gives a survey of the Dutch navigation and commerce of the period, which shows the immense development it could still boast of in those years. It might still be said that Dutch commerce "embraced the whole earth" and formed the basis of the republic's importance as a power, so disproportionate to the area of its territory and the number of its citizens. Only a relatively small part of Dutch commerce consisted of the direct exportation of Dutch products. In this time too the Hollanders had the carrying trade for northern and southern Europe, for South America, western Africa, southern Asia, and Japan. An English economist of the

¹ (P. D. Huet), *Mémoires sur le commerce des hollandais* (published in 1716, but written before the peace of Ryswick). This remarkable little book is based upon official documents and communications from experienced Dutch merchants.

present calculates Holland's export trade, *i. e.*, that of domestic or foreign articles exported from Holland, at 144 million guilders a year, which can be nothing but a rough estimate.¹ The commerce extended really over a large portion of the globe and must be described more in detail.

Commerce with Russia was carried on partly through Archangel, partly through Livonia. Two squadrons went every year to Archangel, the first in June of five or six, the second in July of more than thirty ships from 200 to 400 tons each, in order at the noted Archangel August market to trade in linen and silk stuffs, cloths, beaver skins, paper, table furnishings, arms, gunpowder, sulphur, metals, wines, southern fruits, spices, herrings, white lead, dyestuffs, perfumes, lace, pearls, gold wire, coined gold and silver. English and French competition had almost ceased here. The English came with only four or five ships a year in consequence of the cleverness of the Hollanders in gaining the Russian noblemen by presents and in adapting their offerings to the needs of the inhabitants, which they sought to learn accurately, while they succeeded in making their rivals ridiculous by pamphlets and caricatures. Amsterdam had this commerce almost exclusively. That through Livonia went generally by way of Reval and Narva, then still in the possession of Sweden, to Novgorod, the great market of central Russia, and Pskov, also by way of Riga and Pernau, to which ports about sixty wood ships sailed annually. Besides wood, particularly wood for masts and casks, corn and hemp were exported from here, together with Russian hides for fine leathers, Russian and Siberian fur, caviare, fat, and wax, which last articles were conveyed in large quantities on Dutch vessels to France and the countries on the Mediterranean, as well as to the Spanish-American colonies, much being used for ecclesiastical purposes.

In Norway the Hollanders surpassed other nations in

¹ Pringsheim, *Beiträge*, p. 10.

the importance of their commerce. They carried there whatever the poor country needed and brought away wood, iron, copper, pitch, skins of animals, potash, fat, dried fish. Over 300 ships of 400 to 500 tons each with ten to twelve sailors were employed in this trade, of which the cities and villages of northern Holland and Friesland were the chief seats, Bergen and Trondhjem being the Norwegian ports. Denmark's foreign commerce was not great, but the Hollanders had a considerable trade in corn on Laaland and in cattle on Jutland, whence the animals were brought to the fertile pastures of Holland to be fattened. Seeland's former cultivation of rye had almost entirely ceased, and the island furnished scarcely grain enough to support its inhabitants. Much more important was the commerce with Sweden, where the Hollanders conveyed spices, salt, wines, cloths and silks, sugar, etc., and exported excellent copper, iron, steel, arms, lead, tar, pitch, wood for masts, especially fine timber. The Hollanders were quite the masters of the exportation of copper and advanced money to the owners of the mines, Amsterdam coming to the fore in this business. The commercial treaty of 1679 secured the rule ever desired by the Dutch in their intercourse with other nations: free ships, free goods, even in time of war. The other Baltic coasts, from Pomerania to Livonia, supplied grain, wood, wax, honey, potash, leather, furs, hemp, saltpetre, fat, wool, linen, etc., which were transported there along the large rivers, also from Brandenburg, Silesia, Poland, and Lithuania. All the Baltic ports shared in this commerce, carried on by the English and Dutch, but Dantzic, Königsberg, and Pillau had the most, particularly the first with its enormous grain storehouses which made it the "granary" of the north. Paper, oil, logwood, salt, etc., were imported here besides the articles mentioned above. Twenty to twenty-five vessels served annually for the Courland trade; the grain commerce in

general always kept 700 or 800 busy; next in importance came the trade in wood, because the Hollanders supplied not only the famous shipyards of the Zaan with wood, but also those of France, Spain, and Italy, just as they provided those countries with furs, caviare, honey, wax, hemp, linen, etc., from these regions. With some ships they even carried on a direct trade between Archangel and Leghorn and Venice, just as they took possession of the carrying trade between the Baltic ports, which was ever growing less on account of the increasing self-development of these ports. Generally they made the greatest exertions to keep the northern commerce in their hands, as appears from the establishment of boards of directors for the Baltic trade at Amsterdam and Hoorn in 1689, and especially to prevent the inhabitants of the Baltic coasts from engaging in this trade themselves. The Dutch rix-dollar was still the usual money of commerce in the north and was imported there in considerable quantities.

German commerce went principally along the large rivers from the Meuse to the Elbe. Busy Hamburg, "little Amsterdam," had a chief part in it by reason of its admirable situation as the point of export for lower Germany; it had enjoyed much prosperity in the great wars, which had injured the commerce of the republic for years together, and temporarily had attracted to itself much of this commerce. But the Dutch were again the most prominent merchants here and went up the Elbe as far as Magdeburg. Bremen too had an active trade in wood and beer, the latter being conveyed by the Hollanders as far away as India. Emden was the exporting place for East Frisian cattle and horses, Westphalian hams, wood and linen from Münster and Paderborn shipped by Dutch vessels to the republic. The Rhine trade of the Hollanders was very considerable; they exported wine, wood, cannons, and bullets, and supplied all western Germany with spices, herrings, sugar, cheese, and the products of all sorts of in-

dustry. Cologne and Frankfort were still the chief markets here, where imports and exports met along the Main and Moselle as far as Franconia and Lorraine. Trade went by the Meuse to Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, where metallic wares and coal formed the chief articles of exportation and spices with silks and woollen goods were imported. The Spanish Netherlands were commercially quite dependent upon the republic in consequence of the closing of the Scheldt and the waters leading to Ghent and Bruges. These two places with Antwerp and Mechlin were the principal marts for the trade in the articles required by the south; the exportation, also entirely in Dutch hands, was confined to lace, yarns, hemp, tapestry, and Lille cambric. A small independent commerce between Ostend and Cadiz was the pitiful remnant of the former great commercial movement of this impoverished region.

Since the Navigation Act England had its export and import trade wholly in its own hands, also that of its American colonies. Spices alone, of which the East India Company possessed the monopoly, were still imported through connivance in Dutch vessels. On the other hand the English had their cloth and wool staple at Dordrecht and exported to Amsterdam much lead, tin, and corn besides English colonial goods. The Scotch had their staple at Veere and brought there coal, wool, and hides. The Dutch could not change this, because their situation obliged them to keep friends with the English who dominated the Channel, but the friendly relations of recent times occasioned some improvement, particularly during war, when England needed the help of the Hollanders more than ever. Exports to England amounted in these years to about 6 millions, imports from England to about 18 millions, and considerable smuggling must be taken into account.

Trade with France once so important had much diminished since the obstacles placed in its way after 1648 on

account of political differences. Before that time the Hollanders were the great merchants here; their ships filled the French ports; they imported many necessary goods and were protected by advantageous treaties. To Normandy alone 200,000 "quarters" of train oil went every year, to Rouen 800 lasts of herrings; soap, refined sugar, salt, cloth, porcelain were almost exclusively obtained from Holland. According to the testimony of the ambassador Boreel the republic about 1658 bought French articles every year to the value of 35 million livres, particularly clothing, mirrors, furniture, wines; from the district between La Rochelle and Oléron cargoes for five or six hundred ships were annually obtained. In 1662 a commercial treaty regulated satisfactorily the mutual relations disturbed by a beginning of difficulties, but five years later the French government commenced again to impose heavy taxes on Dutch commerce, which soon caused retaliatory measures on the Dutch side in duties on French goods, especially on wine and brandy. Furthermore some branches of industry passed from France to the republic after the persecution of the Huguenots. Both French commerce and French industry suffered seriously, because the Hollanders accustomed themselves to receive from elsewhere articles formerly obtained from France or had less need of French commodities on account of the establishment of French industries in their country, such as the manufacture of silk, brocade, hats, paper. Then came the war of 1672 to 1678, which destroyed all commerce between the countries. And after the peace of Nimwegen, as usual, it did not appear so easy to entice trade back to the old channels, now that it had formed new ones, so that in 1680 French goods at Amsterdam brought more loss than profit. In France there was soon again an inclination to tax Dutch commerce, but the result was more of a stoppage. Then followed the new political tension and the war of 1688, which cut off all commerce with Holland and when finally the peace

of Ryswick was concluded, it seemed even less easy than formerly to renew the old relations, particularly when new difficulties soon increased the chances of a third great war. Commerce with France consequently was about 1700 of slight significance.

Spain after the peace of Münster favoured Dutch commerce greatly, and the hostile political attitude of this power towards France made a large part of the Franco-Spanish trade go into Dutch hands. There were no ports on the Spanish coast where Dutch ships were not to be found, while English competition alone had to be contended with. Cadiz was the great commercial port, where Indian and American goods were imported and immediately transferred to Dutch and English vessels lying ready. Gold and silver, pearls and precious stones, dyestuffs and cinchona, vanilla, tobacco, cochineal, leather, fine wood from America, were exported from there to all Europe. Moreover Spain itself furnished fine wool, the fruits of Malaga, the wines of Jerez, Malaga, and Alicante, the oils of Seville and Majorca, salt from Cadiz and Iviza, iron and steel from Biscay and Navarre, soap from Alicante and Cartagena. How large the interest of the Hollanders in Spanish trade had become, appears from the fact that before 1688 only 3000, but in 1691 about 16,000 casks of Spanish brandy were exported on account of the lack of French brandy. Navigation to Cadiz and back employed every year thirty large ships. Negroes for the American colonies were an important merchandise; this trade, though really prohibited to other nations as well as all commerce with the Spanish colonies, was almost entirely in Dutch hands and gave considerable profits. The importation into Spain of spices, cloth, clothing, silks, cutlery, wood, medicinal herbs, cordage, tar, pitch, paper, herrings, butter, grain, was likewise accomplished by the Dutch. After the peace with Portugal in 1661 commerce with that country became considerable, and the Hollanders quite crowded out the

French trade in wine and fruits at Lisbon and Oporto. Ten or twelve ships were laden here every year with lemons and oranges. The salt of Setubal was almost wholly shipped by them, often in vessels returning without cargo from the Mediterranean, but also in twenty ships designed for no other purpose.

The commerce of the Dutch on the Mediterranean Sea since the beginning of the seventeenth century belonged among the most important branches of their entire business. It was first of all Levant trade and was carried on under the lead and supervision of directors at Amsterdam. Thirty ships sailed to Turkish lands, distributed into three or four squadrons on account of piracy, and each was provided with twenty to twenty-five cannon and sixty to seventy men, while two large convoy ships accompanied them. Leghorn was the resting place, where the men refreshed themselves for the voyage which found its destination in Smyrna, to which port the countries of western Asia as far as Persia sent their products by caravan. Dutch commerce with Egypt was of slight importance; Alexandria and Rosetta were the ports there, and the farthest point reached was Cairo. Considerable, however, was the direct trade with Italy, where the great places for exportation were Genoa, the staple of rich Lombardy, Venice, Leghorn for central Italy, and Naples and Messina for southern Italy and Sicily. The Hollanders imported here all sorts of commodities from the north and India; they exported raw silk, silken, velvet, and satin stuffs, fruits, olive oil, Parmesan cheese, sulphur, rice, turpentine, lacquer work, marble, Venetian glass, paper, soap; the excellent Italian manufacture of silk, satin, velvet, and damask was famous all over the world and gave great value to this trade. Many Dutch vessels voyaged from the republic to the Spanish, French, Italian, and Barbary coasts, from whence they transported commodities to the Levant and where on the way back they sold Levant goods, as they were

accustomed to do in the Baltic ports; then they returned home with a new cargo from those coasts. The Hollanders in fact shared the Levant commerce only with the English. The trade of these two nations was very notable in the woollen and linen fabrics universally used there for clothing, also that in spices and dyestuffs monopolised by the Dutch, and that in metals, lead and tin in particular, of which the English had as good as a monopoly. The "capitulations" concluded with the Grand Seignior, the oldest of which dated from the time of Haga, regulated trade in the Levant and were administered with liberality. The duties imposed on commerce by the Turks were moderate—three per cent. for exports, five per cent. for imports, and they had to be paid once only for all Turkish ports.

Outside of Europe the commerce of the East India Company is first worthy of mention. Its power in the Indies had much increased since Maetsuycker, notwithstanding the loss of Formosa so well situated for trade with China and Japan. The conquests from the Portuguese in Hither India, the subjection of Macassar in 1669, the capture of St. Thomé in 1675, the cession of Japara and Cheribon by the prince of Mataram in 1680, established its authority at the chief points of trade and communication. The occupation of Bantam in 1682, where a serious competition with Batavia had come up gradually under England's protection, procured for it important advantages. It now possessed the monopoly in the entire archipelago, and Batavia flourished greatly as the centre of the extensive commercial territory exploited by the company. This territory was not limited to the archipelago but stretched out along the whole southern coast of Asia to Japan. As in the Baltic and Mediterranean the Hollanders had here also, though not to the same extent and not at all in China and Japan, the carrying trade in these regions from Socotra to Tongking. The Arabic gums,

perfumes, balsams, and coffee collected on the Arabian coast from Mocha to Muscat and Basra, the Persian coarse silk suitable for lace and thread, the pearls and precious stones sold in Bender Abbas were shipped by the Dutch in all directions. In the states of the Great Mogul they bought silks, fine cotton, cotton garments, woven fabrics, indigo, saltpetre, red and black lacquer, agate, opium, ginger, etc., and carried them as far away as the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in America. Surat was the chief point for this trade. Southwards from the Portuguese Goa to Cape Comorin lies the pepper coast of Malabar, where the coarse cinnamon and pepper for Europe were bought up, in the factory at Cochin especially, by means of contracts with the small interior princes, who could only be won at great expense in consequence of the competition of Arab merchants. The opposite coast of Coromandel included the great exporting harbours of the rich Golconda, whence the company in 1663 drew cotton valued at nearly one and a half million guilders, mainly in the form of printed cotton or chintz, which nowhere in India was manufactured more beautifully than in this realm around Masulipatam. Precious stones were also to be obtained here in large quantities. The capture of Pondicherry from the French in 1693 was therefore of great importance. From Bengal came glossy silk much used in Holland, silken stuffs, muslins, diamonds, saltpetre, and sugar; yearly the Dutch secured here 6000 to 7000 bales of silk, the best of all India; from Buton came musk and excellent rhubarb. A fort in Hugli was, with Patna farther up on the Ganges, the emporium of Dutch trade in these regions. The kingdoms of Pegu, Siam, and Malacca furnished large quantities of lacquer, gold, silver, precious stones, ivory, rice, tin, lead, wood. The last place, admirably situated on the strait of the same name, the old commercial route, was still of some importance, but had been obliged to yield to Batavia its great repute as the centre of Indian commerce. Bangkok,

the capital of populous Siam, carried on a large independent trade with the Arabic merchants in Hither India and even with Japan. From Tongking came fine Chinese silk and musk, but the company's commerce here was of little consequence. Commerce with China, the land of the best white silk and fine silken fabrics, was ardently desired by the Dutch and English, and both at this time took much trouble to get access to it by money and fair words, as the Portuguese had long had it through their fort at Macao, but so far these exertions brought slight success,¹ while the Chinese themselves had but a small foreign trade, mostly the inhabitants of the province of Fokien, who showed themselves much at Batavia and appeared there to be born tradesmen. Chinese trade might have been very important for the company, because thereby it could have supplied Japan, which obtained nearly all its commodities from China and had allowed the company a small factory on the little island of Desima. The restrictions and humiliations, to which the company's representatives there had to submit, seemed about to be made good by large profits, and these profits would have risen incomparably higher, if the trade from China to Japan could have been secured. An official of the company estimated for that case that the profit on silk alone would amount to five millions a year, representing eighty per cent. of the capital to be invested. Hitherto silk and silken stuffs, cloth, deerskins, hemp, linen, wool, quicksilver, spices, sugar, musk, camphor, fine wood, porcelain, ivory, coral, and all sorts of small wares were the chief commodities imported into Japan, which in exchange exported only silver, excellent copper, and lacquer work, but strictly prohibited the exportation of the here abundant gold. Tea was brought from here and China to

¹ Just at this time, however, there was repeatedly some talk of opening the Chinese ports to all foreigners. English and Portuguese carried on a considerable secret trade with China, but the company in this business had little success in its efforts.

Europe by the Hollanders and was a costly object of commerce, but it suffered much from adulteration with dried sage which was even exported to China by the Dutch.

The trade of Ceylon and the archipelago was again wholly in Dutch hands. On Ceylon the Hollanders now held the entire coast in subjection by the possession of the fortified places, but in the mountainous interior the prince of Kandy ruled almost unchecked. The fine cinnamon cultivated on a small part of the coast and ivory supplied by the numerous elephants were here the main articles of trade. Sumatra, where the powerful princes of Atjeh reigned over a large portion of the interior, stood through the possession of Malacca and the establishments at Palembang, Jambi, Padang, and Selidah, where rich gold mines could be worked, very much under the influence of the company, which had in its hands by contracts with the small princes the trade in pepper, gold dust, camphor, and benzoin and succeeded in overcoming English competition, although the English were able to settle at Benkoelen owing to Speelman's untimely yielding. The fine pepper of Sumatra and Java, which was exported to Persia, Arabia, China, and Japan, gave large profits, even 100 per cent. The Asiatics could not use the coarse pepper of Malabar and Ceylon, so it was sold to Europe and America. The great island of Borneo, inhabited by a savage population, was little visited; diamonds, camphor, and gold were brought from there in small quantities by the natives to Batavia. Celebes, where Macassar occupied and fortified by the company was its chief place, furnished small quantities of rice, pepper, and fine wood. In the Moluccas Ambon was for the whole world the seat of the clove industry, which was confined to this island by the Hollanders with great care, by the more or less regular destruction of the clove trees elsewhere every year. Thus the small Banda was the seat of the nutmeg, which was only allowed to grow there. The "little

Moluccas," of which Ternate and Tidor are the chief, were also artificially restricted to the trade in tortoises, while the spice trees there were destroyed by agreement with the small princes who received an annual allowance. The company would not permit free trade with the inhabitants of these islands from fear for its spice monopoly. But the rooting out of the spice trees, regarded as superfluous for the company's commerce, was not continued as regularly and energetically as it had been in the middle of the century by the ruthless governor De Vlaming van Oudshoorn, and sometimes it was quite neglected. When at the end of the century orders came from the fatherland to take up this work again with vigour, because the production of cloves increased to an alarming extent, it even happened that the governor Schagen refused outright to obey this command, and his successor also hesitated to rob the poor population in this manner of its chief means of existence. The conquest of Macassar, inhabited by an energetic and enterprising people, was of great importance for the undisturbed possession and control of commerce in the Moluccas, which previously maintained often secret relations with English and Portuguese from there. So the monopoly of the spice trade for the entire world was indisputably in the hands of the Dutch, especially since, at the peace of Breda, Pularoon, frequently coveted by the English and occupied by them in 1665, was finally ceded to the company and the English were thus driven out of the Moluccas.

The centre of the company's Asiatic commerce was the now populous and flourishing Batavia. To this capital of the pepper and rice-cultivating Java flowed the commodities of the Orient; from there in December or January the returning fleets sailed through the strait of Sunda to the Cape of Good Hope, usually about six large ships, which were joined at the Cape by some vessels from the coast of Coromandel, Ceylon, and Bengal. The com-

pany's commerce was benefited by the fine climate of the southern point of Africa, so conducive to recovery from exhausting tropical heat, and by the growing importance of the colony settled in and around Cape Town, where under the worthy commander Simon van der Stel (since 1679) not only a considerable number of Dutch and German families were sent out but also after 1688 a hundred of the French Huguenot families taking refuge in the republic. Van der Stel established new centres of colonisation in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein, took great pains to develop agriculture, vineyards, and cattle raising, and may be regarded as the second founder of the colony, which gradually broadened out in the direction of the Karroo and along the coast. The East Indiamen usually remained here a month, from March to April, and then, refreshed and supplied with water and provisions, they steered for the fatherland, where they arrived in July or August with their rich cargoes.

Maetsuycker was succeeded as governor-general in 1678 by Rycklof van Goens, an excellent soldier and merchant, who might have upheld the authority of the company in Java and the Moluccas, but on account of his bad health he had to be replaced in 1681 by Cornelis Speelman, one of the most martial but arbitrary, pompous, and careless servants of the company, who had won great renown by the conquest of Macassar. His rule, though outwardly brilliant enough, was not characterised by the vigour expected from it. He died in three years and left affairs in wretched confusion.¹ He was followed by Johannes Camphuis, a cultivated and scientific but not very energetic man, who wrote a history of the establishment of Batavia and did much to assist Rumphius, the writer on the botany of Ambon, and Kämpfer, who borrowed his description of Japan in part from Camphuis himself, the latter having often been on Desima. Things did not go

¹ De Jonge, *Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag*, viii., p. 1

better under him. After him came the able but no more vigorous Willem van Outhoorn, in whose administration the coffee plant was introduced into Java and the cultivation of sugar increased very much. But under Outhoorn also the company's internal condition appeared much less favourable than it looked superficially. Even on Java its authority seemed lax; neither by stratagem nor by violence could it overcome its former slave Soerapati, who after the Bantam war with some revolted Balinese soldiers had first made the environs of Batavia unsafe, then had found a refuge with the emperor of Mataram, and soon established his own kingdom in eastern Java.¹ The weakness of the higher government had the result, that the company's servants, particularly in the remote offices, could more than formerly enrich themselves with its possessions and revenues, an evil often complained of in the reports of the commanders of the returning fleets to the States-General.² Investigation of such abuses, like that of the commissioner-general Van Rheede van Mijdsrecht, who in 1684 was sent from Europe to Hither India and the Cape, amounted as a rule to little, because under Van Outhoorn and his son-in-law, the director-general Van Hoorn, corruption prevailed even in the highest governmental circles. Prohibited trade of the officials, smuggling, extortion from the natives, bribery of judges, arbitrariness, faithlessness in the care of the company's property increased to a dangerous extent, so that Van Outhoorn in 1701 had to be dismissed. But his son-in-law was named as his successor and refused for a long time to accept the appointment; not until three years later did the dismissed governor really step out, a proof again of the degeneration and inner weakness of the company, however rich were its returns, however high

¹ Busken Huet, *Land van Rembrandt*, ii., 1, p. 223.

² See especially the important report of the former bookkeeper-general, Daniël Braems, of 1688 to the States-General (*Rijksarchief*).

were its dividends, which commonly amounted to 20, 25, 30 to 40 per cent., however popular were its shares rising to over 500 per cent. All these serious difficulties were kept as secret as possible, and at the end of this period the company still shared in the admiration of native and foreigner. The few communications and pamphlets, which attempted to throw light upon its true condition, were discredited by the splendid financial results, and the unfavourable utterances of the company's advocate Pieter van Dam in his account of its affairs were carefully suppressed.¹ What Van Dam said of the company's servants in India: "filling the purse, collecting and keeping together money and property, to become rich in a short time, is really the business," was hardly less true of the directors and officials in *patria*, who made all the profit possible in fitting out the ships and selling the goods, and whose appointment led to the most shameful practice of corruption among the regents on account of the great advantages accompanying these posts. In judging of these matters it must not be forgotten that we know many singularities about the company's actions. If we could search the books of the merchants, it is to be feared that we should agree with the opinion of the king, Charles X. Gustavus of Sweden, who answered the appeal to religion of a Dutch ambassador: "see here your religion," showing a rix-dollar that he took from his pocket, "you serve only your idol which is commerce."²

The West India Company was no better in this respect and far behind the East India Company in its gains. The old West India Company, dying in 1674 after long years of slow decline and partly in consequence of the bad years 1672 and 1673, was immediately replaced by a new one, which took over the six millions debt of the old

¹ Even now his book is only to be found in manuscript in the archives.

² Wrangel (translated by Mrs. Beets), *De betrekkingen tusschen Zweden en de Nederlanden*, p. 9.

company at 30 per cent., while the original capital went to it for 15 per cent. with all that remained of the possessions.¹ The working capital of the new company, with a charter for twenty-five years and a board of ten directors, amounted to over 600,000 guilders. It obtained the commercial monopoly over only a part of the territory assigned to the old company: Africa's coast from the Tropic of Cancer to 30° south latitude, Essequibo with St. Eustatius and Curaçao, besides the slave monopoly for Surinam and Berbice. It had offices at Cape Verde, where it possessed Goree, and on the Gold Coast, where St. George del Mina was its chief settlement; gold, ivory, hides, gum, wax, but slaves above all, were its most important commodities. In the slave trade the Hollanders were at this time the first, indeed almost without competition; the coasts of Guinea and Angola furnished them thousands of slaves for the American plantations, mainly in the Spanish possessions, and the island of Curaçao might be called the staple, although trade with those possessions was really prohibited. The profit on these commodities, which the coast negroes bartered for articles of slight value such as kraals, glass, lace, half-worn clothes, and brandy, was great, so that the company in 1687 could declare a dividend of 10 per cent., but usually one of 3 to 5 per cent., and its shares stood at par.² Its trade in the other Dutch possessions of the West Indies was of small consequence, except that in Surinam, where the Dutch authority at first reached little farther than the cannon on the fort, which had to protect the fifty plantations. This last territory, in 1667 conquered from the English by Crijnsen for Zealand and retained at the peace of Breda, was bought in 1682 by the new West India Company, but in the following year a third of it was made over to Amsterdam and a third to the family of Aerssen van Sommels-

¹ *Groot Placcaatboek*, iii., col. 1333.

² Netscher, *Geschiedenis van Essequibo, Demerary en Berbice*, p. 86.

dijk. "The Surinam society" appointed as governor the arbitrary Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdijk himself, who had made himself impossible in the republic, but he was soon in disfavour with the planters and fell in a mutiny of soldiers five years later. After his death the colony rapidly became more flourishing, and in the beginning of the eighteenth century it counted about 200 sugar plantations with more than 12,000 slaves. The emigration of many Huguenot and Dutch families, including some Jews and a number of Labadists brought over by the Sommelsdijk family, had a large share in this growing prosperity.¹ The languishing colony of Essequibo began to come up somewhat under the careful management of Samuel Beekman, largely on account of the augmentation of the sugar plantations. Berbice, after violent dissensions with the directors and the pretended owners of this colony, the Van Pere family, came under the company's rule in 1678 and was extended slowly but constantly by the establishment of new sugar plantations, as in Essequibo, mostly by private individuals.

The industry carried on by the inhabitants of the republic was still flourishing and had greatly increased with the coöperation of the large number of Huguenot tradesmen and manufacturers settling there. Some fine articles of French make encountered thenceforth serious competition in the United Netherlands, particularly during the wars waged by France in the last part of Louis XIV.'s reign. From the Netherlands also were then to be obtained the *marchandises de Paris*, as they were called, under which name belts, feathers, fans, gloves, masks, head-dresses, clocks, mirrors, etc., were included, fashionable goods in general, ribbons and laces, trimmings and Rouen buttons, Norman pins and needles, gold and silver cloth, silks and velvets of Lyons and Tours, paper of Auvergne, Poitou, Limoges, and Champagne, and French

¹ See Luzac, *Hollands rijkdom*, ii., p. 159.

brandies, and with vexation the French saw the considerable diminution of their sales, of which the causes were the wars against the republic and the hostile commercial policy with the intolerance towards the Huguenots. While the French manufacturing cities languished and their population suffered from want of work and hunger, the Dutch cities could not find hands enough to do the work. The hat, silk, gauze, velvet, fine leather, and trimmings factories in Amsterdam, Haarlem, Utrecht, and other places, the paper works on the Zaan and in the Veluwe increased every year, and native Hollanders also took part in this industrial development. The distilleries, where brandy and in the last years of the century gin too were distilled, belonged among the new industries that had arisen in the first war against France. About 1700 the Dutch silk factories were the first in the world and were helped as much as possible by protective measures. The growing wholesale industry soon experienced, however, the obstruction of the mediæval guild regulations, to which it remained subject. It seems to have attained its highest point around 1700, and it is not to be described how many hands, also of women and children, it kept busy, how much prosperity it diffused in the cities among the people as well as among the manufacturers themselves, what large sums in taxes it poured into the treasuries, though it might be at the cost of its own future owing to the high wages and imposts which were finally to make difficult its competition with foreign countries. It was later believed that the silk industry alone at this time gave work to more hands than the East India Company itself.

The republic of the seventeenth century was no less a land of industry than of commerce; as of old they both supported one another and stood in the closest connection. And the land and city governments endeavoured in regulating taxation according to circumstances, giving and

taking without any definite system, to please both so far as possible, provided only the necessary money came in and the old rules and laws were at least ostensibly upheld. But "trade" still kept the upper hand, and where its interests came into collision with those of industry, the latter had to give way, for it was still believed that the republic and the ancient prosperity of the country were founded upon commerce. An author of this time calculates that between 1688 and 1695 the national wealth of the republic was augmented by about ninety million guilders,¹ which may certainly be attributed in the first place to the growth of industry. And it requires no demonstration that the increase of domestic industry, mainly at the expense of the French industry, increased in its turn the exportation of the goods made in such quantities. No longer France but the republic was the country, whence the noble and wealthy classes of northern Europe and Germany procured the luxurious articles of fashionable dress. There were great changes in the industrial conditions of the republic. The old industry in the home was replaced in the last thirty years of the century by an extensive wholesale industry which employed hundreds of workmen and gave existence to many great factories. The example of the new industries had also its influence on the old cloth and woollen industry, which began to throw off the restrictions of the mediæval guilds and halls and derived great advantage from the technical skill so highly developed by the foreigners. It was developed likewise into a wholesale industry with large factories and a considerable working population. This was a very notable change that did not fail to have a powerful effect on the economic condition of the people. There was a current towards the cities with a large increase of their population, and many more workmen joined the guilds, although the bonds of the mediæval guilds commenced to be oppressive and caused

¹ Davenant, *Works*, i., p. 415.

objection to the tyranny of the guild and the arbitrary action of employers and even led to riots. In and before the middle of the century some opinions of a socialistic or communistic tendency were heard of; but by strict prohibitive and penal measures the municipal magistrates managed to hold in check these isolated opinions which have been but little investigated. There is no mention of large collective movements among the labourers at this time, which is owing to the prosperity general in the land.

The stirring industrial life in the Dutch cities and here and there in the country attracted universal attention, not the least in young Russia, whose great ruler, the czar Peter the Great, in preparing his political and economic reforms had cast an interested eye upon the small republic's wonderful development. Thither he directed his steps across Germany in August, 1697, being influenced also by the large importance which Dutch commerce and industry had had for his own realm since the close of the sixteenth century; there he remained with his considerable retinue until early in the following year. His chief object in this visit was to make himself acquainted with everything concerning navigation and shipbuilding, and he devoted much of his time to learning about the shipyards at Amsterdam and on the Zaan, where he worked as a simple mechanic. Aided especially by Nicolaas Witsen, the influential burgomaster of Amsterdam, who knew Russia well, he laid during his visit the foundations for the building of his new fleet and opened relations with Dutch seamen and engineers, many of whom followed him to his country. In the beginning of the next year he went over to England, from where in the spring of 1698 he returned for a few weeks to Holland on his journey to Vienna.

Among the old industries, besides the shipbuilding on the Zaan, which was said to be able to turn out a ship a day for years together in case of necessity, the fisheries still occupied a prominent place. The Greenland fishery, no longer the

old land fishery at Spitzbergen and Jan Mayen Island or even the sea fishery farther away in the inhospitable waters but having become ice fishery, now that the whale and walrus chased by the Dutch, French, English, Hamburg, Bremen vessels had retreated higher up in the direction of the eternal ice, was zealously prosecuted in spite of its hardships and the vicissitudes of its results. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Vlaardingen, Delfshaven, and the Zaan villages were its seats; about 200, in some years over 250 ships, heavier and larger than formerly on account of the more dangerous ice fishery, sailed out annually and formed the most excellent navigators. French privateers did much damage and caused a reduction in the number of outgoing vessels to far below the half in the years of war, exclusive of 1672-1674 and 1691 when the fishery was for the time entirely prohibited, but after the peace of Ryswick the old height was again reached in some years. From 1675 there was a union of "commissioners of the whale fishery" for the promotion of the common interests.¹ The herring fishery had some very hard times in the years of war during this half of a century. Countless busses were captured by English, French, especially Dunkirk, Swedish privateers; repeatedly whole fleets of fishermen were destroyed by hostile squadrons during the English wars in particular. These fisheries also were forbidden more than once on account of the want of sailors for the navy. Notwithstanding the supervision of the powerful board of the great fishery the quality of the Dutch herrings exported finally left much to be desired. At the end of the century this fishery had fallen off very much, and the Scotch fishermen began to drive the Dutch from the world's market, although the lack of statistical data makes it impossible to give details.

With all these material interests, which were ever precious to the Dutch people, it did not forget its spiritual

¹ Zorgdrager, *Groenlandsche visscherij*, 2^{de} druk, p. 302; Beaujon, *Geschiedenis van de nederl. zeevisscherijen*, p. 125.

needs, and the end of the seventeenth century was both for the Catholic and the Protestant portion of the population rich in every species of movements that went to the heart of the Netherlanders. Among the Protestants the Voetian and Cocceian opinions in the reformed church occasioned trouble on both sides, but William III., though personally favourably inclined to the Voetians, took good care not to estrange the opposing party and at last turned to the policy of toleration, which had been followed by Frederick Henry, and would not consent to the new national synod desired by the Voetians, as he feared a revival of the old dissensions of the early part of the century. Van der Waayen, having retired to Friesland under the protection of his cousin, now professor at Franeker, was by him in 1685 also restored to honour and continued to be the influential leader of the Cocceians with Van Giffen, the preacher of Leeuwarden and afterwards of Dordrecht. Both Cocceians and Voetians, however, gradually laid aside some of the old dogmatic asperity and devoted themselves more to the care of the spiritual necessities of their congregations than to mutual strife which was still far from being settled. The progress of dissension was restrained by the Holland resolution "for the preservation of quiet and peace in the churches" (1694), which recommended moderation in preaching and the calling of ministers of "moderate and peaceful disposition," although it recalled vividly the resolutions of Arminian times. The learned and moderate Franeker professor, Campegius Vitringa, the conciliatory Hermanus Witsius, the mystical Voetian A Brakel, and his erudite colleague, A Marck of Leyden, were the principal theologians of this time, who fixed the attention of their followers more upon Christian life than upon dogmatic differences.¹ Remarkable too was the

¹ See Reitsma, *Geschiedenis van de Hervorming en de Hervormde Kerk*, 2^de druk, p. 294.

pietistic tendency revealing itself here in the second half of the seventeenth century as a reaction against the dogmatic spirit of the first half. Men like the Teellinck brothers, like the ascetic preacher of repentance, Jodocus van Lodenstein, who found a great following at Utrecht and held mystical meetings there, in which Anna Maria van Schurman joined, like Willem à Brakel at Rotterdam, like the wandering opposer of Cartesius, Jacobus Koelman, made their appearance teaching and preaching and had attentive listeners in their conventicles among a large part of the conscientious Dutch population. The small number of followers of the fervent French preacher, Jean de Labadie, who in 1666 was called from Geneva as a reformer of the church to Middelburg but was speedily deposed as an unorthodox disturber of the peace and sought to establish a new evangelical church in Amsterdam, dwindled away more and more after his removal to Germany and his death at Altona in 1674. In the following year a portion of the remaining Labadists settled at Wieuwerd in Friesland, soon under the patronage of the ladies Aerssen van Sommelsdijk, through whose influence they were able for a time to maintain themselves there under the protection of the Frisian court, living in a community of property according to the true principles, as they believed, of ancient Christianity. Their weak establishment, constantly molested by the Frisian preachers, reduced by the departure of some to Surinam and New York, gradually shrank away, especially after the community of property was given up in 1688. Other mystical sects like the Brothers of the Angels, disciples of the German theosophist Gichtel, like the Hebrews, led by the Walcheren catechist Verschoor, for a time gathered a small following, which melted away in the long run under the opposition of the great church. They prove the extensive diffusion of mystical ideas at this time, of which the Collegiants still living in Rijnsburg and some Dutch

cities furnished the strongest type with their spirit of Christian brotherhood. Related to them was the gentle Pontiaan van Hattem, preacher at St. Philipsland on Tholen, deposed in 1683 on account of his unorthodoxy, who could not escape the accusation of Spinozism. Until his death he continued to exhort his followers found also in Holland, the "Hattemists," and to persuade them to a fervent religious life. He and other "freethinkers," such as the plain Amsterdam citizen Deurhof, had always to contend with the persecution of the ruling church, which endeavoured with a heavy hand to suppress these "sectarian" movements but succeeded only incompletely. The genuine Protestant feeling for free research was here too deeply rooted.

Cartesian and Spinozistic opinions, the former particularly, had not lost their importance in spite of all the controversial writing, refutation, and opposition. Van der Waayen and the disputatious Hermanus Alexander Roëll, both professors at Franeker, were in this period the foremost champions of the Cartesian doctrine, which was sharply condemned by various provincial synods, in orthodox Zeeland especially, where their propositions had to be abjured with "detestation" by all preachers. Roëll, pupil of Burman and Heydanus, who vigorously upheld the right of speech in religious matters, aroused the most violent indignation but was able to retain his place under the protection of the noble Albertina Agnes of Orange and the stadtholder's court at Leeuwarden, although the Frisian Estates often wanted to end his dispute with Huber and Vitringa. Much more stir was caused by the Cartesian principles of the learned and many-sided Frisian preacher, Dr. Balthasar Bekker, whose *Vaste spyze der volmaakten* in 1670 gave rise to sharp complaints of the ecclesiastical authorities, to prohibitive measures of the secular magistrates, to many pamphlets. Finally he had to leave Friesland in consequence of the agitation, and he became

minister at Weesp and later at Amsterdam. His *Examination of the significance of comets* (1683) disputed in a happy manner the prevailing ancient superstition concerning them. A still deeper impression was produced by his contestation on scientific grounds of the universal belief in ghosts and sorcery in the famous book the *Betoverde Wereld* (1691), that went too far for such men even as Van der Waayen and occasioned vehement writings¹ and general alarm. By the North Holland synod of the following year the author was deposed and put out of the church community by the Amsterdam consistory, but under protection of the ever moderate government of Amsterdam he continued to reside there until his death in 1698; his book went through several editions and, to the great advantage of the good cause which it defended in an intelligent and popular way, it was read by thousands in the country, years also after its writer had closed his eyes. The adherents of Spinoza have made less noise in the world, in accordance with the spirit of the great, quiet thinker, who had been their honoured leader and had died at The Hague in 1677 almost unnoticed, as he wished; only a few noble thinkers, who had formed his small circle, remained faithful to his doctrine until their death and cultivated it in the stillness of the study. The influence of his ideas, however, is not to be mistaken here and there outside of this circle, his name lasted in the memory of the ignorant multitude as that of an outcast, whose pernicious opinions must be rooted out, and the reformed church saw in him one of its bitterest and most dangerous foes. Not until our own time did his philosophy awake again from its sleep of a century and a half to bear fruit anew for thinking humanity and to win followers anew for the philosophical meditation of the "Being, that only is to be."

While agitation and disturbance prevailed in the ruling

¹ Van der Linde's bibliography numbers no less than 230 titles of books by, for, and against him.

church, this was no less the case with the Catholics of this time, among whom the dissension of almost a century between regulars and seculars, between brothers of the orders and secular priests, finally came to a crisis. In other respects it was a restless time for them. The persecutions of the Huguenots and of the Waldenses in Piedmont, later the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the arrival in the country of hundreds of refugees had occasioned a strong anti-Catholic movement among the Protestants of the republic; the important events in England, the dreaded Catholic propaganda in the Palatinate caused new uneasiness. Riots against the Catholics, vehement complaints of synods and consistories, calls in different provinces for the enforcement of the placards, were the unavoidable consequences of the aroused hostility. For a time the condition of the Catholics in 1685 began to be threatening; their meetings were dispersed, their houses menaced with pillage, their priests imprisoned. But the moderation of the regents, no less that of Neercassel and his friends,¹ the caution of the Catholics themselves, who collected money to alleviate the sufferings of the refugees, soon made the agitation diminish, and although there was repeatedly talk of the expulsion of the Jesuits, who were regarded as the instigators, the leaders of the persecutions in France and elsewhere, and the States-General deliberated upon it seriously, it was not brought about in order also not to embitter the allies Austria and Spain. The internal disturbances in the Catholic Church were no less serious and of more lasting effect. The gentle Neercassel, who by the publication of his *Amor poenitens* had incurred an accusation of heterodoxy and had seen his book prohibited by the Inquisition, died in June, 1686, and now the question was who was to obtain the office of apostolic vicar. The chapters of Utrecht and Haarlem, the only ones still in existence, although the government did not recognise

¹ Knuttel, *De toestand der Nederl. Katholieken*, i., p. 289.

them, nominated the learned Van Heussen. But the Jesuits did not want Van Heussen, had one of his books condemned as heterodox, and endeavoured to push through the appointment of a candidate favourable to themselves by the commission of cardinals at Rome charged with the affair. The chapters now proposed three to the pope, Petrus Codde, provicar, being the first, and sent one of their number, Theodorus de Cock, pastor at Leyden, to Rome to secure an election acceptable to themselves. This succeeded finally in spite of all kinds of intrigues, and in September, 1688, Codde was by the pope appointed the successor of Neercassel. Codde was a moderate and careful man, but he quickly fell into strife with the Jesuits, and was suspected by them and their friends of inclining to Jansenism. De Cock too belonged soon to his bitterest enemies and accused the vicar at Rome in 1694, but this time the latter won the victory and was acquitted of all guilt, though the Jesuits opposed him strenuously, even blaming him for a movement among the Catholics in the republic to favour the plans for expelling their order from the country. Codde did not fail to answer, but complained on his side of the violent and imprudent action of the order and of the general manner in which they took up their task in the republic. The adversaries replied with a *Breve memoriale de statu et progressu Jansenismi in Hollandia* (1697), in which violent little book Codde and his secular priesthood were sharply assailed. This work, branded by Codde and his friends as scandalous and refuted with indignation, made so much impression at Rome, however, that in 1699 Codde was deposed by the cardinals assembled again and De Cock was put in his place. On account of the expected opposition this resolution was kept secret until the vicar should come to Rome for the celebration of the jubilee year. He came and then the contest began anew; at first acquitted by the aid of a document in his defence sent in by 300 of his own priests,

he was detained in Rome and finally in May, 1702, suspended by papal decree with the appointment of De Cock as his successor. Evidently this was destined to cause a great disturbance among the Dutch Catholics; a small minority of them, about twenty and some of those not of the best elements, supported De Cock and the Jesuits, but the large majority espoused the cause of the apostolic vicar. Though some of them submitted to the definitive papal decision, others continued in opposition and brought down upon themselves again the accusation of inclining toward or even of having gone over to Jansenism—an accusation that seemed to find some ground in the sojourn of the great French Jansenist Arnauld in the country in 1681 and 1682. The accused indignantly repelled this complaint, which stamped them as heretics and apostates. The posthumous book printed in 1640 on St. Augustine by the Louvain professor, Jansen, from whom the sect was named, was condemned in general in 1643 but most strongly in 1653 by Pope Innocent X. on account of the Augustinian doctrine of grace defended in it, from which Luther also had first started out, while Pope Alexander VII. had required of every ecclesiastic in service the rejection of five propositions attributed to Jansen. But the numerous followers of Jansen in France and Belgium denied that these propositions were to be read in his book, and the Dutch ecclesiastics, faithfully supported by a large number of laymen, disclaimed all thought of any such tendencies. Thus at the beginning of the eighteenth century from the old opposition between the secular priests and the members of the orders arose a sharp dispute regarding adherence to dogmas branded as heretical by the church among a clergy, which was fully convinced that it might call itself Catholic and was averse to Protestant sentiments—a dispute that must be considered as of the highest importance to the Catholic church in the Netherlands on account partly of its relation to the Protestant

government of the country, which might perhaps find a reason for interfering in the matter as soon as these dissensions should seem to threaten the public peace.

Such was the condition of the country and the people of the Netherlands, when was suddenly taken away the strong hand of the great stadtholder, who had guided the republic during thirty years amid the most serious perils. Was it to continue to play the part that it had filled through almost the entire century? Was it to be inspired to a new development of strength in the arduous circumstances that might be the result of the new great war, in which it was about to engage? Or was it, satisfied with the wealth obtained, to rest upon its laurels and yield itself to the seductive voice of enjoyment in peace and domesticity? Both possibilities were open. Which was to become a reality? That was the question to be solved in the years immediately following. But to him, who was acquainted with the nature of the Dutch people and its regents, who knew with what difficulties William III. had always been obliged to contend, it was not doubtful what would happen, now that the motive force of the great general and statesman was wanting and for the time there was nobody to take his vacant place.





APPENDIX

SOURCES OF NETHERLAND HISTORY, 1621-1702

FOR the period after the Truce we possess the *Gedenkschriften* of the Gelderland nobleman Alexander van der Capellen (2 vols., Utrecht, 1777), beginning with 1621 and continued to 1632, the second volume containing notes on important events, in which the author took part to 1654, and fragmentary observations on other happenings. Constantly in the highest governmental bodies, he had an opportunity to hear and see much; as a trusted counsellor of Frederick Henry his information is of great value. Of more importance is the extensive work of the Frisian statesman Lieuwe (Leo) van Aitzema, born in 1600 at Dokkum of a good family, which had already given to the state an excellent diplomat in his uncle Foppe van Aitzema, through whose influence the nephew became resident of the Hanse cities at The Hague. As such he had occasion to watch the political development of the young republic, while his relations with French and English statesmen and the small courts of northern Germany afforded him a deeper insight into the secret ways of European politics. Little scrupulous in his methods of securing important documents,¹ he collected a very considerable number of them and incorporated them in his great compilation, the *Saeken van Staet en Oorlogh in ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (15 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1655; 7 vols., *ibid.*, 1669-71), an inestimable authority for Dutch history from 1621 to 1668, a magazine of important documents and information. The work, like that of Bor, is more a loosely

¹ See Fruin in *Nijh. Bijdr.*, *N. R.*, iii., p. 218.

connected compilation than a real historical relation, though the more personal tone of the author and his larger knowledge of the events described assure to his text greater interest for the reader, notwithstanding his occasional coldness and cynicism.

Other notable sources for the history of this time are the "reports" or "current news" appearing regularly in print after the Truce, which were not yet concerned with affairs of state but served to diffuse political and military intelligence from the prince's camp in particular.¹ Similar was the work of the learned Amsterdam physician, Nicolaas van Wassenaer, the *Historisch Verhaal aller gedenkwaardigste geschiedenissen, die hier en daer in Europe . . . voorgevallen syn* (21 vols., Amsterdam, 1622 *et seq.*), beginning with 1621 and continued to 1632 by his colleague Barend Lampe. Of much more importance is the long series of thousands of pamphlets, which commented on the events of the day for the public or circulated official documents in print. They are most completely gathered in the great collections of the Royal Library at The Hague (Duncaniana Collection), of the Bibliotheca Thysiana in Leyden, of the University Library at Ghent (Meulman Collection), and through the printed catalogues of Tiele (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1856-61), Rogge (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1863-65), Van der Wulp (3 vols., Amsterdam, 1866-68), Petit (2 vols., Leiden, 1882-84), and Knuttel ('s Gravenhage, 1889 *et seq.*) they have become more widely known as invaluable authorities, though to be used with caution, for the history of this time in its full extent, especially for the political, ecclesiastical, and economic history. Historical prints also, partly contained in the larger illustrated historical works of the time, partly produced separately, may be regarded as an important source for the knowledge of events, persons, and customs.²

¹ See Fruin, *Over de oudste couranten in Nederland (Volksalmanak v. h. Nut*, 1863, p. 86).

² See Muller, *Beredeneerde beschrijving van Nederl. historieprenten* (4 vols., Amst., 1863-82) with *Nalezing* by Ch. Dozy (Rott., 1888); Fr. Muller, *Catalogus van 7000 portretten* (Amst., 1853), continued by Van Someren (3 vols., Amst., 1888).

The collections of them in the Royal Museum and elsewhere have hitherto been used more for the history of art than from the point of view of general history. Among the later publications in this department deserve mention that on *Amsterdam in de 17^{de} eeuw*¹ and in a more popular form P. L. Muller's *Gouden Eeuw* (3 vols., Leiden, 1896-98), both works of general importance. Further there are historic medals, among other places contained in the Royal Cabinet of Coins and Medals at The Hague and admirably described in Van Loon's standard work: *Beschrijving der Nederlandsche Historipenningen* (4 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1723-31; continuation, Amsterdam, 1821-69), from 1555 to 1714, afterwards continued by the Royal Academy of Sciences. The awakening of interest in Dutch art during the last quarter of the nineteenth century caused the publication of many contributions to the history of art, particularly in the magazine *Oud-Holland* (Amsterdam, 1882-), in other periodicals of local and provincial character, and in larger works.² Publications relating to the history of economics and law for this period are less numerous. In economics there are only small productions, notably in the last volumes of the *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht*, in the journals of provincial societies, and appended to other works.³ The history of law is limited principally to the older books of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The interest of the present generation is confined almost entirely to the history of the political law of this period, though some activity is shown by the new issue of De Groot's *Inleiding tot de rechtsgeleerdheid* (ed. Fockema Andreae, 2 vols., Arnhem, 1895), the *Bijdragen tot de Nederl. rechts-*

¹ By Meijer, Kernkamp, Brugmans, Kalff, Rogge, etc. ('s Gravenh., 1897, etc.).

² See Galland, *Geschichte der holl. Baukunst und Bildnerei* (Frankf., 1890); Bredius, *Meisterwerke des Rijksmuseums und der Kön. Gemädegallerie* (München, 1890); Bode, *Rembrandt* (Paris, 1897); Michel, *Rembrandt* (Paris, 1895).

³ See Luzac, *Holland's Rijkdom*, 4 vols., 1780; Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Geschichte der Nederl.* (Leipzig, 1893); Klerk de Reus, *Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Geschichte der O. I. Comp.* (Bat., 1894); Van Rees, *Geschiedenis der Staathuishoudkunde in Nederland*; etc.

geschiedenis of Fockema Andreae (Haarlem, 1889-), some publications of the *Vereeniging voor de uitgave der bronnen van het oude vaderlandsche recht*, and a few dissertations appearing, at Leyden. For the history of the East India Company and its possessions, in addition to the old Valentyn, to Laspeyres and Saalfeld, we can now refer to Klerk de Reus' *Geschiedlicher Ueberblick*, and above all to the admirable compilation, begun by J. K. J. de Jonge, continued by Tiele, Van Deventer, and Heeres : *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsche gezag in Oost-Indië* (Amsterdam and den Haag, 1862-), comprising an important series of documents relating to the history of these regions and of the East India Company, and further to the *Daghregister* ('s Gravenh., 1887-) kept in the citadel of Batavia. For the West India Company we must help ourselves, besides with Jan de Laet's celebrated book mainly with the appendixes to the excellent works of Netscher, O'Callaghan, and others.

The important period between 1648 and 1702 is rich in authorities, but a large part of them is still lying in archives and libraries and has not yet become common property, though much of this material has been consulted often and advantageously. First to be remembered are the correspondence of John de Witt, preserved in the Royal Archives at The Hague, and that of William III. and his friends, particularly after 1688, the point at which the publication of Groen's *Archives* stops ; further the notes of members of the Estates of Holland, which are almost unknown, the reports of the English and French ambassadors, who watched the republic's history so close at hand and took part in it ; finally the pamphlet literature very abundant for this period but still little used. Lefèvre Pontalis consulted John de Witt's correspondence diligently, and now there is a prospect that we shall soon be in possession of the ample extracts from it made by Fruin for a book on De Witt often proposed but never written. The publication is not probable of the letters and reports concerning the later time of William III. from the queen's private archives. In recent years there has been talk of collecting the notes from the Estates of Holland so influential

at this time. Various publications have called attention to the importance of the French and English archives.¹ The carefully edited catalogues of the pamphlets in several great collections give an opportunity to learn of the wealth of the pamphlet literature.²

Among the printed sources the publications of official documents deserve first to be mentioned. Of the great publication of the *Resolutiën en Secrete Resolutiën der Staten van Holland en Westfriesland* there exist for a part of this time (1653-1668) separate editions, also of the *Resolutions* of 1672 and 1709, of the *Secret Resolutions* of 1717; furthermore the *Resolutions* "of consideration" of John de Witt's time (1653-1668) have been published in one volume, 1672, at The Hague, and in 1706 at Utrecht. The *Resolutions* of the States-General for this period have only very incompletely survived in print; they remain in manuscript in the Royal Archives. To these collections may be joined the *Letters exchanged between John de Witt and the plenipotentiaries of the state abroad* (6 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1723-1725), which are not complete but afford a good view of the foreign policy in De Witt's time. A complement to them is to be found in Combes, *Correspondance française de Jean de Witt*, in the first volume of his *Mélanges historiques* (Paris, 1873). The ponderous tomes of Aitzema may be regarded as semi-official works for this period also, filled as they are with official documents, the questionable way in which they often came into his possession appearing only after his death in 1669. The Dordrecht corrector Lambert van den Bos (Silvius) continued his book with much less talent; the passion, with which in his *Historiën onses tijds behelzende Saken van Staet en Oorlogh*, 1669-1679 (3 vols., Amst., 1685) he comes out against the De Witts, particularly against Cornelius de Witt, diminishes very

¹ Besides in my *Verslagen over archivalia betreffende de geschiedenis van Nederland in Engeland en te Parijs*, and other places, in the dissertations of Japikse, *De verwickelingen tusschen de Republiek en Engeland*, 1660-1665 (Leiden, 1900) and Haye, *De geheime correspondentie van Abraham de Wicquefort* ('s Gravenhage, 1901).

² See especially the *Catalogus van de pamfletten der Kon. Bib.*, ed. Knuttel, vols. 2 and 3.

much the value of this continuation, which like Aitzema's work itself connects important public documents by a concise relation. His *Toneel des oorlogs* from 1669 (4 vols., Amst., 1675) is no more valuable than his *Leven en Bedrijf van Willem III.* (1694).

Of a similar origin, though not of the same character, is the important book of Abraham de Wicquefort, *Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas*, running from 1648 and continued by the author to 1674.¹ Wicquefort was a man like Aitzema, a diplomat of inferior rank, easy of conscience, dissolute in life, extremely able, but even less reliable than he; only towards De Witt, his constant protector, he showed himself a faithful and attached friend. He was born of a mercantile family² in 1606, at Amsterdam, studied in Leyden, and then went to seek his fortune in Paris, where he lived for years in ambiguous relations, and had access to all sorts of society. In 1646 he became Brandenburg's resident in Paris, but he continued in this position his life of shameless deceit and intrigue, until Mazarin, who also paid for his services, imprisoned him in 1659 and then banished him. Later he still kept up his connection with the French government, and for years was one of its paid correspondents at The Hague, where he was permanently settled from 1662. He entered the service of De Witt as a translator and writer of state documents. He became also the resident for Poland and Brunswick-Lüneburg, and carried on a political correspondence with other small German princes and countries. His admirable French style and uncommon acquaintance with political matters induced De Witt in 1667 to have the Estates of Holland commission him to write a history of the republic from 1648 in favour of the ruling party. The book, remarkable for its striving after moderation in judging the opposing party, was

¹First edition, 4 vols., La Haye, 1719-1745, suspended. Second edition by Lenting and Chais van Buren, 4 vols., Amsterdam, 1861-1874 (under the patronage of the Prov. Utr. Genootschap).

²See concerning him Wickevoort Crommelin in *Nijh. Bijdr. Vierde Reeks*, i., p. 237; Lenting in the biography at the beginning of vol. i. of his edition.

carefully revised by De Witt and Van Wimmenum, but was not yet printed, though partly in press, when the events of 1672 caused the plan to be suspended. Three years later (March, 1675) he was incarcerated for treason, first in the Voorpoort at The Hague, then in Loevestein; sentenced to imprisonment for life with confiscation of his property, he escaped in February, 1679, and fled to Celle in Brunswick, where he died in 1682. He continued his book in prison and later. He wrote also the noted work, *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, an important handbook for the diplomats of the time, and later the *Mémoire touchant les ambassadeurs*, in which are communicated many details of diplomacy as then practised. His confiscated papers, including the proofs of his book, remained in the custody of the court of Holland, until the publishers after much difficulty were able in 1719 to print the first four books, but the printing was suspended with the tenth book in 1745 not to be resumed before our own time. Long after Wicquefort's death the completion of his work was committed to another person, to the French preacher Jacques Basnage of The Hague, exiled to the republic in 1684, who was to continue the work to the peace of Utrecht. After seeing Wicquefort's manuscript Basnage advised against its publication. Basnage himself, a fine scholar and a great friend of the council pensionary Heinsius, who employed him as a mediator in the peace negotiations of Utrecht, was now in his turn entrusted with the task, and wrote his *Annales des Provinces Unies*, 1648-1667 (2 vols., La Haye, 1719-1726), a production in many respects to be praised, which in form and impartiality stands far above Wicquefort's book but not in insight and knowledge of affairs. Less high stands the work of the celebrated and voluminous writer Jean Leclerc of Geneva, who in 1684 had become a professor in the Remonstrant seminary at Amsterdam, and died there at an advanced age in 1734. His immense literary output includes the *Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas*, 1560-1716,¹ a meritorious compilation illustrated with reproductions of medals.

¹ Three vols. Amst., 1723-1728; also translated into Dutch, *ib.*, 1730 and

Above all in this time stands Jan Wagenaar, the worthy Amsterdam historian, ever aiming for impartiality, though favouring De Witt. In his volumes dealing with this period he had at his disposal many important documents and memoranda of eminent statesmen as well as personal communications of all sorts, which made it possible for him in his dryness to write a reliable account of events, belonging, so far as the substance is concerned, to the best productions of the older Dutch historiography. He is undoubtedly surpassed in literary talent by Geraert Brandt, poet and clockmaker, afterwards Remonstrant preacher in Hoorn and Amsterdam, the young friend of Hooft and his later father-in-law Van Baerle, the admirer, not always the friend, also of Vondel. Hooft was his model in style and conception. He imitated him, less in his important but partisan *Historie der Reformatie* than in his *Leven en bedrijf van den heere Michiel de Ruiter* (Amst., 1687) and in his admirable biographies of Hooft and Vondel for the publication of the *Nederlandsche Historiën* and of Vondel's *Poëzy*. His life of De Ruyter remains his masterpiece, and in it he excels Hooft in simplicity and clearness of style. Under the fresh impression of the events, which brought the fatherland to the verge of destruction, Pieter Valckenier, agent of the States in Switzerland and a partisan of Orange, wrote his *Verwerd Europa ofte polityke en historische beschrijvinge der waare fundamente en oorsaken van de oorlogen en revolutien in Europa, voornamelijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden sedert den jare 1664* (Amst., 1688), to which is joined a continuation to 1675, authentic documents being appended, without literary talent and plainly showing the purpose to put William III.'s policy in the best light. Thus Tobias van Donselaer of Amsterdam, besides his notable *Beschrijvinge van Amsterdam*, composed the work *Het ontroerde Nederlandt* (2 vols., Amst., 1674-1676) under the influence of what he had experienced without any pretension to literary value. Both books are of importance on account of the documents and evidence of

1738, under the title: *Geschiedenissen der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (to 1715). See concerning him the excellent article in Van der Aa, *Biographisch Woordenboek*.

eyewitnesses contained in them. Donselaer's work found a continuer in Brandt's younger son, also named Geraert, for the years 1674 and 1675, covered by his *Tweejarige geschiedenis*. For style and contents these works are little superior to the journalistic production, the *Hollantse Mercurius*, the continuation of the old chronicles of the time and collected in 40 volumes from 1650 to 1690, originally appearing weekly and composed of exchange and newspaper reports of general interest. This *Mercurius*, followed in 1690 by the *Europische Mercurius*, gives a good picture of the immediate impression of events upon the public and is therefore indispensable for the history of the time. In the seventeenth as well as in the eighteenth century the republic was the seat of journalism, which in French translation spread the fruits of the pen over a large part of Europe and was a formidable power in the world.¹ The *Gazette de Hollande* was the proverbial political newspaper of those days, the *Gazette d' Amsterdam*, the translated Amsterdam journal, was with the Leyden, Haarlem, and Utrecht journals the source of all kinds of newspapers even in Paris. The writers hid themselves under the mask of anonymity, which led frequently to great abuses and diplomatic difficulties. The French government in the years of peace after 1679 complained repeatedly of the utterances of the French press in the republic often inspired by French refugees; but the States themselves sometimes had to act vigorously against mendacious, indecent, or indiscreet newspaper reports.² The *Mercure historique et politique*, founded in 1686 by Sandras de Courtitz and appearing every month, was during almost a century the most widely circulated of these newspapers.

In the way of memoirs, sources for the Dutch history of this time appear in the letters and writings of the foreign ambassadors and agents at The Hague, particularly those of France and England. D'Estrades and d'Avaux with Temple and Burnet are prominent among them. D'Estrades' *Lettres, mémoires et négociations*³ give a good insight into the relations be-

¹ Hatin, *Les Gazettes de Hollande*, Paris, 1865.

² Sautijn Kluit, *Nagelaten geschriften*, i., p. 108.

³ First edition, 5 vols., Brux., 1709, better that of 1743 in 9 vols., London.

tween the French court and De Witt, also into the internal condition of the republic before 1672; the publication of his works, however, is far from complete and accurate, as appears from a comparison with the material preserved in the archives of Foreign Affairs at Paris.¹ Equally valuable for the period 1679-1688 are the *Négociations en Hollande* of Jean Antoine de Mesme, count d'Avaux (6 vols., Paris, 1752 and 1754), who was in closer relations than d'Estrades with the regents of Holland and Friesland. Sir William Temple's works are important for the latter part of De Witt's time and the early period of William III., and he had an open eye for economic affairs in the republic as well as for the political situation. His *Letters and Memoirs* (*Letters written by Temple and other ministers of state*, 3 vols., London, 1700-1703) and his *Observations* (1672) and *Miscellanea* (2 vols., London, 1680-1690) have been translated into French and Dutch and are much read. Burnet's *History of my own time* (6 vols., London, 1725-1734) affords a good view of Prince William III.'s attitude towards England and towards his wife, who had great confidence in her court preacher, but it must be used with careful criticism. The remarkable *Lettres et mémoires* of Queen Mary herself (ed. Mechth. Bentinck, La Haye, 1880), besides the mostly English *Memoirs and letters* (ed. Doebner, Leipzig, 1886), furnish an excellent picture of the noble princess and her innermost sentiments. The *Journalen* of the younger Constantijn Huygens,² though often descending to trifles, are of consequence for the environment of the prince; the notes and observations of his father³ give us a glimpse of the condition of the house of Orange during the solitary youth of the Orange prince. The attitude of the prince towards his Frisian cousin, Henry Casimir II., is best studied in the latter's published correspondence.⁴ The prince's political ideas and

¹ Rogge, *De diplomatieke correspondentie van d' Estrades in Versl. en Meded. der Kon. Akad.*, *Vierde Reeks*, vol. i., p. 198.

² *Werken Hist. Gen. te Utrecht*, N. S., No. 23, 25, 32, 46.

³ *Mémoires de Const. Huygens*, ed. Jorissen, La Haye, 1873.

⁴ Van Sypesteyn, *Geschiedkundige bijdragen*, vol. iii., 's Gravenhage, 1865, besides the *Archives* of Groen van Prinsterer, vol. v. of the second series.

the difficulties with which he had to contend, in his domestic and foreign policy as well as in his military career, are shown in his correspondence with his faithful friend Waldeck¹ and in the valuable papers of the council pensionary Heinsius,² both his trusted helpers in the work of his life.

Mignet's important work, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne* (4 vols., Paris, 1835-1842), is of great service for the study of foreign politics in this entire period, and with it now goes Legrelle's book, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*.³ The great treaties are to be found in the *Corps universel diplomatique* of Du Mont (8 vols., Amst. and La Haye, 1726-1731). For the internal political conditions the notes of the Amsterdam justice Bontemantel⁴ are of great value. Not without weight for domestic and foreign politics are the letters of Pieter de Groot to Abraham de Wicquefort of the later time⁵ and the correspondence between the Van der Goes brothers,⁶ but the latter gives little else than the impression of known events upon a respectable citizen of the republic not holding office. The rhymed *Geheugchenis* of the former official Coenraet Droste derives its interest mainly from the notes added to it by Fruin.⁷ Smaller sections of this period are treated in Wijnne's book, *De geschillen over de afdanking van het krijgsvolk*, 1649-1650⁸; in Gardiner's *Documents on the First Dutch War* (London, 1899), notable for the history of the Dutch navy, which has also found an admirable historian for this time in De Jonge; in vols. 1 and 2 of Van Sypesteyn's

¹ P. L. Muller, *Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Fr. von Waldeck*, 2 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1873-1880.

² *Archief van den raadpensionaris Heinsius*, ed. Van der Heim, 3 vols., 's Gravenhage, 1867-1880.

³ Two vols., Paris, 1891. See also Sirtema de Grovestins, *Guillaume III. et Louis XIV.* 8 vols., Paris, 1868.

⁴ *De regeeringe van Amsterdam*, ed. Kernkamp, in *Werken Hist. Gen.*, *Derde Serie*, No. 7 and 8.

⁵ *Lettres*, ed. Krämer, *ib.*, No. 5.

⁶ Ed. Gonnet, *ib.*, No. 13.

⁷ Ed. Fruin, 2 vols., Leiden, 1879.

⁸ *Werken Hist. Gen.*, N. S., No. 41.

Bijdragen, in which unpublished documents are given concerning the time of De Witt and referring especially to the Frisian stadtholder William Frederick; in Thurloe's *State Papers*, 1638-1660 (7 vols., London, 1742), and other papers of contemporary English statesmen as Arlington, Shaftesbury, etc., of importance particularly for Dutch relations with England and for the most part described in the *Reports of the Historical Commission* or in separate publications; in the numberless appendixes of books and studies on the epoch appearing in the Netherlands; in the annotations of such works as those of Geddes and Lefèvre Pontalis on John de Witt, as the publication of Wicquefort's *Histoire*, in the French memoirs of the time, among which are particularly valuable for Dutch history the *Mémoires du comte de Guiche*,¹ who went through the first Münster and the second English war on the Dutch side and fought on the French side in the war of 1672, and the memoirs of the prince of Taranto (Liège, 1767), who lived at the court of Frederick Henry and William II. and was one of the principal generals of the Dutch army until shortly before the great French war. The seventeenth century is the "Golden Age" of the history of the Netherlands, and it has in our time especially attracted many investigators and brought forth countless studies large and small on all sorts of subjects.

¹ Ed. as supplement to d'Estrades, 1744.





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